MV-22 Assessment Methodology

War Is Boring website posted an article a few years ago about the MV-22 that I managed to miss which is a shame because it offered some insights into the MV-22. (1)

The author’s main point is that people want to view the MV-22 as a one for one replacement for the CH-46 and, therefore, compare it to the CH-46 and this is not the correct way to look at it.  Here’s the author’s perspective,

“…the Osprey didn’t replace the CH-46—it displaced the CH-46. The older copter made way for an entirely new type of aircraft, not another helicopter.”

Thus, says the author, to compare the MV-22 to the CH-46 on an exact one for one capability and performance basis is inappropriate.  Here’s an example from the article,

“To argue that an V-22 is junk because it doesn’t loiter like a CH-46 is to assume that the V-22 is a helicopter and should loiter like one.”

And,

“…the Osprey’s fragility and susceptibility to heat are notable weaknesses. … It’s not a helicopter. It’s a tilt-rotor aircraft. It should act accordingly. … To prevent overheating, Osprey pilots avoid helicopter mode. They quickly transition to plane mode and move around their objective.”

This is a potentially insightful way to look at, and evaluate, the MV-22 or any new and different platform.  If it can accomplish the mission, just in a different way, then a direct point for point comparison is invalid and misleading.

Note:  The point of this post is not to evaluate the MV-22, it’s to note the author’s point about how to evaluate a new and different platform.

The author also goes on to acknowledge that there are missions and tasks that the MV-22 simply can’t do that the CH-46 can, and vice versa.  He also makes an interesting point about the combination of the MV-22 and the UH-1Y being able to fill all the needed missions.

The author’s point about not evaluating new and, especially, different platforms on a direct point for point basis comparison with the platform they are “replacing” is an excellent one and is my takeaway from the article.  I’ll attempt to factor that approach into my future assessments of platforms.  The LCS, for example, is not a Perry FFG and should be evaluated on its own merits rather than directly compared to the Perry.  Now, that doesn’t mean that the LCS is suddenly a good platform – it just means that there is a better assessment methodology.  That assessment may still reveal a substandard platform!

The F-35 is another example.  So many people want to compare the F-35’s air to air combat capability directly to an F-16/15/18 and that may not be appropriate.  F-35 supporters claim that the aircraft will perform air to air quite effectively, just in a different way.  If it can, that’s fine.  If it can’t, then it’s a failure.  Of course, there are other factors like cost, maintenance, reliability, availability, etc. that can render the aircraft a failure irrespective of any given mission/task performance.

The other takeaway from the article is the author’s more realistic “specs” for the MV-22.  He notes, for example, that the troop carrying capacity is not the commonly cited 24 but rather 18 or less under actual field conditions.  Similarly, he notes that the CH-46 never carried more than 12 troops, despite theoretical claims.

The author also notes that the MV-22’s range with a load of troops is around 233 miles on a single tank.  Compare that to some of the range figures floating around the Internet.

-          Navy Fact File:  860 nm (unstated fuel load) (2)

-          Air Force Fact Sheet for CV-22:  500 (one internal auxiliary fuel tank) (3)

-          Aviation Zone:  2100 nm (unstated but obviously with max internal fuel tanks) (4)

-          Global Security:  251 nm (24 troops; unstated fuel load) (5)

-          Boeing Website:  428 nm (24 troops, unstated fuel load) (6)

That’s quite a range (sorry about that!) of ranges!  It appears that 200 nm is about the actual field range.  Interesting.  I have no idea how that compares to the CH-46 actual field range with a load of troops.  The wide range of ranges further illustrates the points made in the recent post about combat radius (see, “CombatRadius”) 

The article was fascinating and I encourage you to follow the link and read it for yourself.  There was a lot more to it.  It was one of the more balanced articles I’ve seen on the MV-22.

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(1)War Is Boring website, “Actually, The V-22 Ain’t Half Bad”, Vincent Mazzurco, 25-Jul-2014,

https://medium.com/war-is-boring/actually-the-v-22-aint-half-bad-25a39df9a336

(2)http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=1200&tid=800&ct=1

(3)http://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/104531/cv-22-osprey/

(4)http://www.theaviationzone.com/factsheets/v22_specs.asp

(5)https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/v-22-mission_req.htm

(6)http://www.boeing.com/defense/v-22-osprey/

MV-22 and Landing Zones

Hopefully, you’ve all seen videos of Vietnam era UH-1 Huey aviation assault landings.  The helos come in fast in a turning, gut-wrenching drop, tightly packed, land hard, disgorge their troops in seconds, and haul out.  The entire assault landing is over and done in seconds.  The landing zones (LZ) were generally fairly small – just a clearing wide enough for several helos to land at the same time.

Now, let’s consider the MV-22 and LZ’s.  I’m led to understand that the MV-22 requires 250 ft separation when it lands – so much for a tightly packed group of assault craft!  Assuming several MV-22s (or more!) make up the assault package, where are we going to find an LZ that’s big enough to support several MV-22s all spaced 250 ft apart?  That’s going to require an LZ covering several city blocks!  That immediately rules out the type of small clearings that constituted LZs in Vietnam.

On a related note, a USMC Basic Officer Course assault document specifies the LZ diameter for a single MV-22 to be 175 ft if bordering obstacles (trees, buildings, etc.) are 5-40 ft tall and an LZ diameter of 250 ft for a single MV-22 if bordering obstacles are 40-80 ft tall.  In comparison, the LZ diameter for a UH-1 helo is 100 ft for an LZ with bordering obstacles 5-40 ft tall (1).

The implications of the preceding are:

• LZ choices will be limited and much more predictable by the enemy

• Large, wide open LZs will place the troops in open fields without any cover and require them to move across large spaces, potentially under fire the entire time, in order to reach cover around the periphery of the LZ

The alternative to large, wide open LZs is to land aircraft sequentially, one at a time.  Given the very slow landing performance of the MV-22, that will result in an assault landing going on and on, one aircraft at a time with each aircraft, in turn, becoming the focus of enemy fire.  Survival rate ought to be around zero in a contested landing.

These considerations may force the MV-22 to land only in uncontested, unopposed areas.  If so, this further degrades the assault effectiveness of the MV-22 by ruling out most useful LZs and pushing the landings so far away from the ultimate target as to eliminate the element of surprise and speed.  In short, I don’t see the MV-22 as being a viable option for contested assaults.

I am also unaware that the Marines have ever conducted a full scale MV-22 combat assault exercise.  They may have done so but I doubt it or we would have heard about it in glowing terms, no matter how badly it went, and we’ve heard nothing.  Shouldn’t we conduct such an exercise and find out now what the MV-22 can do rather than find out the bloody way, in actual combat?

Let’s take that America class amphibious ship that has no well deck and conduct a full scale aviation assault and see what happens. 

Before we conclude, let me be clear – there is very little public domain information on MV-22 combat landing performance so much of what I’ve discussed is speculative.  However, it is all reasonable speculation backed by data.  For example, I have seen no public information on MV-22 LZ landing speed (the time from entering the LZ’s small arms fire range until the aircraft has landed and troops can begin debarking) but there are plenty of videos of MV-22 landings and they are painfully slow.  I’m sure they would be faster in combat but the point remains that they won’t be anywhere near as fast as the helos they’re replacing.

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(1)“Assault Support Capabilities / Operations”, USMC The Basic School, Marine Corps Training Command, Camp Barrett, VA, Basic Officer Course, B2C0355XQ

MV-22 Assault

The Marine Corps has been rapidly moving away from the traditional over-the-beach amphbious assault using landing craft to an aviation based assault concept using helos and MV-22’s.  ComNavOps has questioned the feasibility of this approach in numerous posts.  Let’s continue to examine the issue.

Defense Update website has a fascinating article describing numerous helo shootdowns.  Here are some numbers to get a feel for the magnitude of the problem.

“The U.S. Army has lost more than 120 helicopters in the war on terror, about 25 percent of them due to enemy engagements. According to recent official statistics, some 57 U.S. helicopters had been downed in Iraq until Feb. 4, resulting in 172 deaths, or about 5.5 percent of total American deaths since the conflict began in March 2003. According to U.S. Army General Simmons, the U.S. Army has lost 29 helicopters to enemy fire since March 2003.” (1)

How have these losses occurred?

“The majority of the firefights involve machine-gun and heavy-machine-gun fire, categorized as up to 23 mm, Simmons said. But, he added, some surface-to-air missiles, such as SA-7s, SA-14s and SA-16s, have been used to shoot down Army helicopters.“ (1)

While that may seem like a lot of losses for a semi-war, we have to recognize that helos have heavy workloads and fly a lot of hours and missions.  It is simple statistical probability that some will be shot down or damaged.

“Army helicopters average 100 enemy firefights monthly and are hit about 17 times a month. Most times the helicopters are able to fly back to base. Simmons said that is a testament to the quality of pilots, crews and equipment. The number of flight hours for the Army has nearly doubled in the past two years. In 2005, pilots logged about 240,000 hours. This year, Simmons said, he expects that number to reach nearly 400,000 hours. In 2006, pilots and crews flew 334,000 hours.” (1)

On the other hand, highly sophisticated helos should be quite successful against ill-equipped and ill-trained terrorists so any losses should be viewed with a degree of alarm.

What about countermeasures and defensive tactics?

“As result [of losses due to SA-18 type missiles], U.S. military helicopter pilots in Iraq tried flying low and fast, hoping to elude heat-seeking missiles fired by insurgents. But the insurgents responded with heavy weapons such as machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, and the loss rate of American helicopters soared. So the pilots went high again and insurgents replied with lethal surface-to-air missiles. The vicious circle continued.” (1)

It’s not just newer surface-to-air (SAM) missiles that threaten helos.

“What is still more vexing to Helicopter pilots flying combat missions in Iraq is the constant threat from RPGs. U.S. military helicopters are equipped with long-range sensors and devices to jam radar and infrared technology, but they have proven vulnerable to intense gunfire, as well as rocket-propelled grenades.“ (1)

American pilots learned to fear good old fashioned barrage fire in Vietnam and the threat remains just as valid today as then.

Helicopters are particularly vulnerable when landing.  At that time they have no choice but to be low, slow, and non-maneuverable – they have to be in order to unload and to maintain flight control in the inherently “unstable” hover mode.  Consider what this means for aviation assault.

“… pilots …  "yank and bank" in a corkscrew motion when approaching a dangerous or "hot" landing zone, dropping with a gut-churning, nose-high descent. Hovering, a helicopter is at its most vulnerable… Brig. Gen. Robert Milstead, a Cobra pilot who recently returned from commanding a Marine air wing in Iraq claims: "Above about 2,500 or 3,000 feet you are out of small arms range but you've got to worry about the MANPADS threat, by all means avoid 500 to 1,000 feet because you're hanging out there like a grape, to be picked!"

This is bad enough for conventional helos but now consider the MV-22, envisioned by the Marine Corps as the backbone of aviation assault.  The MV-22 is not a helo.  It is a conventional aircraft that can temporarily, carefully, and cautiously enter helo/hover mode for brief periods while landing and taking off.  However, it is even more unstable than helos while in hover mode and cannot even remotely “yank and bank” during its landing.

In Vietnam, helo assault pilots learned to come in fast and hard, hit the ground in a tightly packed grouping, unload the troops in seconds, and haul out.  Now, watch any MV-22 “combat” landing video – there’s plenty on YouTube.  MV-22 landings are the complete opposite of what I just described.  The MV-22 requires large spaces – there will be no such thing as tightly packed landing groups, slow, careful maneuvering to deal with the inherent instability of hover mode and the poor visuals that the pilot has, and a relatively slow rate of unloading.

UH-1 Huey Assault

We previously discussed helo operations and losses in Vietnam where over 5000 helos were destroyed – a 43% loss rate (see, “Helo Assault”).  Consider the helo assault losses in Vietnam and then compare the physical size and performance of the UH-1 Huey versus the MV-22.  As a reminder, here are a few relevant specifications.

UH-1 Huey

-          Size:  57 ft long rotor tip to tail

-          Fuselage:  20 ft x 8’7” approx fuselage =  170 sqft

-          Troop Capacity:  around a dozen troops with wide exits from both sides

MV-22

-          Size:  57 ft long x 85 ft rotor tip to tip

-          Fuselage:  50 ft x 15 ft approx fuselage = 750 sqft

-          Troop Capacity:  around two dozen troops with one exit at the tail

As seen, the MV-22 fuselage, the major targeting mass, is 4.5 times the size of the Huey when viewed in profile.  Combine that with the greatly reduced combat landing performance of the MV-22 and the loss rate in a contested assault will soar even over the shocking Vietnam loss rates.

MV-22 - Compare the Size to the Huey!

Let’s look at more recent evidence.  Consider the Karbala battle:

2003 – Karbala, Iraq – During Operation Iraqi Freedom, ambush barrage fire from the Iraqi Medina division routed 31 US helos of the 11th Regiment / 3rd Infantry Division.  Two helos were lost (one to a non-combat crash) and all but one were heavily damaged.  The helo unit was effectively wiped out.

Recognize that all these helo losses were under best-case scenarios where the US had total control of the sky and the enemy was generally ill-trained and ill-equipped.  What will losses be against a peer, under contested skies, and against well trained troops with state of the art weapon and sensor systems?

So, with all that said, I have to pose the question,

How are we going to conduct a successful helo/MV-22 aviation assault?

The answer seems pretty obvious:  we aren’t.

If that’s the case, why are the Marines basing so much of their doctrine and acquisitions around aviation assaults?

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(1)Defense Update website, “Deadly Scourge of the US Helicopter Pilots in Iraq”, Colonel David Eshel, 2007,

http://defense-update.com/newscast/0207/analysis/analysis-100207.htm

MV-22 Multi-Spectral Sensor

I really do not understand the thinking behind many of the new weapon and sensor systems.  The latest is a sensor addition to the Marine’s MV-22 as explained in a Flightglobal website article (1).  US Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) has issued a request to industry for an 18-inch gimbaled multispectral sensor that can be lowered from the MV-22’s cargo hold well.  The new sensors will give the aircraft the ability to target enemies from afar and provide similar situational awareness and precision targeting capabilities as the MQ-9 Predator UAV.   It’s unclear whether this will impact the available cargo space or not, so that’s one concern.

The other concern is under what circumstance does this sensor and capability make sense?  Are the Marines trying to create their own Predator?  Are we really going to risk our most valuable general purpose aircraft (according to the Marines, not me!) performing high risk battlefield surveillance?  Isn’t mitigating that risk exactly why we’ve developed the Predator?  What’s the thinking, here?

I note that the Predator is intended to fly quite high while the MV-22 is limited to under 10,000 ft, if I remember correctly.  That means the area it can cover is quite limited and the danger from the proximity to all manner of anti-air weapons is quite severe.  The aircraft will have limited survivability.  Why are we doing this?

The MV-22 is already equipped with an APQ-174 multi-mode radar and AAQ-27 forward-looking infrared turret so what does this extra sensor gain us?

I’m completely missing the tactical usefulness of this.  It seems like we so often develop and tack technology onto platforms just because we can rather than because it will serve a useful purpose.

Is this just more floundering around trying to come up with uses for an otherwise limited usefulness aircraft?

Feel free to take a shot at explaining this because I have no explanation!

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(1) Flightglobal website, “DOD explores multispectral sensor options for V-22 Osprey”, James Drew, 25-Apr-2016,

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/dod-explores-multispectral-sensor-options-for-v-22-o-424586/

COD Mods

The Navy has selected the V-22 as the next carrier delivery (COD) aircraft.  Bell-Boeing has been given a $151M contract to design the COD version of the plane, as described by a USNI website article (1).

The funding, adding onto an existing contract with Bell-Boeing, covers non-recurring engineering costs to add extended range, high frequency beyond line-of-sight radio and a public address system to the baseline MV-22 used by the Marine Corps. 

The cost of this is absolutely appalling.  Bell-Boeing wants $151M to add a radio, a public address system, and extended range modifications?  It ought to take about ten thousand dollars of design work to add a radio.  A public address system?  Seriously?  That should cost about a thousand dollars of design effort.  That leaves almost the entire $151M for extended range modifications.  Here’s the thing, though, the Air Force’s CV-22 is already an extended range V-22.  The extended range engineering has already been done.  The CV-22 has extra wing fuel tanks and three auxiliary cabin tanks can also be added.

The Navy’s unrefueled range requirement for the V-22 COD is 1150 nm (2).

The Air Force fact file lists a combat radius for the CV-22 of 500 nm with one internal fuel tank.  That means a one way range (which is what a COD flight profile is) of 1000 nm.

The NavAir Navy fact file lists a range for the CV-22 of 2100 nm with internal fuel tanks (number unspecified). (3)

Wiki lists an MV-22 range of 879 nm and a ferry range of 1940 nm with internal auxiliary tanks.

Wiki cites the existing C-2 Greyhound COD as having a range of 1300 nm, for comparison.

Thus, the CV-22 already has an unrefueled range that’s almost 1000 miles greater than the Navy’s requirement.  Of course, the max ferry range requires internal fuel tanks which take away from the cargo capacity of the aircraft but the CV-22 meets the range requirement with a single internal fuel tank.  Presumably, the CV-22’s wing tanks offer sufficient range with no need for internal fuel tanks.  The point is, the engineering has already been done.  Why are we giving Bell-Boeing $151M to engineer something that has already been done?

Why?

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(1)USNI News website, “NAVAIR Awards Bell-Boeing $151 Million To Begin Navy-Variant V-22 Design”, Megan Eckstein, April 1, 2016,

https://news.usni.org/2016/04/01/navair-awards-bell-boeing-151-million-to-begin-navy-variant-v-22-design

(2)USNI News website, “NAVAIR Details Changes in Navy V-22 Osprey Variant”, Megan Eckstein, April 2, 2015,

https://news.usni.org/2015/04/02/navair-details-changes-in-navy-v-22-osprey-variant

(3)http://www.navair.navy.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.displayPlatform&key=54DDA160-02F4-4FB7-9F03-0859718E9B2B

MV-22 Crash Findings

An anonymous reader pointed me to this link of an article reporting on the MV-22 crash in Hawaii in May 2015 (1).  I thank him for the heads up and suggestion to write a post.

To refresh your memory, an MV-22, one of a flight of two, attempted an initial landing which resulted in a complete brownout due to dust, hovered for a period of time at an altitude of perhaps 30 ft, rose, hovered again, and then dropped straight down to the ground.  Two Marines were killed and 20 injured. 

The incident report lays the blame on pilot error despite the pilots violating no rules or guidelines, command error for not selecting a better landing site, and command error for the poor emergency response to the crash.  Punishments have been recommended for many personnel associated with the exercise.  The report and the findings are straightforward as those things go but utterly fail to address the more important warfighting lessons to be learned.  In other words, the incident was investigated as a peacetime, commercial flight incident rather than a combat training incident.

Crash Film - Note the Brownout Conditions and Engine Flameout

As a combat training incident, the main lesson should be that the MV-22 is ill-suited to combat landings.  The MV-22 made a very slow descent and approach before any dust was generated.  This offers enemy gunners an excellent opportunity to target and shoot the aircraft.  Comparing this approach to flims of Viet Nam era helo landings reveals the difference in speed and aggressiveness of approach and landing.  Viet Nam helo landings were high speed, compact, and aggressive with a last moment flair to settle.  The landing process took a fraction of the time that the MV-22 landing does.  The longer the landing time, the greater the vulnerability of the aircraft. 

I’m not an MV-22 pilot but it appears that the initial approach got the aircraft to within 10 ft or so of the ground with less than total brownout conditions.  Had the pilot simply continued the landing, even blind, for 10 more feet the result would have been a safe landing.  The decision to stop and pull back up is what doomed the flight.  Once you’ve reached 10 ft, just continue straight down and the worse that can happen is a slightly bumpy landing.  Taking off again may be a problem but the landing could have been accomplished.  Again, I’m speculating as a non-pilot so take this for what it’s worth.

Some might say that this was a peacetime landing and that in war the MV-22 landings will be considerably faster and more aggressive.  If true, then why are we practicing techniques we won’t use in combat?  Train like you fight, fight like you train, right?  That said, everything I’ve read about MV-22 combat landings suggests that this type of slow, spread out landing is our tactical plan for combat and it’s due to the inherent limitations of the aircraft.  The MV-22 appears ill-suited to effective combat landings.

The next lesson is that, contrary to faulting the command elements for not pre-surveying the landing site and selecting a safer one, acknowledgement must be made that, in combat, landing sites can’t generally be pre-surveyed.  You pick a site and go with it, good or bad.  A total abort is always an option but few sites are going to offer perfect landing characteristics.  If the assault aircraft can’t handle the variety of landing conditions that combat might reasonably dictate, then the aircraft is ill-suited to the role.  Is the MV-22 limited to only “perfect” landing spots?  If so, that severely limits the aircraft's usefulness.

I urge you to read the article but read it from a combat perspective rather than a civilian mishap perspective.

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As an aside, the recommended disciplinary measures against a wide variety of personnel including a fair amount of the chain of command is interesting.  I'll watch to see whether the same punishment zealousness accompanies the Iranian seizure of our boats which I view as a much more serious offense.

(1)Military.com, “Billows of Dust, a Sudden 'Pop' and an Osprey Falls from the Sky”, Hope Hodge Seck, Jan 29, 2016,

http://www.military.com/daily-news/2016/01/29/billows-of-dust-a-sudden-pop-and-an-osprey-falls-from-the-sky.html

V-22 For Navy COD

The Navy has decided to buy 12 V-22 Ospreys for its carrier delivery (COD) role (1) which is currently filled by the C-2 Greyhound.  The Greyhound, you’ll recall, is a variant of the E-2 Hawkeye.

At a quick glance, the V-22 and C-2 appear to have very similar cargo and passenger capacities.  The main difference appears to be in their range.  Wiki cites the V-22 as having an 880 nm range while the C-2 is listed at 1300 nm.  I would have assumed that range was a pretty important factor for reaching carriers well out at sea but, to be fair, I don’t know what the range requirements are. 

The other aspect of this decision that is somewhat puzzling is that the C-2 is supportable on the carrier in that it shares commonality with the E-2.  How will a V-22 be supported?

I have no problem with selecting the V-22 but it is a slightly puzzling choice when range and support are factored in.  I hope this is not a politically motivated decision that sacrifices performance for political expediency. 

(1) "Navy Decides to Buy V-22 Ospreys for Carrier Delivery", Richard Whittle, 13-Jan-2015,

http://breakingdefense.com/2015/01/navy-decides-to-buy-v-22-ospreys-for-carrier-delivery/

MV-22 - Lessons for Other Programs

The Navy has several controversial weapon programs currently under development or in acquisition.  They basically all boil down to proponents who believe the claims and have faith that the system will one day achieve all the promised capabilities and opponents who believe that the system will never achieve a sufficient number of capabilities regardless  of the time and money expended.  History, of course, offers a perspective on the issue and we’ve discussed that from time to time in previous posts.  I think it would be instructive to take a close look at a program that is relatively mature now but that once went through the exact process and controversies that are besetting so many current programs.  I’m talking about the V-22 Osprey.  At one time the V-22 Osprey was every bit as controversial as the LCS, JSF, LPD, or any other program.  Of late, though, there seems to be relatively little discussion.  The program has become accepted, for better or worse.  It’s a good time to take another look at the program and compare the promise to the reality and see what lessons can be learned.

As a reminder, the V-22 (MV-22 Marine version and CV-22 Air Force and Navy version) is claimed to be capable of carrying 24 fully equipped Marines with an external carry capacity of 10,000 lbs over 40 miles.  The MV-22 achieved initial operational capability (IOC) in 2007.  Recent purchases show the MV-22 costing around $65M each although a CRS report (8) cites a unit procurement cost of $84M each versus the initial cost estimate of $38M per unit.

I won’t bother detailing the crashes and myriad technical issues that plagued early development of the aircraft.  The history is well known and easily found on the Internet if anyone wishes to refresh their memory on the subject. 

According to GAO (9), DoD testing in 2000 concluded that the MV-22 was operationally effective but not operationally suited.  Despite this finding, the program continued.  In 2005, after numerous modifications and fixes, the aircraft was again evaluated and, this time, found to be operationally effective and suitable which lead to approval for full rate production.

Operational experience with the aircraft has been mixed.  Missions that emphasize speed and range, typically troop and medical transport, have seen the aircraft garner praise.  Other missions have shown the MV-22 to be no better than the legacy aircraft.  External load carriage, for example, offers no improvement over legacy helos due, in part, to the equipment being limited to transit speeds less than 150 kts.  Additionally, the 10000 lb carriage rating is valid only at lower altitudes and is reduced for higher altitudes (9).  Short range missions, where speed was not a major factor, demonstrated that the MV-22 was no better than the legacy helos. The MV-22’s low availability rates further reduce the operational effectiveness of the aircraft.  The troop transport capacity of 24 fully equipped Marines has been found to be unachievable.  Operational experience has shown a capacity of 20 fully equipped troops is the max (9).  This is further reduced by two when the Interim Defensive Weapon System (IDWS) is mounted.  Use of heavy weapons by the troops further reduces capacity.  Visibility limitations were found to hinder situational awareness by troops and crew during landing.  Engine service life was found to be less than 400 hours versus the estimated 500-600 hours.  Maneuvering limits have restricted the aircrafts ability to perform effective evasive maneuvers resulting in doctrinal changes to minimize exposure of the aircraft to higher threat environments as opposed to the unrestricted use that was originally envisioned.  Other flight limitations have been imposed during helo mode flight operations which limit maneuverability and prevent closely spaced formations such as are used by legacy helos for compact and rapid insertion of troops.  The MV-22 was originally designed to be NBC (Nuclear, Biological, Chemical) capable but persistent problems with cabin seals have led to dropping that capability.  The operating cost per flight has been found to be $11,000, more than double the original estimate and 140% greater than the CH-46E (9).

Shipboard deployment of the MV-22 presents several problems.  The large size prevents the aircraft from operating on a one-for-one replacement basis for the CH-46.  Instead, the MV-22 will deploy on a 10-for-12 basis.  Deck spots have been a challenge with two spots near the island being unusable though reports have indicated that procedural changes may now allow that.  The MV-22’s spare parts inventory requirements are significantly greater than the legacy helos and impacts maintenance.  The large size of the aircraft reduced the number that may be staged in the hangar which further reduces maintenance capacity and has made hangar movement difficult.  Prop downwash is significantly greater than standard helos and has necessitated numerous procedural, safety, and equipment changes.  Another issue is the extreme heat generated by the downward directed exhaust which has caused deformation problems for ship’s decks.

One of the drawbacks of the MV-22 is that it is unable to carry side mount machine guns as a typical helo could due to the tremendous size of the engines and wings.  To address this capability gap, the MV-22 has had an Interim Defensive Weapon System (IDWS) option added to provide covering fire during landing operations.  The weapon is a belly mounted, retractable, machine gun system based on the GAU-17 minigun.  DOT&E reports (6) that testing of the gun showed the system has limited firing arcs during landing/take-off and requires extensive co-ordination between the pilot and gunner at a moment when the pilot is completely occupied with landing.  The weapon was found to be effective when it could be successfully employed.  Installation of the IDWS, which weighs 800 lbs, reduces troop and cargo carrying capacity, costing two troop seats.  The IDWS costs about $1M per unit.  Defense Industry Daily website (7) reports that the weapon system has met with only limited success and acceptance among aircrew.  A rear ramp mounted 0.50 cal gun has also been tested and is effective but is limited to rear targets only.

Aircraft maintenance and resultant mission availability has been a persistent problem.  DOT&E reports MV-22 mission capable rates from June 2007 – May 2010 as 53% versus the required target of 82% (6).  This rate is well below that of the legacy helos that the MV-22 is supposed to replace.  The CRS report (8) states that the aircraft’s excessively large spare parts inventory requirements makes shipboard operation problematic.

Finally, since the beginning of the program there have been persistent allegations of misinformation and misconduct by Marine leadership as regards the safety and performance record of the MV-22.  The website g2mil.com has an extensive series of articles on the subject (2, 3, 4, 5) for those who are interested.  I don’t know the authority level of the source so I won’t comment further.  The USNI blog also has an article on the subject (1).

How has the MV-22 turned out compared to its original vision?  The GAO report (9) sums it up this way.

“After more than 20 years in development and 14 years since the last cost and operational effectiveness analysis was developed to reaffirm the decision to proceed with the V-22 program in 1994, the MV-22 experience in Iraq demonstrated that it can complete missions assigned in low-threat environments. Its speed and range were enhancements. However, operational tests and training exercises suggest that challenges may limit its ability to accomplish the full repertoire of missions of the legacy helicopters it is replacing. If so, those tasks will need to be fulfilled by some other alternative. Viewed more broadly, the MV-22 has yet to fully demonstrate that it can achieve the original required level of versatility.”

The aircraft was “sold” as being able to operate in a wide variety of missions across a wide variety of environments with certain standards of performance regarding speed, range, and payload.  However, as the MV-22 progressed through its development and early production it experienced a steady series of decreases in its capabilities compared with what was promised.  The operational reality appears to be that it is limited to lower threat scenarios, limited in maneuverability and performance, has less troop capacity than stated, is less capable or no better than the legacy helos in some missions, and suffers from chronic, severe maintenance and availability issues.  On the plus side, for those missions that it can do, the speed and range compared to legacy helos offers significant benefits.

In short, the MV-22 appears to be a niche aircraft which offers benefits under a certain, rather narrow, set of mission parameters. 

The MV-22 offers broader lessons.  The astute among you are probably thinking that this all sounds familiar.  If you re-read this post and substitute “LCS” (or “LPD” or “JSF”) for “MV-22” the story could apply to almost any weapon program.  The LCS, for example, is going to wind up being significantly less capable than intended, costs more to operate, suffers from maintenance issues, and is less useful than originally envisioned – same as the MV-22.  The lesson, here, is that weapon programs are always oversold and overhyped and will turn out to be less capable than claimed while costing more to procure and operate than estimated.  This needs to be recognized by all parties in the procurement process and factored into the assessments.  In particular, the Navy needs to stop making outlandish claims about programs in the “selling” stage and just be more honest and realistic about capabilities and costs.  Witness the Navy’s continuing aggressive defense of the LCS capabilities in the face of overwhelming evidence of severe limitations and performance shortfalls.  While the Navy has backed off many of the original performance claims for the LCS, it has done so only very grudgingly and in the process has attempted to demonize critics who turned out to be correct.  This has cost the Navy support and damaged their credibility and integrity.  It would have been much better for the Navy to have stated up front, “Here’s the capabilities we’re designing for but there will probably be performance compromises along the developmental path.”  That’s honest and realistic and does not detract from the “salability” of the program.

As we continue to debate the LCS, LPD, JSF, Zumwalt, etc., let’s take the lessons to heart and recognize that every program will only partially succeed but will still provide useful service under the right circumstances.  The question is whether the cost of the program is justified by the ultimate usefulness of the system.

(1) http://blog.usni.org/2009/12/25/is-the-marine-corps-manipulating-mv-22-safety-records

(2) http://www.g2mil.com/v-22finding.htm

(3) http://www.g2mil.com/V-22missing.htm

(4) http://www.g2mil.com/scandal.htm

(5) http://www.g2mil.com/V-22Amishaps.htm

(6) Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, FY2011 Annual Report

(7) http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/baes-turret-to-trial-in-cv-22s-04618/

(8) Congressional Research Service, “V-22 Osprey Tilt-Rotor Aircraft: Background and Issues for Congress”, Jeremiah Gertler, March 10, 2011

(9) Government Accountability Office, “Defense Acquisitions - Assessments Needed to Address V-22 Aircraft Operational and Cost Concerns to Define Future Investments, May 2009, GAO-09-482

Amphibious Connectors

An amphibious assault?  We all have the mental image of hulking amphibious ships lurking on the horizon and Marines storming the beach.  But how did the Marines get from the ship to the beach?  Well, a variety of ways, I guess, from the futuristic (though they’re actually getting quite dated!) looking Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) hovercraft to the ubiquitous Assault Amphibious Vehicle (AAV) to helos and now MV-22 Ospreys among other means.  All of these vehicles can be collectively referred to as connectors.  Simply put, the connector is the transport between the ship and shore.

The connector has the potential to be both a potent enabler of the amphibious assault force as well as a  bottleneck and vulnerability.

As an enabler, the connector should be able to transport Marines and their gear quickly, safely, and, ideally, with a little bit of inherent firepower to provide some support at the point of landing.  The Marines should land in good physical shape and intimately integrated with their gear.  In other words, they should be landed in peak physical readiness for battle.

As a weakness, the connector represents a potential bottleneck if there are too few connectors to transport sufficient numbers of Marines and weight of gear in a given time frame.  Marines and gear sitting piled up on ship waiting around for connector transport are a recipe for disaster. 



LCAC



Similarly, the connector represents a possible vulnerability.  Just as naval tacticians recognize that it’s far better to shoot archers than arrows, so too would any enemy recognize that it’s far more efficient to kill loaded connectors rather than deal with landed Marines.  Unfortunately, current connectors are slow and unarmored for practical purposes relative to the modern missile age.

The current connectors are aging rapidly and most are only marginally suited for the modern battlefield.  The AAV has been serving since the early 1970’s.  The AAV’s long anticipated replacement, the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) is now a dead program with no other replacement in sight.  The LCAC entered service in the mid 1980’s and only 91 were built.  In addition, they’re large, slow (relative to missiles), attractive targets.    MV-22s are great for rapid transport of troops but can’t carry heavy gear.  The CH-53E heavy lift helo entered service in 1981 and airframes are being used up rapidly.  And so on …

All right, so the existing connectors are aging and ill-suited.  Can’t we just design new ones?  Well, therein lies the initial problem and the crux of this discussion.  What basic conceptual design is needed?  Do we need a traditional short range amphibious vehicle or do we need a very long range, way-over-the-horizon vehicle?  Are we doing traditional beachfront assaults or airborne, inland, maneuver warfare assaults? 



Cancelled EFV



The Marines tried to develop the EFV which is a short range beachfront assault vehicle despite the fact that both the Navy and Marines have stated that amphibious ships can’t survive within 50 miles of a defended beach due to the proliferation of shore launched anti-ship missiles.  In fact, for a decade or more, the Marines have embraced behind-the-lines, bypass-the-beach, maneuver warfare doctrine.  That being the case, why have they been fixated on the EFV?  Even now, with the cancellation of the EFV, they seem to be looking for yet another short range, slow, AAV-like replacement, suggesting a continued emphasis on short range beachfront assaults which is at odds with public statements regarding assault distances. 



On the other hand, the Navy is currently building a new class of amphibious ship (LHA-6) that doesn’t even have a well deck!  OK, so that means we’re going to be doing long range airborne assaults, right?  That’s fine except how do you transport M-1 Abrams tanks and all the other Marine combat vehicles and tons of gear and supplies by air?  The MV-22 can carry troops but not much more.  But wait a minute, didn’t the Navy just build an entire class of new LPD-17 class amphibious ships with well decks?  So, I guess we are doing beachfront assaults.

You see the problem?  I don’t think the Navy and Marines currently have a clear consensus on what type of assault operations they want to conduct in the future.  Of course, they could just opt to try and cover all possible scenarios but the cost of that would be staggering.

The Navy and Marines need to agree on how amphibious assaults will be conducted in the future and then start designing new connectors that complement that vision.

On a related note, here are some capacity/range figures for aerial connectors as cited in an NPS thesis (1).

MV-22

5 ton external, 50 nm range

10 ton internal, 100 nm range

CH-53E

18 ton external, 215 nm range

15 ton internal, 230 nm range

(1) Naval Postgraduate School, Thesis:  Cost Benefit and Capability Analysis of Sea-Base Connectors, Justin Dowd, Sep 2009, p. 17-18