Sequestration Is NOT the Problem

We’ve seen a public relations blitz of late by the Navy and the military in general attempting to blame all its readiness and maintenance problems on sequestration and the resulting lack of money.  The reality is that the Navy’s problems are all self-inflicted and have nothing to do with sequestration.  The Navy has mismanaged itself into a hollow force and is using sequestration as a scapegoat.

Oh come on, now.  Sequestration has caused all kinds of problems, right?  We all know this to be true.  Ships have begun to fail INSURV inspections, manning has been reduced to sub-optimal levels, maintenance has suffered, ships have had to be retired early, we now have submarine and fighter aircraft shortages looming, we’re forced to use F-18’s as tankers, etc.  This more than proves the evils visited on the fleet by sequestration, right?  Well, yes, all those things have occurred and led to the current readiness and “hollowness” failures now plaguing the fleet.  The only problem with that narrative is that all those things occurred before sequestration – a fact seemingly lost on Navy leadership as they talk to reporters and testify before Congress. 

Don’t believe it?  Let’s review the chronology.  As you read through the chronology, note where sequestration begins.  Hint:  it began 1-Mar-2013 and is highlighted in red in the chronology listing.  Obviously, any actions prior to that point could not possibly have been due to sequestration.  Further, any actions in the subsequent year after sequestration began are likely unrelated to sequestration due to the simple fact that the effects hadn’t yet had time to manifest.  Read and learn.

1992 – 2009 – Training

“Significant changes in training affected the surface force from 1992-2009.  Some changes resulted in the misalignment of authority and accountability which negatively affected surface force readiness.” (2, p.4)

1995 – Readiness Squadrons eliminated

“Readiness Squadrons (READRONSs) were disestablished in 1995, eliminating a critical path for the professional development and training of the surface force.  The elimination of the READRONS removed a clear line of accountability for the material readiness of the ships.” (2, p.13)

1995 – Planning and Engineering for Repairs and Alterations (PERA) organization eliminated

“The Planning and Engineering for Repairs and Alterations (PERA) organization that was responsible for executing and maintaining the class maintenance plan (CMP), the plan to ensure each class of ship is maintained to meet or exceed its designed service life, was disestablished in 1995.” (2, p.15)

1996 – All remaining destroyer tenders decommissioned

1998 – Tactical Training Commands Atlantic and Pacific disestablished

“Tactical Training Commands Atlantic and Pacific were disestablished in 1998, closing yet another ship-to-shore professional development path.” (2, p.14)

1999 – Inspections eliminated

“Further exacerbating surface force readiness was the decision in 1999 to eliminate external command inspections and the implementation of self-assessment policies.” (2, p.13)

2001 - Optimal manning cut over 4,000 sailors from surface ships.

“The Optimum Manning (OM) initiative was introduced in 2001.  Shipboard manning requirements were assessed primarily against shipboard watch standing/operational requirement.  This approach did not consider other factors such as maintenance requirements.  As a result, shipboard manning requirements were reduced to levels well below the requirements identified in ship design and, particularly, below the levels required to support material readiness requirements. (2, p.4))

2001 – Preventive maintenance requirements reduced

“Reduced manning prevented ships from performing the minimum required level of preventive maintenance.  To compensate for this misalignment, the Material Maintenance and Management (3M) program was revamped in 2001 to reduce the Preventive Maintenance System (PMS) requirements on board ships to alleviate some of the workload and accommodate reduced crew sizes.” (2, p.15)

2001 – Optimal manning experiments conducted with George Washington battle group and USS Milius, DDG-69

2006 - Two Avenger class MCM unable to get underway for inspections

2006 – Navy POM-08 reduces Perry class manning from 215 to 187 (3)

2007 - A FFG, LPD, and MCM fail INSURV

2007 – Submarine and destroyer shortfalls recognized in testimony to Congress. 

“In particular, relative to the goals for various components of the 313-ship fleet, the Navy would experience shortfalls in attack submarines (40 in 2028 and 2029 versus a stated requirement of 48), … and guided missile destroyers (60 in 2037 versus a stated requirement of 69).” (4)

2008 – Six ships, including USS Stout and USS Chosin fail INSURV

2008 – Navy classifies INSURV reports

2009 – Vadm. Balisle was directed to convene a Fleet Review Panel on 1-Sep

2009 – Average periodicity between INSURV inspections increased from 44 months in 1992 to over 60 months in 2009

2009 – Last S-3 Viking retired forcing tanker duties onto F-18

2009 – Navy reduces Burke manning 23% from 2002 (3)

2009 – Funding for ship maintenance availabilities suspended for FY2009 (6)

“…on February 3, 2009, funding of the remainder of CNO availabilities (9 were scheduled in Hampton Roads) for FY09 was suspended.” (6)

2010 – Aegis cruiser and FFG fail INSURV

2010 - Balisle Report on Fleet Readiness

From the Feb-2010 Balisle Report:

“The panel concluded that Surface Force readiness has degraded over the last ten years.  This degradation has not been due to a single decision or policy change, but the result of many independent actions.  The panel produced a chronology that identified changes across the man, train, equip, and command and control domains since 1992, and identified the impacts of those changes on Surface Force readiness.” (2, p.4)

2011 - Budget Control Act passed

2011 – Aegis cruiser fails INSURV

2012 - USS McCain fails INSURV

“The John S. McCain is the first Aegis-equipped destroyer to flunk INSURV since 2008, when a spate of failures and degraded scores prompted an independent review that found the surface fleet on a downward slide.” (1)

2013 - Sequestration (automatic spending cuts) begins on 1-Mar-2013

2013 – USS Mobile Bay, an Aegis cruiser, fails INSURV in April 2013

This timeline clearly proves that the Navy’s readiness and maintenance issues all began long before sequestration took effect.  The Navy’s problems are entirely self-inflicted as a result of institutional stupidity on a scale that defies belief.  Virtually every major decision the Navy has made has been wrong and has exacerbated the problems. 

The Navy even recognized the readiness problem prior to sequestration as evidenced by the 2010 (three years prior to sequestration!!!) Balisle report, “Fleet Panel Review of Surface Force Readiness” [emphasis added].  The report was initiated as a result of multiple failings of INSURV inspections and other readiness indicators.  Three years prior to sequestration, the Navy knew they had a severe readiness problem and yet, now, they’re attempting to blame it all on sequestration.  Why?  Because if they didn’t they’d have to admit that they brought on, and were solely responsible for, the readiness problems.

That’s worth repeating.

Because if they didn’t they’d have to admit that they brought on, and were solely responsible for, the readiness problems.

It’s really worth repeating because it totally contradicts and disproves the Navy’s claims.

Because if they didn’t they’d have to admit that they brought on, and were solely responsible for, the readiness problems.

Here’s more evidence that the Navy recognized readiness and maintenance issues before sequestration kicked in.  Following is a list of some Navy Maritime Improvement Initiative recommendations from Nov 2012 as presented by OpNav N43 (5) several months before sequestration began.

• Reverse Optimal Manning
• Re-establishment of Surface Maintenance Engineering Planning Program (SURMEPP)
• Reconstitute Surface Intermediate Maintenance
• Expanded Material Condition Inspections

Well, sure, we can see the problems now but that’s unfair.  It’s all hindsight, right?  Wrong.  All of the decisions were blindingly, obviously, wrong when they were made.  This is not a case of unfair criticism due to 20/20 hindsight. 

• Could the Navy really not anticipate that reduced manning on ships would lead to reduced maintenance and poorer material condition?  All the rest of us anticipated this incredibly obvious link between insufficient manpower and poor maintenance!

• Could the Navy really not anticipate that retiring the A-6 and S-3 tankers would lead to using up the only remaining aircraft, the front line F-18 Hornet, doing mundane tanking?  Who/what did they think would wind up doing the tanking.  There was only one candidate, the F-18!

• Could the Navy really not anticipate that failing to plan to build enough subs and destroyers would lead to critical shortfalls down the road?  Every 30 year shipbuilding plan documented the looming shortfall and the Navy wrote the 30 year plans.  They knew exactly what was coming and reported it!

• Could the Navy really not anticipate the reducing readiness inspections would not lead to reduced readiness?

• Could the Navy really not anticipate that eliminating training programs would not lead to reduced tactical proficiency?  Did the Navy really think that not training for tactics would somehow, magically, not adversely affect tactical proficiency?

The evidence is overwhelming that the Navy’s readiness and maintenance problems were entirely self-inflicted due to a steady stream of idiotic decisions and all the problems were already well established prior to sequestration.

Any hint or suggestion by the Navy that sequestration is somehow responsible for readiness or maintenance problems is a flat out lie.  Now you know…

Sequestration is not the problem.

___________________________________

(1)Military Times website, “Destroyer McCain Fails INSURV Inspection”, 20-Mar-2013,

http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/archives/2013/03/20/destroyer-mccain-fails-insurv-inspection/78537746/

(2)“Fleet Panel Review of Surface Force Readiness”, VAdm. Balisle (Ret.), 26-Feb-2010

(3)CNA, “Impact of Manning and Infrastructure Initiatives on the Surface Navy”, David M. Rodney, Michael D. Bowes, Christopher M. Duquette, Sara M. Russell, Nov 2009, CRM D0021247.A2/Final

(4) CBO TESTIMONY, “Statement of J. Michael Gilmore Assistant Director for National Security and Eric J. Labs Senior Analyst The Navy’s 2008 Shipbuilding Plan and Key Ship Programs before the Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Committee on Armed Services U.S. House of Representatives” July 24, 2007

(5)Depot Maintenance Requirements Determination slide presentation, Stu Paul OPNAV N43 13 November, 2012,

http://www.sae.org/events/dod/presentations/2012/depot_maintenance_requirements_determination.pdf

(6)Virginia Ship Repair Association, “White Paper Navy Ship Repair Shortfalls Virginia Impact”, 13-Feb-2009,

http://www.virginiashiprepair.org/files/Revised%20White%20Paper%20-%20Navy%20Shortfalls%20w-encl13FEB09.pdf

Washington Refueling and Overhaul

As you know, carriers undergo a mid-life nuclear refueling and comprehensive overhaul (RCOH) and the USS Washington is the next up in line.  She was scheduled to begin the refueling in 2016 but budget questions have delayed the work until at least 2017.  In fact, the Navy had floated the possibility of an early retirement for the carrier and had publicly stated that they would wait until the 2016 budget to make any decision, thereby ensuring further schedule delays.  Predictably, this caused a bit of an outcry in Congress which responded by including $850M in the 2015 budget for Washington’s refueling.

The $850M was widely reported as ensuring that the Washington would be refueled, overhauled, and retained, thereby maintaining the 11 carrier force level.  Unfortunately, that’s not even remotely correct.  The RCOH is estimated to require 44 months and will cost around $4.7B.  The $850M is little more than enough to get the ship into drydock.  At best, it might cover the removal of the spent fuel which has to be done whether the ship is refueled or retired. 

Thus, the ship’s RCOH is hardly assured, yet.  Add in the fact that a second round of sequestration is scheduled to hit in Oct 2015 with the attendant likelihood of additional budget cuts and the future of the Washington is anything but assured.  The Navy was willing to retire the Washington before and future budget cuts will probably ensure that retirement.

There’s another factor at play, here, that we’ve touched on briefly and that is the fact that the Navy only has 9 active air wings.  A carrier without an air wing is useless.  If Washington is retained, we’ll have 11 carriers (one is always in long term overhaul so that equates to 10 active carriers) and 9 air wings.  So, only 9 carriers could actually operate.  Does anyone think the Navy will pay for the operation and upkeep of an idled carrier that has no air wing?  Some carrier is going to be early retired.

I believe the Navy deactivated the tenth air wing in anticipation of Washington’s retirement and have found a bit more resistance from Congress than they anticipated.

Of course, there’s always the possibility that the Navy could form a new air wing but the procurement cost of the aircraft alone would be on the order of $6B and that’s without considering the personnel costs and all the other associated costs.  Does anyone think the Navy is going to come up with $6B for a new air wing?  Not likely!  Add to that the near certainty that the Navy’s F-35 buy will be significantly reduced and we see that air wings are going to continue to shrink, not form new air wings. 

A carrier is going to be retired early. 

Alternatively, though less likely, the Washington might be refueled and returned to service and the next carrier in line, the Stennis, I believe, might be the candidate for retirement.

ComNavOps has been saying for some time that the carrier fleet is on its way down to 8-9.  This is the next logical step and the budget issues make it almost inevitable.  Note that I do not agree with this trend – I merely observe it happening.

On a somewhat related note, we’ve seen that the Navy has attempted to early retire a carrier, half the Aegis cruiser force, several big deck amphibs, and various auxiliary support ships, all while aggressively pushing for 52 toothless LCS’s.  Honestly, if the Chinese had slipped an agent into the CNO’s position and instructed him to disrupt and dismantle the Navy, he couldn’t do a better job than we are doing to ourselves.  But, that’s another topic …

Surge Capacity

One of the cornerstones of naval readiness has been the capacity to surge non-deployed ships in a crisis.  A portion of the ships that were not currently deployed but were conducting maintenance and working up for deployments have always been capable of being surged.  In other words, their maintenance, readiness, and training was sufficient that they could be deployed in a crisis and still be functional and safe even if not fully ready.

Of late, though, CNO and other Navy leaders have described extensive reductions in maintenance, deferred maintenance, idled air wings, air wings operating at the bare minimum to even be qualified for flight, and so on.  Additionally, cross-decking appears to be at an all time high.  Even CNO has alluded to the practice as a means of ensuring that deploying ships have the equipment and personnel they need.  Of course, when equipment and personnel are cross-decked to outgoing ships, the ships and units they came from are left with sizable gaps meaning that they are no longer surge capable.  CNO has specifically stated that the current surge capacity is well below normal and that the situation will only get worse as sequestration continues.

As budget cuts, continuing resolutions, and sequestration continue to further impact the Navy, we are not only losing our forward deployed capabilities but also our surge capacity.  It’s the loss of surge capacity that is not readily apparent to many people but is just as serious as the potential loss of deployed assets.  Of course, a portion of the impact on maintenance, training, and surge capacities is due to voluntary decisions by Navy leadership which has prioritized new construction over all else.  Still, the various budget pressures are impacting surge capacity and all signs indicate that it will get worse before it gets better.

We can juggle deployment schedules, extend deployment times, reduce coverage, and play other games to scrape by during peacetime but if a true crisis erupts and we have no surge capacity we’ll be in serious trouble.

Navy to Cut 2-3 Carriers?

As reported by Navy Times website (1), Defense Secretary Hagel has acknowledged that one of the options for dealing with continued sequestration budget effects is to reduce the number of carriers from 11 to 8 or 9.  Admittedly, this is just Hagel floating budget trial balloons so let’s not all run around shouting that the sky is falling.  On the other hand, ComNavOps has, on numerous occasions, stated publicly that the Navy is on a path towards operating only 8 or 9 carriers so I see nothing about this that leads me to believe it won’t happen.

Some of you may recall that 11 carriers are mandated by law so it would require a new law or, simply, waivers to operate less than 11.  That shouldn’t be hard to do especially since it’s Congress that agreed to the sequester to begin with and Congress that willing gave the Navy a waiver to operate only 10 carriers with retirement of Enterprise.

Read the linked article and you’ll get more details about which carriers would likely be retired, why they can’t simply be mothballed, and lots of other good tidbits.

(1) http://www.navytimes.com/article/20130805/NEWS05/308050011/Analysis-look-cutting-3-carrier-strike-groups

State of the Navy

CNO Greenert delivered a State of the Navy briefing to reporters at the Pentagon on 19-Jul-2013 (1).  Here are some highlights.

• A year ago we had 3 CSGs and 3 ARGs surge ready to support the deployed fleet in the event of emergencies.  Today, and moving forward, we have only 1 CSG and 1 ARG.

• The Navy’s portion of the sequestration and budget cuts is $14B.  You’ll note that that’s equal to an entire year’s shipbuilding budget.  Each account (shipbuilding, operations, maintenance, manpower, etc.) will take a 10% cut in FY14.  If manpower accounts are  excluded, as was done in FY13, each remaining account would be cut 14%.

• CNO made clear that he wants to maintain shipbuilding at current planned levels and is willing to allow other accounts to take a greater hit to do so.

• Half of the 60 ship maintenance availabilities that are planned for FY14 will be indefinitely deferred.  Again, that demonstrates that CNO will maintain shipbuilding to the detriment of all else.  In fact, the cynical among us might suspect that CNO is not altogether displeased with this.  It allows him to ignore ship maintenance, thus shortening lifespans and increasing the need for new construction, while claiming to have no choice due to budget cuts.

• We will maintain 1 deployed CSG and ARG in the Western Pacific and 1 CSG and ARG in the Arabian Gulf.

• Air wings are undergoing reduced certification activities, which is affecting their readiness.

• CNO wants the ability to reprogram cuts to emphasize some accounts and de-emphasize others to achieve the prioritization he feels necessary.  This is laudable except that his idea of priorities is questionable, at best.

• CNO stated that sexual assault is the “challenge of our time”.  Indicatively, he spent 2X-3X as much time discussing this topic as any other.  Given our previous discussion of the issue and the fact that military sexual assaults are significantly less than civilian assault rates this seems to be a Tailhook-like politically motivated witch hunt that is soaking up time and resources that could be better spent elsewhere.  CNO listed numerous new programs, resources, and personnel that will be devoted to this issue.  This was the only area that was cited as gaining budget!

• Pre-deployment air wings are down to 11 hours per month flying time.

• Q&A made it clear that CNO is focused on peacetime activities and is shorting warfighting capabilities.

• CNO likes the trend that US-China relations are on.  Hmmm …….  He must not be reading the same reports and stories that I am!

• Addressing capabilities, “Our benchmark, in all of those, remains the Western Pacific.”    It was clear from the context (I think) that the warfighting needs are being measured against the Chinese A2/AD scenario.  That said, it’s hard to reconcile the statement with our actual procurement plans which do little to address the needs of total war in an A2/AD environment.

• CNO stated we need a fleet of 306 ships.  That’s a joke to anyone who has read the 30 year shipbuilding plan and studied the budget.

What comes across, crystal clear, from this CNO is an obsession with new construction and a focus on the low end, peacetime functions of the Navy.  Maintenance, manning, and all other functions will be sacrificed to achieve new construction.  Warfighting is being allowed to atrophy.  Under this CNO, the Navy is being transformed from a combat fleet to the seagoing equivalent of a nation-building police force – a glorified Coast Guard – that exists to promote civilian political agendas.  While the Navy has had some stunningly bad CNOs in its history, Greenert is rapidly working his way towards becoming the worst ever.

(1) http://news.usni.org/2013/07/19/cno-adm-jonathan-greenerts-state-of-the-navy-friday-press-briefing

Sequester the Admirals - Part 2

Well, the post Sequester the Admirals generated a bit more interest and comments than I thought it would.  So, here's some more information on the subject.  As reported by Navy Times website (1), the Navy had one admiral for every 130 ships at the close of WWII.  Today, the Navy has one admiral for every 0.8 ships.  Wow, that’s some kind of growth in the flag ranks!

While there have been repeated drawdowns in the lower levels after the Korean war, Viet Nam war, and various other times, it is noteworthy that there has never been a drawdown amongst the flag ranks, as far as I know.

As the article points out, the Navy manning has been steadily decreasing for the last couple decades and yet the flag ranks have been steadily increasing over that same period.  Does that make sense?

Before any of you attempt to make the argument that the Navy, today, is engaged in world wide activities and, therefore, has more responsibilities than before, you'll have to explain how fighting a World War is so much less demanding of flag rank positions.  Common sense suggests just the opposite.  If the Navy of WWII could fight a world war with thousands of ships and many hundreds of thousands of sailors with only a tiny fraction of the number of admirals that today's Navy of 285 ships has then we have a severe problem today and that problem is about 300 useless admirals.  There couldn't be a clearer example of rank inflation.

Revisiting the concept of cutting Admirals as the first step in meeting the demands of sequestration, the Navy estimates that each admiral costs $230,000 per year in salary and benefits.  Even if cutting two or three hundred admirals wouldn’t solve the budget issue by itself it would certainly send the proper message that sacrifice starts at the top and that the Navy’s priorities are rational.  Contrast that to the Navy’s first action which was to stand down four air wings and idling the associated carriers.  How’s that for priorities?

Do any of you still think there isn’t room for LOTS of thinning of the flag ranks?

(1) http://www.navytimes.com/news/2010/08/navy_flag_numbers_081010w/

Sequester the Admirals

The Navy has 280 ships and over 300 Admirals.  How about we get rid of about 250 Admirals as a start towards meeting the budget cut requirements?  It's not like these people have been doing a stellar job of leading the Navy, anyway.  Just saying.

Air Wing Inactivations

As we've recently reported, the Navy is inactivating four air wings and reducing two others to "sustainment" levels.  That leads one to wonder how much money will this save?  

An air wing consists of planes, pilots, mechanics, and all their gear.  Think about that for a minute.  The planes and gear are already paid for - no savings there.  The pilots require several years of training and are far too big an investment to lose.  In other words, the pilots aren't going to be laid off because you can't simply go out and hire new ones, ready to go, when the budget issues resume their normal levels.  So, the pilots are going to be retained which means they're still going to be paid - no savings there.  The mechanics, like the pilots, represent a talent pool not easily replaced.  Possibly a few could be separated from service but, most likely, they won't be separated and will still have to be paid - again, no savings.  

What, then, is saved by inactivating an air wing?  Well, the cost of fuel, I guess, along with miscellaneous consumables like grease or parts that are routinely replaced.  That hardly seems sufficient savings to justify idling an entire air wing.  I'm left to conclude that air wing inactivations are a political ploy by the Navy to try to pressure Congress into rescinding the sequestration cuts.  

Does anyone see anything I'm missing, here?

Sequestration Update

For those of you keeping score at home, Carrier Air Wing 2 (CVW-2) will be the first to stand down, begining now, with three others following shortly thereafter.  Also announced, two additional air wings will be reduced to "sustainment" levels, whatever that means.  That makes six air wings, and hence six carriers, taken off active status over the immediate future. 

I don't claim to understand the nuances of the sequestration law.  My understanding is that there is relatively little room for flexibility in the apportionment of cuts.  Still, this smacks of political brinkmanship with the Navy essentially daring Congress to continue.  As I've said, this is unworthy of the Navy and simply reinforces my opinion of Navy leadership.