Air Force Follows Navy Playbook for A-10

You probably know that the Air Force has attempted to kill the A-10 Warthog, the best close air support aircraft ever built, for many years now but has been repeatedly thwarted by Congress.
 
The Navy faced a similar situation with the Ticonderoga class cruisers.  They attempted to early retire them, multiple times, only to be thwarted by Congress.  The Navy’s solution was to agree to a blatantly bogus “modernization” program which, in reality, was a way to remove funding for the cruisers while they literally rotted pier side until the Navy could claim that they could no longer be economically upgraded.
 
Like the Navy, the Air Force has, yet again, been prevented by Congress from retiring the A-10 but, ignoring the intent of Congress, has settled on the tactic of simply no longer funding the operation, maintenance, and support of the A-10.  As Redstate website reports,
 

… by the end of this year, the A-10 will be without depot support, without a training pipeline, without weapons-school instruction, and without operational-test capacity.[1]

With no funding for support, the aircraft  will rapidly fall into unflyable status.  The Air Force will have, technically, kept the A-10 but will have achieved practical retirement.
 
Congress should fire every Air Force general and withhold all Air Force funding until A-10 support is restored.
 
The military seems to feel it is above the will of Congress.  It is past time for Congress to re-exert its authority.
 
 
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[1]Redstate website, “Act Now: Fund A-10 Warthog or Lose Combat Power Forever”,  Ward Clark, 24-Jun-2026,
https://redstate.com/wardclark/2026/06/24/act-now-fund-a-10-warthog-or-lose-combat-power-forever-n2203670

Air Superiority Fighter Range

ComNavOps has long proposed a very long range fighter aircraft for the Navy.  One of the persistent objections has been that it is physically impossible to achieve the desired 1000+ nm combat radius (see, "Long Range Carrier Fighter") despite the overwhelming evidence that it is eminently possible.  Well, now it appears that the military agrees with me as evidenced by the requirements for the new F-47 under development.  Amazingly, for modern times, at least, the prototype is due for first flight in 2028.
 

The Air Force has said the F-47 will have a combat radius of more than 1,000 nautical miles and be capable of flying at speeds greater than Mach 2. That would make the aircraft’s combat radius nearly double that of the F-22.[1]

AF wouldn’t be making the claim if they (and industry) didn’t think they could do it.  Of course, claims are just that and nothing is proven until demonstrated.  However, we have sufficient examples of very long range aircraft from decades ago to expect that today’s more efficient engines and better aerodynamics should deliver the range we want.
 
We also need to ensure that firepower, speed, stealth, and maneuverability also join with range to make a truly formidable fighter.  Range, alone, will not make an air superiority fighter … but it’s a good start!
 
Let’s hope the military doesn’t try to turn the F-47 into a do-everything, nothing well abomination.  Make it a fighter and leave it alone.
 
This is encouraging if yet premature.
 
 
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[1]Redstate website, “Air Force's New F-47 Fighter Hits Stride for 2028 Takeoff”, Ward Clark, 26-Feb-2026,
https://redstate.com/wardclark/2026/02/26/air-forces-new-f-47-fighter-hits-stride-for-2028-takeoff-n2199600

Do You Trust Them?

China is developing their own stealth aircraft fleet.  If we think our stealth aircraft will be effective, presumably theirs will be, too, right?  Well, the US military doesn’t think so.  For example, here’s the public assessment of China’s copy of the B-2 bomber, the H-20, by a Department of Defense official speaking on condition of anonymity:  

… the H-20 is when you actually look at the system design, it’s probably nowhere near as good as US LO [low observable] platforms … [1]
 
Asked whether the H-20 is a concern, the official replied “Not really.”[1]

For a Navy that is hollowed out worse than I can ever recall, has systemic maintenance problems, is steadily shrinking in numbers, has personnel and leadership character issues, and has had a long string of failed acquisition programs, that’s an incredibly arrogant attitude to have.  Now, perhaps the Navy has access to information about top secret Chinese aircraft that give them reason to be dismissive but I seriously doubt that.
 

Artist Concept of H-20 Bomber

 
It’s not just the H-20 that the Navy is dismissive of but also the J-20 stealth fighter and it’s not just an anonymous official but an Air Force general who publicly offered this comment: 

Gen. Kenneth Wilsbach told reporters that the J-20 stealth fighter isn’t “anything to lose a lot of sleep over.”[1]

Again, barring inside information about China’s most secret weapons, this is beyond belief arrogant.
 

J-20 Stealth Fighter

 
Given all the failed programs, misguided policies, and incorrect assessments of our own needs and capabilities, do you really think the military has correctly assessed China’s capabilities?  We’ve been wrong about most of our own stuff;  do you think we’re suddenly right about China’s?  Do you trust our military’s assessment?
 
Now, here’s the kicker – even if the military’s assessment is correct and the Chinese stealth aircraft are not as good as ours, our own aircraft and pilots are badly degraded.  Mission availability rates are abysmal and pilot training has fallen off badly with pilots struggling to get enough flight hours to even stay flight certified let alone tactically superior.  So, even if the Chinese aircraft are not as impressive as they’re claimed, neither are our own aircraft and pilots.
 
This is highly reminiscent of the US military’s dismissive attitude toward the Japanese just prior to WWII.
 
Those who will not learn from history are doomed to repeat it.
 
 
 
_____________________________

 
[1]Breaking Defense, “China’s new H-20 stealth bomber ‘not really’ a concern for Pentagon, says intel official”, Michael Marrow, 22-Apr-2024,
https://breakingdefense.com/2024/04/chinas-new-h-20-stealth-bomber-not-really-a-concern-for-pentagon-says-intel-official/

Flat Out Lying

Occasionally, I delve into air force matters when warranted.
 
Hey air force (af), I understand spin and I understand differences of opinion but don’t flat out lie to my face and insult my intelligence.  

Air Force officials argue that the roughly $500 million required annually to maintain 32 Block 20 F-22s — which they emphasize are not equipped with the most modern weapons — would be better spent on developing the Raptor’s successor, the secretive Next Generation Air Dominance fighter. Lt. Gen. Richard Moore, Air Force deputy chief of staff for plans and programs, further estimated in April that making the Block 20 fighters combat worthy would take about a decade of effort and cost approximately $3.5 billion — a timeline that, ideally, would already see the NGAD system flying.[1]

 
Let’s look at the math on this.  The af is claiming that updating 32 F-22s would cost $3.5B.  Doing the arithmetic, that works out to over $109M per aircraft.  By anyone’s standard, that’s patently absurd.  You could tear the aircraft down to the wheels and rebuild it for that amount.  How stupid do you think I am, air force (I’ll capitalize their name and give them respect when they begin respecting me, the taxpayer)?
 
Liar.
 
Moving on … a decade to convert 32 aircraft?  Really?  Our entire industrial and military might could only convert 3 aircraft per year?  We can build a hundred brand new aircraft from raw materials but updating existing aircraft has a limit of 3 per year? 
 
Liar.
 
The NGAD will be flying in ten years?  Really?  The F-35 has been in development for over two decades and isn’t yet fully combat capable (Block 4 is required for that) and the automated logistics support system is non-existent in any useful, functional form.  But, we’re going to have the as-yet-to-be-defined NGAD flying in ten years?
 
Liar.
 
 
 
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[1]Breaking Defense, “‘Much better chance’ USAF can retire F-22s in FY24: Kendall”, Michael Marrow, 9-May-2023,
https://breakingdefense.com/2023/05/much-better-chance-usaf-can-retire-f-22s-in-fy24-kendall/

What Have Our Carriers Done For Us? – Follow Up

Well, that post certainly didn’t go well.  Few people were able to grasp the ‘what if’ nature of the premise.  So, instead, I’ll offer my take on it.
 
 
Mission
 
Beginning around 1950, we would have recognized that the Air Force (AF) was the guarantor of our national security and sovereign existence. 
 
 
Budget
 
The untold billions that have gone towards carriers, carrier aviation, maintenance, nuclear operations, annual operating costs, etc. would, instead, have gone to the AF.  Plenty of money!  With that recognition of the AF’s core mission, would have come the realization that we needed a worldwide network of bases.
 
 
Bases
 
So many people started the basing question from today’s reality.  We don’t have bases.  We have no territories.  No host country is going to allow us to operate freely.  Well, in this alternate reality, recall that we started with possession of most of the bases, post WWII, and didn’t give them up so today’s reality is null and void (that’s what a ‘what if’ is, right?).  Perhaps this might have consisted of retaining ownership of a single island from amongst a group for basing purposes and allowing the remainder of the territories to revert to self-governship.  We could have established wholly owned, sovereign US bases across the breadth of the Pacific.
 
The process of base acquisition would have continued throughout the world.  Methods of acquisition would have covered the gamut of soft, friendly, mutually beneficial arrangements to hard core threats and coups.  We have done all the above at various times in our history.  It would have just been more of the same.
 
One of the conditions for forming and joining NATO might have been inclusion of independent bases in each member country?  Don’t like it?  Don’t join.  Fight Russia on your own.  That’s hardball but that’s the way the game is played, if necessary.
 
For any specific potential base location, ask yourself, what was the status of that location immediately after WWII?  Odds are we either had control of it or could have with little effort.
 
Finally, for those who extoll the virtues of the mobile, sovereign airfield that is an aircraft carrier, note that we have only about nine functioning, combat-capable carriers right now.  Surely, in our alternate reality, we could have had many dozens/hundreds of bases (we already do and could have had many more!).  Doesn’t that seem significant?
 
In short, basing doesn’t seem like it would have been a problem.  It’s become a problem in our reality because we never prioritized it like we would have if the AF were the only source of aircraft.
 
By the way, one astute reader noted that an base can be repaired easier than a carrier.  If a carrier is sunk, it takes us 5-7 years (optimistically) to get a replacement.  We can repair a base in hours or days, depending on the type of damage (fuel being the biggest vulnerability).
 
 
Aircraft
 
With a hugely increased budget, the AF would have developed many more types of aircraft and acquired many more of them.  For example, instead of a fleet of just 180 F-22 stealth fighters, we might have acquired several hundred.  Instead of a fleet of 21 B-2 bombers we might have acquired two or three hundred.  Larger aircraft numbers would have required a greatly expanded fleet of tankers, AWACS, ISR, and cargo aircraft.
 
Imagine fleets of B-2 bombers sitting at bases around the world instead of just 15 or so flyable B-2’s sitting in one location back in the continental US.
 
Imagine squadrons of F-22 fighters based all around the globe.
 
In addition to numbers, the AF would have developed additional types of aircraft to carry out its mission.  Imagine fleets of arsenal bombers or converted commercial airliners carrying 70 anti-ship cruise missiles, each!  There’s your ‘naval’ battle!
 
Imagine squadrons of gunships of various sizes and capacities supporting our low end endeavors.
 
Imagine a follow on F-22 fighter with truly epic range to cover the Pacific area.
 
 
Operations
 
Now, imagine swarms of AF aircraft operating from a global network of bases, each base being capable of air defense, short range strike, and very long range strike.  There would be no areas of the world where we couldn’t bring major firepower to bear.
 
Imagine multiple divisions of Army troops operating in conjunction with local AF bases.  We already have Army airborne units but imagine many more such units, dispersed around the world so that combat response is always just a matter of hours away instead of a Marine Corps MEU being, likely, days or weeks away.
 
Imagine joint Army/AF units operating in an integrated fashion with armor, troop, heavy transport, fighter cover, and strike support, all available from the same base.  There’s your truly effective MAGTF!
 
Imagine swarms of bombers able to launch several hundred anti-ship missiles against any naval force anywhere in the world and doing so with fighter and EW support.
 
Imagine base defense with layers of very long range interceptors and short/medium range fighters.
 
Imagine being able to put hundreds of fighters into the air over, say, Taiwan.
 
 
Conclusion
 
We opted to go the carrier route but consider the alternate reality that I’ve described above and ask yourself whether carriers have accomplished the same or more, in our reality?  It’s far from a sure thing that they have.  Had we fully (and intelligently!) committed to AF aviation instead of carriers, could we have accomplished more than we have with carriers? 
 
Aside from fun, one of the practical uses of this thought experiment is to highlight potential beneficial changes to our current reality, going forward.  Should we be emphasizing the AF more?  Should we be expanding our carrier fleet instead of shrinking it?  Should we be far more aggressively acquiring bases?  Should we be altering our operations and doctrine one way or the other?  Should we be developing some of the aircraft types that were mentioned?  Should the AF have a bigger role in a naval battle?  And so on.
 
The potential is certainly there although the devil is in the execution.  We could easily have screwed up the alternate reality just as much as our current reality.  Still, it’s intriguing to think about.

What Have Our Carriers Done For Us?

A reader recently posed a ‘what if’ type of scenario in which aviation had never attained ascendency in the Navy.  Inspired by that, I’d like to pose the question, what have our carriers done for us in modern times?
 
Here’s the reader’s comment and alternate history scenario: 
 

(Jjabatie April 8, 2023 at 7:56 AM) 

The second no-or minimal-carrier scenario would sprout from the historical Navy/Air Force fight surrounding the USS United States. In the alternate, not only is the new supercarrier torpedoed, but future ones are as well, when the Air Force achieves a much larger victory in their push for primacy with their bombers. Long range bombing is somehow pushed through and overwhelmingly accepted as the nations primary system of conventional and nuclear attack. The Navy is punished/penalized for the fight and loses a massive percentage of their funding. Most of the Essexs dont get upgrades, angled decks, etc. New jet aircraft development lags behind for the Navy, as they have neither the funding to stay current, nor the platforms capable of carrying them. It becomes circular, as later cries for supercarriers are countered by the lack of capable aircraft needing such a platform, and requests for new aircraft and ships are dismissed. The missile age solidifies the Air Forces budgetary grip, as they hold all the nuclear forces. They conspire with the Army to massively expand airlift capabilities, yet another way to deprive the Navy of a mission and funding, by claiming theyve replaced sealift. SSBNs do arrive, but  nearly a decade later than in actual history, again due to budgetary constraints and opposition to the need for a triad from the Air Force dominated Pentagon. SSGNs become the naval strike arm, and become the USNs most numerous platform. As the Vietnam era comes and goes, the Essexs start to age out. The handful of angled deck conversions have become CAS platforms, the unaltered ones, helicopter platforms to support Marine Corps operations- precursors to the LH platforms that eventually appear as the Navys newest, largest warships in the 70s...

 
Suppose we had gone down the path the reader postulates?  Suppose we had no significant carrier aviation component?  Or, posing the question in a different manner, what have we gained by having a fleet of modern carriers instead of a massively larger Air Force bomber/fighter inventory and capability? 
 
Well, let’s consider the historical events that involved modern carriers and see how they would have differed if we didn’t have carriers.  For this discussion, modern carriers are defined as those from the USS Forrestal (CV-59) on.
 
Vietnam War – While our carriers sat offshore and conducted daily bombing attacks, those attacks were ineffective in the overall conduct of the war.  I know this will offend many but the truth is that carrier aviation didn’t alter the course of the war or produce a definable achievement.  Alternatively, a much larger Air Force presence and capability could have accomplished the same thing.
 
Desert Storm – Carrier aircraft flew many sorties but did not materially affect the course of the war and could have easily been replaced by Air Force aircraft.
 
Kosovo War (1998-99) – NATO forces generated something on the order of 40,000 sorties and the carrier Roosevelt generated 3000 sorties – a minor role.
 
Afghanistan/Iraq – Carrier aviation was reduced to truck plinking and contributed little of value that an increased Air Force presence couldn’t have easily handled.
 
 
 
One notable contribution of carrier aviation was Operation El Dorado Canyon (1986).  Ironically, the Navy was not, originally planned to play a major role.  The strike was assigned to F-117 stealth aircraft but they were removed from the mission at the last moment due to security concerns.  Instead, Air Force F-111 and Navy A-6 Intruders flew the strike.  Even then, the Navy A-6 attack aircraft were unable to meet the mission requirements.  From Wiki,
 
Although the F-111s would be required to fly from distant bases, they were essential to mission success, because the eighteen A-6 available aboard USS Coral Sea (CV-43) and USS America (CV-66) could not carry enough bombs to simultaneously inflict the desired damage on the five targets selected.
 
It seems clear that there have been few tangible benefits from having a fleet of modern carriers.  Of course, the real question is not what have the carriers done but what could they do?  Many of the weapons and capabilities in our military have never or rarely been used and yet we find value in them for what they could do, if needed.  For example, our nuclear arsenal has not actually accomplished anything, never having been used in modern times, but we find it to be very valuable because of what it could do. 
 
Thus, the question becomes, what can our carriers do in the future that makes them worth the cost, as opposed to the carrier budget being routed to the Air Force, instead?
 
I see great value in carriers but only if they’re used correctly and, unfortunately, I see zero evidence that the Navy has any strategy for effectively utilizing carriers in combat.
 
It is fascinating to ponder what the Air Force could have done with all the Navy’s carrier and aircraft budget.  How many more bombers would we have?  How many more bases?  How many more types of aircraft?  How much more globally dispersed would the Air Force be?  And so on.
 
Note that I am not advocating eliminating carriers.  This is just a fantasy, speculative post although it offers the opportunity to assess how we’ve used (or misused) carrier aviation and what our proper position should be in the future.  It’s an open-ended post in the sense that I’m not offering any conclusion.  I leave it to you to draw your own conclusion and maybe share your thoughts in a comment.

More Incorrect Ukraine Lessons

I’m baffled as to why observers seem to have such a hard time drawing valid conclusions from the Ukraine-Russia conflict.  More precisely, I’m baffled as to why observers seem so hell bent on drawing invalid conclusions.  This conflict could not be more atypical of what a China-US peer level war will be like and, therefore, as I’ve repeatedly stated, we have to be very, very cautious and skeptical about drawing conclusions.  Here’s the latest invalid conclusion by the US Air Force. 

Robust Ukrainian and Russian air defenses have rendered both sides’ aircraft, particularly those used for close air support missions, largely “worthless” in the war between the two countries, according to a top American Air Force general.[1]

About 60 Ukrainian aircraft and 70 Russian aircraft have been downed in the year since Russia launched its invasion, according to commander of US Air Forces in Europe and Africa Gen. James Hecker … [1] 

This is nonsense.  Aircraft have not been rendered ‘worthless’ by air defenses;  they’ve been rendered ‘worthless’ by the complete absence of any operational and tactical expertise in their employment.  Sure, a single soldier with a .22 cal handgun can render your entire platoon ‘worthless’ if you continually walk up to him and allow him to shoot you.  The soldier’s effectiveness is not due to the .22 cal gun;  it is due to your own tactical incompetence.  With the slightest bit of tactical expertise you can easily eliminate him.
 
Similarly, the effectiveness of the air defense systems is not due to the air defense systems, it’s due to the operational and tactical incompetence of the attackers.  Both sides seem to be flying up to the other’s air defenses and seeing how long they can survive.  Well, yeah, that’s a sure way to render your aircraft ‘worthless’. 
 
Where’s the electronic warfare support aircraft?  Where’s the anti-radiation missiles to suppress and destroy the defenses?  Where’s the coordinated artillery suppression of the air defenses?  Where’s the cruise missile attacks against air defense systems?  Where’s the infantry/armor attacks to destroy and degrade the air defenses?  Where’s the coordination with the attacking aircraft?  Where’s the signals analysis to locate the air defenses?  Where’s the operational planning to coordinate efforts?  I have seen zero evidence of any of that, by either side.  It’s no wonder both side’s aircraft are ‘worthless’.
 
Now, if we’re planning to fight China in a similarly inept, incompetent fashion (and I’m not ruling that out!) then the lessons in this conflict are applicable.  On the other hand, if we fight with operational and tactical competence then the only lessons we can draw from this conflict fall into the category or ‘what not to do’.
 
What’s disturbing about all this is the failure of our professional warriors to grasp the underlying reasons for the apparent failure of aircraft.  We seem to be accepting what we see at face value.  Whether it’s the Marine Commandant thinking that he’s seeing validation of his decision to eliminate tanks or the Navy thinking they see validation of their decision to run away from defended coasts or the Pentagon thinking that they’re seeing validation of unmanned assets, it’s all the same failure to understand the utter lack of operational and tactical competency in this conflict and, therefore, the invalid nature of any conclusion drawn therefrom.
 
The only thing ‘worthless’ in this conflict is our professional warriors who can’t seem to grasp the realities of this.  I assume this is because they, themselves, have no operational or tactical competence with which to assess what they’re seeing.  All I can hope is that China’s military leaders are just as incompetent as ours.
 
 
 
__________________________________

 
[1]Breaking Defense, “In Ukraine fight, integrated air defense has made many aircraft ‘worthless’: US Air Force general”, Michael Marrow, 7-Mar-2023,
https://breakingdefense.com/2023/03/in-ukraine-fight-integrated-air-defense-has-made-many-aircraft-worthless-us-air-force-general/?_ga=2.176949349.1343997440.1678141848-1009727458.1647467636

Loyal Wingman No Longer Expendable

After years of Loyal Wingman proponents trumpeting the ability of the unmanned drone to be expendable, thus saving manned aircraft, the Air Force now says that the drone is not expendable. 

The push for affordability “doesn’t mean… that this is an attritable type of platform,” Jobe [Maj. Gen. R. Scott Jobe], Director of Plans, Programs, and Requirements at Air Combat Command, said during a panel at the Air and Space Force Association’s Air Warfare Symposium. “That’s a common misconception.”[1]

Simple logic dictates that if the drone is not going to be expendable then it will have to be extremely capable, meaning on par with modern 5^th generation fighters, in order to survive.  If they aren’t equally capable, they won’t survive.  Of course, simple logic also dictates that if they’re on par with 5^th generation fighters, they’ll cost what 5^th generation fighters cost and that violates another commonly touted characteristic:  affordability.
 
As the Air Force notes, 

Officials said a careful balance must be struck between their affordability and capability.[1]

Of course, when was the last time the military was able to strike an appropriate balance between affordability and capability?  Let me repeat … if you want survivability, you need 5^th generation capability and that means 5^th generation cost.  This is pretty elementary logic.
 
 
 
_______________________________

 
On a closely related note, why have we already committed to a production run of at least a thousand drones before we’ve demonstrated the first proof of combat effectiveness?

 
_______________________________

 
[1]Breaking Defense, “CCA fighter wingmen drones won’t be ‘attritable,’ despite ‘common misconception’: General”, Michael Marrow, 8-Mar-2023,
https://breakingdefense.com/2023/03/cca-fighter-wingmen-drones-wont-be-attritable-despite-common-misconception-general/
 

Air Force Loyal Wingman

Contract competition will begin soon for the US Air Force version of the Loyal Wingman unmanned UAV, the Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA).

 

The US Air Force could kick off a competition for a drone counterpart for its sixth-generation fighter as soon as fiscal 2024, the service’s top leader said Wednesday.[1]

 

That makes sense.  After all, we have no Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for the drones so why not jump into procurement?  We have no field experimentation to demonstrate the capabilities of an unmanned drone so why not jump into procurement? What could go wrong?

 

Regarding cost,

 

In terms of cost, the Air Force wants drones that are no more than half the cost of an F-35 — which would put the most high-end CCAs at about $40 million — with Kendall [Frank Kendall, Secretary of the Air Force] stating that he would like to spend “a factor less than that” because some will be lost in battle.[1]

 

The number one characteristic of a drone in combat is that it will have a very short lifespan since we don’t have Terminator level Artificial Intelligence, yet.  Drones will be the equivalent of single digit IQ pilots – you know, as if Admirals were flying – with no ability to do anything but execute a very tightly defined set of actions (well, that rules out the Admirals).  They’re going to drop like flies in combat so they’d better be dirt cheap.  Very few will come back from a mission.

 

With that in mind, $40M drones seems insanely expensive for a drone that will need a precision Swiss watch to measure its lifespan.  Kendall seems not to appreciate that reality despite saying,

 

“The expectation is that these aircraft can be designed to be less survivable and less capable …[1]

 

How can Kendall acknowledge that the drones will be less survivable and less capable – that’s the definition of ‘throwaway’ in combat - and then set a price target of $40M?

 

I wish that were all that Kendall and the Air Force were confused about but it’s not.  Kendall, and the military, in general, has developed a serious case of delusion, manifested in the recent trend of believing the enemy will be ‘confused’ by everything we do.  This concept of enemy ‘confusion’ has been cropping up in everything, lately.  The Navy believes that the enemy will be ‘confused’ by individual, weak, distributed lethality ships.  The Marines believe that the enemy will be ‘confused’ by platoon size, missile shooting units hiding on small islands.  Now, the Air Force believes the enemy will be ‘confused’ by drones.

 

“The expectation is that these aircraft can be designed to be less survivable and less capable, but still bring an awful lot to the fight in a mixture that the enemy has a very hard time sorting out and dealing with,” Kendall said. “You can even intentionally sacrifice some of them to draw fire, if you will, to make the enemy expose himself.”[1]

 

Options include adding weapons, sensors, electronic warfare systems or other effects, and there is a benefit to fielding CCAs with differing mission packages.

 

“That’s a way to keep the cost down,” he said. “It raises the uncertainty that the adversary has to deal with, because he doesn’t know which is in any given aircraft, he has to take each of them seriously as a threat. And so whether they all carry weapons or a subset carries weapons, he’s going to treat them all as if they do. He has no choice.”[1]

 

Merely swapping out payloads will plunge the enemy into the throes of debilitating uncertainty.  Kendall seems to believe the enemy will wind up in a corner, balled up in the fetal position, sobbing from the confusion and uncertainty we inflict on him.  When has uncertainty about a ship or plane’s payload ever been a problem for any enemy?  In war, you destroy everything of the enemy’s and you don’t give a rat’s ass what it was carrying.

 

Returning to the CONOPS issue, consider the following gem of damnation:

 

As the Air Force begins developing CCAs [Cooperative Combat Aircraft, the loyal wingman drone], the service also needs to take steps to begin learning how to use combat drones alongside fighter aircraft … [1]

 

As we begin developing drones (we’re already starting the production process!), we need to take steps to begin learning how to use them?  Pardon me, Air Force, but shouldn’t you know how you want to use them before you begin procurement?  That’s called a CONOPS and a CONOPS must precede design or you wind up with a useless product as we’ve seen with so many acquisition programs.

 

The Right Path

So, what should we be doing before committing to production?

 

1. We should be conducting actual exercises using some low level aircraft as a simulation for a drone and install whatever autonomy or control software we’re planning on using to see how it performs.  Oh wait … we don’t have any actual software yet, do we?  We’re going to procure the drone and then develop the software concurrently.  What could go wrong?  Hasn’t concurrency worked every time it’s been tried?

 

Can you imagine a ‘less survivable and less capable’ drone simulator, say, a T-6B Texan II Turboprop trainer or a T-45 Goshawk trainer, thrown into combat against Chinese equivalents to the F-15, F-35, and F-22?  What would the lifespan of those be?  What could they productively accomplish in combat?

 

2. Via demonstration exercises, we need to determine a realistic attrition rate of drones and balance that against cost to determine an affordable price point.  I guarantee you it isn’t anywhere near $40M.  By the way, when has any acquisition program come anywhere near its initial, hoped for price target?  Never!  The actual cost of whatever debacle we produce will be closer to $80M than $40M;  history guarantees that.

 

3. Based on the demonstration exercises, we should then – and only then – develop the CONOPS.  The CONOPS will then tell us exactly what performance requirements we need for the drone.  Without the CONOPS, we’re just randomly guessing.  That’s how you wind up with a Zumwalt with no mission, and LCS that has no use, and Afloat Forward Staging Base whose captain has orders to sail around and look for a mission (see, “AFSB– Looking For Something To Do”), a Ford that costs twice as much and offers no improvement, etc.

 

 

This Loyal Wingman / Collaborative Combat Aircraft is another in a long series of fads (see, “Fleeting Trends”) that the military jumps on with no supporting evidence or experience.  So far, none of those have ever turned out well but, hey, this one will be the exception, right Air Force?

 

No CONOPS, no demonstrations, no performance specs, no cost/attrition analysis, guaranteed runaway costs  …  what could go wrong?

 

 

________________________________

 

[1]Breaking Defense website, “Coming soon: A US competition for sixth-gen drone wingman could begin in FY24”, Valerie Insinna, 7-Sep-2022,

https://breakingdefense.com/2022/09/coming-soon-a-us-competition-for-sixth-gen-drone-wingman-could-begin-in-fy24/

! ! ! !

This is not a Navy issue but it warrants a notice.  The Boeing KC-46 tanker program has had lots of problems and the manufacturer has taken massive losses.

... KC-46 losses now total more than $5 billion on a $4.9 billion contract ... [1]

Boeing has lost more than the contract was worth !

KC-46 Tanker [1]

Sooner or later, the various military and industrial contracting parties have got to learn some lessons such as:

• Don't design products that are more complicated than they need to be.  Seriously, it's a tanker.  It's a flying fuel tank with a pump for transferring the fuel.  We've been doing this for how many decades?  But no ... we had to make the new tanker an all-digital, remote vision, automated, fly-by-wire boom, with super glass panoramic displays.  In addition, we couldn't just have it dispense gas.  No, that would be too simple and cheap.  We had to make it a multi-function, combination tanker, passenger transport with seating for 58, cargo transport with capacity for 18 pallets, and medevac with room for 54 patients.[2]
• Don't low ball bids[1]
• Don't accept bids that are obviously unrealistic.  The Air Force is just as much to blame as Boeing.
• Don't ask for and don't offer fixed price bids for unproven products.
• Demand prototypes and test them thoroughly before issuing contracts.

The Air Force may think they were clever by using a fixed price contract but what did they gain?  The program began in 2001 and Boeing was selected in 2011.  Now, 11 years later, the Air Force has yet to receive new functional tankers.  The Air Force may not be footing the bill for the problem fixes and schedule delays but they aren't receiving any product, either.  So, what did they really gain?

[1]https://breakingdefense.com/2022/07/new-boeing-defense-ceo-signals-different-approach-in-future-fixed-price-contracts/

[2]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_KC-46_Pegasus

A Naval Air Wing in the Med (Scrap Two Carriers – Part 3)

In a previous blog post (see, “ScrapTwo Carriers – Part 1” and “Naval Air Wings, Scrap Two Carriers – Part 2”), I suggested that operating supercarriers had become so expensive that it has left our Navy imbalanced, with too few aircraft and surface combatants. This could be corrected by downsizing to nine carriers, which will probably occur anyway because of the flawed USS Ford program. I suggested this loss could be offset by establishing two shore based overseas Carrier Air Wings (CAW)s; the confusing CVW is the official acronym. These could be called Naval Air Wings (NAW) and absorb Marine Corps aviation assets to support Navy sea control missions from existing American airbases.

 

During a conflict in the Persian Gulf, the US Navy will wisely keep its aircraft carriers out of that Gulf. It would also be wise to keep land-based NAW squadrons out of the region until the smoke clears. The United States has access to several first-class airfields in the region, but basing NAW squadrons in this region makes aircraft and military families vulnerable to surprise missile and commando attacks. The US Navy should establish aerial munitions and fuel bunkers at key airbases, but basing NAW squadrons in the Mediterranean is better. Squadrons in the Med can deploy to Persian Gulf airfields on a regular basis to participate in exercises. During a conflict, they can deploy to the Persian Gulf quickly and choose airfields depending on damage and the tactical and political situation.

 

Another reason not to base NAWs in the Persian Gulf is that region is dominated by the US Air Force with its large headquarters in Qatar commanding several deployed squadrons. A NAW there would become an Air Force CENTCOM supporting component. On the other hand, the Air Force has no fighter squadrons in the Med except two at Aviano in Northern Italy. It has no munitions stockpiled at other bases in the Med, no anti-ship or anti-submarine weaponry, and cannot supply or properly support deployed naval task forces. A final reason to choose the Med is a much friendlier political and cultural environment with quick access to turbulent Africa.

 

The US Navy has several options for basing a NAW in the Med where it already has large airbases. Despite this investment, the US Navy maintains more executive aircraft for Admirals based in the region than combat aircraft. Here is the current laydown:

 

Naval Air Station Sigonella (Sicily)

• Executive Transport Department C-20As
• Air Operations Department C-26As
• P-8As (long-range patrol) on rotational deployment from CONUS

 

Naval Support Activity Naples (Italy) collocated at the Naples civilian airport

• Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron HCS-28 det with two MH-60S
• Air Operations Department C-26As

 

Naval Air Station Rota (Spain)

• Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron HSM-79 det with two MH-60Rs

 

Naval Support Activity (Crete) collocated at a Greek airbase

• None

 

US Air Force airbase Moron, Spain

• USMC VMM squadron with MV-22s via CONUS rotations

 

The Navy/Marine Corps have four options to sustain NAW squadrons in the Med.

 

1. Accompanied tours – These are three-year tours with families that require schools and massive base support complexes. These are popular and allow unit stability, but are costly to support.

 

2. Unaccompanied tours - Personnel are deployed individually for a year leaving families stateside. This works well as a 13-month tour (six months overseas, a month of stateside leave, six months overseas), but the high turnover affects readiness.

 

3. Unit rotation - This is used by the Marines where three units rotate with seven-month deployments for foreign presence. This works well but requires three squadrons to maintain one overseas.

 

4. Foreign detachment – A squadron based stateside rotates personnel to maintain a forward detachment overseas with perhaps four aircraft. Personnel deploy for 3-6 months to the overseas det every couple of years, and the entire squadron deploys overseas every year for a month-long exercise.

 

Here is a notional basing plan for a NAW in the Med:

 

• One Navy Helicopter Maritime Strike (HSM) Squadron of eleven MH-60R (anti-sub/boat) Seahawks. There are already two aircraft at Rota to support the four destroyers based there and the Navy plans on adding more aircraft. Make this a full squadron perhaps placing a few with their sister MH-60s at Naples.
• One Navy Helicopter Sea Combat (HSC) Squadron of eight MH-60S Seahawks. Two are already based at Naples so add more or place them with other Navy squadrons in the Med.
• Two Navy Strike Fighter (VFA) Squadrons with 14 FA-18E/Fs each.
• One Navy Electronic Attack (VAQ) Squadron, with five EA-18G Growlers.
• One Navy Carrier Airborne Early Warning (VAW) Squadron with four E-2D Hawkeyes

 

These four squadrons are the core of the NAW striking power and could be based at existing US Navy airfields in the middle of the Med, at NAS Sigonella, NSA Souda Bay, and NSA Naples. These squadrons will be manned via one-year unaccompanied tours. A couple billion dollars and several years may be needed to expand family services to allow some three-year accompanied tours.

 

• One CONUS based Marine VMGR Aerial Refueler Squadron with 15 KC-130Js tasked with support via rotational deployments, so perhaps four will be in theater moving among airfields to support the NAW with more during wartime. Aircraft can deploy for six months bouncing around between airfields.
• One CONUS based Marine Fleet Logistics Support (VMM) Squadron of 12 MV-22 Ospreys tasked with support via rotational deployments, so perhaps three will be in theater to support the NAW with more during wartime. The Marines already maintain a VMM squadron at Moron, Spain near the Med coast to support the Africa Command via rotational deployments among three squadrons. These aircraft should become part of a NAW.
• Two Marine Fighter Attack (VMFA) Squadrons with 16 F-35Bs each. These squadrons would be based stateside and maintain a forward det of four aircraft in the Med region. The entire squadron will deploy for a month-long exercise each year. There are lots of basing options that may change yearly. Maintaining a F-35 det with the Marine VMM squadron at Moron, Spain is simple, or any NAW base in the Med. The Marines have maintained a few fighter aircraft at the American airfield in Djibouti near the strategic Red Sea, so that may be a good location for a squadron/det.

 

Basing NAW aircraft at these locations in the Med will require political approval. This should not be a problem because it adds perhaps only 400 more personnel at each base and more spending in the local community. The US Navy already spends billions of dollars to maintain bases in the Med with over 10,000 personnel, but almost zero airpower exists aboard them! There are other basing options that should be evaluated. The US Air Force has excellent airfields in Romania, Turkey, and Jordan that host aircraft for training exercises. There is also a British airbase on Cyprus and the Italians are buying F-35s so basing with them is possible. Training at these bases and establishing bunkers with naval munitions at these airfields is a good idea.

 

Career sailors will be pleased to serve ashore with a NAW to break from endless shipboard deployments. Improving these bases will cost a few billion dollars, but this will be less than half the cost of a new supercarrier and provide a year around presence at a fraction of the annual operating cost of a supercarrier. Deployed naval task forces will be pleased with the land-based air support available in the region with whom they will train. Additional aircraft from the NAW can be embarked aboard CVNs and LHD/LHAs if needed. Finally, if war erupts in the Persian Gulf, it takes weeks for a second aircraft carrier to arrive in theater, and months for a third to arrive. A NAW from the Med can arrive in a week.

 

Click here for a map of base locations.

Air Force Looking To Eliminate Kinetic Effects

The two decade long Afghanistan debacle has clearly demonstrated that our military leaders are absolute idiots who have no idea how to conduct a war.  This is no longer even debatable.

 

Now, these same demonstrably failed military geniuses are leading us down the path of an ever weaker military chasing the illusion of data and networks.  Here’s something that should scare you to your core: the military is now envisioning replacing kinetic effects with data.  According to Air Force chief of staff Gen. CQ Brown,

 

… advances in artificial intelligence, supercomputing, cyber weapons and space point to an ever-increased reliance on data and software, as well as a trend toward non-kinetic effects. (1)

 

Gen. Brown is looking to significantly reduce our kinetic combat capabilities.

 

“I can’t predict the future, but I would bet the non-kinetic effects will reign supreme,” Brown said during the Dubai International Air Chiefs Conference. “Now we’re somewhere stuck in the thinking that mass needs to be physical. What if we did not have to produce sorties to achieve the same effect? What if a future small diameter bomb looks like ones and zeros?” (1)

 

Mental masturbation about data and networks is all well and good until a Chinese amphibious fleet appears off Guam and none of our data matters at all.  At that point, it’s all about firepower and attrition and we are voluntarily and systematically giving up both firepower and numbers, steadily weakening our forces.

 

We just got kicked out of Afghanistan – a war in which we had total information dominance – and our military leaders want to double down on that failure by further eliminating firepower and emphasizing data?  Remember the definition of insanity?

 

China doesn’t even need to build up their military any further, they just need to wait while we tear down ours!

 

 

 

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(1)Breaking Defense, “Could kinetic warfare go the way of Blockbuster?: US Air Force chief ”, Valerie Insinna, 16-Nov-2021,

https://breakingdefense.com/2021/11/us-air-force-chief-could-kinetic-warfare-go-the-way-of-blockbuster/

Airborne Laser Test Delayed

Airborne lasers have been perpetually just a few years away for many decades, now.  ComNavOps has read articles declaring airborne lasers to be just around the corner as far back as the 1980’s and there are probably reports and articles older than that, proclaiming the same thing.  So, other than just a few years away from fruition, where are we now?

Well, in May 2020, Mike Griffin, Undersecretary of Defense for research and engineering, had this to say,

“I’m extremely skeptical that we can put a large laser on an aircraft and use it to shoot down an adversary missile, even from fairly close.” (1)

Why was Mr. Griffin skeptical?  Here’s what he had to say,

“It has been done as an experiment, but as a weapon system — to equip an airplane with the kinds of lasers we think necessary, in terms of their power level, and all their support requirements, and get the airplane to altitudes where atmospheric turbulence can be mitigated appropriately — that combination of things doesn’t go on one platform.” (1)

Now, we learn that the Air Force is pushing a planned test of an airborne laser on a fighter back to at least 2023.

The U.S. Air Force’s long-planned test of an airborne laser weapon aboard a fighter jet has been delayed until 2023 due to technical challenges and complications spurred by the ongoing coronavirus pandemic, its program head [Jeff Heggemeier, SHiELD program manager for the Air Force Research Laboratory] said.

More,

… Air Force acquisition czar Will Roper acknowledged that the service is rethinking how it could best use directed-energy technologies. Perhaps the most optimal use for SHiELD wasn’t onboard a fighter, he said.

While I am not a laser expert, by any means, it is clear that the challenges involved in mounting a laser on an airplane are far more challenging than anyone cares to admit.  It is also clear that a practical, fighter-mounted laser is not in the foreseeable future.

Not Happening!

Now, let’s delve into a bit of nearly unfounded speculation – isn’t that always the best kind?!

If airborne lasers have zero hope of successful missile defense, what does that suggest for the prospect of using lasers for missile defense on board ships?  To me, reading the blurry, out of focus tea leaves, I see no hope of an effective missile defense for shipboard lasers in the next, say, twenty years.  The combination of extremely fast and maneuverable missiles plus the pitching and rolling of the firing platform (the ship) suggests that maintaining a precise, fixed ‘burn’ point for a sufficiently long time to produce a catastrophic effect on an incoming missile will not be possible.

Now, toss in other mitigating factors like turbulence, humidity, weather, clouds, temperature, and whatever else (remember, I’m not a laser guy!) and the chance of producing a catastrophic effect is even further reduced.

Finally, what happens when the first successful anti-ship missile laser actually works?  You’ve got it, of course … the enemy will begin to incorporate anti-laser measures into their missiles.  One can easily imagine incorporating thicker ‘noses’ to increase burn time, inducing a continuous rolling action by the missile (Rolling Airframe Missile, anyone?), making the missile body more reflective, and many more measures that I, a barely informed amateur in the field, can’t even begin to imagine.  This will set practical laser development back another decade or two.

Of course, for less demanding applications like destroying a low, slow drone, lasers could prove practical and effective in the moderately near future.  Therefore, continued development effort is certainly warranted but to believe high end combat lasers are just around the corner is to believe in fairy tales.

The short of it is that lasers are, and will always remain, just a few years from practical application for many more decades to come.

__________________________________

(1)Defense News website, “Griffin ‘extremely skeptical’ of airborne lasers for missile defense”, Aaron Mehta, May-2020,

https://www.defensenews.com/2020/05/20/griffin-extremely-skeptical-of-airborne-lasers-for-missile-defense/

Air Force Continues To Pass On Light Attack Aircraft

For many years now, the idiocy of using front line jets to plink trucks has been obvious.  The solution has been just as obvious – use a light (probably propeller driven) attack aircraft.  The benefits are blindingly obvious:  cheaper acquisition cost, cheaper operating cost, easier to maintain, easier to learn to fly, etc.  Note that when we say cheaper, we mean by astronomically huge margins.  In the military budget world, these light attack planes border on free to buy and free to operate.

ComNavOps has suggested that the Navy acquire a simple Essex-type carrier to operate a wing of Super Tucanos or something similar.  The Navy has no interest in that and wants no part of it.  In fact, the Navy seems quite happy to burn through F-18 Hornet flight hours rather than embrace a simple, cheap solution.  They have sidestepped the issue by allowing the Air Force to take the lead on ‘evaluating’ the concept.

Tucano Light Attack Aircraft

So, how is the Air Force progressing?  You would think that it would take all of about a week to evaluate the issue, right?  I mean, it’s just not that complicated.  Let’s see how they’re doing.  From a Breaking Defense article,

After a decade of dithering, and under threat from Congress to strip the program from its control, the Air Force today issued its long-awaiting request for proposal (RFP) for the Light-Attack Aircraft to Textron Aviation for the AT-6 and Sierra Nevada Corporation/Embraer Defense & Security for their A-29. (1)

So, rather than a week of evaluation, the Air Force has wiled away a decade????  How can that be?  Well, the answer is obvious.  The Air Force wants nothing to do with a small, light aircraft.  If it isn’t a high cost, high performance jet, the Air Force doesn’t want it – just like they don’t want the A-10.  It’s just like the Navy’s disdain for small vessels, no matter how useful.

So, if the Air Force doesn’t want a small, light attack aircraft why are they even pretending to look at it?  Well, it’s because Congress and public opinion has forced them to make a token effort. 

Well, at least they’re finally going to commit to a light attack aircraft, right?  Wrong. 

The Air Force will buy “two or three of both,” an Air Force spokeswoman told Breaking D today. (1)

So, a decade of dithering and now they’re going to buy two or three of each of the two types for a total buy of 4-6.  That’s not exactly commitment – that’s more delay.

Okay, so that’s a miniscule initial buy but that will quickly ramp up to significant purchases, right?  Wrong.

Air Combat Command will take charge of the AT-6 Wolverine planes at Nellis AFB in Nevada “for continued testing and development of operational tactics and standards for exportable, tactical networks that improve interoperability with international partners,” the announcement said. [emphasis added]

Air Force Special Operations Command will use the A-29 Super Tucano at Hurlburt Field in Florida “to develop an instructor pilot program for the Combat Aviation Advisory mission, to meet increased partner nation requests for light attack assistance.”

Newly installed Air Force Secretary Barbara Barrett chimed in with one of her first official statements, saying: “Over the last two years, I watched as the Air Force experimented with light attack aircraft to discover alternate, cost-effective options to deliver airpower and build partner capacity around the globe. I look forward to this next phase.” (1)

So … … … more studies?

And, what’s this about other countries?

Phase 3, ongoing since at least 2011, includes looking more closely at their use by allies, such as Afghanistan and Lebanon, who both own small numbers of the A-29, for counter-insurgency operations, and assessing how many the Air Force and allies might buy.

“Our focus is on how a light attack aircraft can help our allies and partners as they confront violent extremism and conduct operations within their borders,” said Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. David Goldfein in the Air Force announcement. “Continuing this experiment, using the authorities Congress has provided, gives us the opportunity to put a small number of aircraft through the paces and work with partner nations on ways in which smaller, affordable aircraft like these can support their air forces.” (1)

Congress started this project to acquire small, light attack planes for OUR use, not for other countries.  Where did this focus on other countries come from?  Who gives a rat’s ass about what other countries might think about our light attack aircraft?  This is just a way to continue postponing any significant action by the Air Force.

And, just to close out the idiocy, there’s this tidbit,

Sydney did a comparison of the two planes way back in 2012. (1)

Hey, no sense using what they learned.  That would be too quick.  Better to spend a decade restudying and delaying, right Air Force?

By the way, with the cost of a decade or so of ‘studying’ we could have already purchased all the light attack aircraft we need and had plenty of money left over.

With the Air Force taking the lead on light attack aircraft, the Navy is never going to get a cheap, simple alternative to burning through Hornet flight hours but I guess that’s fine by the Navy.  Why use a free aircraft when you can use a $100M jet with a limited number of flight hours?

_______________________________

(1)Breaking Defense, “Air Force Finally Commits To Buy Up To 6 Light Attack Aircraft ”, Theresa Hitchens, 25-Oct-2019,

https://breakingdefense.com/2019/10/air-force-finally-commits-to-buy-up-to-6-light-attack-aircraft/