Wayne Hughes is one of the foremost proponents of small
vessel naval forces and has spoken and written extensively about it. Before I go any further, let me commend Capt.
Hughes for his willingness to formulate, publicize, and discuss a point of
view. It takes courage to put one’s
opinions into the public realm where they are open to criticism. Whether I agree or disagree with Hughes’
theories, I respect him for holding and publicizing his thoughts.
In Hughes’ book, Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat, he
presents his theories and then, in conclusion, offers a naval combat scenario
to illustrate their application [1, p.321].
I’d like to examine his combat scenario as a means of describing the
limits and constraints of his theories.
There are many naval observers and commentators who ascribe to his
theories so this exercise is well worth the effort.
In brief, the combat scenario involves a conflict between
Greece and Turkey with the US stuck in between, using naval force to,
ironically, keep the peace by attacking docked Turkish amphibious transport
ships. The US attack force consists of
several small missile boats that are transported undetected, by a mothership,
to a location near the proposed battle and then dispersed, again undetected, to
their launch points where they will attack docked Turkish troop transports
thereby preventing a widespread Turkish amphibious assault on several Greek
islands.
Interestingly, Hughes does not conclude his naval battle scenario. Instead, he ends his narrative at the moment
of engagement. His purpose was setting
the stage for the battle to demonstrate the value of his small combatants. Whether the outcome is successful or not is
irrelevant for what he is trying to accomplish and whether he successfully
demonstrates the value of his theories is up to the reader.
In order to make an assessment of Hughes’ scenario and the principles
he applies, it is necessary to clearly understand the conditions he sets for
the scenario. As with any wargame, the
input conditions determine the result (garbage in, garbage out) and this combat
scenario has a number of constraints built into it, to the point of rendering
the scenario nearly irrelevant. I’ve long
maintained that Hughes’ theories and conclusions are of very limited value and
applicability and his battle scenario clearly illustrates this. Following are some of the conditions Hughes
sets for his scenario. Judge for
yourself the validity and usefulness of the overall scenario in light of the
constraints imposed on the scenario.
You can draw your own conclusion but my assessment is that
Hughes constructed a scenario that perfectly fits his theories so as to
illustrate and extoll them. As such, my
conclusion regarding his theories is that their ‘window’ of applicability is so
small and so unlikely as to render them nearly irrelevant. For example, the US small missile boats, the
heart of Hughes’ envisioned fleet structure concept, are almost magically
transported to the perfect placement on the naval battlefield with no possibility
of detection by the enemy. He also
ignores the issue of fuel and logistical support for the small combatants. A single enemy helicopter would wreak havoc on
the small, defenseless missile boats but enemy air activity was excluded since
its presence would turn a nice, neat scenario into a disaster for the US and
Hughes.
As I was reading the description of the scenario, I was
struck by the thought that there was a far easier and far more assured,
alternate battle plan available. Hughes
hypothesized a single US carrier with four Aegis escorts. He limited their involvement to some minor
scouting but he could, instead, have assigned the four Aegis escorts to deal
with the enemy air forces while the carrier’s aircraft swiftly dispatched the
nearly defenseless Turkish amphibious and naval forces. That, however, would not have served the
purpose of illustrating his theories or, rather, would have pointed out a
preferred alternative to his theories.
Hughes’ theories of small combatants have numerous flaws but
the book serves as an excellent Navy 101 or primer on naval combat. It is a starting point for the study of naval
combat, not an endpoint. As a starting
point, it is well worth reading and studying.
Simply identifying the flaws in Hughes’ concept is an invaluable
education in itself.
For those of you who opt to read his book or writings, the
biggest overall flaw is that his theories all begin with his favored small
combatants already in position, perfectly poised for the salvoes that are the
basis of his theories. He neglects the
logistics, basing, detection, lack of anti-air defense, EW, etc. that are all
crucial to, and precede, any successful naval engagement. As you read his writings, keep that in mind
and recognize the weaknesses. It will
help you assess the validity – or lack thereof - of his theories.
______________________________
[1]”Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat”, 2nd Ed., Wayne P. Hughes Jr.,
Naval Institute Press, 2000, ISBN 1-55750-392-3, p.321.
- The scenario is tailor made to fit his theories. In other words, Hughes’ theories are not
applied to the scenario; the scenario is
applied to his theories. That’s
backwards and unrealistic! There’s
nothing wrong, per se, with doing that but the reader needs to recognize what
was done and be very wary of extrapolating the success – or lack thereof – of a
very specific scenario to other, perhaps more likely scenarios such as open
ocean combat or combined arms (aviation) naval combat.
- The scenario forbids attacks on the enemy homeland, land
bases and airfields, land sensors, etc.
In other words, a foolish way to conduct a war. Of course, historically, we generally do
limit ourselves in combat to the point of harming ourselves so this may not be a
totally ridiculous constraint!
- Electronic warfare (EW) is ignored and networks are assumed
to be flawless and unimpeded with the US having perfect communications,
command, and control.
- Land based strikes by enemy aircraft against naval targets
are not included.
- US Air Force and Army assistance is ignored so no friendly air
strikes, reconnaissance, intel, tanker, or EW support.
- Carrier air strikes on ships are ruled out due to fear of a
hypothesized 200 enemy fighters.
- It is assumed that no Greek or Turkish surveillance will
detect the US small combat vessels.
- Complete US satellite coverage is assumed.
Who is the Hughes fellow who repackages my ideas ?
ReplyDeleteEverything old is new again.
Harrrummphhh.
Lmao this is a funny comment. Go back to your Napoleonic War old man!
DeleteI am an admirer of Hughes and his salvo equations. However the flaws in his small ship approach are numerous. He focuses on an engagement but completely ignores how the ships would be supported.
ReplyDeleteI have always been of the opinion that Hughes' theories are really more relevant to aircraft than missile boats.
ReplyDeleteYes, that was really the problem with Seafighter. Basically Hughes and Cebrowski were just describing what a naval aircraft is/does.
Delete"I have always been of the opinion that Hughes' theories are really more relevant to aircraft"
Delete"Hughes and Cebrowski were just describing what a naval aircraft is/does."
I don't see that. You'll have to explain how the salvo equations apply to aerial combat.
Aircraft don't launch in salvos. Launches are, generally, single, discrete events. There is no defending fleet with aggregate defenses and 'staying power' (one of the terms in the equations) is zero (or whatever scale he uses) as a hit is almost always total destruction.
The fleets in the equations are treated homogenously, with a group rating for defense. Aircraft are individual with widely varying defensive attributes depending on the parameters at the time of the attacker's launch. In other words, each individual aircraft has its own characteristics and do not perform as an average or aggregate of the group.
Feel free to explain how you see the salvo equations applying to aerial combat.
I think you're referring to air-to-air combat. I was thinking of air-to-surface combat which is what Hughes focus was on.
DeleteYes, carrier aircraft launch individually, but in strike they form up and conduct missions in a formation - pretty much like a salvo. See Midway where the attack formations were dozens of aircraft.
"The carrier air wing] is best represented as one pulse of fire power unleashed upon the arrival of the air wing at the target" (Hughes, page 99). He has an entire section titled a Tactical Model of Carrier Warfare which applies salvo equations to WW2 carrier combat, treating the air wing as missiles.
Aircraft aren't as homogenous as you seem to think. During WW2 there were three main types of carrier-based aircraft: Fighters, dive bombers and torpedo bombers. They were administered and operated in those groupings. That's gotten even more homogenous today: air wings are almost exclusively comprised of F/A-18s and their variants.
"I was thinking of air-to-surface combat which is what Hughes focus was on."
DeleteAh, my misunderstanding. Quite right.
Consider, however, the case of Midway. Hughes' salvo equations would have been inaccurate since they don't account for changes in circumstances unless one begins to consider each aircraft group or each individual aircraft as its own 'pulse'.
The overall American strike was a pulse but it would not have correctly modeled the reality that the torpedo planes pulled the Japanese defenders down to sea level, thereby allowing the dive bombers a nearly unhindered attack. In other words, the maneuvering of the sub-groups dynamically altered the defensive and offensive parameters. No equation could have predicted those events and that outcome. The only way the equations could work is to apply factors obtained via hindsight which, of course, defeats the purpose of predictive equations.
Again, this illustrates that Hughes equations are simplified to the point of irrelevancy.
I wouldn't say his model is irrelevant. I'd say its useful but incomplete. I do think in drawing inferences from it, Hughes overemphasized the tactical implications and largely ignored logistics implications. The small ship fleet he advocated can maybe win certain types of battles but would be unsustainable and impractical.
DeleteHis model result for the Battle of Midway actually matches up to the actual results (see page 102-3). Japan lost four carriers and the US lost one. And it took two salvoes to do it. The interesting thing about the Battle of Midway that he points out was that the island itself served as a decoy.
"His model result for the Battle of Midway actually matches up to the actual results"
DeleteYes and no.
He doesn't actually present a model in the sense that variables are created and values/coefficients assigned to those variables, resulting in a predictive result. Instead, he observed the actual results and then formulated his 'model' which was nothing more than the observation that one carrier strike generally results in one carrier loss (an incredibly gross simplicfication!) and then REAPPLIES THE OBSERVED RESULTS TO THE BATTLE TO ... WAIT FOR IT ... PREDICT THE RESULTS. No surprise, it matches! You'll note that the other carrier engagement 'predictions' were somewhat hit and miss (no pun intended) as far as predictions.
So, I guess his 'one strike causes one sinking' observation is technically a model but it's purely an observational, hindsight description, not a factor-based predictive model. We could not, for example, use it to predict a US-Chinese carrier engagement today with any reasonable expectation of validity.
I would also note that when the starting carrier numbers are small, say 2 or 3 as was the case with many carrier engagements, the predicted results can't help but be pretty close to reality. If you start with 2, say, and predict an outcome of 1, whether the reality was 0, 1, or 2 you won't be numerically far off. You'll note that for the Philippine Sea battle where he begins with 9 and 15 carriers, his 'predictions' were significantly off because his 'model' didn't account for any of the factors that actually influenced results (night attacks, for example).
Small Missile Ships evolved in the 50s and 60s. One needs to understand the context in which they developed. Early Anti Ship Missiles were too big and bulky to be carried by Aircrafts, baring the large bombers. The small missile boats developed as an answer to a platform to carry these missiles to the launch point. Again the early evolution of small size meant limited endurance, hence more as a defensive solution rather than an offensive one.
ReplyDeleteWith the development of smaller and longer ranged missiles which can be carried by Aircraft the need for a ship based platform is moot, especially for a navy which doesn't lack numbers in aircraft carriers.
Should a navy with no carriers or only limited number of carries invest in such small combatants is something that can be debated. But a larger ship can carry actually self deploy and bring more missiles to the table.
For defensive operations land based fighters can carry the missiles to hit enemy combatants.
The small missile boats were an answer to the era they were designed in and performed relatively well in the wars of that era. But their relevance in todays era is highly debatable.
-BM
"Carrier air strikes on ships are ruled out due to fear of a hypothesized 200 enemy fighters."
ReplyDeleteIf there are no carrier-borne aircraft to launch air strikes on enemy warships, there are no carrier-borne aircraft to perform combat air patrol (CAP) and defend the fleet from enemy air strikes. Even assuming Hughes' proposed the small ships are capable of launching long-range surface-to-air missiles, they are unable to carry large and powerful (and expensive) radar sets necessary to acquire and track targets for these missiles, i.e., enemy strike fighters and antiship missiles.
Hughes' scenario, and the proposal this scenario is meant to support, are WORTHLESS to any military leader with a working brain.
"they are unable to carry large and powerful (and expensive) radar sets necessary to acquire and track targets for these missiles,"
DeleteTo be fair, Hughes' scenario assumed that the missile boat's targets - the Turkish troop transports - were tied up at dock and, thus, their locations were precisely known. He acknowledges that if the transports had been sailing in open waters the scenario would have been much more challenging. As I said, he constructed the scenario to fit his theories rather than the other way around.
The problem with the small combatant concept is that you have to make a LOT of unrealistic assumptions in order for it to be viable. The same is true for the Navy's distributed lethality concept.
"As I said, he constructed the scenario to fit his theories rather than the other way around.
Delete"The problem with the small combatant concept is that you have to make a LOT of unrealistic assumptions in order for it to be viable."
And at no point during Hughes' speech did any of his subordinates, peers, and superiors tell him how unrealistic his scenario is?! What kind of idiots do we have for...?
(Remembers US history.)
Sigh.
I haven't read Hughes. But I see how your characterization of his work applies to so many other things. Scripted wargames, simulations, "lessons from Ukraine", manufacturers claims, even comments on the blog... They all can or do have the same potential problems. They cherry pick a scenario in order to further a point of veiw, sell a certain product or tactic, etc. Until I sat back and thought about it, I hadnt realized just how slanted things are, and the lack of factual, unbiased information makes this blog, and other venues like it, a bit of a jewel in the rockpile...
ReplyDelete"I haven't read Hughes."
DeletePlease don't think that I'm suggesting that there's nothing to be learned from Hughes' work. Quite the opposite! Although wrong, he presents his ideas logically and in detail and he writes well. Simply evaluating his ideas and discerning the flaws is an invaluable educational exercise in itself. We all have too much to read and too little time but his book is well worth the read, if you're so inclined.
" I hadn't realized just how slanted things are"
We've abandoned any pretense of realistic tests and exercises. The pre-WWII Fleet Problems were the last free play exercises with an unconstrained, intelligent enemy and they proved invaluable in our war preparations. All of our tests and exercises now are, as you point out, pre-determined to support an agenda.
In sports, a common saying is that the only thing worse than not practicing is practicing the wrong way because that's how you develop bad habits. Our scripted, pre-determined exercises are just practicing the wrong way and we're developing bad habits. In war, bad habits get you killed. We're knowingly and purposely developing bad habits and a lot of sailors and troops are going to get killed because of it.
"Millennium Challenge 2002"
DeleteWe've covered this in a post. See, "Millennial Challenge"
I recall reading about the Pegasus class patrol hydrofoil boats .These were well armed with harpoon missiles & a 76mm gun. However these boats used too much fuel in hydrofoil mode and were eventually scrapped. The cost of operating these boats was high.
ReplyDeleteNo, neither fuel usage nor operating costs were significant compared to other ships. In fact, the Pegasus was, essentially, free to operate, in comparison. The Navy simply didn't want them.
DeleteWe did a post on the Pegasus class: "Pegasus Class"
The book describes a fictional Cushing-class corvette, displacing 800 tons, with a 76 mm gun, Harpoon missiles, and a LAMPS helicopter. They are described as being for short missions (I would say corvette tenders or an ASW carrier with resupply capabilities would help with that). I know you advocate corvettes with a different design than the Cushings.
ReplyDeleteThe book also describes 200-ton Phantom-class boats, deployed from 40,000-ton motherships, built for stealth, and hard to detect in daytime. This sounds like the Visby-class corvette, though smaller. The Phantoms are armed with a new Army missile, which I interpreted as being the ATACMS when I first read it years ago. My interpretation at the time was these boats were designed to inflict real pain on the enemy while being hard to track down. I reread the book in the past year (it may be a newer edition than the one I read before). It says the missile is so new the Turks would have a hard time countering it. To my mind today, that sounds convenient.
"Phantom"
DeleteThe closest real world equivalent might be the Chinese Type 022 missile boat: small, fast, stealthy, heavy firepower, defenseless.
"motherships"
Everyone who talks about motherships glosses over the fact they represent a massive risk: sink the mothership and all the chicks die or become useless. Over the years, no one has explained how a large, slow, non-stealthy, mostly defenseless mothership will be able to sail deep into enemy waters, undetected, to release the baby boats. Everyone just 'hand waves' the problem away and assumes the mothership will do its job despite all the vulnerabilities and flaws. In this specific case/scenario, the mothership would travel from the far western Med to the contested waters without being detected by anyone. Convenient, if it happens, but not very realistic which makes the subsequent Phantom exploits suspect.
Similarly, the Cushing corvette tenders are going to sail around without being detected by a Turkish military with several dozen ships in theater and 200 aircraft? Is that plausible?
"...defenseless."
ReplyDeleteYes, I have read that one weak spot of this concept is such craft are very vulnerable to air attack.
There has been some discussion on this blog about the Yellowstone-class destroyer tenders and what a crying shame it is they were scrapped. A couple of them did a lot of support work in Operation Desert Storm. Admittedly, they didn't face much of a threat there, but destroyer tenders had been around for a long time, including when we faced peer threats. Presumably modern tenders would hang back from the action and resupply rotating corvette squadrons. I'd equip a tender with at least two each of the Vulcan Phalanx, SeaRAM, and 30 mm chain gun in a stabilized mount. The ships also would get the ESSM and torpedo decoys. I can't recall the source right now, but I've read part of the justification for eliminating destroyer tenders is that modern destroyers are so large and (supposedly) self-sufficient that tenders aren't necessary. If modern warships become smaller, would that not make tenders be more important?
My thinking is also influenced by how the CVS versions of the Essex-class carriers. The carriers operated with destroyers and frigates and provided resupply to the escorts. I also note that you envision dedicated ASW ships operating with a relatively small helicopter carrier.
" tenders would hang back from the action"
DeleteThat's the crux of the problem. How far back? A destroyer tender can hang very far back because destroyers have very good range and can operate for a while and then reach the tender. However, a small 'Phantom' type boat would, presumably, lack the range to go from tender to operating area, stay for a while, and then return to the tender. Of course, the 'Phantom' is non-existent so we don't know what characteristics it would have but small missile boats are typically very short range. That requires the tender to stay close to the operating area instead of far back.
As a comparative example, the Ambassador MkIII has an endurance of just 8 days and a range of 2000 nm at 15 kts. If a tender were to hang back, say, 500 nm, it would take the boat a day and a half to reach the operating area and the same returning. That's 3 of the 8 days of endurance and that would leave the boat with only 1000 nm of range for actual operations - and that's if you run the fuel tanks dry which no captain would ever do. If you insist on maintaining, say, 500 nm of 'reserve', you'd have only 500 nm of operating range to work with.
With today's missile ranges, 500 nm might not be far enough back!
This is why missile boats are generally limited to home water operations where the limited range and endurance don't matter. It's these limitations that everyone hand waves away.
"Phalanx, SeaRAM, and 30 mm chain gun in a stabilized mount. The ships also would get the ESSM and torpedo decoys."
And, of course, you'd have to include the associated radars, fire control, magazines, sonar, technicians, berthing, etc. You're beginning to approach a Constellation or Burke in capabilities and cost!
"This is why missile boats are generally limited to home water operations where the limited range and endurance don't matter."
ReplyDeleteUnderstood. But this blog advocates using corvettes for blue water operations.
"You're beginning to approach a Constellation or Burke in capabilities and cost!"
Well, I didn't include Standard missiles and the equipment needed to support them... I also didn't include Harpoons, Tomahawks, Naval Strike Missiles, or other weapons carried by warships used in offensive operations.
"this blog advocates using corvettes for blue water operations."
DeleteYes, for a very specific function: ASW in peripheral areas or for convoy escort. In each case, the threat is low and a tender can safely operate in the area or the corvettes operate from one base to another as they escort convoys.
" I also didn't include "
No, you didn't but you did hugely overload the mothership. This is a tendency modern naval observers have - to make every ship a single-handed, war-winning vessel. A mothership should have one and only one function: to service smaller craft. It is not an area defense vessel so there is no need for ESSM, VLS, advanced radars, fire control, etc. A few CIWS/SeaRAM for odd leaker is fine but no more than that. Similarly, a 30 mm gun is of no use in a war. Even a torpedo decoy is of no real use unless you increase the ship's speed and maneuverability to assist in evading torpedoes and add a sonar to give warning. Of course, then you'd need to add an underwater combat control suite (SQQ-89).
A mothership should either be operating in a safe area or under the protection of air cover and/or Aegis.
To do otherwise makes the tender unaffordable and too expensive to risk.
Take a look at WWII history and note where the various tenders actually operated in relation to the combat areas.
A chain gun in a stabilized mount would be there to counter speedboats and sea drones. Admittedly, I said a tender would hang back from the action so that weapon would be better suited to other types of ships.
DeleteThank you for the responses.