More Defensive Missile Data

I’ve repeatedly stated that ship anti-air / anti-missile defenses will perform far worse than the Navy believes.  I’ve backed that statement up with all the available historical data which, to be fair, is not a lot.  However, what data exists unequivocally proves that defensive surface to air missiles (SAM) have a probability of kill (pK) in the range of 1%-25% with the vast majority falling in the 1%-10% or so.  Despite this, there is a group of observers/commenters who have a vastly inflated confidence in SAM systems that is based on nothing but the same promise of improved technology that accompanies every new SAM system and that, ultimately, fails to deliver.  Well, here’s a new data point for Russian S-300 system performance against Israeli aircraft:

Syrian air defense forces having launched more than 1,000 surface-air missiles to try and foil the repeated Israeli attacks. They’ve had little effect so far. (1)

While this does not provide exact numbers, the trend seems clear.  I’ve heard of no reports of downed Israeli aircraft nor any credible claims of downings by Syria.  Thus, the Russian S-300 system would seem to have a pK of, essentially, zero.

S-300 - Ineffective?

I know exactly what some of you are going to say.  You’re going to wave away the failings of this system and point to the wondrous S-400 system.  Well, I’ll remind you that the S-300 once got the same rave reviews that the S-400 gets today.  Dr. Carlo Kopp, the renowned author, had this to say about the S-300 system in 2006.

The S-300 SAM systems remain one of the most lethal, if not the most lethal, all altitude area defence SAM systems in service … (2)

This is yet another data ‘point’ that proves that SAM success rates are quite poor across all eras and all systems.  Despite this body of evidence, the US firmly believes that its missile systems are extremely effective, to the point that we don’t even mount close in weapon systems on the Zumwalts.  We desperately need to put our defensive missile systems through real, live fire weapon trials on sacrificial barges and find out what they can, or cannot, do.

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(1)Breaking Defense website, “Unanswered Israeli Air Strikes Against Syria Raise S-400 Questions ”, Arie Egozi, 9-Jun-2020,

https://breakingdefense.com/2020/06/unanswered-israeli-air-strikes-against-syria-raise-s-400-questions/

(2)Dr. Carlo Kopp, 25-Feb-2006,

https://web.archive.org/web/20110928142727/http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.93/pub_detail.asp

Helos in the Littorals

The Navy is heavily invested in helicopters from a tactical perspective and few people even pause to consider the limits of their applicability.  Before I go any further, let me state that I, too, see the obvious capabilities of helos.  However, I also see their limitations.  Let’s look at bit closer at the use of helos in a littoral combat zone since helos will be a major, or perhaps the major, weapon system of the LCS. 

SAM - Counter to the Helo?

Regarding the littoral surface warfare scenario (ASuW) and setting aside the question of why we would be there, as discussed in a previous post, I’ve often heard comments that a couple of helos will make short work of a swarm of small craft and, to be fair, in an otherwise permissive environment, that’s probably a true statement.  But think about it …  Is there anything in a littoral zone, and a small craft swarm scenario, that might negate the effectiveness of a helo?  How about man-portable surface-to-air missiles (SAM) like the Stinger or SA-16/18/24 family?  Such missiles have max ranges of around 5 miles and effective ranges of 3-4 miles.  Compare those ranges to the helo’s air-to-ground (AGM) weapons such as Hellfire (5 miles) or Griffon (3 miles).  The opposing ranges basically overlap.  If one’s in range, so is the other.  SAMs can be fired from shore, from hiding in civilian/commercial small craft or, in what should be an obvious tactic, from each boat in a swarm.  The other obvious danger to helos, since we’re going to be fighting in someone else’s littoral zone, is aircraft from nearby airfields.  So, absent a permissive environment, the helo versus swarm is hardly the one-sided affair that many visualize.  Throw in a helo’s limited number of weapons and possibility of mechanical unavailability when needed and the situation is further complicated.  Finally, what about good old fashioned surprise?  If the helo is not in the air when an attack begins, the attack will be over by the time the helo can get airborne.  Helos are not a rapid reaction weapon system.

The above comments also apply in general to littoral ASW.  In the ASW role, helos made their reputation, and deservedly so, during the Cold War sub hunting days in the open ocean which did, indeed, constitute a permissive environment.  In the littoral zone, as described above, the helo is capable of being targeted multiple ways and may well find itself at high risk.  One wonders if this may have been part of the rationale for the original LCS conceptual ASW module consisting of multiple, off-board unmanned underwater and surface vehicles – an attempt to reduce dependence on easily targeted helos.

Helo - Endangered Species?

In summary, the helo is a powerful weapon system but is not the invincible platform that many make it out to be.  The closer helos operate to shore and shallow water with its fleets of small civilian boats, any one of which may harbor a man with a Stinger, the more at risk they are.  For the helo, operating near shore is analogous to the Army fighting in a city.  Snipers can hide anywhere and blend in with the population.  Stingers can be anywhere and can hide amongst the civilian craft.  One has only to look at the Soviet's Afghanistan experience to see how helos fared against Stingers.

The point of this little thought exercise is that we should not become overly dependent on the helo alone.  The LCS (or any ship attempting to fight in the littoral zone) needs a range of options which should include a small ship-launched Griffon/Hellfire-like missile with a range of several miles or more as well as a robust gun arrangement with multiple guns and fields of fire to the stern so that the LCS can use its speed as a tactic to maintain separation.  What’s needed for shallow water ASW is a topic for another day.