Reaper Losses

ComNavOps has long stated that UAVs, especially the larger ones, are utterly ineffective, unsuited, and non-survivable over the battlefield and the Air Force has publicly agreed with that assessment.  Despite my statements, many (including the Navy) continue to believe that UAVs will provide omniscient awareness about our enemies.  Well, we’re finally starting to accumulate some real world data.  We know that Iran has downed multiple UAVs in the past [2] but now we have combat data from the Navy’s engagement with the Houthis in Yemen.  What does the data show?
 

Seven Reaper drones have been brought down by the Houthis since the beginning of March, with six of them occurring since March 15 and three of them over the past week, the official said. At least 15 Reapers have been brought down by the Houthis since October 2023 … [1]

Bing’s AI search engine reports (unsourced),
 

Houthi rebels in Yemen have downed seven US MQ-9 Reaper drones since March 31, 2025. Since November 2023, the Houthis have claimed responsibility for downing fourteen MQ-9 Reaper drones. Yemeni forces have shot down seven US MQ-9 Reaper drones this month and 22 since October 2023. Each MQ-9 is worth about $30 million, so that means the US has lost $660 million worth of drones over Yemen in about a year and a half.[1]

Other sources have similar or larger reported loss numbers.  The point is not the exact number of losses but the fact that this proves that larger UAVs are not survivable over the modern battlefield.  In this case, the conclusion is even more emphatic since the Houthis are far from a modern, top tier military force like the Chinese and because these losses are occurring in the face of supposed high intensity attacks on the Houthis – and yet they somehow manage to routinely shoot down our UAVs?  I guess our attacks aren’t very effective, are they?
 

MQ-9 Reaper

How is it possible that the Houthis can manage to operate radars and SAM launchers while supposedly being overwhelmed by US military attacks?  We can’t stop the Houthis from doing this but we think we’ll take on the Chinese?

 
I don’t have a target list for this anti-Houthi campaign but, clearly, we’re not hitting the right targets.  Our UAVs are being shot down and drones/missiles are getting close enough to our carrier to make it take evasive action.  Against a tenth tier military force with no air force, aren’t we supposed to own the air?  A mosquito shouldn’t be able to fly from Yemen without a missile heading up its backside.
 
All of this is screaming at us that we need to re-evaluate our ideas about how to fight China.
 
 
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Fun fact:
 
The U.S. Air Force has about 280 Reapers in its inventory, each costing about $28 million, according to the Congressional Research Service.[1]
 
Cost aside, these losses are starting to cut into the military’s inventory of Reapers and we can be sure that we are not seeing all the operational losses from around the rest of the world.
 
 
 
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[1]ABC News website, “Houthis shoot down growing number of US drones”, Luis Martinez, 23-Apr-2025,
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/houthis-shoot-growing-number-us-drones/story?id=121099082
 
[2]As one example, on 20-Jun-2019, Iran shot down an RQ-4A Global Hawk BAMS-D with a Khordad SAM. 

Network Lessons for Future Warfare

The Navy (and, to be fair, the entire military) has gone all-in on networking as the basis of our future combat capability.  We’re attempting to create vast regional (or worldwide!) networks of distributed sensors and weapons all tied together in a completely interchangeable, any-to-any linkage.  The Navy claims this will deliver omniscient awareness that will place us inside the enemy’s decision/action loop (OODA, for those of you who recall Col. Boyd’s work) and allow us to wreak havoc and destruction against a hapless, helpless, confused enemy.  While we aren’t at the end point with fully functioning network systems, yet, we do have more than enough existing pieces to get an accurate assessment of the viability of the concept.
 
To ever so briefly review, ComNavOps has mocked the concept as being utterly unrealistic and pure fantasy.
 
To ever so briefly review, history and real world events have mocked the concept as being utterly unrealistic with example after example of the failure of networks, sensors, and weapons.
 
Now, we have yet another real world example of the failure of networking and distributed sensing to examine.  You recall the recent friendly fire shootdown by the Navy of a F-18F Super Hornet on 22-Dec-2024 by the USS Gettysburg (CG-64)?  Reader ‘G2mil’ brought an interview to my attention that examines the incident and offers insight into the networking and sensor failures that led to the shootdown.[1]  The interview is available on YouTube and features retired Navy Capt. Kevin Eyer, a former Aegis cruiser captain, discussing the friendly fire incident with retired former Navy Commander and F-14 RIO, Ward Carroll.
 
Caution:  The interviewee, Capt. Eyer is not on active duty and made no claim to have inside authoritative information.  He did, however, imply that he has access to unofficial, inside information.  The Navy has not yet issued a formal report.  You can make your own assessment of the credibility of the Captain’s information.
 
 
Continuing …  I’ve extracted salient points from the interview and summarized them below.
 

• The IFF interrogation of the aircraft initially succeeded and the aircraft was identified as friendly.  However, the Gettysburg was in the act of recovering a helo of its own and during the recovery had to shut down all emissions.  Upon re-establishing sensor coverage, the aircraft was again queried but this time the IFF failed and the aircraft was not tagged as friendly.
• An electronic warfare (EW) operator identified the aircraft’s emissions as friendly and designated the aircraft as such.  However, the designation failed to register in the system due to a software bug that has been known since 2023.
• The EW operator followed up with a verbal designation of ‘friendly’ on the CIC communication net but, in the din, confusion, and stress of the CIC environment, the verbal statement failed to register with the TAO or anyone who might have intervened.  Verbal communications in stress situations always fail.
• The area wide Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) network did correctly have the aircraft identified as friendly however the Gettysburg’s CEC was either down or failed to register the designation from the network.  Networks always fail.

 
 
Here’s a couple of interesting, related notes:
 

• USS Gettysburg ‘failed’ its pre-deployment workups with the ship and crew’s performance being notably short of meeting standards.  Despite this, the ship was allowed to proceed on deployment due to a lack of potential replacement ships.  You’ll recall that we’ve talked about the widespread use of waivers that inevitably lead to tragedy and are at the heart of nearly every incident.  We’ve also noted the Navy’s refusal to hold anyone or anything to established standards.  This ship should never have been allowed to deploy.  The entire point of pre-deployment workups is to certify that the ship/crew are proficient enough to deploy.  Gettysburg was not but deployed anyway.
• NavSea knew about the software bugs but pushed the Aegis software out into the fleet anyway.  This is literally criminal negligence and, in the civilian world, is the basis for criminal and civil trials and lawsuits all the time. 
  

 
 
Discussion
 
As with almost every incident, it was due to a number of supposedly unlikely factors all occurring together.  However, upon examination we see that some of the factors were well known and, thus, the incident was less of a freak confluence of unlikely factors and more of a known problem waiting to happen.  It was just a matter of time.
 
In this incident, we see that despite multiple ships and aircraft tracking the F-18, area wide networks sharing their data, an aircraft that was talking and squawking its identification, and the most advanced surveillance and fire control software in the world, we still managed to lose situational awareness and shoot down a friendly aircraft.  If we can’t keep track of a friendly aircraft with IFF flying a known safe flight path and with no enemy cyber or electronic hindrance, what hope does a regional (or worldwide!) network have in combat?
 
With these repeated demonstrations of ineffectiveness and unreliability, why are we basing our entire future warfare plans on this kind of network/software approach?  This network/data/software approach to warfare requires perfect performance to even begin to be useful in combat and when does perfection ever occur in combat?
 
We shoot down our own aircraft, collide with hulking merchant ships, are unable to verify attacks on us (USS Mason affair), and yet we choose to ignore those real world experiences in favor of fantasy level imaginings of future warfare.  How stupid are we?  The answer is … admiralty stupid!
 
 
 
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[1]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bo34Zwbte6c

SEAL Deaths

You may recall the deaths of two SEALs back in Jan 2024, off Yemen, during a night boarding operation in poor weather with 6 ft seas.  One man slipped while climbing a scaling ladder and fell into the sea.  The second man dove in to assist the first man who was struggling to regain the ladder.  The Navy’s report states that the deaths were preventable and attributes the deaths to, 

The cause of the deaths was attributed to poor training, unfamiliarity with flotation gear, and possible improper maintenance of personal flotation devices.[1]

It is also noteworthy that the men were heavily loaded with gear. 

Each SEAL carried about 50 pounds of personal and mission equipment.  Navy Special Warfare Operator 1st Class Nathan Gage Ingram, 27, dived into the sea to assist Chambers. Ingram is believed to have carried about 80 pounds of gear when he dived in.[1]

Diving into high seas with 50-80 lbs of gear is not a formula for success.
 
The Navy identified what they consider the root cause of the tragedy to be: 

The root cause of the incident was unfamiliarity with personal flotation gear and a lack of standard procedure for using, training with, or wearing it.

Other team members told investigators that while they knew the importance of their tactical flotation system — which includes two inflatable floats that attach to a belt and foam inserts that can be added — few had ever operated one in training and there is little instruction on how to wear it.[1]

Contray to the Navy's claim, that is not the root cause and the statement clearly indicates that the Navy doesn’t have the faintest idea what the term ‘root cause’ means or how to conduct a root cause analysis.  A root cause is the ultimate reason something occurs and, inevitably, produces a cascading chain of lesser causes leading to the event itself.  Almost invariably, the true root cause of anything lies with flawed leadership at fairly high levels and, almost inevitably, organizations stop their root cause analysis at a low level, well before they get to the true, upper level (leadership) cause (I wonder why they stop, he asked sarcastically, knowing exactly why).
 
In this instance, the root cause was not the SEAL’s lack of familiarity with the flotation equipment.  That was a low level cause but nowhere near the true root cause.
 
Moving up the root cause chain a bit, the person who selected/specified unfamiliar equipment for the unit was a cause but, again, not the root cause.
 
Proceeding further up the root cause chain, the assignment by leadership of a mission in questionable weather by inadequately trained personnel was a higher level cause but, again, not the true root cause.  This is similar to whoever assigned the riverine boats a mission beyond their capabilities which resulted in the boats and crews being seized by Iran.
 
The true(er) root cause, then, was high level Navy leadership who were unaware (or uncaring) of the equipment and level of training of the unit and proceeded to assign a mission anyway under very questionable weather conditions.
 
The truly ultimate root cause was a Navy system that encouraged lackadaisical training, a never say no culture, an ignorance of real world conditions, and a lack of personal responsibility towards those under their command.  To be clear, I’m talking about SecNav and Chief of Naval Operations who fostered a flawed culture.  This flawed culture has been evident repeatedly in collisions, groundings, waivers leading to fatalities, capsized amphibious vehicles, a surrender rather than fight mentality, acquisition failures and coverups, prioritizing social issues over combat readiness, and so on.  There can be no disputing the failed culture of the Navy.
 
Aside from the root cause, there is another aspect to this tragedy and that is personal responsibility.  Frankly, given the SEALs supposed creed of attention to detail, I’m astounded that they would embark on a mission with unfamiliar equipment and known shortcomings in their training.  I know they (and the Navy/military, in general) have a ‘can do’ attitude (arrogance, when it comes down to it) that drives them to do foolish things but there comes a point where personal responsibility comes into play.  In addition to knowingly endangering themselves, each SEAL knowingly allowed their fellow SEALs to begin a mission that they knew their fellows were not adequately trained or prepared for and that danger was compounded by the darkness and weather conditions.  Even if they wish to ignore the danger to themselves, each SEAL is obligated to be responsible for his fellow team members if he sees them about to do something foolish.  Each SEAL member failed their obligation to their teammates.
 
I’m deeply disappointed in the SEALs individually and as a group culture.
 
Some of you may be offended by this analysis but that doesn’t change the reality.
 
 
 
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[1]Redstate website, “Investigation Reveals Drowning of Two Navy SEALs During a Boarding Operation Was Entirely Preventable”, streiff, 12-Oct-2024,
https://redstate.com/streiff/2024/10/12/investigation-reveals-drowning-of-two-navy-seals-during-a-boarding-operation-was-entirely-preventable-n2180468

Luck is Not a Strategy

It is being reported that a US Navy ship, the USS Gravely, a Burke class destroyer, was forced to use its CIWS to down a sea-skimming anti-ship missile.  If this continues, there is only one possible outcome.  No defense is perfect and the Houthis only need to win once whereas the Navy has to be 100% perfect. 
 
This is an unsustainable, unwinnable situation.  We’ve got to either leave the area before we lose a ship or we have to engage with total force.  There is no middle ground.  The administration is hanging the Navy out to dry.

It is also disturbing that a (apparently single) missile could get that close.  Something failed.

True Multi-Domain War

‘Multi-domain’ is the current buzzword and fad of the month in the US military although, in practice, it seems to just be gibberish-speak for more computers and more unmanned assets.  That aside, the basic concept is that you wage war not just on the kinetic level but on additional levels such as the electromagnetic, public relations, Internet, space, and so on.  Unfortunately, one of the major domains that has the most potential impact is also the most overlooked and ignored and that is the financial domain.
 
Consider the current Houthi conflict.
 
We’re trading shots back and forth with the Houthis and, clearly, not deterring them in the least.  This is yet another in an endless list of demonstrable failures of deterrence for those of you who believe deterrence is effective but, I digress …
 
The point is that our minimal attacks are having little or no effect.  This is quite similar to the ISIS truck-plinking that we engaged in some years ago and which had zero impact.
 
If we were serious about ending the Houthi actions, we’d focus as much on the financial domain as the kinetic and it would likely produce far better results.  The Houthis must finance their operations, weapon acquisitions, weapon component acquisitions, shipping and transport costs, ‘soldier pay’, etc.  That financial mechanism is not just a local, village level network.  They’re engaged in global financial dealings with suppliers, Iran, and others.  That financial network represents a major center of gravity and extreme vulnerability for the Houthis.  We have the means to completely shut down their financial network, halt bank transfers, seize assets, freeze and seize bank accounts, etc.  I’m not a financial expert so these are just the conceptual, top level ideas that I’m aware of.  I’m sure our government accountants and financial experts could devise much more extensive and effective methods.  We should also be tracking and covertly eliminating links in the Houthi financial chains … you know, CIA type work.
 
Waging war is not cheap and the Houthis are not above the financial requirements.  In fact, being a smaller operation, relative to the US, they are more vulnerable to financial disruptions.  Of course, it would help if we would stop giving billions of dollars to Iran![1]
 
I know that the administration will claim to be applying some sanctions against the Houthis but we are a universe away from bringing the full weight of our financial combat capability to bear.  Just as our occasional strikes accomplish nothing, a few minor sanctions also accomplish nothing.
 
We need to either bring our full military and financial might to bear on the Houthis in a true multi-domain fight or we need to leave the area.  What we’re doing is accomplishing nothing and risking everything.  One lucky hit on a warship and the Houthis win on the global stage.
 
As with so many things, our military and government (largely one and the same!) pay lip service to concepts but refuse to actually carry them out to the maximum extent.  We talk about multi-domain combat but largely refuse to engage in financial combat which has, arguably, the most potential to produce the desired results.

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Note: The same considerations apply to our dealings with China.  We are at war with China, right now, even if the current administration refuses to acknowledge it, and we’re making almost no effort to win or even engage.  If we were to fully engage in financial combat with China we’d win overwhelmingly.  Yes, there would be some short term pain for us but also some incredible long term gains.  However, that’s a topic for another post.
 
 
 
 
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[1]Guardian website, “US agrees to release $6bn in Iran funds as part of deal to free detained Americans”, Julian Borger, 11-Sep-2023,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/11/us-iran-sanctions-waiver-americans-detained-iran

Houthis and the Marines – Same Mission?

Reader ‘Robtze’ just thoroughly embarrassed me in a comment with an incredibly astute observation that I completely missed.  He observed/asked whether the Houthis were executing the same mission  the Marine Corps envisions with their island/coastal missile shooter concept.
 
To address his comment, yes, this is almost exactly the mission set.  Let’s take advantage of this remarkable similarity and examine how the coastal ‘missile sniping’ concept is working out.
 
Weapons.  One probable difference is the weapons.  While we have no definitive information on the missiles the Houthis are using, it’s likely that they’re smaller and shorter ranged than the missiles the Marines envision using.
 
Targeting.  From day one, this has been one of the unaddressed, major mysteries about the missile shooting concept.  The Marines have no ability to target beyond the horizon and, if they did, the size and scope of that effort would totally negate the ‘hidden’ and ‘small’ characteristics of the concept (using medium to large UAVs, for example).  We see that many of the Houthi missiles appear to be blind fired, being described by US spokesmen as having indeterminate targets. 
 
From this, we can infer that the targeting issue is a valid one that is not easily solved and will, indeed, be problematic for the Marines.
 
Logistics.  One difference is that the logistic (resupply) issue isn't present for the Houthis since this isn't an isolated island.  They can obtain supplies overland.  Of course, even in this case, the supply routes and methods present a vulnerability that could be targeted and disrupted by US forces.  It seems patently obvious that this logistic vulnerability will exist many times over for Marines on an isolated island in Chinese controlled waters.
 
One of the characteristics of the Houthi attacks is the scarcity of attacking weapons.  It would have been reasonable to expect that they would launch swarms of drones or saturation levels of missiles to try to increase the odds of getting a hit on a Navy warship.  That has not happened which leads one to wonder if their weapon inventories are significantly limited.  If so, this would, again, raise the logistic issue with resupply of missiles, despite being overland, being a weakness.  Again, this illustrates the difficulty (impossibility) of the Marines getting resupplies under their concept.
 
Survivability.  The US and UK have finally executed a counter-strike. 

The US and UK launched some 72 strikes against 60 targets in 16 locations.  The Pentagon described its targets as radar systems, drone storage and launch sites, missile storage and launch facilities and Houthi command and control nodes.[1]

This suggests that an isolated Houthi force, with no significant air defense or counter-air capability cannot prevent the enemy from locating and destroying them.  The Marines, of course, with no significant air defense or counter-air capability, believe that they’ll be able to operate undetected on tiny islands a miniscule fraction of the size of Yemen.  This incident would seem to suggest that the Marine concept is heavy on wishful thinking and light on reality.
 
Effectiveness.  The ultimate measure of the worth of anything is in the results.  The Houthis, due to targeting difficulties and, apparently, logistic (missile inventory) challenges, have been remarkably ineffective.  Some four dozen or more attacks have generated no sunk ships, no hits on a warship, and only minor damage to several ships.
 
The Marines, of course, can expect even less success.  Chinese ships merely have to remain beyond the 12 mile or so horizon and thus achieve total safety due to the lack of targeting.  In addition, there won’t be any Chinese merchant shipping in an active war zone so the Marines would be shooting at warships, not commercial vessels and the Houthi experience demonstrates that warships are, thus far, immune to damage from limited attacks by low end weapons and drones.
 
 
Conclusion
 
This Houthi scenario is offering us a rare opportunity to observe the Marine missile shooting concept in action.  The Marines were quick to jump on – and badly misinterpret – the Ukraine experience to justify their vision.  Will they be as quick to jump on this scenario which is a near perfect duplicate of their concept and is failing badly?  I suspect you know the answer.
 
 
 
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[1]Redstate website, “A 'Morning After' Look At the Strike on Yemen and What It Is Likely to Mean”, streiff, 12-Jan-2024
https://redstate.com/streiff/2024/01/12/a-morning-after-look-at-the-strike-on-yemen-and-what-it-is-likely-to-mean-n2168651

Houthi Attack Lessons

The ongoing drone and missile attacks by the Houthis against shipping in the Red Sea ought to offer many lessons.  However, unfortunately, we have almost no detailed information about the attacks and defensive efforts which makes lessons and conclusions difficult.
 
To summarize, as best we can glean, the Houthis are using very low end aerial drones and cruise/ballistic missiles to target commercial and naval vessels.  It appears that some four dozen or so drones and missiles have been fired at various targets with a couple of hits reported on commercial vessels.  The US Navy claims one or two dozen shoot downs. 
 
That’s all the information we have.  Will that stop us from applying some analysis and drawing some conclusions?  Of course not!  Let’s see what we can learn.
 
 
Strategy.  You cannot win a defensive war/battle.  Only offense wins wars.  The attacker only needs an occasional success whereas the defense needs to be 100% successful and, long term, that’s impossible.  This is even more true when the disparity between the attacker and defender is so great.  Despite dozens of failures, a single Houthi hit on a US warship makes their entire effort an overwhelming success. 
 
By opting for a purely defensive posture, we’re putting ourselves in a no-win position where failure is assured.  It’s only a matter of when, not if.
 
Military Cost Curve.  All indications are that we are using Standard missiles to shoot down very low end drones and missiles.  That puts us on the wrong side of the cost curve.  Depending on the specific variant, Standard missiles cost $4M-$5M each.  Low end attacking drones and missiles cost on the order of thousands or tens of thousands of dollars.
 
While it is perfectly valid to say that we’re spending $5M Standards to protect $3B warships, that kind of economic exchange rate can’t be sustained.  We’re winning the battle and losing the economic war.
 
There are some vague hints that a CIWS may have engaged a target(s).  While that would be much more economical, it would also be very disturbing news:  that a low end attacking weapon could close to CIWS range against Aegis.  Note, this is far from verified.
 
Ill-equipped Ships.  Our ships are simply not suited for fighting a very low end war.  They’re equipped for high end combat (and not well, either, but that’s a separate topic) and lack effective, low end weapons.
 
Targeting.  The Houthi attacks are, presumably, directed towards specific targets although some of the descriptions of attacks strongly suggest that some portion are being nearly blind fired toward general areas.  Regardless, one of the often overlooked aspects of combat is counter-targeting.  The enemy can’t target what they can’t detect.  It is vital to understand how the enemy conducts their detection and targeting and then deny them that process.  There is no indication that the US is applying any counter-targeting effort.
 
Drone Effectiveness.  Despite the desire of the Western military world to jump on the unmanned fadwagon, the reality, as evidenced by these attacks, demonstrates that drones are, essentially, totally ineffective against a prepared and capable defender.  This should come as no surprise as we’ve repeatedly documented and discussed the lack of effectiveness of drones in combat situations in the pages of this blog.
 
 
Summary
 
It is clear that the US is approaching this situation unwisely by opting to adopt a defensive, appeasement stance.  It is delusional to believe that we can maintain a 100% success rate no matter how unsophisticated the attacking weapons are.  We must either leave the area to avoid the inevitable defensive failure or shift to an offensive posture and eliminate the threat.
 
It is also clear that our ships are ill-equipped to deal with low end threats in an economical but effective manner.  We need lower end vessels such as frigates, corvettes, or patrol vessels
 
Perhaps the major lesson from these attacks is that drones are not the all-powerful, invincible threat that so many make them out to be.  This mini-conflict is the perfect counter to the perceived (but incorrect) success of drones in Ukraine.  This is a warning to us not to make drones a major element of our force structure.
 
 
Caution:  As stated at the beginning, we have almost no detailed information about these attacks and defenses so be very cautious drawing lessons and conclusions.  The points I’ve made are general, based on the situation, rather than specific, based on details.  I would very much like to believe that the Navy actually recognizes these points and is taking appropriate action and just not making it public but there is no reason to believe that is the case.

Don’t Train With Allies – More Proof

ComNavOps has long stated that we shouldn’t be wasting time cross-training with allies (see, “This Is Why You Don’tTrain With Allies”) since, far too often, they have their own agendas and won’t support us when needed.  That being the case, it is a pointless waste of time and resources to cross train.  Needless to say, this is not a universally popular position.  It is, however, supremely correct.  The latest example is the US attempt to form an alliance to protect shipping off Yemen from Houthi missile and drone attacks.
 
The concept of a naval coalition, while strongly indicating that the US lacks the will and courage to take unilateral action to defend itself and others, seems simple enough.  Various countries with shipping interests in the area band together to provide for the common defense. 
 
Unfortunately, even this simple, if weak, response appears to be beyond the capabilities of the US Navy and the administration.  Redstate website has an excellent summary article describing the failure of the coalition.  

The final box score shows that the 20 coalition members will contribute a total of two surface combatants.[1]

France and Spain have refused to participate under US leadership and most other countries have opted to limit their participation to sending staff officers.  Redstate reports that the 20 nominal participating countries are sending just two ships but are contributing 27 staff officers. 
 
Without debating the merits of the attempted naval coalition, this vividly demonstrates ComNavOps’ contention that allies simply can’t be counted on and it is, therefore, a waste of time cross training with them.
 
By the way, the two countries that agreed to send a ship were the UK and Italy.
 
 
 
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[1]Redstate website, “Red Sea Security Coalition Melts Down As Member Nations Refuse to Accept US Leadership”, Streiff, 23-Dec-2023,
https://redstate.com/streiff/2023/12/23/red-sea-security-coalition-melts-down-as-member-nations-refuse-to-accept-us-leadership-n2167876

Tamp Down????!

As you are no doubt aware, there have been a recent flurry of reports of drones and missiles, fired by Iran-backed Houthi forces in Yemen, against various naval and merchant ships.  Multiple US Navy ships have reportedly downed several drones and missiles in self-defense.  A normal response would be to destroy the attackers.  Instead – and unbelievably - , the administration’s response is to attempt to create some sort of international group to “tamp down” the attacks. 

Last week, White House officials said they were working to create an international force to tamp down attacks.[1]

Our response to direct attacks is not to destroy the attackers but to “tamp down” the number of attacks????  So, apparently, there is some number of attacks that we consider acceptable as long as they’re “tamped down”?  And we wonder why our forces aren’t deterring China, Iran, Russia, or NKorea? 
 
History tells us with absolute certainty that appeasement only begets more attacks. 
 
 
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[1]USNI News website, “Lethal Drones from Yemen Attacked French Frigate in Red Sea, Say Officials”, Heather Mongilio and Sam LaGrone, 11-Dec-2023,
https://news.usni.org/2023/12/11/lethal-drones-from-yemen-attacked-french-frigate-in-red-sea-say-officials

Yemen Missile Attacks

It’s coming up on two years since the series of reported attacks on US Navy ships off the coast of Yemen.  It’s worth taking a look back at the events and see what lessons can be learned.  As a reminder, here’s the timeline and description of events.  Note that the descriptions are pieced together from many reports.  As such, I’ve not included any specific references because the reports, at the time, were fragmentary, sometimes contradictory, and far from definitive.

Sunday, 9-Oct-2016

USS Mason (DDG-87), a Burke class destroyer, operating near the Bab-el-Mandeb strait off Yemen’s southern coast, in concert with the USS Ponce (AFSB-15), was reportedly targeted by two missiles fired from Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen. Both missiles fell short and impacted the water.

Some reports state that the missiles were detected over a 60 minute period, suggesting two separate launches of one missile each.

Initial reports indicated that Mason employed countermeasures but did not launch its own missiles.  Later reports indicated that Mason fired two SM-2 Standard missiles and one RIM-162 ESSM missile as well as deploying its Nulka decoys.

Official statements say that it is not clear whether the attacking missiles were shot down or crashed on their own.

One report indicated that one of the missiles traveled more than two dozen nautical miles before crashing into the water.  Two dozen miles would be an incredibly short distance for an anti-ship missile.  This report seems highly questionable.

Confirming the uncertainty, USNI News reported that the crew of the Mason was uncertain if the suspected cruise missile was taken out by an SM-2 or went into the water on its own. The Pentagon claimed that an investigation was ongoing.

Some reports suggested that the missiles coming from Yemen might have been intended to strike Ponce.

Wednesday, 12-Oct-2016

On Wednesday, 12 October 2016 Mason was again targeted by missiles fired from Yemeni territory while operating in the Bab el-Mandeb strait.  Mason was not hit by the two missiles, which were fired from near the city of Al Hudaydah.   While the Navy is not certain whether the first incoming missile was intercepted or it just fell into the sea, officials claim Mason successfully intercepted the second missile at a distance of about 8 miles (13 km).

Thursday, 13-Oct-2016

On Thursday, 13 October 2016, US ships attacked three radar sites in Houthi-held territory which the Navy claims had been involved in the earlier anti-ship missile attacks against U.S. ships.  Tomahawk cruise missiles were launched from USS Nitze. The Pentagon assessed that all three sites were destroyed.

The areas in Yemen where the radars were located was near Ras Isa, north of Mukha and near Khoka.

Saturday, 15-Oct-2016

USS Mason was targeted in a third attack by five anti-ship cruise missiles while operating in the Red Sea north of the Bab el-Mandeb strait. Reports claim that Mason launched radar decoys, an infrared decoy, and several SM-2 Standard missiles in response, either neutralizing or intercepting four of the five incoming missiles. The Navy claims the fifth incoming missile was neutralized by a radar decoy launched from USS Nitze, after Mason alerted her to the threat.  Thus, the Mason was the only ship to have seen the claimed attack.

One report puts it this way:  one of the U.S. ships saw on radar what sailors believed to be missiles being fired on it out of Yemen at night.  Well, was it or wasn’t it attacking missiles?

Here’s a quote from CNO Richardson which indicates the general uncertainty and inability to even determine whether an attack even occurred.

“The latest is there has been recent activity today with the Mason once again. It appears to have come under attack in the Red Sea again from coastal defense cruise missiles fired from the coast of Yemen.” (1) [emphasis added]

So, according to the CNO, the Mason “appears” to have come under attack.  Put another way, no one can say for sure if an attack actually occurred.

Conclusions

To the best of my knowledge, no Navy report has ever been publicly issued about the purported attacks and I have not seen any results from the subsequent official investigation.

It is obvious that the Navy has no definitive idea whether any missiles were actually launched against any Navy ships.  If they were, they would likely have offered much more public proof because such attacks are potential windfalls for the Navy in terms of going to Congress and asking for money.

It is further obvious that the Navy has no evidence that any of the defensive missiles hit any attacking missiles if such even existed.  If they had, they would have plastered the news all over the media since successful combat operations would bolster recruiting efforts, justify increased budgets, “prove” the validity of Navy weapon systems, and help make a case for more ships – the thing the Navy wants more than anything else.

We see, then, that despite the most advanced suite of shipboard sensors ever constructed, despite the combined sensor systems of multiple ships, despite the use of networked naval data sharing which make up the foundation of the Third Offset Strategy, despite the oversight of satellite coverage, the Navy appears to have no credible evidence that actual attacks occurred and no credible evidence that any attacking missiles were shot down if there were actual attacks.

Regarding the question of whether the Saturday attacks were real, it is telling that there was no retaliatory attack as there was after the Sunday and Wednesday attacks.  The US Navy didn’t hesitate to respond to those attacks and yet a supposedly larger attack involving several missiles prompted no response.  The conclusion seems obvious that the Saturday “attack” did not actually occur.

This strongly suggests that the crew that reported the attack was seeing what they were conditioned to see.  It is noteworthy that despite the presence of several US ships in the immediate area as well as additional regional sensors, only one ship, the Mason, ever reported attacks and it was that ship that reported all three separate attacks.

USS Mason - Scenario Fulfillment?

Finally, if the attacks were real and the Mason actually shot down one to several attacking missiles, the Navy would, without a doubt, have showered medals on the Captain and crew.  You’ll recall that the Navy gave a medal to the crew member of the seized riverine boats who tried and failed to send a radio request for help.  If they would give a medal for a trivial, failed action they most certainly would have showered medals all around for the first successful combat action in quite some time – not only a successful combat action but hugely successful if they actually shot down four of five attacking missiles!  The conclusion is, again, obvious – there were no actual attacks.

It appears highly likely that the crew of the Mason behaved as the crew of the Vincennes did many years prior.  They saw a scenario that they “wanted” or were conditioned to see.  That the fog of war lead an overeager crew to see missiles where none existed is mildly interesting but hardly shocking.  This is nothing more than a common human tendency of scenario fulfillment demonstrated ad nauseum throughout history.  No, the more important aspect is that all of our vaunted technology utterly failed to tell us what was (or, was not) actually happening.  Despite this blatant failure of technology, we remain firmly committed to placing our entire combat welfare in the hands of technology and basing our entire military future in the hands of the Third Offset Strategy which is based entirely on sensor technology – technology that has been demonstrated repeatedly to be unreliable in application.

I know that my analysis completely contradicts the official Navy story but, lacking any documentation from the Navy, the logic is compelling and inescapable.

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(1)USNI News website, “CNO Richardson: USS Mason ‘Appears to Have Come Under Attack’”, Sam LaGrone, 15-Oct-2016,

https://news.usni.org/2016/10/15/cno-richardson-uss-mason-attacked-cruise-missiles-off-yemen

Maddox / Mason Attacked Again?

The networked, unmanned vehicle Third Offset Strategy is absolute garbage.  It’s a concept put forth by a US military that’s floundering and has no clue about the future of warfare.  Want proof?

I covered this in a recent post (see, "Respond or Leave") and we’ve now seen it demonstrated again.  The USS Mason may have been attacked again, for a third time (1), after the retaliatory Tomahawk strikes on some radar sites.  Wait, what now?  “May” have been attacked?  Were they or weren’t they? 

Burke destroyers are fitted with the miraculous, all-seeing, all-knowing Aegis radar system, EO/IR/laser sensors, electronic warfare systems, signals analysis software, and helos for aerial surveillance.  All this is backed up by a network of other sensors in the region from surveillance aircraft, other UAVs, other ships, satellites, etc., all contributing to a digitally fused composite picture of the battlespace capable of counting the buttons on an enemy’s shirt.  We have layers of Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) software, regional analysis monitoring and software, various intel group’s analysis, unit and regional command staffs that monitor and analyze activities, and so forth.  Despite all this, we’re not sure whether the Mason was attacked?  It may have been?  We’ve spent a gazillion dollars on all this equipment, software, sensors, and analysis and our best assessment is that there may have been an attack?

Note that our befuddlement takes place in an environment unhindered by any electronic countermeasures.  In other words, we had “clear skies”, electronically, and still don’t know if an attack occurred. 

Despite this continued confusion, we’re going to base our entire future military superiority on this exact system of networks, sensors, and unmanned vehicles?  Recall the recent seizure of the two US riverine boats and crews in the middle of the most heavily surveilled region in the world and yet no one had any idea where they were. 

Let’s face it – our dreams of a Third Offset Strategy consisting of perfect battlespace awareness is just a fantasy conjured by people who have no idea of what war is or how to win one.  We’re seeing the proof of the fundamental failings of networked sensor systems on a daily basis but refuse to acknowledge it.

Having shredded the fantasy of the Third Offset Strategy, let’s now turn to the other disturbing aspect of the recent Mason incidents.  Does this sound at all familiar?  You all study military history or you wouldn’t be on this blog, right?  Recall the Gulf of Tonkin incident where the USS Maddox and USS Turner Joy spent several hours on 4-Aug-1964 fending off attacks from North Vietnamese torpedo boats.  The attacks were indicated by radar, sonar, and radio signals – except that it later turned out that the purported attacks never happened.  That incident led, in part, to the US involvement in Vietnam.

Yeah, but that was a long time ago, you say.  Now we have sophisticated sensors.  That couldn’t happen today.  Cause now we have sensors that apparently can’t say if earlier missile attacks were shot down or just, mysteriously, dropped into the water short of the US ships.  Sensors that can’t say whether the Mason was again attacked or not.  Were any of the purported attacks on the Mason real or was it a case of a nervous crew seeing what they expected to see (recall the Vincennes airliner shootdown)?  Fifty some years apart, generations of electronics improvements, and we still can’t distinguish reality in a small, localized battlespace.  Fifty years ago, that confusion dragged us into Vietnam and now this incident(s) is dragging us into Yemen.  We should remember our history and tread very, very cautiously before jumping into yet another ill-considered venture.

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(1)USNI News wesite, “CNO Richardson: USS Mason ‘Appears to Have Come Under Attack’, Sam LaGrone, 15-Oct-2016,

https://news.usni.org/2016/10/15/cno-richardson-uss-mason-attacked-cruise-missiles-off-yemen

Respond or Leave

Everyone has heard by now of the apparent cruise missile (C-802 is the most likely) attacks on two US Navy ships.  If you haven’t, you can check out the USNI article (1).  The USS Mason, a Burke destroyer, launched two SM-2 missiles and one ESSM in response to the cruise missiles.  Both cruise missiles landed in the water short of the ships and there is no indication that either was shot down by the destroyers missiles.  It appears that either the cruise missiles never had a target lock or the destroyer’s electronic countermeasures prevented a lock.

I’m not going to waste time speculating about the performance of the weapon systems since we don’t have enough information.  Instead, let’s see what other lessons we can learn.

First, the fog of war is eternal.  Despite all our sensors, electronics, radar, IR, optics, and computer software, we don’t know whether the missiles we fired in defense hit anything.  How is that possible?  No one was trying to deny us sensor data as would happen in a peer war.  We had a completely unhindered view of a small battlespace and yet we couldn’t even see whether any of our three missiles hit anything?  This should serve as a lesson to all those who want to commit us to the vaunted Third Offset strategy based on networks, unmanned vehicles, and a wholly unfounded belief that we will have an omniscient view of the battlefield thereby enabling and enhancing our forces.  What a bunch of cow droppings!  We can’t see an uncontested battlefield clearly and it’s only going to be much, much more confused when a peer enemy contests the battlefield with electronic warfare.  We won’t know jack about what’s going on.  That’s the reality of war.  That’s the fog of war.  We should be training for that confusion rather than blindly believing we’ll see everything.  The fog of war is eternal and all-encompassing.  We need to embrace it and train for it, not ignore it.

Second, we need to respond with massive and deadly force – or leave the area.  Any other course is just going to get US sailors killed and ships sunk.  Failure to respond will simply embolden our enemies and ensure further attacks.  The various actors in the area need to understand that threatening US ships is a fatal mistake.  If it’s not a mistake and they can launch missiles at us with impunity as we demonstrate our restraint and passivity then we need to leave the area because we clearly aren’t doing any good.  I think the odds of us responding are negligible so I think we should leave the area.

Third, this illustrates the need for a counterbattery (countermissile, in this case) capability.  The moment the incoming cruise missiles were detected, Tomahawk missiles should have been heading towards the cruise missile launch point.   Further, a UAV should have been directed to the launch point to look for follow up attack possibilities.  The two cruise missile attacks were apparently launched an hour or so apart.  It’s not clear whether they were launched from the same point (there’s that fog of war, again!) but a UAV should have been overhead, watching, for the second launch.  A UAV might also have allowed us to preemptively attack the second missile launch site.  If we’re going to operate on the modern battlefield, split seconds will be all we have and a countermissilebattery fire capability is badly needed.

What response will the Navy and the country make?  If history is any indicator, none. 

What lessons will the Navy learn?  If history is any indicator, none. 

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(1)USNI News website, “USS Mason Fired 3 Missiles to Defend From Yemen Cruise Missiles Attack”, Sam LaGrone, 11-Oct-2016, https://news.usni.org/2016/10/11/uss-mason-fired-3-missiles-to-defend-from-yemen-cruise-missiles-attack