Continuing his series, guest author Carlton Meyer returns to discuss Pacific basing and war operations for land based naval air wings. Enjoy !
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In previous blog posts, I suggested that operating eleven supercarriers has become so expensive that it left our Navy imbalanced, with too few aircraft and surface combatants. This could be corrected by downsizing to nine carriers (see, “Scrap Two Carriers! – Part 1”), which will probably occur anyway because of the flawed USS Ford program. I suggested this loss could be offset by establishing two shore-based overseas Carrier Air Wings (see, “Naval Air Wings, Scrap Two Carriers – Part 2”). These could be called Naval Air Wings (NAW) and absorb Marine Corps aviation assets to support Navy sea control missions from existing American airbases. There are several basing options for a NAW in the Mediterranean as explained in a past blog post (see, “A Naval Air Wing in the Med, Scrap Two Carriers – Part 3”). However, there is only one main useful airbase in the Central and South Pacific – Anderson Air Force Base on Guam.[3]
It will take at least four months for the US Navy to form a huge naval task force in the Pacific to confront China. Meanwhile, American airbases within range of Chinese fighters and short-range missiles will be destroyed within the first couple days. China’s primary concern is keeping sea lanes open for its commercial ships to Africa and the Middle East. The obvious strategy is to quickly dispatch a huge naval task force to seize Guam, which then turns south to clear threats in northern Australia, perhaps causing that nation to seek peace. This may seem ambitious, but the Japanese successfully conducted a similar campaign in 1942 that led to a disastrous Allied defeat known as the Battle of the Java Sea.[1]
The mission of a Pacific NAW is to combat a Chinese fleet. The US Navy can instantly create a Pacific NAW by redesignating Carrier Air Wing 5 at MCAS Iwakuni, Japan that could absorb the two Marine Corps Fighter-Attack squadrons at that same base. However, Iwakuni is in the northern Pacific among substantial Japanese and US Air Force bases and airpower. Okinawa, Japan has two American airbases but those will be destroyed by Chinese airpower the first day of a war. Anderson airbase on Guam is an ideal location where some Navy aircraft are already based, but the US Air Force has plans to surge squadrons to that base during wartime. Australia is a close ally and has offered use of some airfields. The Philippines allows access to several of its airfields, but most are too close to China and that nation may declare neutrality in a war. Here is a proposed laydown for a Pacific NAW.
NAF Atsugi – Leave the Navy HSM squadron here to support the four destroyers and help guard Tokyo Bay/Yokosuka from submarine incursions. The Navy already has an HCS squadron on Guam with 14 MH-60S that becomes part of the NAW, so the HSC at Atsugi is disbanded. During a war, these helicopters will disperse to other bases to conduct vital search and rescue of downed pilots.
NAF Anderson Air Force Base – The HCS squadron is already based here. This is the ideal location for the NAW headquarters. The Air Force has no airborne radar or dedicated electronic warfare aircraft on Guam, so should not object to hosting the VAW and VAQ squadrons that only add nine aircraft to the base. The Air Force should be supportive after space at MCAS Iwakuni is offered to Air Force squadrons.
MCAS Kaneohe Bay - Most of the Pacific NAW should move from Iwakuni to Hawaii to keep aircraft and families far from the danger of Chinese air and missile attack. These relocations will be expensive, but remember that billions of dollars will be saved by scrapping two aircraft carriers. The two Marine and two Navy fighter-attack squadrons can be based here, where a VMM squadron and VMGR (KC-130 squadron) already exist to support the NAW. The Marines will need to move the other VMM squadron stateside to make room. If more space is needed, perhaps squadrons can operate from new facilities at Hickam airbase or the Coast Guard airfield at Barber’s Point.
Billions more dollars can be used to establish several austere Naval Air Facilities (NAF) in the Pacific to where NAW fighter squadrons can deploy once the smoke clears from the first week of missile bombardment. There are several civilian airports in the region from which naval aircraft can operate. They’ll need dispersed and protected fuel storage since existing fuel tanks may be destroyed during a war and fuel resupply may take months. They’ll need stocked munitions bunkers and military airfield support equipment, and access to housing, food, and medical care. Facility staff may include just a dozen servicemen and two dozen local civilians, but will need a surge plan to accommodate up to 500 additional military personnel during training exercises or war. Housing may be provided by local hotels, military barracks, or warehouses and tentage.
Airfield support squadrons should be formed to deploy to each NAF during wartime to provide more security, rapid airfield repair, and miscellaneous base support. This is ideal for US Marines who have embraced the idea of establishing austere forward bases. Some could be specially organized reserve units who deploy to their assigned bases for two weeks of training each year. Here are excellent sites for NAFs in the Central Pacific, see the map linked below.[2] All are American territory or secured via long-term base access agreements with reliable allies:
- NAF Iwo Jima – Japanese military airfield
- NAF Saipan – civilian airport in the Marianas
- NAF Tinian - civilian airport in the Marianas
- NAF Rota - civilian airport in the Marianas
- NAF Agana - civilian airport on Guam that hosted a US Navy Air Station until 1995
- NAF Palau - civilian airport whose government welcomes new US military bases[4]
There are three excellent NAF locations much further from China and beyond the range of its intermediate range ballistic missiles. These may be used as transit points, staging areas, or for combat operations should a Chinese advance prove successful. These bases should have a large naval magazine to resupply the forward NAFs and aircraft carriers.
- NAF Darwin – Australian military airfield (already used by US Marines)
- NAF Bucholz – US Army airfield, Kwajalein (Marshall Islands)
- NAF Wake Island – US Air Force airfield (rarely used)
Should war with China become imminent, C-130s from Hawaii will fly Marine Corps airfield support squadrons to the NAFs and evacuate military families from Guam. Since Guam is a primary target for a Chinese missile barrage, NAW aircraft there will disperse to other NAFs. NAW fighters from Hawaii could deploy to NAFs, but it may be wise to deploy them only halfway, to Bucholz and Wake Island, until the initial missile barrage is over and maybe until the Chinese fleet deploys eastward. A Pacific NAW will present a major problem for the Chinese fleet and may be reinforced with more Navy and Marine Corps squadrons. Targeting NAFs with China’s limited number of expensive long-range missiles presents a problem. Currently, all can be directed at Anderson Air Force base, but including six NAFs makes the Chinese missile bombardment plan difficult. NAW fighters flying from NAFs may not stop the Chinese fleet, but will make operations bloody and complex during the first few months of a war.
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Carlton Meyer is a former Marine Corps officer whose writings appeared in the Marine Corps Gazette, Naval Proceedings, and the Navy Times. He became irritated when some articles approved by editors never appeared after the Marine Commandant’s office and the CNO’s office began to preview publications and block articles they didn’t like. This explains why their articles have become bland. He began posting his ideas at www.G2mil.com in 2000.
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[1]“Battle of the Java Sea”; short video; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_oKLSVvRsQY
[2]Map of allied airbases in the western Pacific; http://www.g2mil.com/kadena1.jpg
[3]Fact Sheet about Anderson Air Force base, Guam; August 2021; https://www.andersen.af.mil/Portals/43/Documents/Base%20Fact%20Sheet%202021-Andersen%20AFB-20210805.pdf?ver=GU5mj9wrNr0fj_wiBBxOWQ%3d%3d
[4]“Palau: U.S. Welcome to build military bases”; Indo-Pacific Defense; February 22, 2021; https://ipdefenseforum.com/2021/02/palau-u-s-welcome-to-build-military-bases-amid-prcs-influence-push/
How many large air refuelling tankers would the Navy need to support such a deployment? While in the Med a NAW would need tankers their numbers should be smaller as the distances to cover are not enourmous. The tanker fleet of the Air Force is getting older and smaller, the same goes for the cargo fleet. Tankers like the KC135 aside from the tanking role have an important logistic role.
ReplyDeleteIn the Pacific the ferry distances are much longer and a robust tanker fleet would be necessary to ferry the NAW and to support it after deployment to distributed airfields.
I don't consider the KC130 useful in this role due to it's cruising speed and relative small cargo load.
During WW2 many planes were ferried to the Pacific via carriers or were crated and shipped.
Would the Navy be able to secure the required number of Air Force planes to support such a deployment or not?
I'll assume the USAF tankers will be too busy supporting the USAF. Perhaps an aviator here knows, but it looks like fighters can self-deploy from Hawaii, if there is enough fuel at Johnston Island. The Navy can increase the fuel stored there, or have plans to rapidly deploy a ship tanker there.
ReplyDeletehttps://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/9/9a/South-pacific-map.jpg
The Marines have 15 KC-130s in Hawaii and other 15 in California. They can help out at either end.
The NAFs should have enough supplies stored for four months of combat, with ship resupply after that. The only problem I foresee is USAF Generals demanding some of the NAFs and their support squadrons for their fighter squadrons, since they were too disorganized to establish any themselves. But they may be busy just defending Japan after losing half their aircraft based there during the first two weeks of war.
A key element of this plan is to increase the store of naval aviation munitions in the Pacific by a factor of five. The USAF will likely demand some of that too!
Instead of deleting 2 carriers, can we get rid of 2 CVNs, put those 2 CVN air wings ashore as NAWs, but then re-designate 2 America class amphibs without well decks as UAV carriers. Fill the UAV carriers with Reapers / Mojaves / MUX and Fire Scouts. UAV carriers (CVU?) take over lower intensity missions or sea control missions while allowing us to maintain the same carrier numbers and similar deployments.
ReplyDeleteMissileers can correct me, but the last time I compared forces, every Chinese missile, from AA to ICBM, outranged ours by 50%-100%.
ReplyDeleteIf so, China could take out all our Westpac bases in a day.
How, exactly, would we respond to that, since an attack on China proper would cost us Los Angeles?
Some Americans wouldn’t mind losing LA. Joking aside, any conflict with China will be fought in the Pacific trying to get into the first island chain. Any nation that takes sides is likely to be destroyed in the fighting, so most countries will sit on the sidelines. We will have to fight from Japan if they let us, Guam, or carriers. We will also likely not attack mainland China as that will invite an attack on LA.
Delete"Should war with China become imminent, C-130s from Hawaii will fly Marine Corps airfield support squadrons to the NAFs and evacuate military families from Guam."
ReplyDeleteShould that be necessary, that job would go to the Air Force's C-17s and tankers as they have the range and capacity to pull that off.
A major issue that for some reason is completely missing in US discussion is that the US position in SE Asia has deteriorated considerably since 1991 let alone Vietnam. In fact I would say the US defence situation in SE Asia has collapsed.
ReplyDeleteUp to 1991 US had clear allies in SE Asia - Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia. US and allies had access to bases in Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia (Butterworth airbase) and Thailand.
Since then those allies except Singapore have become more neutral despite China's sabre rattling in SC Sea. But Chinese money speaks more loudly to corrupt elites in those countries than issues of sovereignty.
It might surprise people to find out that Thailand is acquiring Chinese military equipment including submarines. Indonesia recently conducted exercises with China. Malaysia is buying naval patrol vessels from China. Philippines have become completely transactional and thus unreliable, occasionally favouring China, sometimes themselves and sometimes in line with US policy.
Western footprint is much smaller in SE Asia than period up to 1991 - no more major US air and naval bases in Philippines, no presence in Thailand, not much access to RAAF to Malaysia and withdrawal of NZ battalion and helicopter from Singapore.
And other than Singapore, overall defence capabilities are very much in decline despite Chinese aggression. Indeed missing Malaysian airliner MH370 managed to fly in the wrong direction over several countries without causing an alarm to be raised, let alone fighters launched.
Even Vietnam's military is in decline - eg partially modernised air force is a third of what they fielded in 1991.
So with ASEAN states playing the neutral game, their military capability in decline and the Chinese getting stronger, SC Sea becomes effectively a Chinese lake.
However US/allies can keep the Chinese out of Indian Ocean by strangling choke points ala Malacca Strait.
I agree and this explains why we need some NAFs in the region that could also provide some support to cruisers, destroyers, and subs. Build a couple tiny covered piers near each NAF where two can dock for two hours or two days to resupply and let sailors stretch their legs and have some drinks. I suggested establishing three naval magazines outside the range of Chinese bombers and intermediate range missiles, because facilities at Guam will be smashed or too dangerous to attempt docking.
DeleteA couple cruisers, destroyers, or submarines could covertly pull into a pier at Wake Island, Bucholz, or Darwin to reload their VLS tubes since that can't be done at sea. Otherwise, they'll have to sail to Hawaii to rearm! These facilities will cost billions, but remember, scrap two carriers and billions of dollars are freed each year.
"These facilities will cost billions, but remember, scrap two carriers and billions of dollars are freed each year."
DeleteMost guesstimates Ive seen put a years CVN operation in the $3-5M a year zone. So two carriers eliminated gives us $1B a year. For discussions sake, call it $2B. Thats basically a Burke a year. You could invest that money into "austere bases", and those would be non-recurring costs, but, does that improve or degrade our capabilities?? As I commented earlier, I think moving short legged air to fixed positions, where they have limited utility, is a knee-jerk reaction to the budget. We cant make strategic, tactical, or force structure decisions based on budget alone. If we eliminate a couple carriers, the airwings should be dispersed into the others to build their size. Any money saved should be put into the strike platforms, like SSGNs. Yes, we absolutely need to fix procurement, and we absolutely have no room for any more LCS/Zumwalt/Ford blunders, but I dont feel eliminating carriers, and thinking that their air wings, land based, could be relevant in a conflict. All the money potentially saved is irrelevant if we cant win a fight.
*$300-500M a year...
DeleteThe cost of a new Ford class carrier is $15 billion, plus millions for yard work each year and much more for a mid-life overhaul. So $500 million more a year for each carrier. And these 9 Pacific NAFs are ready in theater all the time, something that requires rotating 3-4 carriers. But the six forward NAFs should not be compared to a carrier, they are more a barrier that a Chinese naval force must destroy to invade Guam or travel into the central Pacific. And a NAF don't require expensive escorts and can never be "sunk".
Delete"the six forward NAFs should not be compared to a carrier..."
DeleteIf they are being proposed as a replacement, or a supplement to a reduced number of carriers then they absolutely have to be compared!! These "austere bases" will initially cost billions in non-recurring costs. For them to be surviveable, they will need significant organic infrastructure. Being adequate for anything useful (setting aside the naval aviation range, which precludes that, but...)means more than flying the planes there and setting up tents for the crews like in the WWII days. Shelters, maintenance facilities, parts inventory, weapons stocks, fueling facilities, barracks, food and hospital facilities, etc are all necessasary items, and would need to be hardened as well. Note that a CVBG has all of those, and isnt a static target.
"a NAF don't require expensive escorts and can never be "sunk". "
So the NAWS are going to be the only offensive/defensive forces at these bases? What about all the strike capability of those "expensive escorts"?? The NAWS dont have that. Short-legged naval aviation isnt a/the strike arm. The surface and sub-surface combatants are. What about local defense? Will the NAWS be wasting a third or more of their force for CAP?? Or as a "barrier", is the whole NAW in a defensive role, just to be attritted out of existence? Will those bases need Aegis Ashore?? What about ground troops for security and maybe raid defense? What about Patriot batteries or somthing similar, plus all the infrastructure and "jointness" needed to support them?? And conversely, while not being sinkable, Id mention that an island base cant withdraw to refuel and rearm, it can't retreat and save itself from an overwhelming enemy force, and it cant advance to pursue a beaten enemy. It cant advance towards the first chain, and it cant move forward into range and relevance in a Taiwan-centric conflict.
Pretty outdated and full of unrealistic assumption. Once US and China enter a large scale war, it is matter of time to go nuclear. Fearing go nuclear, US would refrain from escalating for a simple reason - no matter what, Japan or any other nation is NOT USA.
ReplyDeleteFurthermore, look on Chinese weapons development reported in recent year, you can find that they focus a lot on long range missiles, include just reported YJ-21.
China intends to use large number of long range missiles to achieve goal to destroy enemies far away without sending fleet too far from home. Its carrier group is still far from able to counter US far from home where land based aircrafts cannot protect them.
China can adopt this long range missile strike lies on its industry capability. They can ramp up production quickly at low cost. It is what the nation HAD (not any more) before and during WII. They can quickly manufacture lots of missiles at a small fraction cost and much shorter time than Americans.
"Once US and China enter a large scale war, it is matter of time to go nuclear."
DeleteWhy does everyone seem to think that? Why would anyone take it to the nuclear level?? Especially China, when they have about 10% of the US nuclear force. Now, obviously the US would be devastated by 2-300 nuclear warheads, but China would receive THOUSANDS in return. Its a lose-lose. Do we think the leaders are insane?? I dont. China may have evil expansionist goals, but I dont see its leaders taking that step, or being crazy enough to. Conventional war will be tragic and horrible enough...
Can you image US or Chinese leader bites bullet if their fleets were defeated by the other?
DeleteTaiwan is not what most Americans want to risk their lives to defend. National leaders only want to use Taiwan to bargain and/or weaken China.
"Taiwan is not what most Americans want to risk their lives to defend."
DeletePlease refrain from making unsupported statements. As it happens, a 21-Jan-2022 poll by Trafalgar Group found,
"58.1% of likely voters believe the Biden administration “should use U.S. military assets to defend Taiwan if Taiwan is invaded by China,”
Do your research before commenting.
That aside, also refrain from political comments unless they link directly to naval matters.
So, Im not finding any operational and tactical advantage to discarding carriers. Sure, budgets are real, but capability is more important. The range of our naval aircraft is problematic to begin with, and putting them on fixed sites in the Second Chain, well, seems to basically take/keep them out of the fight, except to possibly support carriers in the Phillipine Sea. (Yes, I know, tankers...but do we truly have enough to support wings at multiple dispersed locations, and at any kind of useful tempo??) Assuming that an invasion of Taiwan is what triggers this future war, what part could the NAWs possibly play? Never mind that air wings arent really the offensive shooters, but the means to help dominate an area to allow other platforms to strike. If Japanese bases are under attack and on the defensive, and Guam is damaged or neutralized, what is the NAW going to attack? Why would the Chinese fleet even sail and expose themselves, except to meet a CVBG and hold it at arms length? In the NAW scensrio, it would only be to bring a gross of lesser, more plentiful weapons like the DF-16 within range of the NAFs, and hurt them severly, with relative impunity. Also, bases in the second chain wouldnt be a secret, or mobile, and could be struck even before the wing arrives, damaging or destroying any prepositioned supplies and infrastructure, making them useless for weeks or months. A slight Chinese push east would put newly-arrived NAWs at those locations on the defensive, and an attrition battle, wasting planes, weapons, and men isn't somthing I think we could sustain at the west end of the logistics chain, and especially without multiple carriers in theatre. ( Which begs to ask why they weren't just left on carriers in the first place) Once the Chinese bring a Nimitz-sized carrier or two on line, the battle problem becomes even more difficult. Now Im not well versed on USAF plans, but to me those locations make better sense for them, in a joint/support role since their aircraft range is much greater, and supporting CVBG offensives probing and pushing west makes some sense. So if all we want to do is "make Chinese bombardment plans difficult", maybe make their staff officers put in a few more hours, or make them expend more "expensive missiles" (which is a far cry from fighting and winning), then lets scrap some carriers. But I feel like putting naval air ashore is bowing to the budget, bowing to decades of mismanaged funding and procurement, giving away capability, and accepting the slow demise of our CVN fleet. Sunk not by the enemy, but by mismanagement...
ReplyDeleteA recent article from an Aussie site called The Strategist would agree in general with the broad points here.
ReplyDelete"Military lessons from the Ukraine war are being absorbed quickly in Asia. The message for democracies arming against the threat from authoritarian regimes is to select weapons that are simple and available rather than small numbers of expensive and complex ships, aircraft and vehicles that may not survive the first hours of conflict."
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australia-must-learn-defence-lessons-from-ukraine/
As CNO has often said- become specialised, go cheaper, get larger numbers, make it easier, cheaper, faster to replace
Andrew
While many years old, and the dollar figures would need adjusting to "today dollars", Id assume the percentages cited wont have changed much, so this gives an interesting perspective on the expense of carriers and CVBGs...
ReplyDeletehttps://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2016/03/24/aircraft-carriers-cost-less-than-1-of-the-federal-budget-a-lot-less/
CNO... Wrote a rather expansive comment, and think it might have gone to spam, or whatever dimension they disappear to LOL🤣
ReplyDeleteYes, there was a comment of yours in the spam folder. I've cleared it and it now appears.
DeleteMentioned before that in 2019 Modly stated the carrier strike group expenditure about 31 percent of the Navy's operating costs, 10 carriers in a fleet of 290. Is that not out of all proportion to the very limited firepower they can bring to bear when having to operate at 1,000 to 1,500 miles offshore from China.
ReplyDeleteWell if Modly said "strike group", then he wasnt just talking about 10 carriers...
DeleteSomewhere a while back I found some interesting comparisons of costs vs tonnage... Which makes sense because a frigate and a carrier are both "one ship", but obviously the associated costs are vastly different. Will hafta try and find it, but of course we could do some surfing and create our own...
Real debate is quality vs quantity.
ReplyDeleteOf course, most want quality plus quantity while worst is neither.
I should add that a great value of NAFs is CVN support. CSAR from the NAFs will save many pilots. As carriers lose aircraft they'll grab replacements from NAFs. Long deployments mean carriers will fill with sick, injured, and combat casualties. They'll be offloaded at NAFs and personnel at these bases eyed as replacements. Naval munitions demand will quickly outstrip normal supply sources and carriers will raid NAFs stores for munitions and even fuel.
ReplyDeleteThis is okay. NAF exist to provide an obstacle to a Chinese attempt to quickly grab Guam or move into the central Pacific. Once several carrier battle groups arrive to carry on the fight months after the war began, they are welcome to use whatever remains at the NAFs.
Minor question: When talking about operating 9 carriers, are you allowing for the fact that one is always in a 3 or 4 year "refueling complex overhaul" process, so we always have one less available than the total count?
ReplyDeleteSo are you saying 9 carriers available for combat (some after some months) and 10 total or 9 carriers total with 8 available for combat?
Think your estimate for length of RCOH under estimate and noted the GW requires additional funding in FY23
Delete"The mid-life repair and refueling of carrier USS George Washington (CVN-73) will extend into 2023 and last well over five and half years, according to Navy budget documents"
Also noted "The Japan-based carrier has an annual maintenance period in Yokosuka, while U.S. carriers see a major nine-month or more overhaul every three to four years."
Would guesstimate the CVN's spend one third of 50 life in maintenance, so six of the nine operational at any one time?
https://news.usni.org/2022/05/02/carrier-uss-george-washington-mid-life-overhaul-will-extend-into-2023
"Think your estimate for length of RCOH under estimate"
DeleteHere are the actual RCOH times:
Enterprise 4 yrs completed 1994
Nimitz 3 yrs completed 2001
Eisenhower 4 yrs completed 2005
Vinson 4 yrs completed 2009
Roosevelt 4 yrs completed 2013
Lincoln 4 yrs completed 2017
Washington 6 yrs (current schedule) completed 2023 (scheduled); impacted by COVID
Stennis began 2021 and ongoing
RCOH uniformly runs 4 yrs. Washington is an anomaly due to COVID impact.
It appears that the Australian Labor Party has just won a majority in their election and Scott Morrison ("I've never told the truth my entire life unless I absolutely had to") and his US-paid for party is out. As Scomo explicitly excluded Labor from the AUKUS discussions, it looks like this agreement maybe dead so there will be fewer Australian bases available in the future than G2mil had hoped for.
ReplyDelete