Monday, May 9, 2022

Illustrative Examples From Ukraine

While I have emphatically warned about drawing lessons from the Ukraine-Russia war, there are still some illustrative examples to be had.  These are illustrative in the sense that they describe a lesson without requiring complete and accurate data.  In other words, the points and lessons can be discerned whether all the facts are known or not.  Let’s take a look at a couple of illustrative examples.

 

 

Vertical Assault

 

At the onset of combat, Russia launched a massive helicopter assault to seize the Hostomel air base which is just 6 miles outside Kiev.  Reports suggest that 20-30+ helicopters (Mi-8 escorted by Ka-52) were used and that the airfield was quickly secured. 

 

History has demonstrated, repeatedly, that helo operations over contested battlefields are costly and this held true in this case.  The initial attack was costly with videos showing several helos shot down during their approach to the airfield.

 

The Russian’s initial success did not last, however.  Reports indicate that the 4th Rapid Response Brigade of the Ukraine National Guard counterattacked and partially or completely reclaimed the airfield.  The brigade’s nominal composition was:

 

  • Brigade HQ
  • 1st Infantry Battalion
  • 2nd Infantry Battalion
  • Tank Battalion (T-64BV tanks)
  • Artillery Battalion
  • Anti-aircraft Missile Battalion
  • Support units (drones, etc.)

 

The Russian force consisted of purely light infantry and lacked any armor to counter the Ukraine tanks.  They had to rely on a few Su-25 strike aircraft which were, in turn, countered by Ukrainian anti-air and air support.

 

Control of the airfield then appeared to switch back and forth.  Russia appears to have attempted to reinforce its Hostomel forces with only limited success.  At this point, reports become unreliable and events are unclear.

 

The lesson from this illustrative example is one that history has already taught us.  Airborne assault using light infantry cannot succeed without rapid reinforcement from heavier units.  In addition, airborne assault will, by definition, result in an isolated and surrounded force.  Rapid reinforcement from heavier ground forces is mandatory.  Russia failed to quickly link up an armored relief force with the airborne infantry and, thus, failed in their objective to quickly secure the airfield as an operational hub and springboard into Kiev.

 

The US military, and the Marines, in particular, are counting heavily on vertical assault despite extremely heavy historical losses and without any realistic exercises to demonstrate the viability of the concept.  We desperately need to re-examine our vertical assault operational concepts and doctrine and prove/disprove it with realistic field exercises.  History suggests that the concept is not viable against a peer enemy.


 


Self-deception

 

It appears that the Russian military may have suffered from a case of self-deception about the degree of expertise of their soldiers and units.  Without needing any actual data or proof, it is also an absolute certainty that Putin was being told what he wanted to hear regarding capabilities and readiness.  Passing on only positive news to your boss is simply an ingrained bureaucratic and human tendency.  When your boss is a despotic dictator who will kill you if he doesn’t like what you tell him, the already overwhelming tendency becomes an absolute certainty.

 

We can see the exact same thing happening to the US military, today, if perhaps not to the exact same degree (though likely not much different).  As evidenced by their impossibly optimistic statements about our capabilities and readiness, our leaders are either repeating the end result of being fed falsely positive assessments or they’re out and out lying.  I’ll give them the benefit of the doubt and assume that they’re being fed falsely positive assessments.

 

 

Summary

 

As noted and cautioned, the details of the examples may not be completely correct but the generalized lessons stand and the Ukraine examples illustrate the lessons.  Ukraine is a priceless opportunity for the US military to re-examine and refine/eliminate many of its concepts and beliefs.  We absolutely must start injecting reality into our concepts and our training.  We need to stop lying to ourselves about the magnificence of our weapon systems and start testing them realistically and evaluating them through the ruthless and unforgiving lens of life or death combat.


30 comments:

  1. Replies
    1. Market Garden, Arnhem bridge replay.
      The Russian Airborne landed too far from the objective,
      35km to the main government buildings.
      The British 1st were 13km from their objective, the bridge.

      Quote.
      Lt. Gen. Frederick Browning:
      Only the weather can stop us now.

      General Stanislaw Sosaboski:
      Weather. What of the Germans, General Browning. Don't you think that if we know Arnhem is so critical to their safety that they might know it too?

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    2. The comparison is not quite valid. The Russian helo assault was not - could not have been - intended to seize Kiev. The helo assault's mission and objective was to seize the airfield. Follow on troops would attack the city. As noted in the post, the assault initially - and briefly - succeeded but was quickly negated. The ground forces never managed to link up with the assault force in any significant numbers and possession of the airfield remained in dispute.

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    3. I've come around to Scott Ritter's observations. The entire push on Kiev and air assault on the airfield was a giant feint to draw in all the Ukrainian reserve forces around Kiev to protect the capital while the main fight would be in Donbas/Mariupol.

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SN7o-ThhFfY

      -DLF

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    4. You don't dedicate nearly 30 BTGs to a "feint". That's just Putin trying to make lemonade from his lemon of a special military operation. It is just an operational cluster f* with too many competing priorities.

      Putin had to shift to Donbas/Mariupol when the northern assault got chewed up and spit out.

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    5. "giant feint"

      That's an after-the-fact coverup for a failed operation. The amount of units and resources committed to taking Kiev was far beyond any feint. It simply failed. Russia is not trying to salvage something out of the entire effort.

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    6. The Russian lost 1 or 2 Il-76, bringing air-landing troops & a bit of armour. So the airfield hold force was under strength. The Soviet intel was that 30-50% of the UK troops would come over to them. As the previous invader of the Ukraine said "We have only to kick in the door and the whole rotten structure will come crashing down

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    7. " So the airfield hold force was under strength."

      All airborne forces are. By definition they're too light in terms of firepower, numbers, armor, etc. to hold for more than a brief period. They MUST have heavy relief ground forces link up with them within 24 hrs in order to hold whatever they've seized.

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  2. Kind of hard for the Marine Corps to do vertical assault/envelopment when Commandant Deep Thinker is giving away half their lift and half their CAS aircraft.

    Kind of hard for the Marine Corps to counter attack with armor when Commandant Deep Thinker gave away all their armor and the general Officers/SES mysteriously decided the ACV not actually working was not a BAE contract violation.

    Kind of hard for the Marine Corps to assault or counter assault when Commandant Deep Thinker is giving half their tubes to Ukraine.

    Kind of hard for the Marine Corps to assault, defend, or counter assault, even light infantry style, with no squad automatic weapons. However, Commandant Deep Thinker war gamed this, and he determined rifles and elan will be enough.

    Oddly, the PLANMC brigades not only have lots of arty, their armored swimming vehicles actually swim.

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    Replies
    1. I think the SAW => IAR debacle was cooked up by a small contingent of Marine Gunners at Quantico long before the current commandant was in place. Otherwise, spot on.

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    2. "PLANMC ship-shore connectors"

      Bear in mind that the Chinese shiip-shore connectors are NOT connectors, at least not as I define them. A connector is a REUSABLE craft that can return to the host ship, repeatedly, to continue bringing troops and equipment/supplies ashore.

      The Chinese amphibious vehicle family and the US Marine AAV/ACV vehicles are ONE-TIME, ONE-WAY transports. Now, if you happen to have enough of them to transport the entire ship's load of troops, equipment, and supplies in one 'dump' then that's fine. However, US amphibious ships (and I presume Chinese ships) have only enough vehicles for a portion of the ship's load. The remainder of the ship's load becomes a challenge to get ashore.

      We, and the Chinese, lack that reusable connector (Higgins boat).

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    3. Good point about PLANMC ship-shore connectors. If they can do that (including amphibious tanks) why can't we?

      I note that the Ukrainian Rapid Response Brigade looks a lot like the combined arms Marine Expeditionary Regiment (MER) that I have proposed elsewhere. Add an amphibious armor group and an air group and you basically have my MER. Create an amphibious squadron/ARG that can 1) haul it around and 2) get it ashore, and you might have something. It looks like it could gain--and hold--important positions.

      Some of the Marines on here, what do you think?

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    4. "We, and the Chinese, lack that reusable connector (Higgins boat)."

      And in response to your suggestion about redesigning the amphibious force, that seems like the key to a lot of it. First figure out how we get everybody and everything ashore, and then figure out from what.

      I don't think it is possible to design a fast, stealthy connector that can work from 25-50 miles out, so that basically eliminates the current LHAs/LHDs as amphibious ships. What to replace them depends on the extent to which we can develop connectors.

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    5. "I don't think it is possible to design a fast, stealthy connector that can work from 25-50 miles out,"

      You're correct. It's not possible to do so affordably with current technology. So, there's one assumption you have to make - that our assault starting point has to be 3-5 miles out. Any further than that and we'll be delivering seasick, puking troops who won't be in any condition to fight.

      With that starting point, that simplifies the connector design, doesn't it? In fact, an exact Higgins boat would now work, wouldn't it? I'd like to believe we can do better than that but it won't be by a lot !

      With a Higgins-ish connector, you can not start to envision the kind of attack transport (APA) that will carry, load, and launch them.

      See, you're halfway to a new amphibious ship design !

      Now, figure out how the ship will do the storage, loading, and launching and you've pinned down much of the amphibious ship design.

      This stuff isn't really that hard. That's why it infuriates me that our professional naval leaders need years of study to come up with a conceptual design for a ship. I could have a viable new amphibious ship design on a napkin in 30 minutes and a solid concept drawing and spec list in a few days.

      This is also why I think tweaking around the edges of what we currently have is pointless ... it gets us nowhere. Tweaking bad still produces bad if ever so slightly less bad. Scrap it and design something truly good !

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    6. IIRC, LVTs were used as connectors (multiple trips) as well as armored vehicles ashore. There's no reason AAV/ACVs couldn't be as well.

      For a fast (though not stealthy), OTH, Higgins boat, look at the Watercat M12/14 (>35kts), or even the British LCVP Mk5 (25kts).

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    7. "There's no reason AAV/ACVs couldn't be as well."

      No, not really. Doctrine dictates that the AAV/ACV is the Marine's personnel carrier (and firepower to a pathetically small extent !). That aside, from a practical perpsective they're not suited for the role with a max speed of 8 kts, a max troop capacity of 17 (much less in full gear), and no equipment/supply capability. Compare that to even the WWII Higgins boat with a speed of 12 kts, a troop capacity of 36, and the ability to carry equipment and supplies.

      The AAV/ACV is not suited for a connector role and will never be used that way.

      "Watercat"

      From my cursory understanding of it, the Watercat is ill-suited to use as a landing craft due to having a very restricted rapid egress capability. This is both an abandon ship (sinking) danger and a rapid unloading under fire risk. It appears to be a death trap in the landing craft role. It appears to be intended as a commando craft and, perhaps, is suitable for that although the limited egress just seems like a dangerous feature.

      "LCVP"

      This is a better choice for a landing craft although, again, I'm concerned about the over-the-side abandonment which is nearly impossible. The forward troop unloading seems adequate. Eliminate the troop 'shelter' and the steering 'cabin' and it would be fine. Of course, then it would be a straight Higgins boat !

      I would think a HIggins-ish boat with a 20+ kt speed and armored (against small arms and splinters) sides with slanted sides for deflection of direct fire rockets would make an adequate landing craft.

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    8. There's also the small hovercraft designs. The Griffon 2450TD can be armored, to a degree, unloads over either side, and has a top speed of 35+kts. It can fly over reefs and sand bars and land troops feet-dry and has no beach gradient restrictions. Can't carry much other than people though.

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    9. "Griffon"

      That's a nice general purpose civilian utility craft but it has no features that would make it suitable for a combat landing craft. The pilot is far forward which almost guarantees the 'bridge' and pilot will be destroyed killed, leaving the craft drifting. There is no rapid egress for debarking under fire. As you note, there is no cargo capacity. The single large fan is a failure (mechanical or battle damage) waiting to happen. It's a large, non-stealthy target. The 17 passenger limit is probably around 10 troops in full combat gear which isn't much for the size of the craft.

      Honestly, there are few (no?) suitable landing craft for opposed amphibious assaults.

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    10. Re: Griffon: The pilot house can be lightly armored (vs small arms & perhaps cage for RPGs). Marines can rapidly egress out either side. It can carry 2.4 tonnes of cargo, but there isn't a great way to get it in or out. The fan/engine is a single point of failure. All downsides.

      But it can fly over mines, sand bars, and reefs at 35kts. An LVCP can't.

      Each option has tradeoffs.

      Personally, I still think the LVT/AAV/ACV approach is the best way to go, but you do need ships that can bring them close enough to shore.

      They can crawl over reefs/sand bars, have enough armor to shrug off small arms fire, and can move off the beach immediately at vehicle speeds.

      I'd prefer to see them with all with a 30mm RWS, though. Not just the dinky MG or AGL. I wonder how well a Trophy-equipped RWS turret would work at sea?

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    11. The main problem with the AAV/ACV is numbers. The amphibious ships can't (or don't) carry enough to transport more than a small portion of the troops ashore. A MEU is listed as having around 15 vehicles which for, say 15 fully combat loaded troops each, is 225 troops. A MEU would be something on the order of 3000 troops during war which means less than a tenth of the ground force can get ashore for the initial assault. That's a problem !

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    12. "Marines can rapidly egress out either side."

      How is that done? I'm not seeing any way to do that in photos of the craft. There's some sort of shelter that blocks access to the sides of the craft. Even if that were removed, trying to climb up and over and then down the side skirts seems like a risky proposition. Have you seen photos of side debarkation?

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    13. A Newport could carry 30 AAV/ACVs at 21kts. The older De Soto County LSTs could carry at least as many at 17kts. If we had Marine units that were fully mechanized, we could land a brigade-sized element with ~10-12 LSTs (~300 ACVs, if going by comparable Army SBCTs). Obviously this doesn't include all of their non-ACV vehicles and equipment. This would be just the initial assault waves. The rest would have to come ashore by other means.

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    14. There are pics of the Griffon hovercraft with the central shelter removed.

      https://www.defencetalk.com/military/photos/rm-hovercraft-patrol.1423/

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  3. RE: the Higgins Boat. One thought that occurs is that a Higgins boat will deposit unprotected infantry (except of course for body armor) on the beach, with only their legs to carry them beyond the beach. Does that match our thoughts for how to proceed with the operation after landing?

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    Replies
    1. We (all of us !) persist in wanting to focus on individual aspects instead of the total picture. Yes, a landing craft would deposit unprotected infantry but, in the larger picture - as we demonstrated in WWII assaults - the infantry would not (should not) be unprotected. Their protection would take the form of massive pre-assault bombardment and even more massive assault suppressive fire from naval ships and fire support vessels. This forces the enemy to shelter during the time the infantry are landing. This is a combat proven assault doctrine. Of course, the flaw in that is that we've allowed our naval gun support to evaporate. That means that, currently, we have no ability to conduct a successful opposed landing.

      What we're discussing, here, is just one aspect of an amphibious assault. These are brief comments, not books.

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    2. I think the idea of moving troops en masse with many small (Higgins) boats, carried by "troopships" is to me still the ideal. Im wondering about the Army's new landing craft... Basically 100ftx25ft, can carry a tank or multiple other vehicles. Having a 350mi range and a relatively high speed of 25-ish kts loaded and 30 empty, it seems like itd have promise as a connector for current large amphibs, the only detractor being that its aluminum, so it will either need to be copied in steel for dangerous landings, or used as-built for follow-on waves... But generally the speed, range and size makes it a potential template for somthing useful. Funny how its the Army building them...!!!

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    3. "Army's new landing craft."

      I assume you're referring to the Army LCU. It has the same problem as the Navy LCAC which is that it's not suitable for the actual assault. It's too slow, too large (too much risk in one vessel), and has no effective defense. In other words, it's a target drone waiting to be sunk.

      The role of the LCU or LCAC is follow on sustainment and for that it's well suited.

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  4. ComNavOps, a question about amphibious assault.

    You have repeatedly stated that overwhelming local superiority is required for it to succeed, and I don't necessarily disagree, but do you think that's realistic in a peer war?

    In which reasonable scenario is USA going to have overwhelming "local" superiority over China in a place that matters?

    I can't really see it happening.

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    Replies
    1. "overwhelming local superiority"

      We achieved it repeatedly in WWII so it's certainly possible. Whether it can be achieved in a China war depends on where we're attacking. For example, it wouldn't be difficult to establish local superiority in the first island chain. Now, that doesn't mean that it would happen on day one of a war. It might take years to roll back defenses to the point where can achieve local superiority.

      A specific, reasonably possible scenario would be if the Chinese seized the Philippines (or Philippines opted to side with China) and we wanted to take it back. With several carriers, we could establish local air superiority which is the prerequisite for an assault. Throw in a far ranging cordon of SSNs to interdict Chinese surface groups and we now have local naval superiority.

      Personally, I don't see any need for amphibious attacks in any likely war scenario but that's a separate topic.

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  5. We are definitely not getting the whole story. No doubt the Russians are crap but the Ukrainians are actually really secretive about anything except success or images/video of success.

    Look at operations at Snake Island. Ukrainians clearly put in a major effort here - multiple drone strikes on SHOARADS, patrol craft, a landing craft, a Russian helicopter and even a Su-27 strike with 2 aircraft (one of which nearly got fragged by the leaders initial strike).

    And then nothing....apparently the Ukrainians just deployed multiple scarce assets to take out some assets on Snake Island and then did nothing.

    Russians claim that they managed to stop a Ukrainian amphibious assault including shooting down several Ukrainian helicopters and destroying several landing craft. Ukrainians said nothing but did confirm the death of a high ranking naval aviation officer flying a Mi-14 naval helicopter.

    So what really happened?

    From a propaganda purpose the Su-27 or initial drone strike was sufficient enough.

    But why launch a concerted suppression and put multiple major assets at risk effort if it was not followed up by more significant attempt to take the island?

    There's been quite a lot of inconsistencies in reporting on both sides so I doubt the truth will be known for many years.







    ReplyDelete

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