Our Navy For The China War

ComNavOps has discussed various aspects of what our naval force structure should be but it’s generally been in isolation rather than presented as a grand overview.  This has sometimes made it difficult for people who haven’t been following the blog closely to understand how the individual components relate and where they fit in the overall force structure.  I think it’s time to begin presenting the overall picture.  One way to do this is to examine the naval force structure we’ll need to fight China and win.  Of course, we lack an explicit military strategy which is what we really need to do a detailed analysis and presentation but we can still generate a pretty good picture just by looking at the typical types of naval operations that will be needed.
 
With that in mind, here are some of the naval operations that will be required in the China War and the specific force needed to meet those requirements.
 
Tomahawk Strikes – We will need massive, very long range, cruise missile strikes against Chinese bases, industrial facilities, etc.  The easiest and most survivable way to accomplish this is via submarine.  We need a moderate sized SSGN force.  The handful of Virginia Payload Module equipped Virginia class subs with their 40 cruise missiles is simply insufficient and inefficient compared to the 154 missiles carried by a single Ohio class SSGN.  It takes 4 Virginias to equal the missile load of a single Ohio SSGN.  Let’s recall that the Tomahawk strike on the Syrian airbase in response to the chemical weapon attack used 70+ missiles and was only a partial strike on a small, undefended base.  Any serious strike against any substantial, defended target is going to require hundreds of missiles.  Trying to mass and coordinate a dozen Virginias is much more difficult than using two or three Ohio SSGNs.  We simply must build more SSGNs.
 
We also need a new cruise missile.  The Tomahawk is old, slow, non-stealthy, and has limited capabilities.  The attrition rate among Tomahawks in a peer defended attack will be substantial which will require much greater numbers of missiles to achieve the desired result – numbers we don’t have in inventory.
 
Our surface ships will have to participate in Tomahawk strikes and the Burke is our only cruise missile shooter.  In order to get our Burkes into launch position, they will have to be escorted.  In a role reversal, the escorts will be carriers.  The carriers will provide the aircraft portion of a strong, layered defense in addition to the Burke’s own AAW capabilities.
 
Air Force Protection – The Air Force is going to be busy launching constant, very long range B-2/21 bomber strikes and will need protected air corridors to the extent possible.  Carriers will have to provide temporary, mobile, air superiority to create protected transit lanes.  This will require long range air superiority fighters with very large weapon loads.
 
Anti-Surface Superiority – The Navy will need to establish surface superiority – total domination, actually – to enable free movement of submarines, unhindered by enemy ASW forces, free movement of carrier forces, transport of supplies, at-sea fleet logistic support, etc.  Since carriers can’t be everywhere and will have higher priority tasks, this will require independent (independent of carrier support) surface groups tasked with eliminating Chinese surface forces and capable of operating, at least initially, with minimal or no air support.  These surface groups will need extensive organic small UAV capability for local situational awareness, a long range (200 miles or so), stealthy anti-ship cruise missile, and heavy naval guns for those close range, unanticipated naval encounters that are all too common in naval warfare.
 
ASW – Arguably, the most important aspect of our naval operations will be our submarine activities.  To do this successfully, we need to provide the maximum amount of ASW support.  We need to attack enemy subs and ASW assets at the source (factories, supplies, bases) and at sea, as they operate.  All of the source attacks will, of course, be on the Chinese mainland and all the operating attacks will be inside the first island chain.  We need to be able to penetrate the A2/AD zone, find those assets, and destroy them.  This leads back to a long range strike capability (Tomahawk or, ideally, a Tomahawk replacement) and the ability to operate near or inside the first island chain using surface groups.
 
Logistics Convoys – Resupply convoys from the US west coast will have to transit to Pearl Harbor and beyond and will require ASW/AAW escort.  A typical escort group should include small ASW corvettes and a single Burke AAW destroyer.
 
Air Superiority – The one absolute we count on, operationally, is that the Chinese will make a Taiwan invasion the initial action of any war.  Assuming we intend to contest that, a Guadalcanal-like battle will ensue with the Chinese invasion fleet on the west side of Taiwan and US naval forces on the east.  Carriers will provide the local air support over Taiwan and will attempt to establish air superiority over the island and the Chinese fleet – no easy task.  Again, this demands a pure air superiority fighter for our air wings.
 
Mine Warfare – The Chinese reportedly have hundreds of thousands of mines and we have no useful mine countermeasures capability.  Offensively, on our part, the Chinese are contained by the first island chain and should be bottled up by mining the relatively narrow passages out of the chain.  However, we have little to no useful mining capability as measured by the ability to lay thousands of mines in a very brief period of time.  A sub or airplane laying a couple dozen mines at a time is not combat-useful.
 
 
Conclusion
 
This is beginning to tell us what our fleet structure should look like and what kinds of weapons we need.  THIS … this is how you build a fleet – from an analysis of needs not a desire to pursue isolated technology for its own sake.
 
We can see what we need and now we need to look at our current force structure, see what’s useful, see what’s useless, see what’s missing, and recognize what we need to begin acquiring on an urgent basis.
 
So much of what we have, and are actively acquiring, has little or no use in a war with China.
 
Of note, what naval capabilities are conspicuous by their absence from the discussion?  That’s right … amphibious assaults and unmanned assets.  There is simply no strategic need for assaults and no tactical need for unmanned assets, at least at their current level of capability.
 
To summarize,
 
Not Needed: 

• amphibious ships
• F-35
• F-18
• Zumwalt
• Ford
• LCS
• unmanned assets

 
Needed: 

• new cruise missile
• Simpler, cheaper aircraft carriers
• new air superiority fighter
• SSGNs
• 8” gun ships / 16” battleships
• new electronic warfare aircraft, both air-to-air and air-to-ground optimized
• true destroyer
• Burke replacement
• mine countermeasure ships and equipment

 
There you have it … the naval force we should be procuring for the war with China.  It’s noteworthy that pretty much everything we currently have is not needed and everything we need is non-existent and, worse, we have no plans to develop/acquire any of the missing items.
 
So what is the Navy working to acquire?  Unmanned sail boats, a generic do-everything aircraft that will do nothing well, more Burkes, tiny cargo/landing vessels for the Marines, AI-powered everything, and more Fords.
 
I’ll put it as plainly as possible:  What we have, we don’t need and what we need, we don’t have.

Changing the Calculus

You’ve probably heard, by now, about the Navy’s AIM-174B air-to-air missile.  It’s a Standard SM-6 surface to air missile adapted to be air launched from F-18 Hornets.  The key characteristic of this missile, in this role, is its 200-300 mile range.  There is no exact published spec on the range, yet, but the ship launched version has a range of 150 – 290 miles, depending on the flight profile.  Various reports suggest that the air launched range is 300+ miles. 
 
Other performance characteristics of note include a weight of around 1,900 pounds, a length of more than 15 feet, a speed of up to Mach 3.5, and an impressive 140-pound blast-fragmentation warhead. In comparison, the Sidewinder has a 20 lb warhead and the AMRAAM has a 44 lb warhead.
 
Of course, this performance comes at a staggering cost of $4.3M per missile.[1]
 

AIM-174B

This missile is intended to be the very long range air to air missile (VLRAAM) that’s been missing from the inventory and is an answer to the very long range Chinese and Russian air to air missiles.  The Chinese have the PL-15 which is reported to have a range of 120-190 miles and a speed of Mach 5, the PL-17 which is reported to have a range of 250-310 miles and a speed of Mach 6, and the PL-21 which has a reported range of 190+ miles.  The Russians have the AA-13 (R-37) Arrow which has a reported range of up to 250 miles and a speed of Mach 6.  A similar, though shorter ranged US missile is the AIM-260, currently under development.  It is reported to have a range of 120 miles and a speed of Mach 5.

 
This category of very long range, very fast missile is a severe problem for high value units such as tankers and E-2 Hawkeyes.  We’ve discussed the impact of this missile and noted that it could force our Hawkeyes, in particular, to operate so far back from the aerial battle as to lose awareness and control which is, of course, the doctrinal key to US aerial combat.  This would, for example, cede aerial supremacy to the Chinese over Taiwan in the event of an invasion.  Our carrier aircraft would be unable to operate effectively in the area with each aircraft forced to operate independently instead of with the benefit of an all-seeing controller.  It would also force each aircraft to radiate instead of remaining emissions silent and allowing the E-2 to detect and designate targets.  The negative impact of Chinese very long range air to air missiles (VLRAAM) cannot be overstated.
 
 
Targeting
 
This is, as always, the crucial and limiting factor.  A 300+ mile missile is useless if we can’t generate targeting at that range.  No fighter radar is going to see modern enemy fighters at anything approaching that range and certainly not enemy stealth fighters.  My best semi-informed guess is that a fighter won’t see an enemy stealth fighter until 20 miles or less.
 
In a match up between the Navy’s F-18, the only plane currently designated to carry the AIM-174B, and an enemy stealth fighter, the enemy is going to get first detection every time.
 
A large radar plane (AWACS or E-2 Hawkeye) might be able to see enemy fighters at somewhat longer ranges but, still, nothing approaching 300+ miles.  So, where do we get targeting for these missiles?  There are a few viable options.
 

• The F-35 (or the occasional F-22 from Guam?) might have the stealth to get close enough to provide targeting against HVUs (though not enemy stealth fighters).  HVUs are not stealthy and are relatively easily detected.  Note: this is one reason I’ve called for stealthy ‘Hawkeyes’, possibly based on the B-21 (see, “B-21 Hawkeye”), to thwart enemy attacks against our HVUs.
• A B-2/21 equipped with passive sensors could be used to provide targeting although it is questionable whether it would be worth the risk.
• Taiwan ground assets might well be able to provide targeting, particularly using passive EO and IR sensors.  It would be almost impossible for the Chinese to completely eliminate this kind of small, non-radiating, hard to find asset.

 
The reverse case of the Chinese providing targeting for their VLRAAMs is interesting.  They would have their own stealth aircraft to provide targeting, land based over- the-horizon radars, and suicide aircraft.  The latter is concerning.  The Chinese do not have the same view of the value of the individual pilot that we do and the idea of sending throwaway fighter aircraft on semi-suicide runs straight at our HVUs, either to shoot them directly or to provide targeting for remote VLRAAM shooters, is viable and concerning.  From the Chinese perspective, if they can trade a handful of second tier fighters to kill a US HVU, that would be a win for them.  The Russians essentially had this as the cornerstone of their anti-carrier strategy during the Cold War.  They were doctrinally willing to sacrifice many Tu-95 Bear search aircraft to provide detection and targeting for their naval aviation bomber regiments.
 
 
Taiwan Scenario
 
The problem with any contemplation of a Taiwan-centered war with China is that it presents a massive advantage for China due to physical proximity.  The skies over Taiwan can safely be assumed to be packed with Chinese aircraft and only occasionally challenged by US sorties from Guam, if it remains operational or carrier aircraft.  The advantage becomes all the greater for Chinese aviation through their uncontested use of AEW and EW aircraft supporting the aerial fight from a safe distance.  Until now, we simply didn’t have a VLRAAM of our own to threaten Chinese AEW and EW aircraft.
 
Conversely, Chinese VLRAAM missiles would be used to push US AEW, EW, and tanker aircraft back, thereby relinquishing control of the air battle.
 
For many decades, US military operations have assumed aerial supremacy.  Chinese VLRAAMs have upended that assumption.  Now, however, the AIM-174B offers the ability to regain control of the aerial battle or, at least, force an even contest (which is not how you want to fight but it’s better than fighting from a disadvantaged position!).
 
 
Summary
 
The AIM-174B VLRAAM offers the possibility of establishing aerial supremacy (or, at least, equality) in the Taiwan scenario.  The key, as always, is targeting.  As usual, the US military has focused on the weapon and ignored the sensor/targeting issue.  We should be working just as hard at solving the targeting issue.
 
We also need to be working on tactics for the Taiwan scenario and I guarantee that we have not addressed this in any realistic fashion.  We need to figure out how best to deploy the AIM-174B and how best to take advantage of the opportunities it creates.  Will this allow our F-18s to fight with a reasonable chance of success or is the F-18 simply outclassed by Chinese aircraft?  Are there tactics that can make the F-18 effective?  This, by the way, is why I’ve repeatedly called for a new, very long range, stealthy, air supremacy carrier fighter and end this idiotic combination strike-fighter nonsense that produces an aircraft that is neither a good strike asset nor a good fighter.
 
We can win the Taiwan aerial battle but it means focusing on what’s important and letting go of our paradigms.  We need new approaches, new tactics, and new aircraft optimized for the Chinese war.  The AIM-174B is one piece of the puzzle but we can’t stop there, as we are almost certain to do.  We need to develop the accompanying tactics and fighter aircraft that will take advantage of the AIM-174B.  And no, we can’t simply stand off and lob these missiles into the skies over Taiwan.  The missiles are far too expensive, complex, and time-consuming to produce to ever have that kind of inventory.
 
We’ve taken the first step.  Now, we need to finish the job.
 
 
 
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[1]https://www.19fortyfive.com/2025/05/aim-174b-is-navys-new-air-launched-missile-a-hypersonic-killer/

Philippines Strategy

You’ve probably noticed that several of ComNavOps’ fictional stories revolve around the Philippines.  This is not by random chance.  The strategic value of the Philippines cannot be overstated.  The country, along with Taiwan, forms two gigantic ‘forts’ that China must deal with in any war.
 
From China’s perspective, those two countries act as forward enemy bases that dominate the surrounding seas and impact any operations the Chinese would attempt.  Their removal from the strategic equations is imperative.  Ideally, China would turn the tables by seizing both countries and using them as forts against any American response.
 
Taiwan’s seizure (or ‘reunification’ as the Chinese would euphemistically put it) is absolutely mandatory for both strategic and cultural reasons.  Wisely or foolishly, China’s leadership has linked themselves to the seizure of Taiwan as a national and cultural imperative.  For those reasons, Taiwan will be the first operation in any war.
 
The Philippines present a somewhat different situation for China.  The Philippines cannot be allowed to become a US forward base but it is not necessarily a requirement that the country be physically seized and occupied.  Forcing Philippines to declare neutrality is almost as good as seizing it.  A declaration of neutrality would eliminate Philippines as a forward base for the US and would have the added benefit of not tying up any Chinese forces in an occupation. 
 
Ideally, of course, China would like the Philippines to enter a war as an ally of China, thereby allowing China to use it as a base without the difficulties of an invasion and occupation.
 
By far, the most likely course of action is that Philippines would declare neutrality rather than place themselves as a target between the US and China.
 
Neutrality, however, will not prevent China, which cares nothing for international laws, from occupying areas of the Philippines that it finds advantageous in its war efforts against the US.  This, of course, leaves Philippines in a bit of a no-win situation.
 
All of this is fairly obvious so where is this going?  Let’s consider scenarios in which the US has access to the use of the Philippines, either because the Philippines enters the war as an ally of the US or because Philippines declares neutrality and China ignores that and attempts to seize or operate from the country, thereby negating Philippines’ neutrality. 
 
In this case, the US would attempt to set up bases and, perhaps more importantly, surveillance assets (radar, elevated optical sensors, etc.).   Obviously, China is not going to sit back and allow that to occur without hindrance. This raises the scenario of the US having to fight to establish and operate a base – something that we haven’t had to do since Guadalcanal.  Do we have the capability to seize suitable land, set up a base while under fire, and defend that base well enough to keep it operational?
 
The answer is no and certainly not with the equipment, units, and training we have currently.  This strongly suggests that we should be developing – quickly! – the capability to seize, set up, and defend a major base.  I’ve often suggested that the Marine’s core mission should be port seizure and this type of operation would be a logical extension of that.  Note that the Army does have existing units dedicated to the seizure of existing airbases.
 
Seizure of land for a not yet existing base could range from ‘walk in unopposed’ to a full fledged, contested, amphibious assault depending on how extensively the Chinese manage to get established.  As we’ve thoroughly discussed, our ability to conduct an opposed landing is extremely limited as we lack naval gun support, sufficient ship-to-shore connectors to allow for attrition, armor, logistic support, sea bases (if we don’t seize a port), mines to protect our sea flanks, and mobile anti-air defenses to protect forces ashore.  In addition, our ability to establish local air superiority is highly suspect and would be largely limited to the understrength air wings of our carriers which would be hard pressed to conduct simultaneous air-to-air and ground support operations with just thirty or so combat aircraft per air wing.
 
 
As we contemplate seizing land and establishing a base, consider these questions:
 

• Do we have the ability to transport and very quickly (instantly!) set up anti-cruise and anti-ballistic missile defenses to protect a base?
• Do we have ground forces who have been trained for base defense?
• Can we transport armor to the Philippines for base defense.  Yes, we’ll certainly be facing Chinese armored forces.
• Do we have sufficient numbers of C-RAM (counter rocket, artillery, and mortar) weapons to defend a base against constant, high volume attacks?
• Do we have sufficient portable, mobile sensors to establish effective surveillance and early warning systems?
• Are we doctrinally willing, and trained, to move our Aegis ships in close to land to provide anti-air protection for the ground forces until they can establish their own defenses?
• Are we capable of quickly constructing hardened and/or underground hangars and fuel/weapons storage?
• Do we sufficient airbase repair equipment that can be transported to the site?
• Do we have sufficient engineering units to build a base under fire, continuously repair it, and keep it operational under fire?
• Can we operate modern, finicky aircraft under primitive conditions with few spare parts, computers, and no modern state of the art repair facilities?  That’s what a forward, contested base would be, after all.  Our abysmal aircraft readiness rates during peacetime suggest that this, alone, almost rules out establishing an airbase in the Philippines.  If you can’t keep aircraft operational, there’s little point having an airbase.  If you recall, we were only able to sporadically operate F4F Wildcats from Guadalcanal and they were robust, easy to maintain aircraft by comparison, requiring only a wrench and duct tape to repair!

 
This kind of thought exercise is exactly what the US military should be doing all day, every day and yet we’re not.  Not even a little bit.  Instead we’re engaged in all manner of social programs, diversity, gender issues, environmental issues, climate concerns, etc.
 
We must start planning for the China war.  If the war never comes, that’s fine but failure to plan for it is dereliction of duty at its most extreme.

Scrap Two Carriers – Part IV - New Airfields in the Pacific

Continuing his series, guest author Carlton Meyer returns to discuss Pacific basing and war operations for land based naval air wings.  Enjoy !

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In previous blog posts, I suggested that operating eleven supercarriers has become so expensive that it left our Navy imbalanced, with too few aircraft and surface combatants. This could be corrected by downsizing to nine carriers (see, “Scrap Two Carriers! – Part 1”), which will probably occur anyway because of the flawed USS Ford program. I suggested this loss could be offset by establishing two shore-based overseas Carrier Air Wings (see, “Naval Air Wings, Scrap Two Carriers – Part 2”). These could be called Naval Air Wings (NAW) and absorb Marine Corps aviation assets to support Navy sea control missions from existing American airbases. There are several basing options for a NAW in the Mediterranean as explained in a past blog post (see, “A Naval Air Wing in the Med, Scrap Two Carriers – Part 3”). However, there is only one main useful airbase in the Central and South Pacific – Anderson Air Force Base on Guam.[3]

 

It will take at least four months for the US Navy to form a huge naval task force in the Pacific to confront China. Meanwhile, American airbases within range of Chinese fighters and short-range missiles will be destroyed within the first couple days. China’s primary concern is keeping sea lanes open for its commercial ships to Africa and the Middle East. The obvious strategy is to quickly dispatch a huge naval task force to seize Guam, which then turns south to clear threats in northern Australia, perhaps causing that nation to seek peace. This may seem ambitious, but the Japanese successfully conducted a similar campaign in 1942 that led to a disastrous Allied defeat known as the Battle of the Java Sea.[1]

 

The mission of a Pacific NAW is to combat a Chinese fleet. The US Navy can instantly create a Pacific NAW by redesignating Carrier Air Wing 5 at MCAS Iwakuni, Japan that could absorb the two Marine Corps Fighter-Attack squadrons at that same base. However, Iwakuni is in the northern Pacific among substantial Japanese and US Air Force bases and airpower. Okinawa, Japan has two American airbases but those will be destroyed by Chinese airpower the first day of a war. Anderson airbase on Guam is an ideal location where some Navy aircraft are already based, but the US Air Force has plans to surge squadrons to that base during wartime. Australia is a close ally and has offered use of some airfields. The Philippines allows access to several of its airfields, but most are too close to China and that nation may declare neutrality in a war. Here is a proposed laydown for a Pacific NAW.

 

NAF Atsugi – Leave the Navy HSM squadron here to support the four destroyers and help guard Tokyo Bay/Yokosuka from submarine incursions. The Navy already has an HCS squadron on Guam with 14 MH-60S that becomes part of the NAW, so the HSC at Atsugi is disbanded. During a war, these helicopters will disperse to other bases to conduct vital search and rescue of downed pilots.

 

NAF Anderson Air Force Base – The HCS squadron is already based here. This is the ideal location for the NAW headquarters. The Air Force has no airborne radar or dedicated electronic warfare aircraft on Guam, so should not object to hosting the VAW and VAQ squadrons that only add nine aircraft to the base. The Air Force should be supportive after space at MCAS Iwakuni is offered to Air Force squadrons.

 

MCAS Kaneohe Bay - Most of the Pacific NAW should move from Iwakuni to Hawaii to keep aircraft and families far from the danger of Chinese air and missile attack. These relocations will be expensive, but remember that billions of dollars will be saved by scrapping two aircraft carriers. The two Marine and two Navy fighter-attack squadrons can be based here, where a VMM squadron and VMGR (KC-130 squadron) already exist to support the NAW. The Marines will need to move the other VMM squadron stateside to make room. If more space is needed, perhaps squadrons can operate from new facilities at Hickam airbase or the Coast Guard airfield at Barber’s Point. 

 

Billions more dollars can be used to establish several austere Naval Air Facilities (NAF) in the Pacific to where NAW fighter squadrons can deploy once the smoke clears from the first week of missile bombardment. There are several civilian airports in the region from which naval aircraft can operate. They’ll need dispersed and protected fuel storage since existing fuel tanks may be destroyed during a war and fuel resupply may take months. They’ll need stocked munitions bunkers and military airfield support equipment, and access to housing, food, and medical care. Facility staff may include just a dozen servicemen and two dozen local civilians, but will need a surge plan to accommodate up to 500 additional military personnel during training exercises or war. Housing may be provided by local hotels, military barracks, or warehouses and tentage.

 

Airfield support squadrons should be formed to deploy to each NAF during wartime to provide more security, rapid airfield repair, and miscellaneous base support. This is ideal for US Marines who have embraced the idea of establishing austere forward bases. Some could be specially organized reserve units who deploy to their assigned bases for two weeks of training each year. Here are excellent sites for NAFs in the Central Pacific, see the map linked below.[2] All are American territory or secured via long-term base access agreements with reliable allies:

 

• NAF Iwo Jima – Japanese military airfield
• NAF Saipan – civilian airport in the Marianas
• NAF Tinian - civilian airport in the Marianas
• NAF Rota - civilian airport in the Marianas
• NAF Agana - civilian airport on Guam that hosted a US Navy Air Station until 1995
• NAF Palau - civilian airport whose government welcomes new US military bases[4]

 

There are three excellent NAF locations much further from China and beyond the range of its intermediate range ballistic missiles. These may be used as transit points, staging areas, or for combat operations should a Chinese advance prove successful. These bases should have a large naval magazine to resupply the forward NAFs and aircraft carriers.

 

• NAF Darwin – Australian military airfield (already used by US Marines)
• NAF Bucholz – US Army airfield, Kwajalein (Marshall Islands)
• NAF Wake Island – US Air Force airfield (rarely used)

 

Should war with China become imminent, C-130s from Hawaii will fly Marine Corps airfield support squadrons to the NAFs and evacuate military families from Guam. Since Guam is a primary target for a Chinese missile barrage, NAW aircraft there will disperse to other NAFs. NAW fighters from Hawaii could deploy to NAFs, but it may be wise to deploy them only halfway, to Bucholz and Wake Island, until the initial missile barrage is over and maybe until the Chinese fleet deploys eastward. A Pacific NAW will present a major problem for the Chinese fleet and may be reinforced with more Navy and Marine Corps squadrons. Targeting NAFs with China’s limited number of expensive long-range missiles presents a problem. Currently, all can be directed at Anderson Air Force base, but including six NAFs makes the Chinese missile bombardment plan difficult. NAW fighters flying from NAFs may not stop the Chinese fleet, but will make operations bloody and complex during the first few months of a war.

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Carlton Meyer is a former Marine Corps officer whose writings appeared in the Marine Corps Gazette, Naval Proceedings, and the Navy Times. He became irritated when some articles approved by editors never appeared after the Marine Commandant’s office and the CNO’s office began to preview publications and block articles they didn’t like. This explains why their articles have become bland. He began posting his ideas at www.G2mil.com in 2000.

 

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[1]“Battle of the Java Sea”; short video; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_oKLSVvRsQY

 

[2]Map of allied airbases in the western Pacific; http://www.g2mil.com/kadena1.jpg

 

[3]Fact Sheet about Anderson Air Force base, Guam; August 2021; https://www.andersen.af.mil/Portals/43/Documents/Base%20Fact%20Sheet%202021-Andersen%20AFB-20210805.pdf?ver=GU5mj9wrNr0fj_wiBBxOWQ%3d%3d

 

[4]“Palau: U.S. Welcome to build military bases”; Indo-Pacific Defense; February 22, 2021; https://ipdefenseforum.com/2021/02/palau-u-s-welcome-to-build-military-bases-amid-prcs-influence-push/

Defensive Mindset

Over the last several decades, the US military has developed one major flaw that is crippling it.  No, it’s not any particular weapon system or lack thereof.  It’s a mindset that no longer recognizes victory as a goal (see, “Ending War – True Victory”).  The US military no longer wants to win a war.  We have become a purely defensive military whose goals have become the maintenance of the status quo.  The fact that so many naval analysts talk about containment as a strategy against China illustrates this defensive, status quo mindset which guarantees a repeat of any war and eventual defeat (see, “China War Strategy - Blockade”).

Victory is no longer in our ethos.

 

Consider the history of recent conflicts 

• Korea – Gen. MacArthur aside, this was a war that had no victory condition and whose cease fire resulted in the creation of a continual threat – now including a nuclear threat – from North Korea.
• Vietnam – This was a half-hearted war with no desire for actual victory and only nebulous containment goals as objectives.
• Soviet Union – The collapse of the Soviet Union presented us with the opportunity to secure a lasting victory but our refusal to follow through resulted directly in the Russian threat we face today.
• Kosovo – The goal of this conflict – to the extent that there was a goal – was to simply return to the pre-war status quo which has left all the pre-conflict problems still festering.
• Desert Storm – While a brilliant tactical and logistical victory, our refusal to follow through and bring down Iraq/Hussein was a strategic failure that directly resulted in having to refight the war in Gulf 2.
• Gulf 2 – This was not so much a war as an armed raid to kill/capture Hussein and his followers.  The aftermath led to the formation of various insurgency groups, such as ISIS, and many years of terrorism and conflict in the region.
• Afghanistan – We are now abandoning Afghanistan after two decades and the Taliban is in process of reclaiming it, as we speak because we had no goal of victory, just some nebulous nation building that had no hope of happening.
• China – Our current policy of appeasement speaks for itself as to the lack of any victory conditions.
• ISIS – Our main goal in combatting ISIS was avoidance of collateral damage which led to massive additional civilian casualties due to our reluctance to engage ISIS.

 

Some might attempt to argue that we achieved our goals in some of these conflicts but that’s exactly the point – that our goals did not include actual victory.

 

This refusal to make actual victory an objective has led directly to the formation of our current defensive military.

 

• The Marines are now a totally defensive force, having abandoned amphibious assault, armor, and firepower and substituted a defensive missile-shooting mission.
• The Navy is a floundering organization with no guiding strategy whatsoever except the pursuit of a greater budget slice.

 

We are at a crossroads.  We desperately need to make a decision about our China strategy.  Will we go for true victory or fight a defensive war until we can negotiate an unfavorable settlement that will allow China to secure its gains and build for the next go-around?  This will determine whether we should construct an offensive or defensive military.

 

Some issues that need to be addressed if we want to build an offensive force that can achieve an actual victory:

 

What is our guiding strategy and what are our victory conditions?

How will we use the Navy in an offensive role and what fleet structure do we need to do so?

Will we use tactical nuclear weapons?

What offensive weapons does the Navy need?

What ground assault capabilities do we need?

Seize the High Ground … Or Some Level Ground … Or Any Ground …

We’ve previously noted that the Navy is a mostly defensive force.  Now, we have to add the Marines to that assessment as they are transforming from a ground seizing force to a missile-based defense force.

 

For the sake of discussion, let’s pretend that the idiotic Marine concept of small, hidden, missile launching forces is completely valid, effective, and survivable.  How does that concept impact an overall war?  Well, let’s consider what influence a small missile launching unit can have in combat.

 

Being able to launch a handful of anti-ship missiles into an area of one or two hundred miles radius around the launch point prevents enemy ships from entering that area – again, we’ll assume that enemy Aegis-type ships would be deterred by a handful of missiles.  That’s a denial capability which is, inherently, defensive.  In the Chinese theatre, this translates to setting up a blockade of sorts – we’ll assume we’ll somehow get permission to set up such bases on the myriad islands that we have no ownership of, or basing rights to, – that, at its most effective, prevents the Chinese surface navy from exiting the first island chain.  We’ll ignore the fact that for the foreseeable future, the Chinese have no interest in exiting the first island chain during a war.

 

Now, let’s consider the geography and distances.  The distance from the first island chain islands to the Chinese mainland is 500-1000 miles depending on where you choose to measure.  The shortest distances are from the Philippines and we can safely assume that the Chinese-leaning Philippines are not going to grant us basing rights in a war with China.  We’ll be lucky if they don’t actively enter the war on the Chinese side!  So, that leaves us with the longer distances, again, assuming we can get basing rights anywhere.  That means that the bulk of the thousand mile deep South China Sea is unthreatened by the Marine’s one or two hundred mile missiles – we’ll ignore the targeting challenges involved in getting sensor platforms one to two hundred miles deep into the South China Sea and surviving long enough to find a target and transmit data.

 

The usual purpose of a war is to seize territory:  either territory you want to take from someone else or territory you want to reclaim because it was taken from you.  As they are constituted today and as they are envisioned in the moderately near future, how are the Navy and Marines set up to seize territory?  The short, brutal answer is that they are not. 

 

The Marines have flat out stated that they are out of the amphibious frontal assault business.  Further, they have transformed themselves from a middle weight force with tanks and artillery to a very light infantry force with no tanks, not much artillery, no armored fighting vehicles, and few heavy weapons.  They won’t be seizing anything.

 

In short, the Marines have very little to contribute to an offensive strategy.

 

The navy can’t, themselves, seize ground, of course.  However, the traditional role of the Navy is to support ground forces that can seize territory.  That role involves transporting soldiers and supplies, providing amphibious assault ships and ground support firepower, and conducting offensive strikes in support of an overall offensive, ground seizing strategy. 

 

Unfortunately, the Navy has completely abandoned naval gun support firepower, has only an obsolete, non-survivable land attack cruise missile that is too expensive to use in general area bombardment, and has ships that are too expensive to risk in open battle.  The Navy’s main weapon system is Aegis and that is a purely defensive system. 

 

The Navy has only the big deck amphibious ships for transport and those are likely to be phased out in favor of the small Light Amphibious Warships (capacity 75 troops) that the Marine Commandant has demanded the Navy give him.  Given the cost of building, manning, and maintaining large amphibious ships that the Marines don’t want, the Navy is likely to quickly begin retiring the large ships.

 

In short, the Navy has very little to contribute to an offensive strategy.

 

The Navy and Marines have ensured that the next offensive waged by this country will be a purely Army affair with no Marine contribution and, at best, some logistics contribution from the Navy.

 

Of course, if we toss in even a bit of realism (you noted all the assumptions we had to make in the preceding discussion in order to keep the conversation moving?), the Marines missile-shooting concept is dead on arrival and they won’t be able to contribute even a defensive effort.

 

Seize the high ground?      Sorry, no ……..

Fleet Problems - Then and Now

The Navy’s most famous exercises were the series of 21 major Fleet Problems conducted between 1923 – 1940.  These massive exercises not only presciently predicted the course of the WWII naval campaign but also developed the doctrine and tactics that would become the foundation of our WWII naval operations.

From the Wikipedia compilation of Fleet Problems, here is a summary of the exercises.(1)  Look them over and note the remarkable similarity they bore to the actual WWII naval operations.

Fleet Problem I

Held in February and March 1923 and was staged off the coast of Panama. The attacking Black force, using battleships to represent aircraft carriers, tested the defenses of the Panama Canal. A single plane launched from Oklahoma—representing a carrier air group—dropped 10 miniature bombs and theoretically "destroyed" the spillway of the Gatun Dam.

Fleet Problem II

Simulated the first leg of a westward advance across the Pacific.

Fleet Problem III

Focused on a defense of the Panama Canal from the Caribbean side. The Blue force was defending the canal from an attack from the Caribbean by the Black force, operating from an advance base in the Azores. It was to practice amphibious landing techniques and the rapidity of transiting a fleet through the canal from the Pacific side.

In the exercise, a Black force special operations action resulted in the "sinking" of Blue force battleship New York in the Culebra Cut which would have blocked the canal.

Fleet Problem IV

Simulated the movement from a main base in the western Pacific to the Japanese home islands—represented in that case by islands, cities, and countries surrounding the Caribbean.

Fleet Problem V

Held in March and April 1925 and simulated an attack on Hawaii. The Black force, the aggressor, was given the United States' first aircraft carrier, Langley along with two seaplane tenders and other ships outfitted with aircraft, while the defending Blue force had no carriers. In addition, aircraft aboard the battleship Wyoming could not be launched for lack of a working catapult. Langley's positive performance helped speed the completion of aircraft carriers Lexington and Saratoga.

One aspect of Fleet Problem V was conducted near Guadalupe Island off Baja California and involved attacking a lightly held position and refueling at sea.

Fleet Problem VI

Held off the west coast of Central America in early 1926.

Fleet Problem VII

Held March 1927 and involved defense of the Panama Canal. The highlight of the exercise was Langley’s successful air raid on the Panama Canal.

Fleet Problem VIII

Held in April 1928 between California and Hawaii and pitted Orange, a cruiser force from Pearl Harbor, versus Blue, the Battle Force.  It also involved a convoy search and anti-submarine operations.

Fleet Problem IX

This scenario in January 1929 studied the effects of an attack upon the Panama Canal and conducted the operations necessary to carry out such an eventuality, and pitted the Battle Fleet (less submarines and Lexington) against a combination of forces including the Scouting Force (augmented by Lexington), the Control Forces, Train Squadron 1, and 15th Naval District and local army defense forces. In a daring move, Saratoga was detached from the fleet with only a single cruiser as escort to make a wide sweep to the south and "attack" the Panama Canal, which was defended by the Scouting Fleet and Saratoga's sister ship, Lexington. She successfully launched her strike on 26 January and, despite being "sunk" three times later in the day, proved the versatility of a carrier-based fast task force.

This was the first major test of independent carrier task force operations which would eventually become the model for WWII naval operations in the Pacific.

Fleet Problem X

Held in 1930 in Caribbean waters. This time, however, Saratoga and Langley were "disabled" by a surprise attack from Lexington, showing how quickly air power could swing the balance in a naval action.

Fleet Problem XI

Held in April 1930 in the Caribbean.

Fleet Problem XII

USS Los Angeles moored to USS Patoka, along with other ships off Panama during Fleet Problem XII.

Held in 1931 in waters west of Central America and Panama. Black, attacking from the west, was to land forces and establish bases in Central America and destroy the Panama Canal, while Blue defended with an aviation-heavy fleet.

Blue's two carrier groups, centered on Saratoga and Lexington, attacked the invasion fleets but failed to stop the landings and got too close to the Black fleets.

Fleet Problem XIII

Fleet Problem XIII began in March 1932, one month after Army/Navy Grand Joint Exercise 4. Blue, based in Hawaii, was to sail east and invade three "enemy" ports on the North American Pacific coastline to try and gain a foothold for future operations. Blue had nine battleships, one aircraft carrier, and many lesser ships. Black defended with one modern aircraft carrier and some fictional battleships, as well as a number of actual cruisers, submarines, and many other ships.

Blue's advance was quickly located by Black's picket line of submarines which then took heavy losses from air attack. Both sides put a priority on destroying the enemy aircraft carrier, launching air attacks almost simultaneously after a few days of probing. Significant damage was laid on both carriers, with Blue's carrier eventually "sunk" by torpedo from a Black destroyer.

After-action critiques stressed the growing importance of naval aviation, and an increased need for the construction of aircraft carriers in the event of a war in the Pacific. Submarines operating at or near the surface were seen to be critically vulnerable to air observation and attack. The exercise showed that one carrier was insufficient for either fleet attack or area defense, so the practice of two or more carriers operating together became policy. Admiral Harry E. Yarnell said that six to eight carriers would be required for a Pacific campaign, but no orders were placed for new carriers, as Depression-era financial difficulties caused President Herbert Hoover to limit naval expenses.

Fleet Problem XIV

Held February 10–17, 1933, Fleet Problem XIV was the first naval exercise to test simulated aircraft carrier attacks against the west coast of the United States. Pacific cities had for decades vied for permanent stationing of U.S. military assets, and vulnerabilities exposed through the exercises were used by metropolitan navy boosters to leverage their cases. In spite of early Navy plans for San Francisco to be home port for the main west coast fleet, these plans had failed to materialize with San Diego incrementally gaining the majority of navy investments.

Fleet Problem XIV coincidentally occurred the month before Franklin D. Roosevelt, a former Assistant Secretary of the Navy, took the office of the presidency. The results of the exercise between the U.S. Navy's 'black' and 'blue' fleets, were mixed. The simulated attacks had certainly been mitigated by the defensive 'blue' fleet, however the 'black' fleet had scored key victories with strikes on San Pedro and San Francisco, California, respectively.

Fleet Problem XV

Held in May 1934 in Hawaii, this was a three-phase exercise which encompassed an attack upon and defense of the Panama Canal, the capture of advanced bases, and a major fleet engagement.

Fleet Problem XVI

Held in May 1935 in the northern Pacific off the coast of Alaska and in waters surrounding the Hawaiian Islands, this operation was divided into five distinct phases which were thought to be aspects of some real naval campaign of the future in which the U.S. would take the strategic offensive.

Fleet Problem XVII

This problem took place off the west coast of the U.S., Central America, and the Panama Canal Zone in the spring of 1936. It was a five-phase exercise devoted to preparing the fleet for anti-submarine operations, testing communications systems, and training of aircraft patrol squadrons for extended fleet operations, and pitted the Battle Force against the submarine-augmented Scouting Force.

Fleet Problem XVIII

This exercise was held in May 1937 in Alaskan waters and in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands and Midway, practicing the tactics of seizing advanced base sites—a technique later to be polished to a high degree into close support and amphibious warfare doctrines.

Fleet Problem XIX

This operation in April and May 1938 gave the navy added experience in search tactics; in the use of submarines, destroyers, and aircraft in scouting and attack, in the dispositions of the fleet and the conduct of a major fleet battle. In addition, the exercise again dealt with the matter of seizing advanced fleet bases and defending them against minor opposition. Fleet Problem XIX also tested the capabilities of the Hawaiian Defense Force, augmenting it with fleet units to help to defend the islands against the United States fleet as a whole. The last phase of the exercise exercised the fleet in operations against a defended coastline.

Fleet Problem XX

Took place in February 1939 in the Caribbean and Atlantic, and observed in person by President Franklin Roosevelt. The exercise simulated the defense of the East Coast of the United States and Latin America by the Black team from the invading White team. Participating in the maneuvers were 134 ships, 600 planes, and over 52,000 officers and men.

Fleet Problem XXI

An eight-phase operation for the defense of the Hawaiian area in April 1940.

Fleet Problem XXII

Scheduled for the Spring of 1941, but cancelled.

Grand Joint Exercise 4 (GJE4)

Similar to the Navy’s Fleet Problems, the Army and Navy held a few large, combined exercises.  This particular exercise revolved around an attack on Pearl Harbor.  Lexington and Saratoga conducted an air strike on Pearl Harbor on Sunday morning, 7-Feb-1932.(4)  The attack was an unmitigated success with facilities, aircraft, and ships being decimated.  Attacking aircraft even dropped sacks of flour on battleships to simulate bombs!(5)  Army defenders protested the ‘inappropriateness’ of an attack on a Sunday morning and the unfairness of the attacking aircraft having deceptively approached from the direction of the mainland.(5)  As we know, this was almost an exact foretelling of the actual Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

Operations During Fleet Problem X

What is striking about these exercises is the sheer size compared to what we laughingly call exercises today.  Today, a couple of ships that happen to pass each other is called an exercise whereas the Fleet Problems were actual, entire fleet exercises!  The commanders learned to operate entire fleets and squadrons for real.  Here’s an interesting explanation for the size of the Fleet Problems:

This large-scale participation was possible because very little of the U.S. Navy was forward-deployed, so forces could be brought in from the East and West Coast bases. (2)

Hmm …  Better training thanks to reduced forward deployments.  Does that sound familiar?  This is exactly what ComNavOps has been calling for and yet we had it back in the 1920’s!  History is shouting at us, telling us what we should be doing but we’re not listening.

Also noteworthy is that the exercises were not just technology demonstrations as today’s exercises are; they were scenarios that tested operations that we actually believed we might be called on to execute in a war.  The exercises tested specific aspects of War Plan Orange that we were unsure about which made the exercises highly relevant since they were taken from the actual operational plan of war with Japan.  Of particular note are Fleet Problems II (first leg of an advance across the Pacific), IV (advance on the Japanese home islands), V (attack on Hawaii), XVIII (seizing advanced bases in the Pacific via amphibious assault), XXI (defense of Hawaii), and GJE4 which exactly simulated the eventual Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.  It was evident that as early as the 1920’s, the Navy was already anticipating war with Japan and developing the doctrine and tactics needed to conduct that war.  What are we exercising today?  What are we preparing for?  In a word … nothing.

Note all the techniques, tactics, and operations that were tested and exercised that eventually became the foundation of our WWII naval operations.

The Navy has revived some minor exercises and fraudulently given them the name of ‘Fleet Problem’ but they do not even remotely capture the essence, purpose, or magnitude of the real Fleet Problems.(6)

Another interesting aspect of the Fleet Problems was that they were real in the sense that problems were not hand-waved away and the results, good or bad, stood.

… the Fleet Problems assumed there often would be a clear loser—and not a junior officer designated to be defeated, but an officer of stature and accomplishment. Senior officers could and did fail dramatically, were critiqued candidly and publicly, and continued to advance and lead. Indeed, across the 21 Fleet Problems, timidity and inattention seemed to be the only unforgivable errors in command. (3)

This is how you learn … by doing and, often, failing!

We need to bring back real fleet problems, not the small, pathetic, watered down efforts that we call exercises today – exercises which are conducted for just a few days while transiting somewhere.(5)  We need to assemble entire fleets and conduct real war games.  Here’s a few examples of some large scale fleet problems we should be conducting.

• How to operate 4-carrier combat groups and their escorts
• How to penetrate a thousand mile A2/AD zone
• Where and how to attack China
• How to defend or reseize Taiwan (if that’s even part of our geopolitical strategy)
• How to operate groups when we don’t have aerial supremacy
• How to operate non-carrier surface groups
• How to escort convoys and defend against subs, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and aircraft

Of course, all of these possible Fleet Problems presuppose the existence of a modern War Plan Orange aimed at China and, sadly, I see no evidence that we have such a plan.  We need a War Plan Pacific aimed directly at China and we need to start exercising it.

____________________________________

(1)Wikipedia, “Fleet Problem”, retrieved 5-May-2020,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fleet_problem

(2)Naval History and Heritage Command website, “Fleet Problem IX”

https://www.history.navy.mil/browse-by-topic/heritage/usn-lessons-learned/fleet-problem-ix.html

(3)United States Naval Institute Proceedings, Captain Dale Rielage, Jun-2017,

https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017/june/bring-back-fleet-battle-problems

(4)http://oaktrust.library.tamu.edu/bitstream/handle/1969.1/2658/etd-tamu-2005B-HIST-Wadle.pdf

(5)https://www.military.com/navy/pearl-harbor-first-attack.html

(6)USNI Proceedings, “Fleet Problems Offer Opportunities”, Adm. Scott Swift, Mar 2018,

https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2018/march/fleet-problems-offer-opportunities

Chinese Territorial Objectives

An anonymous commenter recently discussed war with China in relation to US Army operations and land operations.   I replied with a discussion about China’s land objectives in a war.  I think it’s worth a post to repeat the essence of that discussion since China’s objectives will determine, in large measure, what our objectives will be.

Looking at a map, China has two semi-exposed flanks: to the east is N/SKorea and to the south is Vietnam, Laos, and Myanmar with Thailand and Cambodia further on (Indochina). In the paranoid Chinese world view where everyone is potentially out to get them, these flanks are vulnerabilities and must be secured. Further, seizing Indochina solidifies their hold on vast sections of ocean and major shipping lanes in addition to resources.

Note:  I use the term "semi-exposed flanks". By this, I meant that the flanks are not under Chinese control but neither are they active threats - kind of like Mexico and Canada are semi-exposed flanks of the US - not controlled but not a threat (at least, not militarily). For the US, this means that we happily leave them alone. For China, being paranoid and having a global domination desire, semi-exposed flanks are unacceptable.

Taiwan, due to its proximity to China, represents another vulnerability as well as a long-stated political objective.  The seizure of Taiwan is a foregone conclusion on day one of any war.  China simply cannot allow Taiwan to exist as an enemy base that close to China’s mainland.  The Taiwan invasion will be massive and swift.  Taiwan will, undoubtedly, put up a good fight but will be swamped and the US will be unable to muster any significant assistance in time to do any good.  The most the US could hope to do is operate some Air Force stealth bombers in the area and attrite Chinese forces a bit.  It would be a useless gesture and would risk our very small fleet of stealth bombers for no strategic gain.

The Philippines are another enticing territory.  Control of the islands would provide the basing and staging to ultimately secure the South/East China Seas, expand into the Indonesian region, and roll back America’s Pacific presence.  At the moment, China is in the process of politically and culturally annexing the Philippines with the active support of the Philippine President.

Japan is the intriguing element in this analysis.  China desperately wants to eliminate Japan but Japan, supported by the US, represents a major military challenge.  Would China attempt to fight a war with the US without engaging Japan at the same time by politically maneuvering Japan into neutrality?  Undoubtedly, but given Japan’s attitudes towards China, it seems unlikely that would succeed.  Thus, any war China would initiate with the US almost automatically becomes a war with Japan, too.  Can China successfully fight Japan and the US? 

Much, much further in the future, China will want to deal with India, Russia, and the Middle East but those are a step too far for the moderate to near future.

Having some idea what China’s territorial objectives might be, we can begin to speculate about US reactions.  In other words, what territories would America fight for?

Taiwan is a near hopeless affair until the very end of a Chinese war.

Korea (South, at least) is defensible because Korea has significant armed forces of their own that could make a successful defense feasible.

Indochina is questionable. Would we care enough to commit to another Indochina war? I don't know but I suspect not.

These, then, are the possible areas where the US might engage in land combat during a war with China and, as such, are the areas where should be planning for operations and determining what force structure and size we need to be successful.

More importantly, we need to determine what naval and air forces we need since any China war will be primarily a sea and air affair.  While we may debate what exact force structure we need, there is no debate that the force we have now is not well suited for a China war.

For example, for an air war conducted over vast distances, if not intercontinental distances, we need long range, penetrating bombers and lots of them.  What do we have?  We have around 18-19 functional B-2s.  The proposed B-21 program is a step in the right direction but whether we can build the aircraft in useful quantities remains to be seen.  The Air Force “envisions” 175-200 bombers but the Air Force “envisioned 132 B-2s and we wound up with only 21 so …

We can go on and analyze what else we need but that’s not the point of this post.  Moving on …

This also demonstrates the need for a Pacific NATO-ish alliance.  Unfortunately, unlike NATO where several countries had credible, if small, militaries, there are only two such countries in the Pacific region:  South Korea and Japan.  Australia could build a credible military but has so far shown no great inclination to do so and has given very mixed messages about its desired relationship with China.  India, though somewhat outside the direct Pacific rim territory, would make a great addition for a Pacific NATO, having a credible military.  Unfortunately, the US and India have shown no great desire to engage closely with each other.  The US should seek to change that.

The main benefit to forming a Pacific NATO would not be the very small military force that most of countries could contribute but, instead, would be the basing opportunities they would, presumably, offer for the U.S.

Someday, someone will write about the future U.S.-Chinese war and state that the objectives and needs were evident in hindsight but no one could have foreseen them at the time.  Well, this is the time and hindsight is not required.  China’s objectives and our responses/needs are pretty evident.  Now, we just need to begin acting.