Again and Again

The current Israeli-Hamas conflict has perfectly illustrated one of ComNavOps’ themes:  a war with less than total victory is a war that will be repeated.  I covered this in detail in a previous post, “Ending War – True Victory”.  Read it.
 
For decades, Israel attempted to wage constrained, proportional, partial wars with Hamas and, as a result, kept having to refight the war, over and over, with the ultimate result that we see today.  Worse, each clash with Hamas, though technically victories for Israel, taught Hamas valuable lessons and allowed Hamas to come back stronger, wiser, more determined, and more experienced.  In other words, Israel kept strengthening their enemy through repeated conflicts that left their enemy intact and with lessons learned. 
 
Had Israel reacted initially, the way they are now, none of the subsequent endless conflict and deaths would have occurred.
 
The lesson is simple and obvious:  if you fight a war, fight it to win, totally and completely, so that you don’t have to fight it again.
 
It will be interesting to see whether Israel has finally learned the lesson and truly finishes this conflict or stops with some sort of partial victory (as the US did in Desert Storm) thereby guaranteeing that the war will be fought again and yet more people will die.
 
Also, if Israel doesn’t finish off Hezbollah when they’re done with Hamas, they’ll have to face yet another war in the future after more years of conflict and deaths.  Again, this is not a judgment on the politics of the situation, just a recognition of the military realities.
 
This conflict and the lesson from it should serve to influence and guide US geopolitical and military strategies. 
 
 
 
Note:  This is, emphatically, not a pronouncement about the politics of the situation.  It is purely about the military aspect of total versus partial victories and what the negative implication of partial victory is.  I will not tolerate any political comments, whatsoever.  We’re not going to debate who’s right or wrong.  Fair warning.

Small Wars and Firepower

ComNavOps focuses a great deal of attention on major wars and rightly so.  Smaller conflicts are just subsets of major wars and if we’re prepared for major wars then we’ll be prepared for smaller conflicts, at least on the macro scale.  To be sure, smaller conflicts bring their own unique and specific problems that must be addressed but it is major wars that represent existential threats and are the main responsibility of our armed forces.  However, the likelihood of major wars is less than the likelihood of smaller conflicts - witness the never ending parade of small conflicts the US has jumped into over recent decades.  Therefore, let’s take a momentary break from contemplating major wars and look at smaller, localized conflicts.

 

The US military wants to fight small, clean, data based and AI-assisted wars with firepower being a mere afterthought.  The problem with this is that the enemy may not agree. 

 

The US had every possible technological advantage in Vietnam and yet the enemy refused to accept our evident superiority and, instead, opted to wage a brutal, barbaric, individual level war which did not hesitate to kill civilians, use them as hostages and pawns, and use them as intel and supply resources.  The enemy waged a dirt level war while we attempted to wage a high level, technological one and, worse, a technological war with significant self-imposed restraints.  As it turned out, the low level approach prevailed, not just in terms of ultimate victory but, more importantly, in terms of its daily relevance to combat operations though the US military was loathe to acknowledge that fact.  Now, some maintain that the US technological approach was hamstrung by extremely restrictive rules of engagement and, indeed, there is ample evidence to support that view.  But, I digress …

 

 

What allows one to win a small war?  The answer is twofold: 

 

1.     Firepower  – the ability to apply sufficient firepower to devastate the enemy.

2.     Willpower – the willingness to apply one’s firepower.

 

This leads us to recognize the following ComNavOps axiom:

 

War will devolve to the lowest technology level rather than rise to the highest. 

 

 

This has profound implications for technology-loving militaries such as ours.

 

When you’re fighting goat-herders, all-domain technological warfare probably isn’t going accomplish much.  The sniper or suicide bomber hiding as a civilian amongst the population isn’t going to be affected by superior technology.  The verbal orders delivered in person are not really subject to electronic intel collection.  And so on.

 

So, how does this discussion of small wars impact us, today?

 

Breaking Defense website published an article about a new set of Chinese military doctrine which emphasizes smaller, remote (from the Chinese mainland) conflicts and operations.(1)

 

The PLA began shifting in the 1990s from preparing to fight “local wars under modern, high-tech conditions” to “local wars under informationized conditions” to today’s “informationized local wars.” In each case, the Chinese phrase embodies both the scale of the conflict and the key methods by which it would be fought. The PRC’s assessment is that wars will be “local,” not global; as important, they would not be nuclear or total wars. (1)

 

What should worry China’s neighbors and competitors is that the Chinese strategic assessment is so pessimistic. A PRC that sees the global situation as fraying is one that is likely to conclude that conflict is not only more likely, but may be inevitable. (1)

 

Where the US abhors war at any scale and only reluctantly enters into it (despite the contrary evidence of the last two decades!), the Chinese, viewing war as inevitable, may not only not shy away from war, especially smaller, localized conflicts, but may embrace the opportunity for conflict and may actively seek it out, creating the circumstances for such a conflict and hoping that it blossoms into a localized conflict.  By pushing the limits beyond any reasonable point, in an attempt to foster a localized conflict, China would either gain their objectives without combat if their opponent opts for appeasement – as has been the case thus far - or achieve the conflict that they desire.  From their perspective, it would be a win either way.

 

One could make an argument that the construction and militarization of illegal artificial islands in the South China Sea was an example of this philosophy.  China pushed the limits beyond all norms, hoping for a localized conflict and, instead, achieved all their objectives without combat when the US opted for appeasement.

 

Why did this happen?  Because the Chinese had no fear of our firepower (criteria 1. from above) and were absolutely certain that we would never use it since we lack the willpower (criteria 2. from above).

 

So, how do we prevent future small wars?  The answer is almost ageless ...

 

If one desires peace, one must prepare for war. 

 

This means we must embrace firepower and willpower.  Potential enemies must have the certain knowledge that we will crush any small war in short order.  To convince them of this, we must begin demonstrating both our firepower and willpower.  The next time Iran harasses us with their swarm boats or UAVs, we need to destroy them.  The next time a Russian aircraft buzzes our ship, we need to shoot it down.  The next time NKorea tests a ballistic missile, we need to shoot it down.  The next time China focuses a laser on our aircraft, we need to destroy the laser source.  For the squeamish among you, this is not escalation, it is a response to provocation.

 

If someone points a weapon (rifle, UAV, aircraft, whatever) at us, we have the right to assume deadly intent and respond with instant, overwhelming, deadly force.  Again, squeamish, that’s response, not escalation.  Every person and country in the world should know with unwavering certainty that you don’t threaten US forces.  Period. 

 

With that belief firmly in mind, the number of small wars will drastically decrease because the instigators will know with absolute certainty that will lead to total destruction.

 

Now that we understand how to prevent a small war from happening, let’s consider the reverse … a textbook example of how not to prevent and contain a small war:  the rise of ISIS.  The US was so consumed with the desire to avoid collateral damage and potential bad publicity that we refused to unleash our firepower and put a short, violent end to ISIS.  Thus, ISIS grew, captured huge areas, and slaughtered many thousands of civilians.  Our reluctance actually caused much greater death and destruction, in the long run … that continues to this day.

 

 

There you have it.

 

1.     Firepower

2.     Willpower

 

It’s really that simple.

 

 

 

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[1]Breaking Defense website, “How China’s Thinking About The Next War”, Dean Cheng, 19-May-2021,

https://breakingdefense.com/2021/05/how-chinas-thinking-about-the-next-war/