The Navy has announced its intention to construct a
multi-tiered fleet of unmanned vessels to supplement and, to a significant
degree, replace the Burke class destroyers.
Incredibly, this has occurred with no substantive validation of the
concept. This is very reminiscent of the
commitment to an entire fleet of LCSes without a Concept of Operations (CONOPS)
and before the first was even designed.
With that in mind, let’s examine how the Navy’s vision of future naval
combat might play out.
As always (and always ignored by readers!), this is NOT
intended as a complete and realistic combat simulation. It is an ILLUSTRATION of various concepts in
a more entertaining format.
The First Battle
The #8 MDUSV (Medium Displacement Unmanned Surface Vessel)
controller nodded slightly in satisfaction as he surveyed the picture and sonar
display on his console. The situation
was shaping up nicely. The MDUSV anti-submarine
and surveillance screen of 14 vessels plus the two specially modified EA-18G Growler
communications relay aircraft were arrayed to the sides and front of the
carrier and its two Burke escorts (the last Ticonderogas had recently been
early retired by the Navy to free up funding for the unmanned fleet) plus the
four LDUSV (Large Displacement Unmanned Surface Vessels) arsenal ships and he
and his fellow controllers aboard the USV control ship were receiving a steady
flow of sonar, radar, and EO/IR data which, so far, had proven more than
sufficient to detect and ward off the occasional probe by the Chinese as the
group made its approach to Taiwan.
Two Chinese patrol boats and a few ‘fishing’ vessels had
been easily detected and dispatched with Naval Strike Missiles (NSM) from the
LDUSVs. A few Chinese long range patrol
aircraft had also been driven off and one, that had approached just a bit too
closely, had been shot down by a Standard missile launched from a LDUSV and controlled
by a Burke.
Indeed, it appeared that the Navy’s vision of a multi-tiered
unmanned fleet paired with just a few high end Burkes was paying
dividends. The Navy had gone all-in on
the tiered, unmanned fleet concept and replaced (allowed to retire without
direct replacement) many Burkes with combinations of unmanned vessels. While many naval analysts had been uneasy
about reducing the number of Burkes in favor of the smaller, more distributed,
unmanned vessels, the argument for the unmanned vessels – mainly budget related
- had prevailed. The individual unmanned
vessels were far less capable than a Burke or even a frigate but in the
aggregate the unmanned vessels offered more capability, better distribution of
risk, and more complication for the enemy …
at least, that was the theory. Unbelievably,
the Navy had never bothered to test the concept before wholeheartedly
committing to the new fleet structure.
The concept was being put to the test now, though, in real combat.
The carrier group’s approach to Taiwan hadn’t been
completely one-sided, though. A pair of
F-35s had ventured a bit too far forward and been ambushed by four Chinese J-20
stealth fighters resulting in one F-35 shot down and the other damaged but able
to recover back on the carrier.
Predictably, the war had begun with an all-out Chinese
assault on Taiwan and Chinese forces now occupied most of the militarily
significant sites on the island. Chinese
aircraft were now operating out of hastily repaired airbases and Chinese naval
forces were screening the eastern side of the island from the expected American
counterattack.
The carrier group had been tasked with sweeping the seas on
the eastern side of the island and taking station there to establish local air
superiority for the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) amphibious assault force
that was following a day behind. The
United States had chosen to stand with Taiwan and this was the first response
and first battle between China and the US.
Following the newly established amphibious assault doctrine,
the MEU would be sent ashore at various points along the Taiwanese coast to
establish sea control which would allow the unhindered landing of the main,
follow on Marine and Army forces – again, an untested and unvalidated concept. First, though, the carrier had to do its job
and set the stage.
As the MDUSV controller settled back in his chair with a
satisfied shifting of his weight – you had to learn how to meld with these
chairs because they weren’t designed for comfort! – the thought crossed his
mind that it was a bit surprising that there had been no submarine contacts
yet. He’d have bet that the Chinese
wouldn’t allow the carrier group to approach without challenge and the Chinese
had a pretty impressive collection of both nuclear and conventional submarines. Still, he wasn’t going to complain and,
likely enough, the subs would show up eventually and when they did, the MDUSVs
and their controllers would be waiting.
At the same moment the USV controller settled back, an
airborne controller aboard an E-2 Hawkeye leaned forward, peering intently at
his screen. He had just noticed several
faint, intermittent contacts, far beyond the MDUSV ASW screen. After a few more minutes observation the
contacts began to solidify and the controller made the call. Small, high subsonic, wave skimming contacts
– small anti-ship missiles, undoubtedly - were approaching the MDUSV screen
vessels.
What the controller didn’t know was that the Chinese had
long ago detected the communications activity between the MDUSVs, their communications
relay aircraft, and the control ships and pretty much pinpointed the USV
locations – certainly well enough to launch anti-ship missiles with active
seeker heads. Line of sight (LOS)
communications were not as secure as the US Navy believed. With its vast sensor laden ‘fishing’ fleet
and a host of various other air and land based sensors all peering intently at
the eastern sea off Taiwan, it had not been difficult to pin down the exact
location of each MDUSV. While short
burst LOS transmissions were very difficult to detect, the continuous, high
volume, high bandwidth transmissions required to transmit sonar, radar, and
EO/IR data in real time offered plenty of opportunity for the sophisticated,
computer aided Chinese sensors to detect and localize the MDUSV communications. No single Chinese sensor could directly and
completely ‘see’ any individual LOS comm link, however, the plethora of sensors
managed to pull together enough bits and pieces to assemble an accurate picture
of the communications nodes which were the MDUSVs, the relay aircraft, and the
USV control ships. It was somewhat
analogous to the multistatic sonar detection techniques employed in ASW.
With so little warning and with the MDUSVs so far out in
front of the Burkes and LDUSV arsenal ships, there was no time to engage the
incoming missiles. The MDUSVs would have
to face the missiles on their own.
Unfortunately, the MDUSVs had no defensive weapons nor even any
electronic countermeasures. It had been
determined, correctly, that the minimal defensive weapons that a MDUSV could
mount would provide no effective defense and would only drive up the cost of
the vessels thereby making them less expendable.
The Chinese anti-ship missiles rapidly closed on the
helpless MDUSVs. With four missiles
allocated to each MDUSV there was little the MDUSV controllers could do but to
try to turn their vessels head on to the incoming missiles in an attempt to
minimize their radar profile and break lock.
Unfortunately, the MDUSVs were not very maneuverable and their box-like
superstructures were decidedly not stealthy and all the vessels were hit. Of the 14 screening vessels, 8 were blown to
pieces and sunk outright, 3 were severely damaged and mission killed, and 1 was
damaged but, miraculously, still afloat and functional.
As this took place, a waiting ring of Chinese subs noted the
time and, as planned, surged forward at high speed towards the carrier and the
remaining escorts. The carrier’s
location had been extrapolated from the MDUSV locations and knowledge of US
Navy tactics. In other words, if you
knew the location of the USVs, you could pretty accurately surmise the location
of the carrier.
In addition, the Chinese had, for years, been laying their
equivalent of a SOSUS seabed listening array throughout the South and East
China Seas and the arrays had no great problem picking up the noise of an
approaching carrier.
With the MDUSVs out of action the ASW responsibility fell on
the two Burke escorts, alone. The LDUSV
arsenal ships, of course, had no ASW capability. Unfortunately, the Burkes only rarely trained
for ASW operations and, even then, only in highly scripted exercises that
served no purpose other than checking a training box on a list. The situation had gotten even worse with the
advent of the MDUSVs which had been given the responsibility for ASW. AAW was the training priority for Burkes, not
ASW.
Now, though, there was no choice. The Burkes, warned by the sudden acoustic
‘appearance’ of the surging Chinese subs at multiple points around the compass,
attempted to localize and engage the subs.
However, the Chinese subs, using a variation of the tried and true US
Navy tactic of sprint and drift, were able to close on the Burkes and the
carrier with impunity. No sooner would a
Burke begin to localize a loud, sprinting sub then it would cease its cease its
high speed run and another sub would ‘pop up’.
Being completely inexperienced and largely untrained in submarine and
ASW tactics, the Burkes were ineffective to the point of helplessness. The Burke’s helos were frantically directed
and redirected from one transient contact to another with no time to properly
find and fix any sub’s location.
In relatively short order, the submarines began reaching
optimum attack points and spreads of torpedoes were launched from, essentially,
point blank range. The outcome was inevitable. The carrier was hit by at least seven
torpedoes and its fate was sealed. The
first battle of the Chinese War would end in disaster for the US fleet.
__________________________________
Here are some issues/questions from the story:
Does it make sense to place defenseless unmanned vessels far
out in front of a battle group where they cannot be supported?
Does it make sense to assign a vital function, like ASW, to
defenseless unmanned vessels far out in front of a battle group where the
entire function (ASW) can be eliminated in a moment, due to lack of support?
Are we so sure that our communications will be undetectable?
If MDUSVs are going to be our front line of ASW, what asset
will do the actual attack since the MDUSV has no helo or weapons?
The MDUSV ASW sensor is fairly short range, being limited in
power and size. Is it wise to depend on
only short range ASW sensing, given the long range of submarine weapons? Are we wise to continue to ignore the long
range ASW role that the S-3 Viking filled?
Is it wise to replace Burkes with small, individually weak,
unmanned vessels? Yes, this is the
Navy’s stated plan.
__________________________________
As a brief refresher, here are some basic specs for the
Navy’s multi-tiered, unmanned vessels.
MDUSV
40-130 ft long
Function: ISR / unmanned scouts
Networked to each other and the main group
LDUSV
300 ft, 2000 tons
Function: Arsenal barge
Networked and fire-controlled by Burke/F-35
___________________________________
For those interested, here is a good general background
article:
(1)The Drive / War Zone website, “Navy’s Budget Requests Two
Huge Missile-Laden Drone Ships That Displace 2000 Tons”, Joseph Trevithick,
12-Mar-2019,
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/26915/navys-budget-requests-two-huge-missile-laden-drone-ships-that-displace-2000-tons
