MLP Update

Here’s an interesting data point for the Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) in its role as a transfer point for pre-positioned cargo.  A DOT&E test verified the design transfer spec, stating,

“When the MLP was positioned 25 nautical miles from the LCAC shore landing site, it met its timed transfer requirement, enabling Marine Corps equipment for a reinforced rifle company to be moved to shore in less than 12 hours.” [from DOT&E 2015 Annual Report]

So, the MLP is capable of transferring the equipment for a single reinforced rifle company over a distance of 25 miles in 12 hours.

The Navy has two MLPs and will have three MLP-AFSBs.  I assume the MLP-AFSB would be capable of functioning as the MLP but I don’t know that for sure.  On the other hand, it’s likely that the MLP-AFSB would not be available for the MLP cargo transfer role because it would be occupied performing its designated MCM role.

The question, then, is whether two MLPs (possibly five) have sufficient throughput capacity to support a major assault in a relevant time frame?  Of course, this also assumes that the MLP can maintain that transfer rate indefinitely.  My guess is that the 12 hour test was something of a max effort and could not be indefinitely sustained by either the crew or the equipment.  Regardless, is this sufficient transfer capability?  I don’t know the answer.  If there’s an amphibious logistics expert among the readers, please chime in!

MLP

Transfer capability and capacity aside, the MLP seems to have met its design specs according to the DOT&E assessment.  Notably, the ship’s tested range significantly exceeded the spec (12,000 nm vs. a spec of 9500 nm).

I’m on record as stating that the MLP seems to be a vulnerable weak point in the amphibious assault scheme in the sense that there are very few of them and they represent such a vital capability.  A semi-intelligent enemy would make them a priority target and the loss of even one would seriously cripple an assault.

All that said, it’s nice to see a vessel at least meet its design specs!

AFSB and MCM

The Navy’s first purpose designed Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB) is the USNS Lewis B. Puller (T-ESB-3).  It was delivered to the Navy in Jun 2015 and is being readied for a Mid East deployment late next year.  As a reminder, the ship is a Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) with a flight deck added some 40 ft above the main deck (yes, that raises questions about stability).  The interesting thing about this ship is that it’s primary mission is mine countermeasures (MCM)(1).

“The baseline requirement, the threshold requirement, is MCM capability.”

Apparently, the ship will conduct MCM primarily through the use of helicopters, specifically the MH-53E.  The ship has space for two helo parking spots on the flight deck, two operating spots, and two in the hangar.  The article suggests that the Navy is looking at increasing the operational spots by converting the parking spots to operating.

The interesting aspect of this is the focus on helicopter MCM versus the LCS’ emphasis on remote unmanned underwater vehicles.  Previously, the Navy MCM focused on two main components:  helicopters and in-the-water operations from small MCM vessels like the Avenger class.  Now, the Navy seems to be attempting to use the LCS for the in-the-water ops and the AFSB for the helicopter operations.

Afloat Forward Staging Base

Of course, the AFSB could also operate in-the-water vehicles although this would, of necessity, place a very large ship very close to the minefield.  We’ll have to see how this develops.  Again, I get the feeling that the Navy is stumbling its way through mine countermeasures warfare rather than having a very clear plan developed from operational experience and wargaming analysis.  For instance, how will an AFSB conduct MCM against a peer in a contested environment?  I’d really like to see the Navy game out its MCM efforts, specifically in these scenarios:

• Contested amphibious landings
• Contested restricted passages
• Lightly contested, wide area mine clearance
• High speed movements (for example, a carrier group attempting a high speed transit through potentially mined areas)

Like so many Navy developments, this is a small piece of a much bigger picture and the piece is developed seemingly in an operational vacuum.  We’ll have to wait to see how the AFSB integrates into the overall MCM force and operations.

(1)USNI, “Expeditionary Mobile Base Chesty Puller May Receive SOF Upgrades Before 5th Fleet Deployment”, Megan Eckstein, November 2, 2015,

http://news.usni.org/2015/11/02/expeditionary-mobile-base-chesty-puller-may-receive-sof-upgrades-before-5th-fleet-deployment

MLP Update

Let’s take an updated look at the Mobile Landing Platform, MLP, vessel program, once the hottest thing in the Navy but now largely quiet.  The MLP, you’ll recall, is intended as a mobile, floating pier allowing cargo transfers between large transports and smaller vessels or connectors.  In addition, the Navy has developed an Afloat Forward Staging Base, AFSB, variant of the MLP which incorporates an elevated flight deck.  The base MLP is built on a commercial oil tanker hull and is 764 ft long with accommodations for 250 personnel.  The ships will be operated by the Military Sealift Command, hence the USNS designation.

To date, four vessels are complete or under contract with two configured as MLPs and two as AFSBs.

MLP-1                        USNS Montford Point           2013 delivery

MLP-2                        USNS John Glenn                 2014 delivery

MLP-3 / AFSB           USNS Lewis B. Puller          2015 delivery

MLP-4 / AFSB           USNS ??                                2018 delivery

I’ve scoured the media for MLP contract announcements and here is the contract history.

Mar 2009       $3.5M             MLP design

Dec 2009       $7M                ?

Apr 2010        $10M              ?

Aug 2010       $115M            long lead items for MLP-1

May 2011       $744M            addition to contract for first two MLPs

Jul 2011         $60M              long lead items for MLP-3

Feb 2012       $360M            MLP-3

Jun 2013        $11.2M           MLP-3/4 design work

Dec 2013       $21.4M           MLP-3/AFSB

Mar 2014       $128M            contract addition to convert MLP-3 to AFSB

Jun 2014        $64.1M           long lead items for MLP-4

Dec 2014       $498M            MLP-4 as AFSB

Total =            $2.022B

So, as best I can piece together, here are the individual ship costs.

MLP-1                        $440  

MLP-2                        $440

MLP-3 / AFSB           $581

MLP-4 / AFSB           $498

The higher price for the second pair is understandable as they have the AFSB additions.

There are no concrete plans for additional ships, as far as I know and the continuing budget limitations probably preclude any additional vessels.

As far as usefulness, I’ve heard remarkably little, good or bad, about the ship’s performance and utility.  Of course, to be fair, the first vessel is just now achieving operational status so there has been little chance for hands on experimentation.  USS Ponce, which was converted to a makeshift AFSB, was reported to be quite useful in the MCM mothership role.

This is a vessel and concept that I’m somewhat dubious about.  The cargo transfer function seems like an unnecessarily inefficient extra step that ought to be addressed by designing larger ships with the ability to transfer cargo directly to connectors.  The MLP also represents an enormous vulnerability.  If the bulk of an amphibious assault’s cargo must pass through the MLP, that would make the ship a very high priority target and a single point of failure for the entire assault.  Regardless, having only two (or four if the AFSBs are counted) MLPs seems woefully insufficient to support a major amphibious assault.



MLP - The Jury Is Out



As an MCM mothership, I’m sure the ship would be very useful but I’m also sure that a smaller, dedicted, purpose built MCM mothership would be a better option for that role.

As with the JHSV, this seems to be a ship design that lacks a clearly defined and necessary mission.

The ultimate value of the ships will lie in how the Navy chooses to use them and for that we’ll have to wait and see.