The LCS has failed on so many levels that it’s no longer even noteworthy when new failures are identified. However, I’d like to document one more new failure, not because of the failure itself, but because of lessons behind it.
The Failure : It’s Loud !
The failure is the ASW capability of the LCS. As you know, the Navy has officially abandoned the LCS ASW effort (see, “Stunning LCS News”). Without revisiting the entire sordid history of the LCS ASW module development effort, suffice it to say that the initial ASW module concept was totally abandoned and then subsequent versions attempted to fill the void, with no success. Now, we hear that LCS ASW efforts were doomed to failure by an inherent characteristic of the LCS ship, itself. From CNO Gilday,
First of all, the ASW Modules just didn’t pan out; the VDS [Variable Depth Sonar] didn’t work as it should. LCS is as noisy as an aircraft carrier and so there are some big challenges there that we should have [picked] up on way earlier.[1]
This is saying that the LCS self-noise is so loud that it negated the successful use of ship sonars, whether towed, hull mounted, or variable depth (VDS). Where is the noise coming from? The water jets, of course! This is not something new. I’ve been pointing out that the LCS is a deafening acoustic beacon for years.
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| What did you say? I can't hear you! |
Was this really a surprise to Admiral Gilday? Apparently so. He says that the Navy should have picked up on this ‘way earlier’. Come on, admiral. Are you really so ignorant about ASW that you didn’t realize that deafening water jets would be a detriment to ASW operations? You and all the CNOs before you should be ashamed that you allowed this pile of hot, steaming LCS to continue. You knew better and yet you went right along with it. You’re complicit along with the rest. If you had any integrity, you’d resign in shame. But you don’t … and you won’t.
Lessons
Okay, so much for beating up the LCS about yet another problem. I mentioned that I wanted to highlight this because of the lessons underlying the problem. Those lessons are:
Foresight / Hindsight – It’s far too easy to excuse the LCS personnel for not seeing the various problems except in hindsight. This, however, is completely false. Almost every LCS problem was readily recognizable from day one. In this specific case, anyone contemplating ASW operations for the LCS should have stopped the development effort on day one and pointed out that water jets were problematic. Hindsight is not an excuse. Foresight was readily available and there was no end of naval analysts pointing out these problems.
The lesson is that we need to listen to foresight. Again, almost every LCS problem was readily apparent on day one of the program. If the Navy is too inept to see the problems with foresight then they should listen to the crowd … the large, deafening crowd that saw all this from the start.
Modularity Versus Optimization – ComNavOps has long decried the concept of modularity (see “The Myth of Modularity”), as attempted by the LCS. The very concept is fundamentally and foundationally flawed. Modules cannot compensate for a platform that is not exquisitely integrated and optimized for whatever the function is and this is a perfect example. No ASW module can compensate for a host ship that is, inherently, a deafening acoustic beacon. Modularity, by definition, produces sub-optimal, mediocre platforms. Modularity is a fool’s dream born of a business case rather than a combat case.
The LCS should have died at the napkin stage.
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[1]Naval News website, “Admiral Gilday Explains LCS ASW And MCM Module Decisions”, Peter Ong, 5-May-2022,
Navy/Gilday having eventually to admit they have wasted near $30 Bn on the LCS seaframes and modules through incompetence due to the current severe budget pressures and continuing will be just poring money into a black hole, Congress will not admit they have been conned by the Navy as its just too embarrassing for them and will insist the ships not be decommissioned with new ships still being delivered.
ReplyDeleteRe modularity, think it has its place, Mk41 VLS cells prime example and would note the success of the small Danish Navy has with their StanFlex modules over the years, stainless steel 3m length x 3.5m width x 2.5 m height with connections for power, ventilation, communications, water and data, have been swapped out/used in nine different Danish ship classes, used for its 76mm guns, ESSM Mk 48 launchers, Harpoon Mk 141 launchers, MU90 torpedoes, cranes for its RHIBs etc.
To a certain extent it enables navy to keep the HM&E platform seperate from its weapons and sensors if enough slots built in for StanFlex modules to optimize them for their mission, that's presuming the HM&E adequate not like the under engineered LCS seaframes, not quite so important for a big navy but would think has its advantages as in standard production modules to be slotted into ships as and when required, disadvantage dimensions could become a straight jacket.
"modularity"
DeleteAbsolutely not. You're missing the key inherent characteristic of modularity which is the unavoidable fact that it produces an unoptimized, substandard platform for whatever function is being attempted. This post just graphically illustrated that fact. The base LCS hull, being unoptimized for ASW, could NOT be made into an optimized ASW vessel regardless of what module was placed on it. The same applies to the LCS as an ASuW or MCM vessel. They CANNOT be optimized platforms. If you want an optimized platform then you have to design it from day one as such and integrate every single rivet for that function and only that function.
Do you know what we call an unoptimized combat platform? Dead.
The only use for modularity is for non-combat functions like logistics.
Here's the post on modularity:
The Myth of Modularity
What happened to Delores Etter who oversaw the early portion? She went to teach at the Naval Academy. What happened to Charlie Hamilton who cautioned this is not the way to develop a ship? Reassigned. What happened to Captain Babcock the Initial PM? Fired. What about E. Anne Sandell PEO LMW - now at ONR.
ReplyDeleteThe junior guy got canned, deservedly so, along with one level up. The rest went on with not a mark against them. Look DDG-1000 former PMs for complete escapes from responsibility. Syring is at USAA and Goddard is at Fincantieri Marine Group,
that builds some of the LCSs.
All of these folks were smart enough to know they were violating all of the rules for good ship design and construction. But they instead just said yes to the folks that wanted to do it fast and loose. And as long as it wasn't their money and didn't hurt their careers, they just went ahead, service and country be damned.
There's no reason why we couldn't have built a quiet modular ship. We just chose not to. We chose to build speedboats. All that money spent on hitting 40+kts could've been spent on quieting instead.
ReplyDelete"no reason why we couldn't have built a quiet modular ship"
DeleteYou're missing the point about modularity. Yes, we could have built in rafting of machinery, acoustic isolation, some type of quiet propulsion system (maybe a dual system?), Prairie and/or Masker, etc. to optimize for ASW when the ASW module was aboard but what about when the MCM or ASuW modules were aboard? Then, all the money poured into optimizing for ASW would be wasted. The ship would be overbuilt and overspent for a function it wasn't using. The same applies to optimizing for ASuW and MCM. If you try to optimize for every function you wind up with a very expensive vessel.
Worse, some of the functions are antithetical with diametrically opposed requirements. For example, the high speed requirement (for ASuW? ; no one has really pinpointed why speed was a requirement but it was) necessitated large, powerful waterjets which meant ASW hull mounted sonars wouldn't work and towed arrays and VDS wouldn't be effective, as the Navy found out. So, no, you can't optimize for multiple functions on the same ship.
Modularity is fundamentally flawed because it results in sub-optimum platforms.
It's true that some requirements can conflict with each other. Quieting and high speed being a good example. But quieting is important for MCM as well as ASW, so it wouldn't have been wasted on either missions.
DeleteOTOH, the case for high speed in ASW, other than torpedo evasion, was never well justified.
It may be a valuable trait while performing ASuW against small boats, but maybe that should've been done by a separate vessel.
We don't need perfectly optimized platforms for these missions. We need platforms that are "good enough" that are also numerous enough.
The attraction of modularity is that we don't know up front whether we'll need a lot of MCM or a lot of ASW, or a mix of both. Being able to re-role vessels post construction allows us to adjust the mix over time. The LCS program thought they could do this quickly, but even if it takes a month or more to switch a ship, it could still be valuable. This is still a LOT faster than creating more MCM ships or more ASW escorts.
"maybe that should've been done by a separate vessel."
DeleteBingo!
"We don't need perfectly optimized platforms for these missions."
For any combat mission, yes, we do need optimized platforms. All else being equal, a non-optimized platform will always lose to an optimized one. Combat is NOT the place to send sub-optimal ships. We want to win and win overwhelmingly. That can't happen with sub-optimal platforms. You've already identified the solution: separate vessels, each with a single function, as I've repeatedly demonstrated and called for in this blog.
"Being able to re-role vessels"
Again, re-role-ing a vessel just gives you a sub-optimal vessel that will lose in combat. Now, one can make an argument that the MCM role is a non-combat role and I've stated that modularity can work for non-combat. However, ASW and ASuW are most definitely combat roles. You either optimize the vessel for them or you lose them in combat. Think about it ... if you were designing an optimum ASW or ASuW vessel, would either look anything like an LCS? Of course not! So, why would you want to produce a modular vessel that, to put it bluntly, sucks at its role due to a business case desire for modularity?
Setting all that aside, it's far cheaper to build single function, optimized ships. You'll get more of them. For example, MCM does not require a $600M-$700M LCS. A modernized Avenger (to deploy a USV) is sufficient for a fraction of the cost and we'd be able to afford many more of them. Similarly, an optimized ASuW vessel would look far more like, say, an Ambassador class than an LCS, again, at a fraction of the cost.
Absolutely nothing about modularity passes the combat or cost test.
@B.Smitty, Your comment went to the spam folder and did not appear right away. This is a sporadic problem that is on-going and has no apparent solution. Rest assured that all comments will eventually appear in the blog but there may be a delay. I check the spam folder several times a day.
Delete@B.Smitty, For what it's worth, on rare occasions I've had my own comments get re-routed to spam ! I wish I knew what triggers the spam routing.
DeleteOne of the problems with USN is they are cheap when they should spend and spend when they should be cheap.....
ReplyDeleteHow much money in long run would have been saved if they had just leased for a year or 2 a STANFLEX from Dutch? Figured out a few things, maybe even thought up some form of CONOPs, ok, maybe asking too much there but I think operating it for a year and serious evaluation of what's right, wrong for USN should have been done and probably would have avoided some pitfalls of LCS....which also should have been bought and ridden hard for 2 years and then started production after all faults found and corrected?!!? And lastly, can we stop already the concurrence none sense??!?!?
US DoD isn't saving any money by starting massive production when nothing works and fixes haven't even been implemented yet!!!
You're not wrong!
DeleteAnd yet we're still commissioning them....... https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/05/us-navy-commissions-its-21st-littoral-combat-ship/
ReplyDeleteI though this post was going to be about the hull cracks,
Deletelimiting speeds to 15kn for the Indys.
Well, at 15kn you have a bit better ASW platform,
so there is an upside.
https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2022/05/10/the-littoral-combat-ships-latest-problem-class-wide-structural-defects-leading-to-hull-cracks/
I've got a post coming on hull cracks. The LCS has so many problems it's becoming difficult to keep up with them and still find time to cover other topics!
Delete"Well, at 15kn you have a bit better ASW platform,"
DeleteWell, not really. One of the standard ASW tactics is 'sprint and drift'. With the LCS it would have to be 'meander and drift'.
Correct me if I am wrong, but the didn't the Navy "borrow" a smaller ship from Australia to evaluate it for potential use by the Navy? The Joint Venture, I believe it was called. Try before you buy. If both variants of the LCS were actually(and honestly) put their paces before determining that they were good to proceed to production, would these problems have been discovered before they were placed into service? (Did I confuse anyone?).
ReplyDeleteThe Joint Venture (HSV) was evaluated mainly as a logistics support vessel and the subsequent Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) wound up being an almost exact copy. In that regard, the evaluation was successfully accomplished.
DeleteThe USAV Joint Venture HSV-X1 had nothing to do with LCS. It was more of a prototype for the Spearhead-class expeditionary fast transport.
DeleteLots to leearn there though. 1 engine, 1 transmission, 1 water jet. Simple, reliable propulsion.
DeleteThe MCM module is never going to work, because it is not designed to deliver what is needed. The ASW module is never going to work because of the internal engine noise.
ReplyDeleteASW and MCM are not functions that can be handled by bolting modules onto non-specialized ships. The Navy needs two dedicated ASW ship types (ASW frigate and ASW corvette) and two dedicated MCM ship types (drone/helo sweep mother ship and hunter), and no two of them can be the same ship. The one common attribute that is useful in both MCM and ASW is quiet running, and the LCSs flunk that one badly.
Although described as a littoral ship, the LCSs are remarkably ill-suited to any littoral mission. They can't do MCM, they can't do shallow-water ASW, and the 57mm popgun is bloody useless for NGFS.
How do the mission of the ASW frigate and the ASW corvette differ - is one an escort and the other a hunter?
DeleteI am skeptical of the latter concept.
"The MCM module is never going to work, because it is not designed to deliver what is needed. "
DeleteAnd what do you think is needed?
I could see an ASW corvette being a ship lacking area air defense and the frigate having some more AAW.
Delete"I could see an ASW corvette being a ship lacking area air defense and the frigate having some more AAW."
DeleteThat's a difference in capabilities. What's the difference in mission or usage?
Eg. are you envisioning the frigate as an all-purpose escort and the corvette as an ASW escort, or the frigate as an ASW escort with secondary AAW capabilities and the corvette as an ASW hunter/killer?
"How do the mission of the ASW frigate and the ASW corvette differ - is one an escort and the other a hunter?"
DeleteComNavOps provides a pretty good description of each at his Fleet Structure tab to this page.
ASW Frigate (he calls it ASW Escort) "Provides open ocean ASW escort to carrier, amphibious, surface action groups, and logistics convoys.
ASW Corvette – Provides ASW for shallow water, choke point, harbor defense, and convoy escort. This is not a battle carrier or surface group escort."
"And what do you think is needed?"
DeleteA little stage-setting. In the commercial world, a frequent comment is something like, "I can do it fast, or I can do it cheap, or I can do it good, but I can't do all three." Well, MCM probably can't be done cheaply, but there is a definite tradeoff between good and fast. And there are two kinds of MCM--thorough (hunting) and fast (sweeping). For commercial shipping, you want virtually 100% clearance. No losses are acceptable. For military operations timing is often critical, so you may determine to live with a certain risk level and incur a few casualties in order that am operation may proceed on time.
So for commercial ports you will favor hunting, which is slower (one mine at a time) but more thorough. The primary Dutch and Belgian concern is commercial activity around the mouths of the Rhine, so they are huge proponents of hunting.
For military transits, some sweeping will reduce the threat level, but not eliminate it. When the risk level is acceptable in view of the importance of the objective, the operation proceeds.
The LCS is purely a hunting platform. And the MCM module was designed to permit hunting without requiring the ship to enter the minefield. Keeping humans out of minefields has become an obsession with MCM planners in the last half century. The photo of the exploding South Korean minesweeper in Wonsan, with the First Lieutenant about 100 feet in the air and headed higher, made an indelible impression on planners. Thus the development of sweep platforms without humans in the water--helos in the USN, drones in the German.
MCM really requires dedicated platforms. There are just too many unique aspects of MCM vessels--from non-magnetic engines and hulls to solid state degaussing to the galley rinsing empty cans and placing them back on the pantry shelves after using their contents. I would propose two types:
1) A sweep mother ship, something like a small LSD/LPD, with a helo deck for 2-3 sweep helos, and a well deck with room for 3-4 helo sweep sleds and 4-6 Seehund-type drone sweepers, and fitted with ComNavOps's system that I have called wild walrus--a bunch of UUVs that you launch up a channel and which are programmed to find anything that might be a mine and destroy it, without taking the time-consuming classification step.
2) A hunter, which could range from something like the new Belgian/Dutch hunters (at the top end), to perhaps something less extensive and expensive.
Sweep first, get to an acceptable level of risk for the military operation to proceed, then come in and hunt to clean up everything before reopening the port to commercial activity.
LCS had a sweep system as well - Unmanned Influence Sweep System (UISS).
DeleteMCM doesn't require dedicated platforms anymore. Everyone is moving from the old style Channel Immune/Avoid style to Channel Standoff or Area Standoff.
Having a dedicated platform can still help, but isn't a hard n fast requirement.
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/f3a1/28c638ba522454f475f2056e9f10227d0ae1.pdf
"hunting" "sweeping"
DeletePretty good answer. I would offer one thought: for combat sweeping (under fire such as an assault or contested passage), helos are extremely vulnerable as we've seen repeatedly over land battlefields. You might want to place more emphasis on surface sweeping by USVs. I'm not saying eliminate helo sweeping but re-balance between helos and USVs. This would also necessitate a MCM mothership that could QUICKLY AND EFFICIENTLY handle USV launch/recovery. This is one of the LCS major design failings. It has limited launch/recovery capacity and the operations take an exceedingly long time.
On the topic of assault MCM, clearing assault landing lanes is yet another version of MCM that has its own unique requirements since it spans the region from deep water to on the shore and mines can be bottom, moored, floating or anywhere in between. I'm certain we haven't exercised this type of clearance in recent history.
"MCM doesn't require dedicated platforms anymore."
DeleteGotta disagree. Sure, any old tugboat can lug a USV sweeper to a spot and dump it over the side and claim to be conducting MCM and, if you have unlimited time that's a valid approach. However, performing combat MCM such as clearing assault landing lanes or clearing choke point passages is a time sensitive operation. For that, you want an MCM optimized vessel that can very quickly and efficiently handle whatever your equipment is (USV, helo, UUV, whatever) and in large numbers. That will required specialized handling equipment and ship design (well deck?). One of the LCS major MCM design flaws was its very limited unmanned vehicle launch/recovery capacity and speed. The launch/recovery process required staggering amounts of time and has never been fully successful. For a time sensitive operation, the limitation of one vehicle at a time and hours to perform that one launch/recovery is a major weakness as well as introducing a vulnerability for the ship by requiring it slow down/stop for extended periods.
Also, the host ship should have specialized maintenance and support facilities for the equipment as well as advanced communications and data processing for transmitting/receiving the sensor data and analyzing it. Most of the sensor systems seem to still require the sensor to return to the host ship to upload and analyze the data. Manufacturers are working on transmitting data while operating but that's not yet a routine capability.
So, all in all, a specialized host ship is required to perform MCM quickly and efficiently.
I did say, "Having a dedicated platform can still help, but isn't a hard n fast requirement."
DeleteMost MCM performed isn't so-called "combat MCM". It's cleaning up for weeks/months/years/decades after conflicts. Or it's ensuring friendly ports and waterways aren't mined by adversaries. Or it's like our operations in the Persian Gulf, under the defensive umbrella of friendly forces.
OTOH, I've wondered if small, manned, submersibles wouldn't be preferable for "combat MCM". MCM ships, USVs and helicopters are targetable from shore. UUVs are useful, but more for survey and less for clearance. They lack the autonomy and comms for clearance.
A manned submersible could carry tethered AUVs for hunting and clearance as well as UUVs for survey. Midget subs like the DRASS 160 could be carried by amphib or semi-submersible, to within a few hundred miles of its operating area, and then proceed undetected. Once there, they could launch UUVs to survey the area for mines, and then use multi-shot AUVs to place charges.
http://www.hisutton.com/DRASS.html
"DRASS 160"
DeleteThe cruising speed for DRASS 160 is 5 kts. It would require 40 hrs to cover a 200 nm drop off distance. If you have unlimited time to conduct MCM, that will work. A few UUVs are almost useless in MCM. I'm unaware of any UUV that can simultaneously detect, classify, and destroy mines. Further, each UUV can typically only destroy 1-4 mines. Worse, the maximum UUV speed is typically around 3-5 kts. That's not exactly speedy clearance!
Neutralizer UUVs typically require operator guidance to the target mine; something that would be difficult or impossible from a mini-sub.
The problems with this concept are almost limitless.
Yes, it would take a while to move a couple hundred miles. We plan major amphibious operations (the main reason for "combat MCM") weeks or months in advance, so I don't see this as a major issue.
DeleteIt isn't a rapid capability, but there is no such thing when it comes to MCM. It could be done clandestinely, up until the time you start detonating clearance charges. Even then, it would require ASW to counter it. Can't just shoot anti-ship missiles from shore.
UUVs would be for surveying the area ahead of clearance. You can launch multiple UUVs to survey in parallel.
A mini-sub could use tethered ROVs just like a surface ship.
For any semi-major operation, it would require either many weeks/months to conduct clearance operations or dozens/hundreds of mini-subs and UUVs to achieve large area clearance in short, combat-relevant time frames. The former is not feasible in combat and the latter is, currently, unworkable even if we had the subs/UUVS. We don't have anything remotely approaching the kind of large area coordination of mini-subs and UUVs required to achieve coverage without mutual interference.
DeleteWhile a single mini-sub/UUV might operate undetected for a short period of time, I'm certain that trying to operate dozens/hundreds to achieve timely clearance would be readily detected.
The coordination required to operate what amounts to a swarm of UUVs is something that the Navy hasn't even begun to consider. This is one of the [many] failings of the LCS MCM effort. Even trying to operate two LCS and their couple of UUVs in close quarters would cause problems and, as I said, any semi-major operation would require dozens/hundreds of UUVs.
The unfortunate reality is that we haven't got either the equipment or the doctrine/tactics for large scale combat clearance operations. Worse, the Navy has demonstrate zero interest in addressing the doctrine/tactics side of things. We've been working on LCS MCM for the better part of two decades and the Navy has never attempted a multi-LCS (or simulated LCS) clearance exercise to work out MCM command/control and tactics.
I don't think it would require weeks or months to clear transit and assault lanes through minefields. You don't have to clear the entire area.
DeleteThe LCS UUV-based effective clearance rate is 1-2 mines per hour. You can do the math.
DeleteAssuming Soviet-style minefield designs and densities, there may only be 8-10 mines in the perimeter and main belt in each transit lane, total. That's not too bad. 4-10 hours isn't too bad @ 1-2 mines per hour.
DeleteMore than half of those would be moored contact mines in the Soviet design, which can be swept with cable cutting sleds.
The VSW zone is where they may be more dense but still mostly smaller contact mines.
Saw a snarky post on social. China and Russia pulled off a 13 hour long distance air patrol.
ReplyDelete'Maybe it was a safety patrol looking for US Navy LCS ships who broke down and are in distress.'
Which is sort of on point.
And at this point just scrap the things, and I guess order some more Burkes. Maybe commission some merchant mates and masters who have a proven ability to navigate and ship handle safely to drive the ships, too.
The only real possibile use i could see for the LCS in a future conflict would be as high speed minelayers around the Philippines, Indonesia an Malaysia, where they would mostly operate within radius of an allied base.
ReplyDeleteThe mission deck would be equipped with rails for a good number of mines. In such a scenario they would always be vulnerable units but they could be considered expendable as they have no real combat value. At least the mines they could lay would hamper a chinese advance and cause some losses.
For this role most advanced systems could be removed or simply disabled. The mines could be released by a simple (non gold-plated) mechanical system or simply manhandled.
The only use i could find (aside as diving wrecks and work for the breakers) would be as expendable automated decoys (missile sponges) emitting sound, thermal, radio, radar and other emissions to hamper targeting imitating larger unit's (carriers, cruisers, LPDs ecc.). It would cost money but at least they would be useful as the assumed large number of chinese missiles can't simply all be intercepted so the next best thing would be present them a target to engage.
A while back on another forum I read some anecdotes from SSN sailors. They were talking about when the first few LCS hit the water, and the sonar guys aboard the subs heard them at some absurd ranges, and had some "wtf?" moments, wondering what was making all the racket!!
ReplyDeleteYup, thatll be a great ASW platform!!🤣
Put the LCS in the South Pacific, like around the Solomon Islands. Show the flag. Flags still work, right?
ReplyDeleteAt least they'll be nearby when the yearly typhoons hit, to provide some aid to the Pacific Islands and the Philippines
Andrew
And metal halls are also not a great feature for MCM. If the Navy had been truly serious about a vessel to doe ASW/MCM it would have been a GRP hulled ship with its engines on an acoustic raft driving a submarine-like screw.
ReplyDeleteLets face it. One of things driving modularity wasn't even the end of the cold war. It was the internal politics of a Navy that hates doing MCM, ASW, and patrol which doesn't require giant Battlestar Galactica vessels. So they make patrol boats the size of a corvette and say they can do anything...but put no priority whatsoever on the actual roles.
Surprise that they are too noisy. Why? They weren't interested in ASW anyway. They never liked the mission and would have simply pressed older Burkes into doing it anyway in wartime.
For the MCM mission if they truly wanted to use commercial design then instead of going to big military conglomerates building to cheaper standards, they would have went to commercial yacht builders who regularly design on the fly, use non-metallic hulls, and design for minimum crew. For today's rich, there are already yachts with docks for private submersibles and moon pools for diving which can be adapted for MCM equipment delivery. And no it wouldn't be easy, but it would still be cheaper than LCS. MCM ships have never been heavily armed (at least not since WW2), and a pair of non-penatrating CIWS would actually give it twice the air defense of an LCS. Of course we would leave off the granite countertops and mahogany rails, and if the British or French wanted one they could leave the bar intact and well stocked.
The Navy has the only modularity it needs since the 1980's--it's called the vertical launch system. It can fire AAW weapons, ASW Weapons, ASuW weapons, and Land attack weapons. It can do all those missions because it is just a weapons platform. The ship it is on must be dedicated to the mission by having a specific fit for the sensors, specific engine mounting (for ASW), etc.
ReplyDeleteThere is a part of warfare other than logistics that would benefit from modules. Specifically the Merchant Marine.
In wartime a containerized CIWS would be useful to add missile protection to our supply chain since escort is another mission the Navy has forgotten. Ditto for 30mm guns for protection against asymmetric small boat attacks or pirates. Since most big commercial ships already have a helo pad, maybe a spare parts module for ASW choppers--who would act as scouts relaying their sonobuoy/dipping sonar info to a frigate for actually attacking an enemy sub. And perhaps a crew quarter module so the Navy can man the other modules.
The current Navy and Marine leadership apparently believes that supplies will magically fly on pixie dust past enemy ships, subs, and aircraft as they continue to ignore the Merchant Marine and let their own supply ships rust into useless hulks while wasting billions on non-functional crap.
Oh, just thought of a useful module for the LCS. Fire Boat. The report on the Bonhomme Richard's fire indicates one of the staggeringly large amount of mistakes leading to its loss is that working boats like tugs and fire boats have been ignored and no Naval working boats were there. Commercial tugs and local fire boats--with no training on dealing with the military or military vessels--provided that role.
"Oh, just thought of a useful module for the LCS. Fire Boat."
DeleteMight have to add some masts and rig sails for it to get around the harbor.