The Marine Corps, our national crisis response force, couldn’t respond to an emergency deployment request to deal with the Ukraine-Russia war.
As Russia prepared to invade Ukraine, the head of U.S. European Command asked for a Marine Expeditionary Unit and Amphibious Ready Group to deploy early to Europe as a hedge against the conflict expanding.
But the Marine Corps couldn’t meet the request, Lt. Gen. Karsten Heckl, the deputy commandant for combat development and integration, told the Senate Armed Services seapower subcommittee today.[1]
The Marines couldn’t respond?!?! Isn’t that their entire reason for existence? Isn’t that why we have them around?
According to Marine Lt. Gen. Karsten Heckl, the deputy commandant for combat development and integration, crisis response is the Marine’s responsibility. As he stated,
“Within force design is our ongoing requirement as a Marine Corps and by law to be the crisis response force for the nation.”[1]
So what happened?
According to Heckl, U.S. European Command chief Gen. Tod Wolters asked that the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit and the Kearsarge Amphibious Ready Group “sortie early to be on station as the Ukrainian situation evolved, or devolved. And we were not able to sortie the ship[s].”[1]
So, according to the Marine general, the blame lies with the Navy. He further states,
The 22nd MEU was already prepared to go. However, the maintenance status of the three warships of the Kearsarge Amphibious Ready Group was “so bad” they were not prepared to leave then or after the invasion, Heckl told Defense One on Thursday.[2]
On March 16—a month and a day after the orders came down—most of the MEU departed Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia, aboard the amphibious assault ship Kearsarge (LHD 3) and the amphibious transport dock Arlington. The rest left aboard the dock landing ship Gunston Hall about a week or so later, Heckl said.[2]
The Navy owns 31 amphibious ships and the Navy and Marines are telling me that they couldn’t even muster 3 functional amphibious ships during a crisis? If the three ships designated for the 22nd MEU weren’t functional, are you telling me that the Navy couldn’t pick three other ships out of the remaining 28 amphibious ships in the fleet? Is our amphibious fleet in that bad a shape that we can’t find 3 functional ships out of 31? Or, is our Navy/Marine force so inflexible that only the three designated ships could be used for the 22nd MEU and no other ships could be allowed to take their place?
If the Navy can’t even keep 3 amphibious ships out of 31 functional, why would we give the Navy any more new ships?
Whatever the answers are to the various questions, it looks very bad for the Marines and Navy.
Here’s what the Marine general had to say about the Navy’s readiness,
Navy’s Optimized Fleet Response Plan, … assumes the ships have an 80 percent readiness rate, Heckl said Thursday.
“The 10-year running average for the amphib Navy is 63 [percent]. Last month, it was 46 [percent],” he said. “So the number is only valid if the readiness rates are achieved and maintained, which today is simply not the case.”[2]
The general threw the Navy under bus, big time. The question is whether it was with good reason or not. This is one side of the story – the Marine’s side. We don’t know the Navy’s side. Was it 100% the Navy’s failure, as the general claims, or were the Marines also not ready? Unknown.
Regardless, this is a very bad incident.
The Navy’s vaunted and much hyped Optimized Fleet Response Plan (OFRP), which was supposed to solve the entire Navy maintenance and readiness problem and which failed instantly with the first aborted carrier deployment, by the way, was intended to prevent exactly this kind of scenario. The OFRP has been a dismal failure. The Navy has failed utterly and completely at ship maintenance. Having ships ready to go is kind of like your only job, Navy. You had one job and you failed.
Recommendations
Here’s my recommendations as a result of this embarrassing and humiliating fiasco:
- Cut the Marines down to one MEU. Get rid of all the rest. There’s no point having a bigger force that can’t be deployed. There’s also no point maintaining a purely defensive, light infantry force – we’ve got the entire Army that can do that job better.
- Cut the Navy shipbuilding budget to zero until the Navy can prove that they can keep the ships they have functional.
_____________________________________
[1]USNI News website, “Marines Couldn’t Meet Request to Surge to Europe Due to Strain on Amphibious Fleet”, Mallory Shelbourne, 26-Apr-2022,
[2]Defense One website, “‘We Should Have Been There’: Marine General Laments the State of the Amphib Navy”, Caitlin Kenney, 29-Apr-2022,
Short term: Fire the entire chain of command responsible for maintenance of the Atlantic amphibious fleet. That will send a signal that will get somebody's attention. We fire ship CO's for much less egregious offenses. Until you start firing people for failures, you will keep getting failure.
ReplyDeleteLong term: Redesign the amphib force around a larger number of smaller, cheaper, simpler, and more easily maintained amphibious ships. Putting all our amphib eggs in the LHA/LHD/LPD-17 basket is a failure on multiple levels, even more if we can't maintain them.
You're missing the picture. Individual ship readiness - or even fleet wide readiness - is not an individual commander's responsibility or failure. Readiness is an infrastructure (drydocks, spare parts, etc.) and systemic (manning, scheduling, deployments instead of maintenance, etc.) issue that's above and beyond the lower chain of command. It's a CNO, SecNav, SecDef, President responsibility. They're the ones laying budgets, deployment schedules, approval of COCOM requests, manning, etc. They're the ones failing. The COs and chain of command levels are just working with what they're given. Congress needs to get involved and start firing the top level and hiring better people.
DeleteThe major problem with readiness is leadership fixation on new hulls to the neglect of drydocks and maintenance infrastructure.
Hand in hand with that is deployments. Endless deployments are, literally, killing the fleet readiness by postponing maintenance. We need to end the entire deployment model and switch to home porting, as I've described many times.
"more easily maintained amphibious ships"
Setting aside the fact that we don't need amphibious ships, at all, designing more easily maintained ships is not the solution. All that does is hide the problem which is the lack of maintenance focus and neglected maintenance infrastructure, as I just described. If you have termites eating your house, the solution isn't a better way of patching holes, it's elimination of the root problem. A more easily maintained ship is just patching a hole and leaving the root problem in place. I'm not against ships that are easier to maintain but it's not the solution and should not be pursued as such. In fact, easier maintenance puts ships on the F-18 Hornet path to mediocrity. The Hornet was designed as a maintenance business case and it turned out to be a mistake because it produced a substandard combat aircraft. Most 'ease of maintenance' features will result in decreased combat effectiveness.
"The major problem with readiness is leadership fixation on new hulls to the neglect of drydocks and maintenance infrastructure."
DeleteAnd those leaders are the people that need to be fired. You want to change attitudes and actions, make it a career breaker to keep doing the same crap. I don't suppose you can fire a president over it, but you can surely fire a SecDef, a SecNav, a CNO, and a few rungs down the chain of command over it. And that will deliver the message faster and more effectively than anything else.
"Setting aside the fact that we don't need amphibious ships, at all, designing more easily maintained ships is not the solution."
DeleteComNavOps, you and I are simply not going to agree about the need for an amphibious force, so I think agreeing to disagree makes more sense than debating that further.
My point about simpler and more easily maintained ships goes back to the old amphibious squadron/group of my gator navy days. You had a collection of smaller, simpler, single-purpose ships--an LPH, an LPD, an LSD, and LST, an LPA, and an LKA. Each made its own particular contribution, and the lot of them cost less than one LHA/LHD costs. I would rebuild the PhibRon/ARG around a group of such ships and and repurpose or park the LHAs, LHDs, and LPD-17s.
"not going to agree about the need for an amphibious force"
DeleteHence, the phrase, "Setting aside ..."
"more easily maintained ships"
DeleteYou didn't seem to get the point about easy maintenance not being the solution or even a significant factor so I'll provide a specific example that demonstrates the fallacy in the ease of maintenance concept.
What is the single US aircraft that was designed specifically for ease of maintenance instead of combat effectiveness? Yes, the F-18 Hornet. It was designed to be the easiest modern aircraft ever to maintain. Despite this, half the F-18s in the inventory are down awaiting maintenance and the ones that are available have an abysmal fully mission capable rate (FMC) even with the Navy manipulating the data. If your ease of maintenance concept were valid, we should have no problems and the vast majority of the Hornet fleet should be FMC. As I described, it is not the ease of maintenance that is the issue, it's the maintenance infrastructure.
Ease of maintenance is a nice, neat sounding idea that actually has no bearing on the real world readiness and availability.
"Ease of maintenance is a nice, neat sounding idea that actually has no bearing on the real world readiness and availability."
DeleteAnd you're missing my point. The ships I'm talking about being easily maintained are so because they are basically simple single-purpose ships. They are easier to maintain because they don't ave so much crap that can go wrong.
I fear you're unaware of what's causing maintenance and readiness/availability problems. It's not, for example, the complex Aegis radar array that's sidelining ships. It's the basic hull and mechanical items that are the problem. As various admirals have described for the carriers and Aegis cruisers, one of the major maintenance issues is tankage. The dozens/hundreds of tanks of various types need regular corrosion control maintenance and because of deployments, deferred maintenance, double deployments, lack of drydocks, scheduling problems, etc,, the maintenance isn't getting done and the ships are languishing pier side. It isn't the radar array, it's the basics: hull corrosion, props, rudders, tanks, pipefitting, pump and valve rebuilds, and so on. Building 'simple single-purpose ships' isn't going to alleviate that kind of maintenance.
Delete"I fear you're unaware of what's causing maintenance and readiness/availability problems."
DeleteNo, I'm aware of the basic hull and equipment maintenance issues. But having simpler ships reduces the need for maintenance on the other things. And having cheaper ships allows building more of them, so the operating tempo issues can be reduced. And building more ships theoretically puts more yards back into business and activates more supply chains, so there should be an increase in facilities available to provide maintenance. The USN fascination with just a few highly complex and expensive ships causes problems all over the place.
ComNavOps, we have our disagreements. I'm probably not going to convince you to change any of your opinions, and you're probably not going to convince me to change any of mine (although I will admit that my thinking on some issues has been affected by some of your ideas and concepts).
DeleteBut I greatly enjoy having a forum like this to discuss ideas, and I truly appreciate what you do to keep it going, and lively. So I'll just continue to hang around and post ideas whenever the topic interests me. And I'll consider your comments in reply.
"having simpler ships reduces the need for maintenance on the other things."
DeleteYou haven't thought this through! 'The other things' are not what's preventing ships from deploying and 'the other things' use different technicians for the maintenance so the two sets of maintenance needs are not interfering with each other. Freeing up radar techs or programmers by using simpler radar, EW, computers, or whatever is not going to free up any time or people for the other maintenance since those people can't do the other type of work. It's the hull, corrosion, tankage, pipefitters, welders, painters, etc. that are preventing deployment. The complex electronics (radar and the like) issues may prevent maximum performance - like the degraded Aegis issue - but they don't prevent deployment. 'Simpler' ships won't change that or improve the situation.
You started off by talking about 'simpler' amphibious ships. What would make an amphibious ship 'simpler' that would reduce the need for hull maintenance, corrosion control, tankage maintenance, pump and valve rebuilds, pipefitting, filter cleaning, etc.? You have this vision of 'simpler' ships alleviating maintenance but I can't think of any 'simplification' that would actually do that. Give me some examples. This is not a 'gotcha' attempt. I'd really like to know what kind of simplification could significantly reduce basic ship maintenance of the type that is preventing deployments and availability. I don't think there are any but maybe you've got some ideas?
As one possibility, azipods would eliminate shafts, bearings, lube systems, etc. but I suspect that's just trading one type of maintenance for another rather than gaining a net decrease in maintenance. I don't know enough about pod maintenance requirements.
Again, I remind you of the F-18 example.
"Redesign the amphib force around a larger number of smaller, cheaper, simpler, and more easily maintained amphibious ships."
DeleteSetting aside the 'simpler' aspect and the fact that there is no need for amphibious ships, the idea of redesigning the amphibious force is an intriguing intellectual exercise. One of the problems we currently have is that the ships were not designed around combat DELIVERY needs. What are our troop delivery requirements? Units should be transported and delivered intact, if at all possible. If we want to deliver company size units then that determines our ship size. If we want to deliver battalion size units then that determines our ship size. And so on.
Risk enters into it. We may want to deliver a division size force but it would be insane to build a division size transport so we have to, again, decide what risk we'll accept versus what size unit we want to deliver and find the balance point in design.
Units MUST be delivered intact and with ALL their gear. Our current ships do not all do this. The non-well deck LHAs, for example, can ONLY deliver troops but not gear. That's insane. That's not combat effective.
Our current ARG arrangement is totally arbitrary and unbalanced from a risk perspective. It's not combat efficient.
The LCAC is a sustainment craft, not an assault craft (that's not my opinion, that's Marine and Navy doctrine). We lack any reusable assault landing craft. We desperately need one. If we develop a reusable assault landing craft (our Higgins boat), what does that do to transport ship design in terms of storing, loading, and launching the craft? Well deck? Over the side? Something else?
How do we get armor, artillery, and heavy equipment ashore in the assault waves? Currently, we can't.
And so on.
So, what would a truly effective and efficient combat DELIVERY amphibious force look like? I'm betting it wouldn't look anything like what we have today! Instead of redesigning based on cost, simplicity, or whatever (spreadsheet stuff !), why don't you try your hand at designing a true combat delivery force and see what you wind up with? That would be fascinating.
"
DeleteSo, what would a truly effective and efficient combat DELIVERY amphibious force look like? I'm betting it wouldn't look anything like what we have today!"
It would look NOTHING like what we have today. And nothing like an LAW either.
"Instead of redesigning based on cost, simplicity, or whatever (spreadsheet stuff !), why don't you try your hand at designing a true combat delivery force and see what you wind up with? That would be fascinating."
First, despite your opinion, I have never tried designing anything based on cost or simplicity or any other of what you call spreadsheet stuff. I have used spreadsheet formats for presentation, because they are a useful way to present data, as you note when you make frequent use of them to present data on here. I wish I knew how to work around the formatting and 4000-character limitations to present my spreadsheet summaries on here, so that I could explain them as the product and not the process.
Second, before starting to conceive or design a delivery force, it is essential to define exactly what the force that is to be delivered looks like. In order to have a credible assault, you need to get armor, artillery, and heavy equipment ashore in the assault waves, supported by necessary air cover an CAS. But that means that all those elements have to be included in the assault force. What has happened is that the USN has designed away the capability to get all those pieces ashore, so the Marines have gotten rid lf everything that makes them substantially more than a troop of boy scouts with BB guns.
The assault force needs to be redefined--and defined in terms of required capabilities instead of what can be carried on and landed from the ampibs we have--before an appropriate combat delivery force can be designed. Also, as you correctly note, we need a new approach to ship-shore connectors.
So, yes, I'd like to take a shot at what a true combat delivery force would look like. But that needs to start with what does the force we would be delivering have to look like, and ow much can we upgrade ship-shore connectors. With those two pieces in place, then we can design an amphib fleet to get those forces ashore effectively.
Also, to have a credible assault, you need extensive NGFS, which the USN also currently lacks.
DeleteBasically, the USN has built an "amphibious" force that is ill-suited to do amphibious assaults--just as the "littoral combat ship" is of virtually no use in littoral combat.
"I have never tried designing anything based on cost or simplicity or any other "
DeleteAh ... yeah, you did. Here's your quote:
"Redesign the amphib force around a larger number of smaller, cheaper, simpler, and more easily maintained amphibious ships."
That has every design factor EXCEPT combat efficiency and delivery!
But, I don't care about that. The concept of redesigning an amphib force for combat delivery is intriguing. However, you're bogging yourself down, already.
"it is essential to define exactly what the force that is to be delivered looks like."
It is. However, unless you want to wander off on your own and spend years working on it, you have to make some assumptions. So, pick ground combat force composition and move on. The same applies to gun support, air support, etc. Just pick the amphib ships, make some assumptions and do it ! Don't get bogged down ... unless you want to make it your all-consuming goal in life ... and even then you'll have to make assumptions - that's what operations planners do in real life !
"Ah ... yeah, you did. Here's your quote:
Delete'Redesign the amphib force around a larger number of smaller, cheaper, simpler, and more easily maintained amphibious ships.'
That has every design factor EXCEPT combat efficiency and delivery!"
Point of clarification. They HAPPEN to be smaller, cheaper, simpler, and more easily maintained ships. But that's an end result, not the basis for the design concepts. They have been chosen because I believe they are the best force for combat delivery.
The current "big deck" amphibs are basically useless in an assault. And the LAW goes too far in the other direction--too small, too slow, poorly defended, and not stealthy.
What I would propose is something in between those extremes that looks a lot more like a traditional amphib force--smaller LHA/LHD, LPH, LPD/LSD, LST, LPA/LKA, and gunfire support frigate. It would need to be stealthier (including a strong electronic counter-measures suite) and include both soft and hard AAW defenses, because the intent would be very much to take it into arm's way. It would need to be supported by air cover (carriers), NGFS (battleships, cruisers), ASW (particularly shallow water ASW), and MCM forces (of which the Navy has virtually none).
Ship-shore connectors are a huge concern. The Chinese Type 05 series (particularly including the amphibious tank) and the French EDA-R both appear to be promising technologies that are better than what the USN has and that could be emulated.
As far as the force, I would need some input from someone better informed on current USMC practices, but just for grins and giggles I worked out a Marine combine arms regiment including infantry battalion, tank companies, artillery batteries, amphibious armor companies, and air wing, about 3500 strong, that could be hauled by the PhibRon/ARG that I have in mind.
In the words of a former boss of mine, you either make a small number of gross assumptions or a gross number of small assumptions. My approach can be presented on a spreadsheet and does include smaller, cheaper, simpler, and more easily maintained ships. But those are end results, not methodology.
I get the impression that you're working backwards from a pre-determined end point instead of going where the requirements take you. I also get the impression that you're limiting yourself (consciously or subconsciously) to traditional amphibs and just playing around the margins with a little more this or little less that instead of starting with a mental blank slate.
DeleteFor example, a sunk transport is not good and short of turning transports into Aegis platforms, there's not all that much active defense possible. That suggests that EXTREME stealth is required - a Visby-ish transport, suitably sized, of course. That, alone, eliminates traditional amphib hull forms.
For example, the Navy/Marine fascination with helos is woefully misguided. Helos are simply not survivable over modern battlefields. That suggests that amphibs should not have any aviation capability which eliminates every current amphib hull form and focus.
The obvious requirement is to be able to quickly load and launch the landing craft regardless of what exact form those craft take. What does that mean for ship design? I haven't thought that one through but I lean towards the WWII over-the-side approach rather than a well deck. A WWII transport could carry, load, and launch up to 24 landing craft of various types and sizes and do it quickly and continuously. A well deck just can't do that or, if it can, I've seen no evidence of it.
Cargo handling is another clean slate issue. Our current system is limited and cumbersome. We ought to be able to do better but I don't know what that would be. Again, though, it suggests that current hull forms are not optimal.
You have the background. I'd like to see you use that to really redesign the amphib delivery force, not just tweak the margins.
Abandon those vague, meaningless 'cheap', 'small', 'simple' words and get into specifics. I'm still waiting for an example of what 'simple' change you'd make that would significantly reduce maintenance, by the way!
Hmm ... I may have to do a post on a new design amphibious ship. It's intriguing.
"I get the impression that you're working backwards from a pre-determined end point instead of going where the requirements take you. I also get the impression that you're limiting yourself (consciously or subconsciously) to traditional amphibs and just playing around the margins with a little more this or little less that instead of starting with a mental blank slate."
DeleteI would not agree with the working backwards/pre-determined end point part. But I have pretty much confined myself to adapting existing designs.
One simple change I would make to reduce maintenance would be to go with proved systems rather than Rube-Goldberg-ish state of the art contraptions. One example: Bow ramps on conventional LSTs were pretty straightforward mechanical devices. For the Newport class, everything else was sacrificed to get a 20 kt SOA. That meant a clipper bow with the over-the-bow suspended ramp. IIRC, that configuration was capable of getting a dry ramp on something like 3% of the world's beaches. The controls for that ramp were solid state. It was supposed to be the electricians' gear to maintain, but they couldn't handle it. Every time there was a problem, my ETs had to go help them. And the control boxes sat forward and exposed to sea spray, so every time we took white water across the bow, the ramp wouldn't work. One of the T's, I think it was LaMoure, was doing PMS in Little Creek one day and launched their ramp out into the parking lot.
It was a classic case of letting a nice-to-have that beame somebody's idea of an essential requirement effectively destroy the reason for having an LST in the first place.
"Bow ramps"
DeleteThat was certainly a dumb idea but that's not the kind of maintenance that prevents ships from deploying. Your idea of 'simpler' is, again, just playing around the edges.
A better 'simpler' would be eliminating the Navy's fascination with propulsion systems that are CODIESELTURBINEWARPINFINITECROSSCRAP systems and stick to just one power source. That would eliminate combining gears, gear lube systems, tons of piping, etc. It wouldn't be as superefficient but it would be more maintainable and more combat effective. Even that, though an improvement, is still kind of playing around the edges. I don't think there really is any simplification that would make a significant improvement in ship availability because the things that are actually causing problems are the simple, basic things like hull, corrosion, tanks, etc. You just can't simplify them any more than they are.
"I have pretty much confined myself to adapting existing designs."
DeleteThat was apparent. If that's what you mean by redesigning the amphib fleet, that's fine but that's just tweaking and won't substantially change or improve anything. I've offered a few ideas for significant changes but if that's not the direction you want to go, that's fine. I'll drop this line unless you express an interest in something more substantial.
"That was apparent. If that's what you mean by redesigning the amphib fleet, that's fine but that's just tweaking and won't substantially change or improve anything. I've offered a few ideas for significant changes but if that's not the direction you want to go, that's fine. I'll drop this line unless you express an interest in something more substantial."
DeleteIt's not so much a redesign out of whole cloth, but rather a return to what has worked in the past. What I am proposing is way more than a tweak, it is a paradigm shift away from the fascination with "big deck amphibs" that can pretty much do most anything with Marines except put them ashore in a viable assault. I've never liked the LHA/LHD concept, going back to my gator navy days when we thought they were putting too many eggs in one basket.
Your idea of a complete redesign of the phib force is interesting. I had not let my own thinking wander that far, but let me give it some thought.
"
DeleteA better 'simpler' would be eliminating the Navy's fascination with propulsion systems that are CODIESELTURBINEWARPINFINITECROSSCRAP systems and stick to just one power source. That would eliminate combining gears, gear lube systems, tons of piping, etc. It wouldn't be as superefficient but it would be more maintainable and more combat effective. Even that, though an improvement, is still kind of playing around the edges. I don't think there really is any simplification that would make a significant improvement in ship availability because the things that are actually causing problems are the simple, basic things like hull, corrosion, tanks, etc. You just can't simplify them any more than they are."
That whole propulsion issue is another of those Rube-Golberg-ish ideas designed to squeeze a few more knots out of a ship, when I'm not aware that anybody had developed a CONOPS where that speed was essential. My only question about your "basic, simple" comment is I wonder how many of those things could be better addressed if it were not for the money and time expended trying to make the other stuff work.
I do think it makes sense to have electric propulsion for ships that are heavily involved in ASW, since quiet running is so important there. Whether that takes the form of CODLAG or fully IEP would impact the complexity. The USN has tended toward CODLAG with speed limited under electric propulsion. But I would note that the 80,000T French liner Normandie set trans-Atlantic speed records with a form of IEP (with steam generators). And that was with 1930s technology, so it should clearly be doable.
"CODLAG or fully IEP"
DeleteShip noise, as it pertains to ASW, comes mainly from three sources:
1. Props (cavitation)
2. Propulsion machinery (shafts, gears, turbines or whatever)
3. Hull turbulence which is a function of speed
Not being an expert in this area, it seems that a pod system solves all those problems. It's purely electric. Props can be designed not to cavitate and/or be speed limited. Multiple pods/props should allow each to run at a slower speed which reduces cavitation. There are no shafts, gears, etc. to make noise; only a generator of some sort. At slow ASW speeds, speed/turbulence should not be an issue. Again, not an expert so pure speculation on my part.
The worst ASW propulsion system would be a gigantic waterjet but no one would be stupid enough to put that on an ASW vessel. Oh wait, we did exactly that with the LCS.
I read through the discussion between COMNAVOPS and CDR Chip. What you both fail to realize is that even IF the infrastructure was there to have the ships repaired....the personnel to do the repairs are not. The Navy has rid itself of the SIMA's, tenders, and any other place that sailors learned the deep technical aspects of repair to the various systems. If you do find someone on todays crews that can do these repairs it has nothing to do with the Navy teaching him/her as much as it has to do with that individuals desire to do so.
DeleteAnd the civilian work force is aging and there are few younger folks that want to do the ship repair career. One of the shipyards has opened up its apprenticeships school to all ages. HII is advertising for 17 year olds to apply for $21.00 an hour jobs, no experience necessary, to start when they turn 18 and graduate high school. The average age at BAE in Norfolk when I worked there was 57 years old, and that was 10 years ago.
The ship repair industry is hurting and not getting any better in the foreseeable future. Please keep that in mind when discussing readiness.
" fail to realize "
DeleteNo one is overlooking this.
"'fail to realize'
DeleteNo one is overlooking this."
For the record, I am not overlooking it either. ComNavOps has some excellent suggestions in another post on this thread. I do think that if the USN got busy with enough new ship orders, shipyards would find a way to build them. And starting a buildup of the fleet, particularly including large numbers of relatively simple ships that could be ramped up in a hurry in wartime, would seem to me to be an excellent way to start to rebuild capacity.
"I'd like to see you use that to really redesign the amphib delivery force, not just tweak the margins."
DeleteI'm still thinking on this one. It seems to me that you need to design from back to front.
What does the force that we want to put ashore look like?
How do we get it from ship to shore (connectors)?
What kinds and numbers of ships do we need to carry that force and those connectors?
"It seems to me that you need to design from back to front."
DeleteAre you sure you aren't over thinking this? China is the overriding threat. Anything else is a subset. So, in a war with China, where would you need an amphibious assault. Using your views, I suspect you'd say somewhere in the first island chain and the purpose would be to reclaim a seized island. Of course, I'd come up with something completely different but I'm trying to help you with your thinking so ...
You'd need a maximum of a full division. Other scenarios would be lesser subsets. So, design a division strength assault. With absolutely no respect due to the current Marine Commandant, you'd need tanks, armor, artillery, and all manner of heavy equipment and firepower.
Assume a modernized Higgins-ish connector. The exact form doesn't really matter.
So, there you have the scenario and required force level. The starting point is 3-5 miles from shore. It's an opposed landing. All that's left is to design the ships!
There you go. Quick, simple, no over thinking. Start designing !
" do think that if the USN got busy with enough new ship orders, shipyards would find a way to build them. " Great, they get built...that is the easy part truthfully. Now, who is repairing them? That is where it gets difficult. I can tell you that contractors pretty much take over ships in the shipyards. Ships Force.........I am trying to say something nice here but am finding it difficult. Leadership cannot get sailors to work. Go into the hangar bay of any carrier in repair and you will find it full of sailors on their phones. PO1's and Chiefs are unable to get the junior sailors to work especially in current climate (USS GW). But it was bad before those issues came to light.
DeleteGiving amphibious problem more thought, working backwards from objectives, to what kind of force that requires, to how to get it from ship to shore, to what ships do we need to haul it. All bullet points to fit 4000-character limit, so no in-depth discussion
DeleteWhat objectives?
- Phib Ops in 1st island chain, or Arabian/Persian Gulf in rogue nation/terror scenario, or eastern Med/Baltic in Russian/Europe scenario.
- Port seizure with respect to Chinese “chain of pearls” ports in South Asia and elsewhere.
- Humanitarian or other non-combat ops to support diplomatic goals
- Retake Philippines or elsewhere that China/Russia might occupy
- No suicide direct assault on either Chinese or Russian mainland.
What kind of force?
- Combined-arms Marine Expeditionary Regiment (MER)
o 1 reinforced infantry battalion, including HQ – 900-1200 troops
o 3 amphibious armor companies plus HQ – 70 amphib vehicles including 15-20 amphib tanks), 700 troops
o 3 artillery batteries plus HQ – 1 gun, 1 rocket, 1 AAW, 500 troops
o 3 tank companies, antitank and scout platoons, plus HQ – 45 tanks, 500 troops
o Aviation detachment – 10 STOVL, 15 heavy helos, 35 light/medium helos, 600 troops
o Special forces commando – 120 troops
o HQ&S company – 380 troops
o Total 3700-4000 troops
o Source: MCRP 5-12D, HQ units downsized to reduce redundancy
- MER concept of integrating combined arms at relatively low command level allows this force to punch well above its weight and be powerful and versatile enough for wide range of missions. For division sized force, put 4 of these together.
How to get it ashore?
- Achilles heel. We haven’t improved on boat that Andrew Higgins brought out of Louisiana swamps 80 years ago. Better connectors means more flexibility with ships, but connectors are hard nut to crack. 20 knot Higgins boat that would offer protection to crew and troops while still being easy to board and offload would be good. Even with that, we still need to bring ships in to 3-5 miles offshore, and that rules out current LHA/LHD/LPD-17 mix.
What ships?
- LHAs, LHDs, and LPD-17s are too expensive and risky to bring in close, but LAW is too small, slow, and unstealthy to be useful.
- Aside from amphib ships, other requirements include
o NGFS – need battleships with 16” guns and cruisers with 8”
o MCM – need remote standoff sweep capability (helos/drones with mother ship), plus hunting capability (like new Dutch/Belgian hunters)
o ASW – need some shallow-water ASW specialists—ASW corvettes
o Air cover – need air superiority plus CAS; make air superiority the USN mission and CAS the USMC mission
- Best idea is what the USN left behind 50 years ago—modernized version of the conventional amphibious squadron (PhibRon) including:
o Small LHA/LHD like SP Juan Carlos/AU Canberra, 46 tanks/amphib vehicles, 2 EDA-R/LSM, 10 STOVL, 10 helos, 913 troops
o LPH like FR Mistral, 50 tanks/amphib vehicles, 15-30 helos, 2 EDA-R, 600 troops
o LPD/LSD like UK Albion, 4 LCVP, 4 LCM, 67 vehicles, 6 tanks/amphib vehicles, 30 ATV, 2 large helos, 500 troops
o LST with conventional beaching bow, 4 LCVP, 2 LCM, 20 tanks/amphib vehicles, 2-3 helos, 400 troops
o LPA/LKA, adapted merchant, 8 helos, 12 LCVP, 7 LCM, 2 LCPL, 1500 troops
o NGFS frigate with 2x155mm, rockets like LSMR, counterbattery, helo deck and RHIBs, 120 commandos
o LST offloads amphib tanks along LOD as wave 1, anchors, and beaches to offload heavy stuff when beach is secured, LPA/LKA debarks over side to boats, LHA/LHD, LPH, and LSD/LPD offload by helo and stern dock
- Design considerations:
o Extreme stealth, as ships will have to sneak into the AOA; maybe Visby-like composite superstructure plus top-of-line ECM
o Close-in AAW capability including point defense, ECM, soft and hard kill AAW, 2 SeaRAM (fore/aft) and 4 Phalanx (2P/2S); no other weapons
o True LST limits SOA to 18 knots; blunt bow won’t go through water any faster; but without Navy’s 20+ knot requirement, all ships can be much cheaper
o Also need capability to resupply troops once ashore
Nice start. Just a couple points to consider:
Delete1. Why do you need helos? What task will they perform? Combat experience has shown that using them as assault transports will incur frightful losses. If not assault, then what to they do? Helo losses over a battlefield are staggering. Think this one through carefully. People today have a knee jerk reaction that helos are mandatory but no one can offer a viable CONOPS for them. What's your helo CONOPS?
2. Port seizure and island assault are two different and distinct missions with vastly different force requirements. You might want to pick one of the two missions and work it through and then tackle the other, if you feel so inclined. You're clearly geared as island assault in this comment.
3. Don't forget an engineering unit ! Breaching fortifications, clearing obstacles, etc. is vitally important. I understand you can't cover everything in one comment. Just a reminder about engineering.
4. How do you provide anti-air and C-RAM during initial assault?
"that rules out current LHA/LHD/LPD-17 mix."
DeleteNot necessarily. What it means is that you need an effective anti-air defense to protect the amphibs. Aegis was designed to defeat saturation missile attacks. Are we saying that it can't defeat the occasional shore launched anti-ship missile? If it can't, our entire fleet is as good as sunk. If it can, then we can operate close to shore.
Hand in hand with operating close to shore is the need for ship-based counterbattery fire so that no enemy missile launcher gets more than shot at us before it dies. Our ship radars are technically capable of counterbattery but no one has bothered to write the software to do it.
A Burke with Aegis counterbattery could control a 10+ mile strip of inland area. If enemy missiles are being launched further away than that, it gives our anti-air defense more time to react.
This also highlights the need to get true counterbattery radar/artillery ashore as soon as possible - a connector issue, again.
This also highlights the need to have large caliber naval guns with 20+ mile range.
This also highlights the need to coordinate counterbattery detection with aircraft for those targets our of range of naval gunfire.
“Nice start. Just a couple points to consider:”
DeleteThis as intended as a notional force to meet an unspecified objective, and the nature of the force and its assets would shift depending upon the particular mission. Thoughts:
1. I like helos more than you do. About 1/3 of helos would be assault gunships for CAS. Pre-landing, they can be used to insert small groups (like the Brit “junglies” in the Falklands) for intel/recon/targeting/landing prep. If the element of surprise is maintained, they can insert a significant number of people behind enemy lines in a hurry, to interdict logistics/communications, open a second front, and link up ultimately with the force coming ashore. After the troops are ashore, they can be used for resupply or to move people around. The Brits would have had a much easier time in the Falklands had not they lost most of their large transport helos when the Atlantic Conveyor was sunk. Not every action is going to be an opposed assault against mainland China or Russia, and I see helos as having great utility in many lesser situations. One fairly safe use would be to use helos to ferry about among the PhibRon ships, either before or after entering the AOA. If you chose to keep the LHA/LHD outside the AOA to facilitate air ops, helos could be used to ferry troops to ships inside the AOA from where boats could be used. Bottom line, sometimes when helos would be very useful and sometimes they probably would not be.
2. This is very skeletal. I have 900-1200 in my reinforced infantry battalion. 900 is about right for a Marine infantry battalion, so that gives me 300 slots to play with for whatever mission-specific needs arise. In a port seizure we are obviously going to need some engineering and UDT types to restore ports to active operation. Also, a port seizure aimed at Chinese “string of pearls” ports would likely be more concerned with denying access to the Chinese than restoring access for USA/allied forces. So in some ways it could be more like an island assault than like what we did at Cherbourg and LeHavre in WWII, although we would want to restore operations for the host country (keeping in mind that these would likely be situations where the Chinese and the host country were at odds, so our intervention could be welcomed).
3. Again, I have slots for 300 or so extras in my reinforced infantry battalion, and some slots would go to engineers. The publication I pulled data from indicates 142 personnel for an engineer company, 92 for a bridge company, 265 for a bulk fuel company, and 406 for an engineer support company, so a substantial engineers force could be split between the enhanced infantry battalion and the regimental HQ&S company.
4. You’re going to have some kind of naval escort right up to the AOA, and navy ships could help with area and point air defense at least. If we can achieve air superiority (from the Navy) and have enough NGFS to make the bad guys keep their heads down, we can reduce the threat. With 2 SeaRAM and 4 Phalanx each, ships should have some significant self-defense capability inside the AOA, plus non-kinetic measures. Again, if the Royal Navy had that kind of capability in the Falklands (and AEW) their losses might have been nil.
Obviously, all of this will need to be tested with boots on the ground and not just tabletop war games. I would plan to conduct annual fleetwide Fleet Problems/SpringTrains around real world scenarios and adjust or modify based on results. This is a first cut, not a tested battle plan.
"About 1/3 of helos would be assault gunships for CAS."
DeleteAre you giving due consideration to the historical attrition rate of helos over an active battlefield (Vietnam, Soviet Afg, US Afg, Russian Ukraine, etc.)? The attrition rate is high enough to make them nearly ineffective.
" can be used to insert small groups "
That's pure fantasy. Helos are non-stealthy, will be instantly spotted, and will be decimated. Again, the entire history of combat helos demonstrates this.
"can insert a significant number of people behind enemy lines"
Seriously???? You think against a peer in an opposed landing that helos will be able to travel behind enemy lines, unobserved and unhindered? There's a job waiting for you on the Commandant's staff !
"I see helos as having great utility in many lesser situations."
In lesser situations, anything and everything will work. However, that's not the planning standard. It's an opposed landing against a peer (China).
"port seizure aimed at Chinese “string of pearls” ports would likely be more concerned with denying access to the Chinese"
If that's the goal then a cruise missile bombardment is all that's needed.
“In lesser situations, anything and everything will work. However, that's not the planning standard. It's an opposed landing against a peer (China).”
DeleteI think this comment encapsulates a lot of our differences. You see the planning standard as an opposed landing against a peer opponent. I see that as a fool’s errand, with zero chance of success. But I see numerous opportunities for meaningful and successful use of amphibious forces other than that. I would rather plan for things that have some chance of 1) happening and 2) succeeding.
My policy objective would be to prevent China from gaining control of the first island chain, or any significant portion thereof. I think that is a difficult but still attainable goal that will require a combination of diplomatic, economic, and military action, and I see a number of opportunities to utilize amphibious forces in significant ways to achieve that goal, as examples ranging from disaster relief efforts to support diplomatic outreach to solidifying defenses of islands threatened by China to retaking any territory actually occupied by China.
If we engage China n a long war of attrition, then at some point we may wear them down to the point that an invasion might be doable. But against their current A2/AD structure, nope.
" I see that as a fool’s errand, with zero chance of success."
DeleteAnd then you turn right around and cite it as a mission ! Here's your statement:
"to retaking any territory actually occupied by China."
Your remaining missions are non-combat and do not require amphibious ships or forces. Here's your example missions:
"examples ranging from disaster relief efforts to support diplomatic outreach to solidifying defenses of islands"
So, it appears that your two broad sets of 'amphibious' missions are, 1. non-combat administrative unloadings and, 2. opposed peer assaults (the exact mission you claim to be a fool's errand).
You have to plan for the worst case. All other cases are easier subsets of the worst case. Making easy subsets your planning standard is the path to defeat when the worst case comes along.
I think there is a big difference between assaulting the Chinese mainland and retaking an island in the first chain that China may ave occupied.
Delete"assaulting the Chinese mainland"
DeleteWhere did you get that idea? I know it wasn't from me! I must have said a hundred times throughout this blog that would be insane.
If we did want to do that, it would be a Normandy type effort that would take years to build up the resources and forces.
A worst case planning scenario would be things like invading a Chinese fortified Philippines, recapturing Vietnam, staging an assault on NKorea to open a 'second front', recapturing Taiwan, etc. These would large efforts that would require multiple divisions and armadas of 50-100 vessels of various types. This is the type of thing you plan for, not seizing some tiny, artificial island or attacking a Chinese camp on an island.
With all that said, I'll repeat, I see no need (or ability !) for amphibious assault in any reasonable strategic or operational scenario. However, since you insist on wanting amphibious assault capability, at least plan for the worst cases, as noted. Anything less is pointless.
"What it means is that you need an effective anti-air defense to protect the amphibs."
DeletePretty much agree with everything yo stated in that post, except I still don't think you can justify bringing the LHAs/LHDs/LPD-17s in to anything like 3-5 miles.
Maybe I'm being too loyal to what I saw work in my time in Gator Navy, and too dismissive of what I have not seen work yet in the years since. Maybe I just don't get all this new-fangled jolly, gee-wiz stuff. Or maybe I do.
For me, what's even more disappointing than even the crappy condition of the ships, the sub par maintenance, etc, is the Lt. Gen. Karsten Heckl attitude! When you get a phone call from your boss or whoever is above you to get moving and we need you NOW near a conflict zone, your response, especially for a US MARINE! shouldn't be something to the effect: "call me back in 2 months!" Even more infuriating, this shouldn't have been that hard to meet since the USMC was supposed to be leaving for a training exercise!!!! and they failed to meet that deadline!!!!
ReplyDeleteAnd where is USN leadership?!? Where is their testimony? Only thing I heard was crickets or rumor that USN leadership stopped sending officers to testify.....
I once had a First Sergeant in the Army that said," The effect range of an excuse, is Zero meters." This is not a single point of failure situation, it has multiple faults with plenty of blame to go around. To what ComNavOps said about skippers being fired/removed/sacked for much lesser reasons, that is spot on. Accountability starts at the top and eventually it will pool at the bottom.
ReplyDeleteMy concern goes much deeper. What is it going to take for them (upper echelons of leadership) to address this? Another Forrestal or Enterprise incident? Wasn't SUBSAFE created out of the USS Thresher (SSN-593) tragedy?
Is gundecking rampant? We used to be better than this.
"We used to be better than this."
DeleteWe were better when there was an imminent threat - the Soviets. Leaders were selected based mostly on combat skills. For the last few decades, we haven't had an imminent threat (except for those of us who recognized the Chinese threat) and leaders have been selected based on budget skills and political acumen.
We need to recognize that there is a new (not really, but new to the Navy), imminent threat from China and start practicing and selecting for combat skills again.
I think we ought to be more proactive rather than reactive to threats.
DeleteCare to offer some specific examples of proactive actions?
Delete"Is gundecking rampant?"
DeleteMore generally, we've had a serious problem with a culture of dishonesty within the officer corps for some time now. Its effects dwarf the real and serious problems caused by PO3 or Lance Corporal Schmuckatelli fudging maintenance reports.
Gundeckking happens...but it is not the reason for the issue at hand.
DeleteI would shout this from the rootops if I could (and have been on the blogs I frequent)....skilled labor in the ship repair industry is lacking. Until someone can convince a whole lot of people that there are good jobs in the skilled trade arenas........and the Navy can stop the up and down circus that is their maintenance plans for ships, it will continue to be a root issue with the readiness of the fleet.
"skilled labor in the ship repair industry is lacking"
DeleteNo one is overlooking this.
If I were running a shipyard, I'd focus on the high schools. I'd pay to establish vocational ed programs. I'd establish permanent recruitment centers in the high schools to counter the current line that's being fed to students that if they don't go to college they're failures. I'd set up recruiting centers around every college so that those students who weren't good college fits to begin with can see that there are alternatives. And so on. It would take some time but I'd wind up the work force I wanted.
HOWEVER, all of that is dependent on the Navy providing a steady, reliable source of construction and maintenance and, at the moment, the Navy is not doing that. Their plans change on a near daily basis and swing wildly.
To a certain extent, it's a bit of a chicken and the egg scenario. The Navy's plans vary wildly because the shipyard capacity is lacking but the shipyard capacity is lacking, in part, because the Navy is not providing sufficient volume of steady work for the yards to justify extensive recruitment and expansion efforts. Both sides need to come to an understanding.
"If I were running a shipyard, I'd focus on the high schools. I'd pay to establish vocational ed programs. I'd establish permanent recruitment centers in the high schools to counter the current line that's being fed to students that if they don't go to college they're failures" This exists EVERYWHERE in the Hampton Roads area. There are apprenticeship schools at every major shipyard. Even smaller companies have training available to get employees up to speed (I am thinking of my company). The issue is that kids last about 6 months in the yards when they are told they can't have their cell phones, or are told to get into a tank to prep it for paint, or for any other reason including "Its too early in the morning".
DeleteI was at BAE when they laid off the entire just graduated Apprenticeship class because of a "last in, first out" policy. This was due to a slow down in Navy ship repairs coming into the yard. Hard to keep a stable workforce when the customer "ebbs and flows" as bad as the Navy does.
This story hits me in the soft spots. Regardless of the fact we are only hearing this from one side, not being "ready" when the phone rings *IS* or should be the ultimate cardinal sin.
ReplyDeleteArgue about how we are not focused on the right things, including health, moral and welfare, or the latest procurement boondoggle all you want. But when you can't answer the call when it comes, just proves to the world, friends and foes alike that we cannot be trusted and relied upon. Since everyone and their sister has nukes, now, full faith and trust is all we have.
I've argued for decades that amphibs get worn down with pointless steaming about when deployed. They should not be funded for the same number of steaming days each year as combatant ships, only half as many. ARGs shouldn't "patrol" or remain underway just to meet goals. Deploy overseas and spend most time in port.
ReplyDeleteWe also complained about them allowing deployments leading to the collissions fiasco. Its damned if they do do damned if they don't. I think saying no is the first step to getting it fixed. No fun.
ReplyDeleteJust a thought: Against someone like the Russian military, is a single MEU (ONE battalion) really enough of a force to make any difference?
ReplyDeleteThe AZOV Battalion has held out for a month. The Marines are way better than they are. So yes.
DeleteA single MEU is a political statement not a combat effort.
DeleteIt would make a difference, in the sense that it would start WW3.
DeleteIrony being USMC Commandant wants ASM shore batteries that we keep debating about in Chian war context and sure looks like that's what's scaring crap out Soviet Navy, I mean Russian Navy. Rumor is another ship is on fire and that Ru ships are now standing off further out.....
DeleteAs best I can tell, the Russian navy isn't actually doing anything other than drifting around in one spot waiting to get shot at. If the Chinese will be as obliging then the Commandant will look like a genius. Unfortunately, I suspect the Chinese won't be quite so obliging.
DeleteI know there's so much disinformation, fake news, propaganda, controversy, etc etc it will be years before we get a better picture of Russian forces and what the heck they were thinking and doing but yes, i agree that their navy seems to be doing nothing else but going around in circles.....very perplexing.
DeleteWell, if they're supporting ground operations they simply have to be bound to a restricted sea zone, which leads to losses.
DeleteIf they're just sitting there, well then someone needs to stop with the vodka.
My suspicion is that someone up high in the Russkie chain of command was/is wavering back and forth about whether to conduct a landing somewhere near Odessa, and demanding that they be ready to go on short notice for an extended period of time. Another possibility is that they were hoping to tie down Ukrainian resources far from the front lines by threatening such an assault.
DeleteIn any case, the tactic of "station keeping within range of shore-based anti-ship cruise missiles" was self-evidently a bad idea regardless of intent. The live-fire demonstration(s) are just lagniappe.
Remember that war is a continuation of politics, so a MEU can be relevent.
DeleteAmazing that in Ukraine we are witnessing the result of poor readiness in Russian units. And now the USMC is admitting their main delivery system is pretty much in the same boat. Even if the Chicoms are as useless as the Russians, it seems the USMC would not be able to practice their little island deterrent strategy as they have no way of getting there!
ReplyDelete