Showing posts with label Merchant Fleet. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Merchant Fleet. Show all posts

Saturday, August 26, 2023

A Prototype, Subsidized, Convertible, Merchant Ship

Logistics will be a major issue in a war with China.  Of course, logistics are a major issue in any war so that wasn’t exactly the world’s most earth-shaking statement, was it?  Nevertheless, it’s true.  Now, what does the Navy/nation lack in regards to China war logistics?
 
Well, we lack a large, ready merchant fleet to carry supplies to Guam, Taiwan, Japan, etc.
 
Moving on to a seemingly unrelated topic (which you know we’re going to directly relate to shortly!), we’ve discussed ship prototypes and the Navy’s near total unwillingness to explore ship designs, tactics, and CONOPS via the use of prototypes (see, “Prototypes”).
 
So, to summarize … we lack a merchant logistics fleet and we don’t make use of prototypes.  Could those two things be related?  Of course they are!
 
One major advantage China has over us is that all their merchant ships are constructed with military adaptations built in.  In a war, China will have an easily convertible merchant fleet available for military use.
 
Here’s thought … why don’t we copy China for once and build a military-convertible merchant fleet?
 
Let’s start with a single prototype, funded by the government.  It would be a merchant ship that has military adaptations and ‘convertibility’ built in.  We could try it out by practicing rapidly converting it to military use (troop transport, military supply transport, military vehicle transport, oiler, or whatever other use we might need). 
 
Once we debug and prove out the concept, we can embark on a production program in which the government subsidizes (or totally pays to build) a convertible merchant ship and then loans/leases it to commercial shipping companies with the agreement that they maintain it to acceptable standards.  If war arises and we need it, we have a well maintained, readily convertible, military logistics fleet and if war does not occur during the ship’s lifespan, the commercial shipping company gets a nearly free ship to use.  Win, win.
 
Logistics Fleet in Waiting?


This potentially solves multiple problems. 
  • We establish a well maintained, readily convertible logistics fleet.
  • We strengthen our commercial shipping industry.
  • We increase demand for new merchant ships and encourage the growth of our shipbuilding industry while possibly gaining new shipyards to meet the increased construction.
  • The Navy/government gets a fleet of ready logistics ships while off-loading the yearly operating costs to the shipping industry.
Note:  I have no idea what the exact degree of subsidies or specific loan arrangements would be.  That would require an economic analysis that I lack the data to conduct.  Someone would have to work that through to see what makes sense.
 
Thus, for a minimal initial outlay (subsidy or total construction cost), the Navy gets a modern, ready, reserve fleet of logistic ships and our shipping and shipbuilding industries get a much needed boost.  Ideally, we’d simultaneously revamp our shipping-related laws and regulations to further encourage domestic shipping but that’s another topic.
 
Here’s some example merchant ship construction costs in FY22 dollars.
 
Dry bulk                        $49.6 million
General cargo               $17 million
Container                      $68.2 million
 
As you can see, these are almost free relative to typical Navy ship costs!  We could buy 71 container ships at $70M apiece for the cost of a single $4B Zumwalt.
 
The key to this concept is to build a single prototype and use it to learn how to best design a ship for rapid wartime conversion.  With that knowledge in hand we can then begin a production program that benefits both the military and the shipping industry.  That’s a lot of benefit for very little money!
 
Of course, none of this addresses the issue of manning those ships during war but, again, that’s a different topic.

Wednesday, December 21, 2022

US Commercial Ship Delivery Data

Here’s just a bit of data about commercial ship deliveries. 

 

For the six year period 2015-2020, inclusive, US shipbuilding delivered 30 large ships ranging from 26,410 to 53,400 DWT.[1]  Contract costs ranged from $125M - $255M.  The builders were:

 

  • Keppel AmFELS, Brownsville, TX
  • NASSCO, San Diego, CA
  • Philly Shipyard, Philadelphia, PA
  • VT Halter Marine, Pascagoula, Mississippi.
  • Bay Shipbuilding, Sturgeon Bay, WI

 

 

Ship Deliveries 2015-2020

Container/RORO

10

Dry Bulk

1

Offshore Rig

1

Product/Chemical Carriers

18

 



NASSCO Orca Class Ro-Ro


 

 

I was slightly surprised to learn that some thirty to forty smaller craft, such as tugs, tows, barges, and the like are delivered each year from a multitude of shipyards.

 

 

 

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[1]http://shipbuildinghistory.com/statistics/currentcommercial.htm


Friday, December 9, 2022

Tanker Stipends

As we’ve discussed (see, “Merchant Ship Conversions to Wartime Use”), the US needs to require that merchant ships be designed for rapid conversion to military use in the case of war.  A small step in that direction is taking place.  Congress has authorized the Tanker Security Program to provide stipends for private tanker ships in exchange for a commitment to allow the military to use the vessels, if needed.

  

“The rule published today kicks off the process of standing up a critical program necessary for our at-sea logistics and mobility enterprise for the Departments of Defense and Transportation” said [Joe] Courtney, chairman of the House Armed Services’ seapower and projection forces subcommittee. “The Seapower Subcommittee pushed for the authorization of the Tanker Security Program on a bipartisan basis to address alarming capacity gaps in our at-sea fueling logistics capabilities and our reliance on foreign-flagged vessels to deliver these resources.”

 

The program would provide stipends to the owners of privately-owned, militarily useful tanking ships and in exchange the ships’ owners agree to use their vessels to assist the federal government if called upon.[1]

 

 

Some more information from the Maritime Administration (MARAD), as published in the Federal Register,

 

Congress appropriated $60,000,000 for the TSP in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2022, Public Law 117-269. Authorized payments to participating operators are limited to $6 million per ship, per fiscal year and are subject to annual appropriations. Participating operators will be required to make their commercial transportation resources available upon request by the Secretary of Defense for military purposes during times of war or national emergency.[2]

 

This is a good, if very small step in the right direction.  In addition to securing the right to use merchant vessels, we must ensure that new construction is militarily useful and designed for easy conversion. 

 



 

 

 

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[1]Breaking Defense, “Navy admiral touts sealift recap, stops short of saying 2025 problem is solved”, Justin Katz, 8-Dec-2022,

https://breakingdefense.com/2022/12/navy-admiral-touts-sealift-recap-stops-short-of-saying-2025-problem-is-solved/

 

[2]https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/12/07/2022-26358/tanker-security-program


Monday, December 5, 2022

Merchant Ship Conversions to Wartime Use

It is no secret that the Navy has nowhere near enough amphibious and logistic support ships to prosecute a sustained war with China.  New construction of sufficient numbers and types of ships when war comes will be impossible given the state of US commercial shipbuilding.  An alternative to new construction is to acquire and convert commercial ships as was done routinely during WWII, especially at the start of the war.

 

Consider the case of troop transports.  At the start of WWII, we had nowhere near enough Attack Transports which were the backbone of the entire Pacific campaign.  Instead, we converted commercial ships to troop transports until we were able to ramp up our wartime shipbuilding.  Here’s a few examples:

 

McCawley Class - The McCawley class consisted of two converted commercial ships built for the American shipping company, Grace Lines, by Furness Shipbuilding Company.  The ships were completed in 1928 as Santa Barbara and Santa Maria. They were bought by the Navy in 1940 and converted to troop transports as the USS McCawley (AP-10) and USS Barnett (AP-11).

 

USS Harry Lee (AP-17) - The Harry Lee was built as the passenger ship SS Exochorda by New York Shipbuilding Co. in 1931 before being acquired by the Navy in Oct-1940 and converted to the Harry Lee (AP-17) in Dec-1940.

 

USS John Penn (AP-51/APA-23) - The John Penn was built as Excambion in 1931 by the New York Shipbuilding Company as one of American Export Lines's original "Four Aces."  She was acquired by the Navy 8-Jan-1942 and converted to a troop transport in Apr-1942.

 

 

Even prior to WWI, the US recognized the need for vastly increased numbers of commercial ships that could be converted to wartime use.  With the 1916 Shipping Act, Congress established an organization to do just that – the United States Shipping Board which, in turn, founded a business, the Emergency Fleet Corporation whose mission was to acquire merchant ships for war needs.

 

Paraphrased from various Wikipedia entries,

 

The Shipping Board had been established while the United States was at peace, with the intent to restore the nation's Merchant Marine.

 

Ten days after declaration of war, on 16 April 1917, the Board created the Emergency Fleet Corporation (EFC) in the District of Columbia with a capital stock of $50,000,000.  The EFC’s purpose was to acquire, maintain, and operate merchant ships to meet national defense, foreign and domestic commerce during World War I.

 

When the United States declared war against Germany the purpose and policy of the Shipping Board and the Fleet Corporation changed from a body established to restore the American Merchant Marine to a military organization tasked with providing transport of war materials to Europe. 

 

The EFC was renamed the U.S. Shipping Board Merchant Fleet Corporation in February 1927, then abolished entirely in October 1936. Its functions were transferred to the United States Maritime Commission.

 

The EFC operated together with some 80 shipyards throughout the country to design commercial ships suitable for conversion to war use.  For example, the Design 1029 ship (full name Emergency Fleet Corporation Design 1029) was a steel-hulled passenger/cargo ship designed to be converted in times of war to a troopship.

 

Today, China does something along these lines with their commercial ships being designed for rapid conversion to wartime vessels.

 

We see, then, that acquisition and conversion of merchant ships to wartime use has been a common practice throughout history.

 

Given our appalling shortage of transport and logistic ships, we will definitely need to acquire and convert merchant ships.  Unfortunately, the US flagged merchant fleet is lacking in numbers.  The U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration, lists only 180 US flagged, privately owned, oceangoing ships of 1,000 tons or greater, as of 2021.[1]  The breakdown by type is shown in the table below.

 

 

Ship Type

Qty.

Containership

63

Dry Bulk

4

General Cargo

20

Ro-Ro

26

Vehicles Carrier

3

Tanker

64

Total

180

 

 

Of the 180 vessels, 157 were deemed militarily useful.[1]

 

We don’t need to attempt to build more amphibious or logistics ships but we do need to ‘change the landscape’, so to speak, with the following actions:

 

  • Need to require merchant ships to include military conversion features in their design.
  • Need to increase the number of US flagged merchant ships by modifying the applicable laws.
  • Need to plan for acquisition and conversion of merchant ships.
  • Need to have conversion plans for each individual ship in hand and ready to go.
  • Need to assess shipyard capacity to accomplish conversions.

 

Most of all, we need some kind of organization tasked with the described acquisition and conversion.  It is unclear to me whether such an organization exists within the government/military.  The ‘s responsibilities have, over the decades, been diluted and distributed among various organizations such as the United States Maritime Administration (MARAD) but none seem to have the charter to produce/ensure that commercial ships are designed for easy and rapid conversion to wartime configurations.

 

Of course, converted merchant ships won’t be perfect fits for wartime uses since they are, after all, merchant ships at heart.  For example, we can easily convert a merchant ship to a troop transport, like we did in WWII, but we can’t convert it to a big deck, aviation ship of the type the Navy currently procures.  However, this fits well with the blog’s overall ship design philosophy of single function, cheaper, smaller ships.  The Navy needs to institutionally come to grips with this reality – and desirability!  We then need to revise our doctrine and operations to include these types of ships instead of the big deck, aviation ships we have today.

 

One final consideration is the cost of naval amphibious or logistic ships – they’re expensive to buy and operate!  By having a fleet of merchant ships capable of being usefully converted to wartime work, the Navy largely avoids the cost of procuring and operating the ships while still having access to the numbers and capabilities the ships represent.  Thus, the cost of administering such a program would easily pay for itself.

 

 


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Related Note:  Following is an example of a commercial ship, the SS United States, designed for conversion to wartime needs.  The ship was designed and acquired under the direction of the United States Maritime Commission (MARCOM) which succeeded the United States Shipping Board.  From Wikipedia entries,

 

… the US government sponsored the construction of a large and fast merchant vessel that would be capable of transporting large numbers of soldiers. Designed by American naval architect and marine engineer William Francis Gibbs (1886–1967), the liner's construction was a joint effort by the United States Navy and United States Lines. The US government underwrote $50 million of the $78 million construction cost, with the ship's prospective operators, United States Lines, contributing the remaining $28 million. In exchange, the ship was designed to be easily converted in times of war to a troopship. The ship has a capacity of 15,000 troops, and could also be converted to a hospital ship.

 

The vessel was constructed from 1950 to 1952 at the Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Company in Newport News, Virginia. The hull was constructed in a dry dock. United States was built to exacting Navy specifications, which required that the ship be heavily compartmentalized, and have separate engine rooms to optimize wartime survival.[2]

 


SS United States



 

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[1]https://www.maritime.dot.gov/sites/marad.dot.gov/files/2021-04/DS_USFlag-Fleet_2021_0316_Bundle.pdf

 

[2]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SS_United_States


Thursday, November 11, 2021

Are We Still A Maritime Power?

In a recent post/comment, a reader offered a thought about the US as a maritime power:

 

… we are no longer a maritime power in the traditional sense.(3)

 

Such a simple statement has enormous implications and this led me to consider … are we still a maritime power?

 

The knee-jerk response is, of course we are!  But … are we really?

 

Answering the question requires that we set some criteria for what constitutes a maritime power.  Setting aside any definitions from anyone else, here are the common sense requirements for a nation to be considered a maritime power:

 

Extensive Merchant Fleet - We don’t have many US flagged ships but the US is the central node in an extensive international shipping ‘fleet’.  From Wikipedia,

 

As of October 1, 2018, the United States merchant fleet had 181 privately owned, oceangoing, self-propelled vessels of 1,000 gross register tons and above that carry cargo from port to port. Nearly 800 American-owned ships are flagged in other nations. (1)

 

So, while it is disturbing that the US flagged merchant fleet is almost non-existent, the US does have a very substantial merchant fleet supporting the nation.

 

Extensive Shipbuilding Capacity – The US has a pitifully small shipbuilding capacity, bordering on non-existent.  This was not always the case.  The US built around 77 commercial ships in 1975.(2)  In 2000, the US built around 17 commercial ships.(2)  The WWII Emergency Shipbuilding Program (US Maritime Commission) produced around 6000 general purpose cargo ships for the war effort.  The causes of the decline of US shipbuilding are well known and the reader can research the subject, if they wish.  Suffice it to say that the decline was largely self-inflicted and that the current situation has resulted in nearly non-existent shipbuilding capacity for the US.

 

Powerful Navy – It should go without saying that a powerful maritime nation requires a powerful navy to protect its maritime interests.  The US has a large navy relative to the rest of the world, however, that navy is steadily shrinking, aging, and has become woefully hollow, demonstrably incompetent, and lacks support in terms of shipbuilding capacity, repair facilities, drydocks, logistics, and foreign bases/ports.  For example, in the Pacific/China theater, we have almost no relevant bases/ports.

 

Given the above, can we still be considered a maritime power?



Maritime Power?


 I’m not going to offer an answer.  Instead I’ll leave it to you to answer the question for yourself.  You might, however, consider the following:

 

If we are still a maritime power, 

  • Why are we allowing our navy to decline so precipitously?
  • Why have we allowed our shipbuilding industry to decline so precipitously?
  • Why have we created the legal/regulatory conditions that prevent our merchant fleet from being US-flagged?

 

If we are not still a maritime power, 

  • How can we assure our continued unhindered access to global shipping?
  • Who will defend our global maritime interests as our navy fades?
  • Can we continue to remain a powerful nation if our access to global shipping is threatened or reduced?
  • How will we compete economically with other countries if our maritime access is further reduced?
  • Can a country with reduced maritime access and capability even be an economic power in the long term?

 

 

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(1)https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Merchant_Marine

 

(2)https://www.enotrans.org/article/decline-u-s-shipbuilding-industry-cautionary-tale-foreign-subsidies-destroying-u-s-jobs/

 

(3)AndyM, November 8, 2021 at 8:19 AM

https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2021/11/reality-is-not-same-as-right.html?showComment=1636388373043#c7559607597155846673