Jump Over Justification

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has issued a report on the Navy’s unmanned systems acquisition efforts and they list various challenges the Navy faces in expanding the unmanned fleet.  For example,
 

• Inconsistent leadership and priorities impeded RAS [ed. robotic and autonomous systems] investments
• Domain- and platform-centric approaches impeded progress of RAS

 
That’s nice, however, the report entirely ignores the fundamental question, why do we even need unmanned assets?  Instead, they jump over the “why” and proceed immediately to address the “how”.  The Navy, and those who report on the Navy, has done this repeatedly and always to their detriment, if not regret.  Can you say “LCS”?  Can you say “Zumwalt”?  Can you … well, you get the idea.  I don’t need to cite the nearly endless list of acquisitions that ignored the why (the CONOPS, in other words) and focused on the how.
 
The report simply accepts the official Navy spiel about unmanned.
 

Recent conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East prove that robotic and autonomous systems(RAS) are disrupting naval warfare and challenging traditional naval superiority. To provide more adaptable, distributed operations, the Navy intends to shift away from its World War II-era operating model, which was based on closely knit battle groups comprised of several traditional platforms, such as planes, ships, and submarines. [1]

Consider that statement.  Ukraine proves nothing about naval warfare except that a sufficiently inept navy can be injured by drones.  The Middle East proves nothing about naval warfare because there hasn’t been any naval drone warfare.
 
The statement then unquestioningly accepts the Navy’s idea that unmanned assets will somehow, in some unproven, magical manner be successful.  There has been absolutely no relevant, real world experience to justify drones and no exercises that do so.
 

According to Navy strategic documents, a hybrid fleet is necessary to enable this shift and would incorporate smaller, more numerous, and distributed capabilities—including RAS capabilities—as a complement to larger, more individually powerful, traditional capabilities.[1]

So, a hybrid fleet is “necessary”?  Based on what?  Not based on the real world and not based on exercises so … what?
 
I’ll repeat what I’ve said many times:  I have yet to see a viable CONOPS (the why) for unmanned assets.  The people reporting on the Navy need to question the Navy’s proclamations, not blindly accept them.  GAO needs to examine the why before they examine the how … and so do we.
 
 
 
__________________________________

 
[1] Government Accountability Office, “GAO Report to Congress on the Navy’s Robotic Autonomous Systems”, 16-Jun-2026, GAO-26-109014,
https://news.usni.org/2026/06/16/gao-report-to-congress-on-the-navys-robotic-autonomous-systems

Our Navy For The China War

ComNavOps has discussed various aspects of what our naval force structure should be but it’s generally been in isolation rather than presented as a grand overview.  This has sometimes made it difficult for people who haven’t been following the blog closely to understand how the individual components relate and where they fit in the overall force structure.  I think it’s time to begin presenting the overall picture.  One way to do this is to examine the naval force structure we’ll need to fight China and win.  Of course, we lack an explicit military strategy which is what we really need to do a detailed analysis and presentation but we can still generate a pretty good picture just by looking at the typical types of naval operations that will be needed.
 
With that in mind, here are some of the naval operations that will be required in the China War and the specific force needed to meet those requirements.
 
Tomahawk Strikes – We will need massive, very long range, cruise missile strikes against Chinese bases, industrial facilities, etc.  The easiest and most survivable way to accomplish this is via submarine.  We need a moderate sized SSGN force.  The handful of Virginia Payload Module equipped Virginia class subs with their 40 cruise missiles is simply insufficient and inefficient compared to the 154 missiles carried by a single Ohio class SSGN.  It takes 4 Virginias to equal the missile load of a single Ohio SSGN.  Let’s recall that the Tomahawk strike on the Syrian airbase in response to the chemical weapon attack used 70+ missiles and was only a partial strike on a small, undefended base.  Any serious strike against any substantial, defended target is going to require hundreds of missiles.  Trying to mass and coordinate a dozen Virginias is much more difficult than using two or three Ohio SSGNs.  We simply must build more SSGNs.
 
We also need a new cruise missile.  The Tomahawk is old, slow, non-stealthy, and has limited capabilities.  The attrition rate among Tomahawks in a peer defended attack will be substantial which will require much greater numbers of missiles to achieve the desired result – numbers we don’t have in inventory.
 
Our surface ships will have to participate in Tomahawk strikes and the Burke is our only cruise missile shooter.  In order to get our Burkes into launch position, they will have to be escorted.  In a role reversal, the escorts will be carriers.  The carriers will provide the aircraft portion of a strong, layered defense in addition to the Burke’s own AAW capabilities.
 
Air Force Protection – The Air Force is going to be busy launching constant, very long range B-2/21 bomber strikes and will need protected air corridors to the extent possible.  Carriers will have to provide temporary, mobile, air superiority to create protected transit lanes.  This will require long range air superiority fighters with very large weapon loads.
 
Anti-Surface Superiority – The Navy will need to establish surface superiority – total domination, actually – to enable free movement of submarines, unhindered by enemy ASW forces, free movement of carrier forces, transport of supplies, at-sea fleet logistic support, etc.  Since carriers can’t be everywhere and will have higher priority tasks, this will require independent (independent of carrier support) surface groups tasked with eliminating Chinese surface forces and capable of operating, at least initially, with minimal or no air support.  These surface groups will need extensive organic small UAV capability for local situational awareness, a long range (200 miles or so), stealthy anti-ship cruise missile, and heavy naval guns for those close range, unanticipated naval encounters that are all too common in naval warfare.
 
ASW – Arguably, the most important aspect of our naval operations will be our submarine activities.  To do this successfully, we need to provide the maximum amount of ASW support.  We need to attack enemy subs and ASW assets at the source (factories, supplies, bases) and at sea, as they operate.  All of the source attacks will, of course, be on the Chinese mainland and all the operating attacks will be inside the first island chain.  We need to be able to penetrate the A2/AD zone, find those assets, and destroy them.  This leads back to a long range strike capability (Tomahawk or, ideally, a Tomahawk replacement) and the ability to operate near or inside the first island chain using surface groups.
 
Logistics Convoys – Resupply convoys from the US west coast will have to transit to Pearl Harbor and beyond and will require ASW/AAW escort.  A typical escort group should include small ASW corvettes and a single Burke AAW destroyer.
 
Air Superiority – The one absolute we count on, operationally, is that the Chinese will make a Taiwan invasion the initial action of any war.  Assuming we intend to contest that, a Guadalcanal-like battle will ensue with the Chinese invasion fleet on the west side of Taiwan and US naval forces on the east.  Carriers will provide the local air support over Taiwan and will attempt to establish air superiority over the island and the Chinese fleet – no easy task.  Again, this demands a pure air superiority fighter for our air wings.
 
Mine Warfare – The Chinese reportedly have hundreds of thousands of mines and we have no useful mine countermeasures capability.  Offensively, on our part, the Chinese are contained by the first island chain and should be bottled up by mining the relatively narrow passages out of the chain.  However, we have little to no useful mining capability as measured by the ability to lay thousands of mines in a very brief period of time.  A sub or airplane laying a couple dozen mines at a time is not combat-useful.
 
 
Conclusion
 
This is beginning to tell us what our fleet structure should look like and what kinds of weapons we need.  THIS … this is how you build a fleet – from an analysis of needs not a desire to pursue isolated technology for its own sake.
 
We can see what we need and now we need to look at our current force structure, see what’s useful, see what’s useless, see what’s missing, and recognize what we need to begin acquiring on an urgent basis.
 
So much of what we have, and are actively acquiring, has little or no use in a war with China.
 
Of note, what naval capabilities are conspicuous by their absence from the discussion?  That’s right … amphibious assaults and unmanned assets.  There is simply no strategic need for assaults and no tactical need for unmanned assets, at least at their current level of capability.
 
To summarize,
 
Not Needed: 

• amphibious ships
• F-35
• F-18
• Zumwalt
• Ford
• LCS
• unmanned assets

 
Needed: 

• new cruise missile
• Simpler, cheaper aircraft carriers
• new air superiority fighter
• SSGNs
• 8” gun ships / 16” battleships
• new electronic warfare aircraft, both air-to-air and air-to-ground optimized
• true destroyer
• Burke replacement
• mine countermeasure ships and equipment

 
There you have it … the naval force we should be procuring for the war with China.  It’s noteworthy that pretty much everything we currently have is not needed and everything we need is non-existent and, worse, we have no plans to develop/acquire any of the missing items.
 
So what is the Navy working to acquire?  Unmanned sail boats, a generic do-everything aircraft that will do nothing well, more Burkes, tiny cargo/landing vessels for the Marines, AI-powered everything, and more Fords.
 
I’ll put it as plainly as possible:  What we have, we don’t need and what we need, we don’t have.

Do It Again!

Reader AndyM had recently offered an absolutely masterful summation of Marine Corps acquisition programs. 

Nothing says dead on ideas like just making a new repeat, LCAC, H-53 and LCU.[1]

He is dead on.  Indeed, this thought can be expanded to the entire Navy!  Consider some recent Navy acquisition programs:
 

• LCU-1700 – nearly an exact duplicate of the previous LCU class
• H-53 – in production since the 1960’s
• SSC (Ship to Shore Connector) – nearly an exact duplicate of the original LCAC
• Burke – rapidly approaching its centennial year of production
• Constellation (mini-Burke) – just a scaled down Burke
• Virginia – an upgraded Los Angeles class submarine
• F-18 Super Hornet – a little bigger regular Hornet
• Ford – a bigger repeat of the Nimitz with some [thus far] failed technological gimmicks thrown in
• E-2D – repeat of the E-2C with the next higher letter;  22 more versions to go before a new aircraft design is needed
• ACV – repeat of the AAV

 
Granted, each has incorporated some technology improvements but none have been clean sheet, unconstrained, new designs with future combat in mind.  This blog has proposed many platforms that are designed with future combat requirements in mind and none bear any resemblance to the Navy’s tired repeats.  Future combat will require entirely new ways of approaching stealth, armor, firepower, surveillance, sensors, ship design, and doctrine/tactics.  None of that has been incorporated into recent acquisition programs.
 
Not only have these platforms remained almost unchanged, unbelievably, some have been downgraded in order to keep them the same!  For example, the new Burkes have had their critical radars downsized in order to fit into the same platform.  The future war requirements have changed but the Navy has proudly demonstrated that the Burke will not change, by God!  The Navy wants no part of a new ship when they can keep making the same old one!
 
Where are the stealthy carriers with long range fighter air wings?  Where are the Visby-like stealth ships?  Where are the UAV carriers?  Where are the pure passive platforms, ship and aircraft?  Where are the dedicated ASW corvettes?  And so on.
 
As AndyM observed, this pattern of repeats clearly demonstrates an organization bereft of ideas which, in turn, denotes an organization bereft of professional warriors capable of analyzing combat and correctly predicting future needs.  Even the Marines didn’t analyze future combat in making their idiotic and useless shift to being pointless missile shooters;  they analyzed future budget share and changed to preserve their slice of the pie.
 
We must break the cycle of repeats whose main justification is that they’re viewed as “safe” acquisition programs.
 
 
__________________________

 
[1]https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2025/11/my-marine-corps.html?showComment=1762315642312#c3837210506297094006

My Marine Corps

 
ComNavOps has often criticized the Marine Corps for what it’s become.  A once proud and valuable fighting force has been reduced to silliness and irrelevance.  So, what would ComNavOps’ ideal Marine Corps look like?  What would its main mission be?  What forces would it need?  I’ve described some of this in passing in previous posts and comments but here is the collected and condensed summary.
 
As always, it starts with mission.  What is the Marine’s mission – its purpose? 
 
There are two answers to that:  legal (Title 10) and practical (what’s actually needed)
 
Mission – Legal Requirements
 
Title 10 [see Ref 1 for the text of Title 10, Section 8063] defines the purpose of the Marine Corps which consists of the following stated purposes:
 

• seizure or defense of advanced naval bases
• conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign
• provide detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy
• provide security detachments for the protection of naval property at naval stations and bases
• perform such other duties as the President may direct
• develop, in coordination with the Army and the Air Force, those phases of amphibious operations that pertain to the tactics, technique, and equipment used by landing forces
• responsible, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of peacetime components of the Marine Corps to meet the needs of war

 
Notice that it doesn’t actually say that the Marines must be the ones to conduct amphibious operations, only that they jointly develop the “tactics, technique, and equipment” for such operations.  Note, also, that there is no explicit mention of amphibious assaults, only “operations”, which can be any action initiated or enabled from the sea.  Again, that means that amphibious assaults, while certainly one example of an “amphibious operation”, are not the only possible action.  Thus, the claim that many make that the Marines must be capable of performing amphibious assaults is not true, strictly speaking.
 
 
Mission – Practical Requirements
 
Legal requirements aside, what missions are actually pertinent to US military operations, in general, and suited to the Marines, in particular?
 
Main Mission – Port seizure (a form of amphibious assault, thereby satisfying the legal requirement)

Secondary Missions – naval base defense, embassy protection, and the like
 
Regarding the more commonly envisioned amphibious assault, I’ve said, repeatedly, that I don’t see amphibious assaults as being strategically necessary in the foreseeable future so what does that leave?  As we’ve often noted, any ground action (adage:  the seat of purpose is on the land) requires a secure port for sustainment.  Over the beach supply cannot support a large ground action.  For example, Normandy was all about securing ports.  Thus, the Marine’s main mission should be port seizure.  I’d add airfield seizure to that except that the Army/Air Force once had that mission and, presumably, still do.  If not, that would also be part of the Marine’s mission.
 
Many would suggest that the Marine’s primary – or, at worst, secondary – mission is to be the nation’s first response force.  Once upon a time that was true, though not a legal requirement, but now the combination of Army/Air Force can respond faster and with more force than the Marines can.  Thus, first response is not a Marine Corps mission although they might assist in such a mission if circumstances warranted.
 
So, having defined the main mission as port seizure, what is needed to execute that mission?
 
 
Size
 
Two divisions (10,000 men, each) ought to be sufficient to execute a successful port seizure.  If you need more than that, you’ve probably bitten off too big a bite and should look elsewhere for a port to seize.
 
There is also the practical concern that 10,000+ men crammed into the relatively small area of a port is beginning to get too physically crowded to be practical and would offer an enemy too concentrated a target.
 
In addition, one brigade (3000 men) should be dedicated to specializing in the secondary missions.
 
Add in a 50% extra troop level for logistic support tasks and you get a total troop strength of around 34,500.
 
Division Unit Types
 

• 3x Assault Brigade
• 1x Construction Battalion (300 troops) specifically dedicated to port clearing and initial repair
• 1x Construction Battalion (300 troops) dedicated to road construction and repair to enable landed supplies and forces to quickly disperse outward
• 1x Harbor clearance and dredging unit (specialized vessels, 100 troops)
• 1x MCM – land (100 troops)
• 1x MCM – sea (100 troops)
• 1x Recon Drone Company

 
Equipment
 

• Self-propelled anti-aircraft guns (think ZSU)
• Self-propelled anti-aircraft missile units
• Mobile C-RAM
• Mobile EW
• High speed landing craft with capacity for two squads
• Amphibious tank like LVT(A) for anti-personnel and anti-building and anti-fortification
• Small, very fast, very maneuverable assault helos carrying one squad each;  very fast insertion/unloading/departure (think Vietnam Huey) unlike current helos and V-22
• Specially designed, high speed attack transports
• Lots of self-propelled mortars for use in urban areas requiring indirect fire.due to high rise buildings
• Combat Engineering Vehicles for debris clearance

 
Note some of the things that are not listed as equipment, meaning that they are not useful or required under this concept:  AAV/ACV, fixed wing aircraft, ‘jeeps’, anything towed
 
 
Aviation
 
This is the big question.  Does a Marine Corps need its own air force?  For the port seizure mission, I see a need for a heavy helo component providing both attack and troop assault transport.  Helos are used for rapid insertion of troops at key locations in and around the port.  Attack helos provide the suppression and fire support needed to land the ground force from the air and sea.
 
I do not see a need for a fixed wing component.  Fixed wing aircraft are nearly useless for ground support in an urban area and are far too vulnerable to ground anti-air weapons.  Aerial supremacy is a fixed wing function but is a Navy responsibility so no Marine aircraft are needed for that.
 
A division should have a helo component of something on the order of 50 attack helos and 50 transport helos.  This would require the use of three big deck amphibious ships.
 
I’ve often stated that helos are not survivable over the battlefield.  Well, port seizure is an exception to that rule though only under this specific scenario.  The helos must be supported with ground forces applying relentless attack against the enemy’s anti-air assets.  Further, the helos do not fly overland to any great extent and thus avoid much of the enemy’s anti-air threat.  Finally, as described in the equipment list, the helos must be designed for very rapid insertion, which is the polar opposite of the MV-22 or any existing helo. 
 
The idea of helos spending time over a battlefield is, indeed, a non-survivable scenario as is trying to land in giant, open fields using snail-slow descents and takeoffs as MV-22s are required to do.  The helos in this scenario, as in Vietnam, would use a gut-wrenching drop, a five second unloading, and bounce back into the air heading directly away from the battlefield.  You might want to look at videos of Vietnam helo insertions to see just what we were once capable of.
 
One of the reasons helos had such high attrition rates in Vietnam was that we attempted to use them to insert troops directly into high threat areas.  In this concept, helos would be transporting troops around the periphery of the battle more so than directly into the threat.  We also attempted helo ops without much firepower support, depending on surprise to achieve survivability.  For this scenario, naval gunfire should be used to suppress enemy anti-air fire as the helos are inserting.  Of course, we have no naval gun support but that glaring weakness is another topic.
 
Another aspect of aviation is the role of the fleet carrier.  Many people believe that our carriers will supply ground support aircraft.  Setting aside the fact that we have no carrier based, ground support aircraft, that is not the role of the fleet carrier.  The carrier group’s job is to provide distant interdiction of enemy counterattacks.  That means preventing enemy naval response, overland troop reinforcement, cruise missile attacks, air attacks, etc.  Typically, this would be done at significant distances from the landing site and the carrier would not be in range to provide effective ground support.
 
 
Ships
 
Amphibious Aviation Ship – Looking at the equipment list, it is obvious that a new type of amphibious aviation ship, geared toward port seizure, would be needed.  The ship would carry 30+ helos (attack and transport) but not troops.  It would be purely an aviation ship – a landing support carrier.  As such, it would be, conceptually, half the volume and displacement of today’s big deck amphibious ships.  Troop insertion helos would be supplied and serviced by this ship but would pick up their loads from the attack transports, as needed, using the same combat-quick ‘bounce’ loading as for insertion unloadings.
 
Attack Transport – As we’ve previously discussed, WWII style attack transports would transport and land troops.  Landing craft would consist of around 30 reusable landing craft (think Higgins boat) as opposed to the sinlge use AAV/ACV.  While a well deck is an option, I would lean towards a WWII style attack transport. 
 
 
Basing
 
My Marine force would not function like today’s Marines.  There would be no deployments, no extended MEU-like cruises floating around, doing nothing, just waiting for something to happen.  Instead, the forces would embark from CONUS or, possibly, a central base such as in the Middle East or Pearl Harbor.  A port seizure is never going to be a spur of the moment operation so there is no need for deployments.  The force would be home based, training relentlessly – nothing else.
 
 
Mission Methodology
 
The key to the success of the port seizure mission is speed.  This means a rapid approach to minimize defensive reaction time.  For example, despite knowing pretty much where and when the Allies would invade Europe, the Germans were still slow to react and were unable to mount a rapid, coordinated counter attack.  Even if the enemy knows we’re coming, if we can hit fast enough and hard enough (shock), we can still be successful.
 
 
Command
 
This force would have little need for a top-heavy command structure.  Here is the envisioned command:
 
Commandant = General
Staff = Colonels, as needed
Division = General (1x per division, 2x total)
Brigade = Colonel
 
Thus, the entire force would have a total of 3 Generals and a handful of Colonels.  Hopefully, this would create a smaller, more focused force.
 
 
Missing
 
What are we currently missing in order to execute my vision of the Marine Corps?  Well, almost everything!  Setting aside the missing mission, organization, doctrine, operational planning, command and control structure, and mindset, we lack the following equipment (partial list):
 

• Large caliber naval fire support
• Amphibious aviation ship
• Attack transport
• Landing craft
• Anti-aircraft vehicles
• Self-propelled mortars
• EW
• C-RAM
• MCM
• Amphibious tank
• Transport helo
• Combat engineering vehicles
• Harbor construction vessels

 
In short, we lack everything.  Almost nothing we currently have is useful other than largely untrained bodies.
 
 
Conclusion
 
There you have it.  I’ve laid out a coherent rationale for the existence of the Marine Corps and a description of their mission and what is needed to execute that mission.  Contrast my vision to today’s Marine Corps vision – to the extent that they even have one.  Which one would you like to devote your taxes to supporting?
 
  
 
___________________________

 
[1] Following is the text of Title 10, §8063.
 
Title 10, §8063 United States Marine Corps: composition; functions
 
(a) The Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall be so organized as to include not less than three combat divisions and three air wings, and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be organic therein. The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. In addition, the Marine Corps shall provide detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy, shall provide security detachments for the protection of naval property at naval stations and bases, and shall perform such other duties as the President may direct. However, these additional duties may not detract from or interfere with the operations for which the Marine Corps is primarily organized.
 
(b) The Marine Corps shall develop, in coordination with the Army and the Air Force, those phases of amphibious operations that pertain to the tactics, technique, and equipment used by landing forces.
 
(c) The Marine Corps is responsible, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of peacetime components of the Marine Corps to meet the needs of war.

Screaming, Here I Am!

As we know, the Navy, with absolutely no concept of operations (CONOPS) or any validation testing, is proceeding full speed ahead with the unmanned craze.  The plan, for a while, called for two unmanned surface vessels: a very small surveillance (ISR) vessel and a somewhat larger mini-missile barge.  Apparently, to no one’s surprise, the Navy’s thinking is changing again.  Here’s the latest plan, as best I can tell.
 

The U.S Navy is seeking a wide range of new medium and large USVs as part of its Modular Attack Surface Craft (MASC) program … [1]

Don’t you love how everything has to have ‘modular’ in it, now, whether it makes any sense or not?  ‘Modular’ shows that it’s high tech, innovative, and cutting edge.  It also shows that it’s stupid but, I digress …
 

The MASC program looks to deliver three distinct USV types to the U.S. Navy … [1]

Okay, what are the three (instead of the previous two, I guess) types?
 

Vessel one is the baseline Modular Attack Surface Craft (MASC) which the U.S. Navy says addresses “the need for a fast, high capacity, embarked payloads platform”. MASC will carry two 40-foot ISO containers that consume 75kW of power each. The baseline range with a payload of 25 metric tons is set at 2,500 nautical miles, all while maintaining 25 knots up to Sea State 4.[1] [emphasis added]
 
Vessel two is a High-Capacity MASC with double the payload of the baseline variant. It will carry four 40-foot ISO containers each drawing 45kW of power while maintaining a “high endurance, high capacity” capability. A configuration of four such containers would allow a High-Capacity MASC to carry four reloadable Mark 70 launchers for sixteen single-packed missiles like Tomahawks or Standard missiles, or sixty-four quad-packed missiles like the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM).[1] [emphasis added]
 
Vessel three is a single-payload USV, dubbed the Single Payload MASC, embarking a single 20-foot ISO container drawing 75kW of power. The documents explicitly state that the container should have no obstructions at the rear, likely for a towed array ASW capability or similar anti-submarine system like the Liberator concept, which Naval News recently covered. Liberator aims to pair heavyweight torpedo launchers to unmanned ships.[1] [emphasis added]

So, vessel types one and two will carry missiles inside 40 foot ISO containers with each container holding four large missiles or sixteen ESSM missiles in quad packs.  Let’s give some thought to the advantages and disadvantages of each vessel type.
 
Firepower. 
 
Vessel One type will carry two ISO containers with a total of 8 larger missiles and Vessel Two will carry up to four containers with 16 missiles.  Contrast that with a Burke’s 96 VLS cells or even a Constellation’s 32 cells.  The unmanned vessels carry very little firepower payload.  An individual unmanned vessel can’t successfully strike a target or defeat an attack.  To give some perspective, it would require 12 Type One vessels to equal a Burke and 6 Type Two vessels.  That’s not a very efficient or effective distribution of firepower given that each vessel adds to the complexities and difficulties of controlling, monitoring, maintaining, and refueling for the overall group.
 
In other words, these unmanned vessels are of no effective use individually and can only be useful in significant numbers which carries significant difficulties with it.
 
 
Communications / Stealth
 
As noted, each vessel must be controlled, monitored, positioned, maintained, refueled, and provided remote fire control data among other needs.  That’s a lot of time and effort on someone’s part and, more importantly, that’s a lot of communications going on.  While I’m sure we’ll attempt to use line-of-sight and various other low probability of detection communication methods, there’s no such thing as truly undetectable communications.  The only undetectable communications is no communications.  The more vessels we need to control (refer to the previous point about the very small firepower payloads), the more likely it is that we will be detected.  In essence, using unmanned vessels is the equivalent of continually screaming, here I am!  Come sink me!
 

Additional attributes include USVs built to commercial construction standards , automatic RF control with respect to EMCON mission requirements … [1]

RF (radio frequency) control is not inherently stealthy and this suggests that the Navy is looking to build and operate these vessels to commercial standards.  That’s find as a peacetime business case but not as a combat operation.  It’s bad enough to not be stealthy on the modern battlefield but to literally broadcast your location is pure folly.
 
Endurance / Logistics
 
As a general statement, small vessels are slow and will need to be refueled frequently.  Yes, it is possible to design a long endurance, small vessel by giving up combat payload for more fuel and decreased weight but that almost seems counterproductive relative to the intended combat function of the vessel.  The more small, unmanned vessels we have to operate (refer to the previous point about the very small firepower payloads), the more refueling we’ll have to conduct.  Given that we don’t have stealthy oilers, that means even more chance of being detected.  In addition, those oilers will have to be protected and escorted which is an example of the ripple effect of disadvantages of small, unmanned vessels.
 

Additional attributes include USVs built to commercial construction standards , automatic RF control with respect to EMCON mission requirements … [1]

 
Conclusion
 
All of this is not to say that there can’t be a valid, effective use for small unmanned ships but I have yet to see anyone articulate a viable CONOPS.  We’re pursuing the technology with no idea how to use them.  We’ve seen the disastrous consequences of that path, repeatedly, and yet, inexplicably, we’re doing it again.
 

 
__________________________________

 
[1]Naval News website, “U.S. Navy Sets Sights on Fleet-Wide Family of Unmanned Ships”, Carter Johnston, 29-Jul-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/07/u-s-navy-sets-sights-on-fleet-wide-family-of-unmanned-ships/

The Thousand Ship Navy

Do you remember the Thousand Ship Navy concept?[2]  To refresh your memory,
 

In the fall of 2005, Admiral Michael G. Mullen, the U.S. Navy’s Chief of Naval Operations, challenged the world’s maritime nations to raise what he called a “thousand-ship navy” to provide for the security of the maritime domain in the twenty-first century. Speaking at the Seventeenth International Seapower Symposium at the Naval War College, in Newport, Rhode Island, Admiral Mullen candidly admitted to the assembled chiefs of navy and their representatives from seventy-five countries that “the United States Navy cannot, by itself, preserve the freedom and security of the entire maritime domain. It must count on assistance from like-minded nations interested in using the sea for lawful purposes and precluding its use for others that threaten national, regional, or global security.”  He had voiced the idea a month earlier in an address to students at the College, but he now elaborated the concept:
 
Because today’s challenges are global in nature, we must be collective in our response. We are bound together in our dependence on the seas and in our need for security of this vast commons. This is a requisite for national security, global stability, and economic prosperity. As navies, we have successfully learned how to leverage the advantages of the sea . . . advantages such as mobility, access, and sovereignty. . . . We must now leverage these same advantages of our profession to close seams, reduce vulnerabilities, and ensure the security of the domain, we collectively, are responsible for. As we combine our advantages, I envision a 1,000-ship Navy—a fleet-in-being, if you will, made up of the best capabilities of all freedom-loving navies of the world.[1]

Consider this excerpt from Mullen’s speech:
 

“…leverage the advantages of the sea . . . advantages such as mobility, access, and sovereignty. . . . We must now leverage these same advantages of our profession to close seams, reduce vulnerabilities, and ensure the security of the domain …

What a bunch of verbal garbage!  No wonder this concept didn’t go anywhere or amount to anything.  Mullen’s Thousand Ship Navy proposal was just vague fantasy for the purposes of public relations.  It was tantamount to calling for world peace – a fine sentiment that is totally divorced from reality or action.
 
Okay, so is this post just a quick shot at Mullen and we’re done?  No!  While Mullen had nothing worthwhile to offer, the idea of an international, thousand ship navy has enormous potential though not in any way that Mullen would ever have imagined.  Let’s examine a better Thousand Ship Navy.
 
Consider the following truths:
 

• Reality is that the US Navy is the biggest and only truly significant friendly naval force in the world.
• Reality is that the US Navy, through its own incompetence and mismanagement, has glaring gaps and weaknesses in its force structure.

 
Now, let’s lean back in our chairs, close our eyes, and think fairy dust thoughts:
 

• Wouldn’t it be nice if we didn’t have those gaps and weaknesses? 
  
• Wouldn’t it be nice if those gaps and weaknesses could be magically filled without us having to spend any money or resources?

 
Opening our eyes, we realize that those things can’t happen, right?  I mean, the only way we could fill those gaps and weaknesses without spending money or resources would be if someone else built the missing assets and gave them to us and that’s not going to happen.  It can’t happen … could it?
 
Well … what if other navies around the world focused their efforts and force structures on the assets we’re missing.  What if they built the minesweepers and SSKs, among other needs, that could fill the gaps and weaknesses in our Navy and we could call on those assets as needed?
 
Think about it.  As an example, when the global war with China comes, and it will, will the UK’s one carrier with a couple dozen short-legged F-35Bs make any difference?  Not much.  However, a couple of squadrons of highly effective mine countermeasure ships would be invaluable to the war effort.
 
Will some country’s couple of underarmed frigates make any difference?  No, but large numbers of small ASW corvettes would be a big help.
 
And so on.
 
The idea is that other countries would partner with the US to fill the gaps and weaknesses in our Navy.
 
Of course, this is easier said than done.  Consider the following challenges.
 
Command and Control – This is a challenge in peace and in war.  Who commands these fill-in assets?  No country wants to give up command and yet a single, central command, the US, is necessary.

Agendas – Every country has their own geopolitical agendas and, often, those don’t perfectly align with the US.  A fill-in force can’t be subject to the whims of each individual country.  A NATO-like imperative is needed that would compel every participating country to actively contribute their eligible assets to meeting certain defined needs such as mines in international waters, war with China (with the US required to formally declare war on China).  It is the defined nature of the compelling threats that allows countries to still pursue their own agendas outside the bounds of the defined threats and ensure that the assets are available in the face of the defined threats.  What can’t happen is, for example, a Spanish frigate pulling out of a task force because their country doesn’t perfectly agree with the task force’s mission.  If the mission is a response to a defined threat then the assets are in, pure and simple.

Force Structure – Which country would build which assets?  That can’t be left up to the individual countries.  The individual contributions must come from analysis of the US Navy’s needs and, ultimately, be subject to US dictation.  Otherwise, each country will build whatever suits them and the US gaps won’t be filled other than haphazardly, if at all.

Reciprocity – In return for, say, building mine warfare ships instead of frigates, participating countries must be supported by the US Navy for any legitimate defense needs.  In other words, the US becomes the participating country’s navy against defined threats.
 
 
Discussion
 
Ideally, this shouldn’t be necessary.  The US Navy is big enough and well funded enough that it should be able to build its own complete naval force without any gaps or weaknesses.  However, until we clean house and fire every flag officer, that won’t happen.  We’ll continue to obsolete Burkes for the next two hundred years and bigger carriers as our air wings shrink ever smaller.  This NATO-ish concept at least provides a work around to the Navy’s abject stupidity for the foreseeable future.
 
The key to making this work is a set of very specific, well defined, major international threats that would trigger the combining of assets.  This precludes, as an example, other countries being forced to go along with, say, a US strike on an aspirin factory in the middle of nowhere for political messaging purposes.
 
It should be made crystal clear that any country that opts not to participate is on their own if they find themselves threatened by an enemy.  Participate and share or stand alone.  A simple choice.
 
In order for this concept to work, it has to be divorced from any of the political maneuverings of the type that prioritized the F-35 as an international jobs program rather than a lean, focused production program.  Ship types can’t be assigned based on politics or jobs or whatever.  Of course, the individual countries can build their assigned vessels any way they like but the assignments have to be based strictly on naval combat needs.
 
Finally, note that none of the above precludes any country from still building their own ships of whatever type as long as they meet their assigned gap-filling quota.
 
 
 
___________________________

 
[1]https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?httpsredir=1&article=2029&context=nwc-review
 
[2]USNI Proceedings, “The 1,000 Ship Navy: Global Maritime Network”, Vice Admiral John G. Morgan Jr., USN, and Rear Admiral Charles W. Martoglio, USN, November 2005, Proceedings Vol. 131/11/1,233
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2005/november/1000-ship-navy-global-maritime-network

The Wrong Criteria

I continue to see the Navy’s fascination with unmanned craft despite them being completely divorced from any relevant Concept of Operations (CONOPS).  In the latest example, the Navy is diligently evaluating various unmanned vessels.
 

The commander [Rear Adm. Michael Mattis] of a US Navy task force [ed. Task Force 66] focused on employing unmanned systems said his team is making decisions about which can be “operationalized,” and which will be sidelined for further development.
 
The task force, which was established in May 2024, participated in Baltic Operations 2025 (BALTOPS), a reoccurring major international maritime exercise featuring the US and NATO countries. That exercise, which took place throughout June, played an integral role in helping the service evaluate various USVs on the commercial market.[1]

Well, that’s good, isn’t it?  The Navy is carefully evaluating various craft in order to make the best decisions, right?
 
Let me ask you this: what criteria are being used in the evaluation?  Different criteria will lead to different results.  What might be ideal for one task might be useless for another.
 
Of course, there’s only one criteria for any weapon system and that’s combat.  How will the item being evaluated contribute to high end combat?  If it can’t or won’t, then it has no value.
 
What is the Navy trying to accomplish with unmanned craft?
 

Mattis, whose office falls under the Navy’s three-star operational command, US 6th Fleet, described Task Force 66 as being focused on using low-cost systems, such as commercial-off-the-shelf USVs, to “impose costs on the adversary.”[1]

Ah … I see.  We’re going to “impose costs” on the enemy.  That’s great!  Just out of curiosity, I wonder what these mythical costs are that small, unmanned craft will impose?  It certainly won’t have anything to do with firepower since none of these craft have any firepower.  It won’t be near-invincibility causing the enemy to use vast amounts of their anti-ship missile inventory trying to kill them since none could survive anything more than a 0.50 cal bullet and the enemy would just use the unmanned craft as training aids for their ship’s crews to have target practice.  It won’t be sowing panic and confusion on the enemy’s command and control because I doubt the enemy will even care that much about them, assuming they don’t just laugh.
 
What are the “imposed costs”?
 
How are the unmanned craft being evaluated?
 

Mattis said the event included “red versus blue scrimmages” where sailors were tasked with participating in either side of an engagement featuring several unmanned surface vessels staging an attack on a warship.[1]

Wow, a free form, red versus blue scrimmage (I guess that’s what battles are called now?) !  That’s great for evaluating unmanned craft.  Although … the thought occurs to me, where/when would we expect a [Chinese] warship to present itself conveniently close to several small, unmanned craft, obligingly allowing the unmanned craft to approach, assemble for an attack, and then attack without hindrance?  How would these small unmanned craft get anywhere near a warship on alert?
 
We’re evaluating unmanned craft but we’re using the wrong criteria for the evaluation.  It’s as if we think the Chinese will behave like the oblivious Russian ships.
 
You know what the Navy should do?  They should skip any kind of focus on a combat CONOPS and instead leap right over that and get into the technology of controlling, networking, and interfacing small, unmanned craft.  Well, …
 

Tangential to operating individual USVs, Mattis said TF-66 is working on controlling numerous autonomous vessels through a “single pane of glass,” referring to the notion of commanding multiple vehicles through a singular command-and-control station. And beyond controlling multiple American vessels, Mattis said his team is also working to integrate that capability with NATO allies.[1]

You can see from this that we’re caught up in the technology and ignoring the CONOPS.
 
At this point, you might be wondering what type of unmanned craft we’re talking about?
 

Mattis said the Navy was using at least 10 Global Autonomous Reconnaissance Craft USVs during BALTOPS.[1]

Here’s a photo of the Global Autonomous Reconnaissance Craft.
 

Global Autonomous Reconnaissance Craft
This is what we're going to war with ?

I’m not sure where the “Global” comes from because the range of these tiny motorboats is probably once around the harbor.  “Reconnaissance”????  Whatever sensor they put on it will have a field of view of a few hundred yards.  Is that really reconnaissance?  How would something like this be of any possible use in a high end combat scenario?

 
Anyway … ignore everything I’ve just written.  Hail, unmanned!  Damn the logic, full technology speed ahead!
 
 
 
_____________________________

 
[1]Breaking Defense website, “Navy uses European exercise to help evaluate unmanned vessels”, Justin Katz, 23-Jun-2025,
https://breakingdefense.com/2025/06/navy-uses-european-exercise-to-help-evaluate-unmanned-vessels/

LCS Organization Update

As you know, the LCS program has been in a state of disarray – to put it politely and mildly! – for quite some time.  LCS vessels – the Freedom variant, in particular – are being slated for retirement almost as fast as they’re being built.  Further, the Navy has cancelled the anti-submarine (ASW) module and eliminated that function from the LCS mission (to the extent the LCS has a mission!).
 
You may recall that the Navy had organized the LCS into two groups, one on each coast, with four ships dedicated to each mission (ASW, ASuW, MCM).  Each group of four were to consist of one dedicated training ship and three deployable ships.  Thus, in total, there were to be six dedicated ASW ships, six dedicated ASuW ships, and six MCM ships.
 
The elimination of the ASW mission and the [very] early retirement of a dozen or more LCS has thrown that organization out the window.  Now, the 2023 GAO annual report offers some partial clarity on the new plan for task organization of the LCS.
 
.. 24 MCM packages will support 15 MCM-assigned LCS and nine will deploy from shore and other ships. Ten SUW packages will support eight SUW-assigned LCS and two MCM-assigned LCS.[1]
 
This raises some interesting points:
 
- It appears that the Navy will have only 15 MCM vessels as the total fleet mine countermeasures capability as the current Avengers and MH-53E helos retire shortly.  That’s a pitifully small number against the hundreds of thousands of mines in the Chinese (and NKorean, Iranian, and Russian) inventory.
 
- It appears that the Navy will have only 8 dedicated ASuW LCS which is surprising since anti-swarm was, arguably, the main function of the LCS.
 
- There is some confusion about the meaning of the statement that two of the ASuW packages will support two MCM LCS.  Does this mean the Navy will attempt to double up on modules on two ships?  Given the critical weight limits, that seems not to be feasible.  Perhaps it means that those two LCS will be ‘swappers’ even though the Navy officially abandoned the module swapping concept?
 
- It appears that the Navy will be left with 25 active LCS out of the original 38 that have been built with 5 already retired and around a dozen more slated for retirement over the next two years.
 
 
 
A program in disarray has become even more confused!
 
 
 
__________________________________

 
[1]U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Weapon Systems Annual Assessment”, Jun 2023, GAO-23-106059, p.148

Why the Last Post?

Some of the comments from the last post, “Defending Taiwan”, led me to believe that not everyone grasped the purpose of the post.  To be fair, I didn’t spell out the purpose although it’s been ‘spelled out’ throughout the blog.
 
The purpose of the post was not to provide a scenario that people could jump on and criticize (though that’s a favorite sport among readers of any blog!).  The purpose was to offer a likely scenario (Chinese invasion of Taiwan and US defense against the invasion) and a means (a strategy) of addressing that scenario (carriers, subs, locations, strategy, etc.) with the objective of examining the operational, tactical, and asset requirements to execute the scenario strategy.
 
The scenario gives us the specific requirements that should be driving our strategy, military force structure, doctrine, tactics, and procurement.
 
This is analogous to my constant harping on CONOPS, CONOPS, CONOPS which should drive ship design.
 
In this case, it’s OPERATIONS, OPERATIONS, OPERATIONS which should drive force structure and capabilities.
 
OPERATIONS, of course, are derived from STRATEGY, STRATEGY, STRATEGY.
 
Isn’t it neat how, if you do this correctly, each step flows logically from the preceding one?  But, I digress …
 
With a specific scenario and strategy defined, we can now proceed to examine force structure by examining the required operations.  For example, 

• How many subs do we need?  Operations will tell us that.
• What kind of aircraft do we need?  Operations will tell us that.
• How big an air wing do we need?  Operations will tell us that.
• What kind of ASW effort do we need?  Operations will tell us that.
• How many carriers do we need to defend Taiwan?  Operations will tell us that.
• How do we logistically support a Taiwan defense fleet?  Operations will tell us that.

And so on.
 
The Navy’s approach is to build something … anything … and then try to get it into the hands of the sailors so that they can tell leadership what the ship can do.  This, of course, is a heaping pile of stupid on a plate.  CONOPS tells you what to design and then you tell the sailors how to use it, not the other way around.  Similarly, Operations tells us what kind of force structure and capabilities we need.
 
Thus, scenarios like this give us the basis for intelligent discussion of force structure.  That was the purpose of the post.

Hughes Great Battle

Wayne Hughes is one of the foremost proponents of small vessel naval forces and has spoken and written extensively about it.  Before I go any further, let me commend Capt. Hughes for his willingness to formulate, publicize, and discuss a point of view.  It takes courage to put one’s opinions into the public realm where they are open to criticism.  Whether I agree or disagree with Hughes’ theories, I respect him for holding and publicizing his thoughts.
 
In Hughes’ book, Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat, he presents his theories and then, in conclusion, offers a naval combat scenario to illustrate their application [1, p.321].  I’d like to examine his combat scenario as a means of describing the limits and constraints of his theories.  There are many naval observers and commentators who ascribe to his theories so this exercise is well worth the effort.
 
In brief, the combat scenario involves a conflict between Greece and Turkey with the US stuck in between, using naval force to, ironically, keep the peace by attacking docked Turkish amphibious transport ships.  The US attack force consists of several small missile boats that are transported undetected, by a mothership, to a location near the proposed battle and then dispersed, again undetected, to their launch points where they will attack docked Turkish troop transports thereby preventing a widespread Turkish amphibious assault on several Greek islands.
 
Interestingly, Hughes does not conclude his naval battle scenario.  Instead, he ends his narrative at the moment of engagement.  His purpose was setting the stage for the battle to demonstrate the value of his small combatants.  Whether the outcome is successful or not is irrelevant for what he is trying to accomplish and whether he successfully demonstrates the value of his theories is up to the reader. 
 
In order to make an assessment of Hughes’ scenario and the principles he applies, it is necessary to clearly understand the conditions he sets for the scenario.  As with any wargame, the input conditions determine the result (garbage in, garbage out) and this combat scenario has a number of constraints built into it, to the point of rendering the scenario nearly irrelevant.  I’ve long maintained that Hughes’ theories and conclusions are of very limited value and applicability and his battle scenario clearly illustrates this.  Following are some of the conditions Hughes sets for his scenario.  Judge for yourself the validity and usefulness of the overall scenario in light of the constraints imposed on the scenario. 
 

• The scenario is tailor made to fit his theories.  In other words, Hughes’ theories are not applied to the scenario;  the scenario is applied to his theories.  That’s backwards and unrealistic!  There’s nothing wrong, per se, with doing that but the reader needs to recognize what was done and be very wary of extrapolating the success – or lack thereof – of a very specific scenario to other, perhaps more likely scenarios such as open ocean combat or combined arms (aviation) naval combat.
  
  
• The scenario forbids attacks on the enemy homeland, land bases and airfields, land sensors, etc.  In other words, a foolish way to conduct a war.  Of course, historically, we generally do limit ourselves in combat to the point of harming ourselves so this may not be a totally ridiculous constraint!
  
  
• Electronic warfare (EW) is ignored and networks are assumed to be flawless and unimpeded with the US having perfect communications, command, and control.
  
  
• Land based strikes by enemy aircraft against naval targets are not included.
  
  
• US Air Force and Army assistance is ignored so no friendly air strikes, reconnaissance, intel, tanker, or EW support.
  
  
• Carrier air strikes on ships are ruled out due to fear of a hypothesized 200 enemy fighters.
   
  
• It is assumed that no Greek or Turkish surveillance will detect the US small combat vessels.
  
  
• Complete US satellite coverage is assumed.

  
You can draw your own conclusion but my assessment is that Hughes constructed a scenario that perfectly fits his theories so as to illustrate and extoll them.  As such, my conclusion regarding his theories is that their ‘window’ of applicability is so small and so unlikely as to render them nearly irrelevant.  For example, the US small missile boats, the heart of Hughes’ envisioned fleet structure concept, are almost magically transported to the perfect placement on the naval battlefield with no possibility of detection by the enemy.  He also ignores the issue of fuel and logistical support for the small combatants.  A single enemy helicopter would wreak havoc on the small, defenseless missile boats but enemy air activity was excluded since its presence would turn a nice, neat scenario into a disaster for the US and Hughes.
 
As I was reading the description of the scenario, I was struck by the thought that there was a far easier and far more assured, alternate battle plan available.  Hughes hypothesized a single US carrier with four Aegis escorts.  He limited their involvement to some minor scouting but he could, instead, have assigned the four Aegis escorts to deal with the enemy air forces while the carrier’s aircraft swiftly dispatched the nearly defenseless Turkish amphibious and naval forces.  That, however, would not have served the purpose of illustrating his theories or, rather, would have pointed out a preferred alternative to his theories.
 
Hughes’ theories of small combatants have numerous flaws but the book serves as an excellent Navy 101 or primer on naval combat.  It is a starting point for the study of naval combat, not an endpoint.  As a starting point, it is well worth reading and studying.  Simply identifying the flaws in Hughes’ concept is an invaluable education in itself.
 
For those of you who opt to read his book or writings, the biggest overall flaw is that his theories all begin with his favored small combatants already in position, perfectly poised for the salvoes that are the basis of his theories.  He neglects the logistics, basing, detection, lack of anti-air defense, EW, etc. that are all crucial to, and precede, any successful naval engagement.  As you read his writings, keep that in mind and recognize the weaknesses.  It will help you assess the validity – or lack thereof - of his theories.
 
 
 
______________________________ 
[1]”Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat”, 2nd Ed., Wayne P. Hughes Jr., Naval Institute Press, 2000, ISBN 1-55750-392-3, p.321.

Opportunity Cost

A reader (username = ‘cheezit’) recently posed an insightful question about mine countermeasures (MCM): 

I wonder what sort of advancements might have been made in combat sweeping had we (anybody?) bothered for the last thirty-five years or so.[1]

In a sense, the user is asking what the opportunity cost has been resulting from the Navy’s focus on areas other than MCM.  For those who may not be familiar with the term, ‘opportunity cost’ refers to the ‘things’ that might have been procured/developed instead of whatever actually was procured/developed.  In simplistic terms, if I spent a dollar on something, the opportunity cost refers to all the things that I might, alternatively, have purchased with that dollar if I had spent it on something other than what I did.  There is an opportunity cost associated with every purchase/development because there are always alternatives.  Opportunity cost is not inherently good or bad;  it’s just alternatives.  What one wants to do is ensure that the opportunity cost doesn’t have greater value than whatever is actually procured/developed.
 
If I may rephrase the reader’s question, what advancements in MCM could have been achieved if the Navy had not been so myopically focused on new hulls, regardless of their usefulness … or lack thereof?
 
It only takes a moment’s consideration to realize that this excellent question could be applied to so many other areas besides MCM.  Let’s consider some of those other areas and engage in a bit of speculation about what might have been achieved (the opportunity cost) if the Navy had not been so focused on new hulls (the shiny, sexy toys).
 
Here is the reader’s question applied to other areas along with some speculative answers:  Note, the proposed alternatives are by no means intended as a comprehensive list.  There could be an almost limitless number of opportunity cost alternatives.  Feel free to offer your own in the comments.
 
 
"I wonder what sort of advancements might have been made in combat sweeping"
 
Modern Avenger MCM Vessel – A modern, affordable minesweeper would be invaluable.  Instead, we opted to spend our money on the LCS which we’re now retiring almost as fast as we build them!
 
MCM Mothership – A mothership would immensely improve our MCM capabilities and capacities by bringing large numbers of helos, surface drones, underwater drones, and centralized command, control, data analysis, and coordination to MCM instead of the haphazard assets we currently have.
 
Intelligent Sweep Capability with Signal Modulation – The biggest weakness in our MCM efforts (aside from the lack of numbers!) is the inability to conduct effective, large area, rapid sweeps.  We need sweeps with programmable, variable signal outputs to mimic actual target ships.  This capability exists, to some degree, in the naval world but not in the US naval MCM world.
 

What sort of advances could have been made if the Navy had focused some effort on offensive mine warfare?
 
Mobile Mines – We’ve almost abandoned the Submarine Launched Mobile Mine (SLMM) and we could have done much more with that:  longer range, waypoints/navigation, etc.
 
Intelligent Mines – We could use a mine with sophisticated target discrimination and the ability to regulate its own actions (skip a target, choose the optimum target, sense and shut down in the face of sweeping, etc.).

Autonomous Limpet Mines – How about a mobile, self-attaching mine?

Cruise Missile Mines – Perhaps we could have developed a simplified cruise missile mine that simply travels to a coordinate and then dives into the sea to become a mine.
 
Mine Inventory – Simply building tens of thousands of basic mines would have been a huge step in the right direction of cheap, incredibly effective firepower.  The US Navy is terrified of mines – and rightly so – so imagine what kind of offensive mine warfare capabilities we could have now if we had put some effort into it.

 
What kind of advances could have been made if the Navy had focused some effort on ship armor?
 
Reactive Armor – Reactive armor, among many other types of land vehicle armor, could have been adapted to ship use, providing a significant degree of protection.  While it might not be possible to adapt every type of land vehicle armor to ships, it is certain that many types could have been.  Reactive armor, composite armor, bubble armor, spaced armor, layered armor, etc. would all have been worth investigating.
 
Missile Immunity – Proper armor design could have provided a degree of immunity to the most common anti-ship missiles and provided damage mitigation in the face of any missile.
 
Fight Hurt – The ability to absorb damage, stay in the fight, and fight hurt effectively is an ability totally absent in the fleet despite being self-evidently invaluable.  We should have been developing ships that could absorb damage as was routinely done in WWII.  Imagine a Burke with armored VLS and capable of shrugging off Exocet/C80x type anti-ship missiles.
 
Torpedo Armor – Torpedoes, along with mines, are major threats to ships and yet torpedo armor development has been totally ignored.  New concepts of armor, armor shaping (slanted lower hull and keel armor), structural optimization (flex versus rigid, shock absorption, etc.), and void usage could have been developed to provide much greater protection from underwater explosions.

 
What sort of advances could have been made if the Navy had focused some effort on large caliber gun support?
 
8” Gun - The Navy could have adapted a modern version of the Des Moines 8”/55 Rapid Fire Mk16 gun, the best 8” gun ever developed.  The gun was capable of a sustained rate of fire of 10 rds/min and, in the Des Moines class, had magazines of 150 rds per gun for a total of 1350 rds per ship.  These triple gun turrets could have provided the Navy with an overwhelming anti-surface and land attack shell capability.
 
The Zumwalt, in particular, could have been provided with a full 9-gun fit of three triple turrets which would have gone a long way towards providing effective naval gun support.
 
Alternatively, the 8”/55 Mk71 lightweight gun could have been fully developed, providing a large caliber gun capable of being mounted in the Burke and Zumwalt classes.
 
These options would have provided true amphibious assault gun support as opposed to the total absence of any such effective support today.
 
Imagine a fleet of large caliber-gunned ships capable of supporting an amphibious assault, decimating an enemy fleet in close range combat, or laying waste to enemy shore facilities and doing so with cheap shells instead of multi-million dollar missiles which will be in vanishingly short supply by the second week of a peer war.

 
What sort of advances could have been made if the Navy had focused some effort on torpedoes?
 
Wake Homing – It’s inexplicable that we don’t yet have a wake homing torpedo like our enemies.  The Japanese Long Lance torpedo was devastating in WWII and a wake homing version would be many times more effective if ship combat reaches that range.
 
Range – We could have had a much longer range torpedo which, combined with various forms of guidance and homing, would make both surface ship and submarine torpedo attacks frighteningly effective.
 
Larger Warhead – WWII Japanese Long Lance torpedoes had a warhead weight of 1080 lbs.  Our biggest Mk48 torpedo, today, has a warhead of 647 lb.  We need a true ship-sinker warhead.
 
Supercavitating – The underwater equivalent of hypersonic missiles is the supercavitating torpedo which Russia has developed.  It would be nice to for us to have an unstoppable, supercavitating torpedo.
 
AI – Artificial intelligence could have been applied to torpedoes.  Just as missiles have been given the ability to sense and self-allocate targets using rudimentary AI, so could torpedoes do the same.  With AI self-targeting, salvos of torpedoes could be fired at general target clusters and the torpedoes could self-target.
 
These kinds of advances could have made surface ship torpedo use extremely effective.  Instead, we are left with no anti-surface ship torpedo capability.

 
What sort of advances could have been made if the Navy had focused some effort on long range COMBAT surveillance?
 
UAV Surveillance Swarms – We’ve discussed the need for small, cheap, numerous UAVS for surveillance, situational awareness, and targeting.
 
Cruise Missile Based Surveillance – Imagine a surveillance asset based on a stealthy cruise missile.  Instead of a warhead, the payload would be sensors and communications.  We could have thousand mile surveillance capability today, thus solving the long range surveillance/targeting problem!

 
What sort of advances could have been made if the Navy had focused some effort on electronic warfare?
 
Dedicated EW Ships – We could have dedicated offensive and defensive electronic warfare ships similar, in concept, to Burke AAW escorts but for EW instead of AAW.
 
Aegis-like EW Capability – We could have total EW capability controlled by an Aegis-like, master software system. 
 
Cooperative EW Engagement - Imagine a networked, integrated EW capability using a system analogous to our Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) that would link and integrate the EW efforts of an entire task force.
 
Offensive EW – We could have offensive ‘attack’ EW capability using high power output signals for truly effective jamming or signal disruption.

 
What sort of advances could have been made if the Navy had focused some effort on supersonic cruise missiles?
 
Heavyweight Supersonic ASM – We could have a serious, credible, anti-ship capability using supersonic, heavyweight anti-ship missiles instead of the lightweight Naval Strike Missile (NSM).
 
Penetrating Missile – We could have a missile with a realistic chance of penetrating enemy defenses instead of the obsolete Tomahawk.  Such a missile would use supersonic speed and stealth and include versions that would disperse decoys and generate jamming signals.
 
Heavyweight Missile – We could have a true heavyweight missile (BrahMos or similar) capable of inflicting serious damage on Chinese carriers including the coming supercarriers.

 
What sort of advances could have been made if the Navy had focused some effort on aerial tanking?
 
Tanker – We could have a dedicated strike tanker which would extend the useful combat range of the air wing.  This would give us greater numbers of combat aircraft since they wouldn’t be allocated to tanking.  A tanker would give us less cumulative wear and tear on our front line combat aircraft which are currently being forced to fly endless hours of tanker duty.
 
And so on.
 
 
 
Instead, the Navy was totally focused on new hulls in the water no matter how useless they were (LCS, Zumwalt, Ford, MLP/AFSB, JHSV).  The opportunity cost has been enormous and demonstrates just how unwisely we have spent our money.

 

 
________________________________

 
[1]Navy Matters blog, “Atlas Elektronik SeaFox”, February 13, 2023 at 7:42 AM, comment by username = ‘cheezit’,
https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2023/02/atlas-elektronik-seafox.html?showComment=1676302948023#c2558241129023499117