Monday, July 18, 2022

! ! ! !

This is not a Navy issue but it warrants a notice.  The Boeing KC-46 tanker program has had lots of problems and the manufacturer has taken massive losses.

... KC-46 losses now total more than $5 billion on a $4.9 billion contract ... [1]

Boeing has lost more than the contract was worth !


KC-46 Tanker [1]


Sooner or later, the various military and industrial contracting parties have got to learn some lessons such as:
  • Don't design products that are more complicated than they need to be.  Seriously, it's a tanker.  It's a flying fuel tank with a pump for transferring the fuel.  We've been doing this for how many decades?  But no ... we had to make the new tanker an all-digital, remote vision, automated, fly-by-wire boom, with super glass panoramic displays.  In addition, we couldn't just have it dispense gas.  No, that would be too simple and cheap.  We had to make it a multi-function, combination tanker, passenger transport with seating for 58, cargo transport with capacity for 18 pallets, and medevac with room for 54 patients.[2]
  • Don't low ball bids[1]
  • Don't accept bids that are obviously unrealistic.  The Air Force is just as much to blame as Boeing.
  • Don't ask for and don't offer fixed price bids for unproven products.
  • Demand prototypes and test them thoroughly before issuing contracts.
The Air Force may think they were clever by using a fixed price contract but what did they gain?  The program began in 2001 and Boeing was selected in 2011.  Now, 11 years later, the Air Force has yet to receive new functional tankers.  The Air Force may not be footing the bill for the problem fixes and schedule delays but they aren't receiving any product, either.  So, what did they really gain?


[2]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_KC-46_Pegasus


45 comments:

  1. The KC135 has been a multi-function aircraft since it came into the fleet. They hauled cargo and passengers for years, as has the KC-10. In that, the KC46 being multi-function is not new or unusual. Being the fraken-tanker Boeing said they were not going to bid, after they lost to Airbus, is a different story.

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  2. I find it interesting that the Air Force is now proposing to fly these without a copilot in high risk operational environments like WestPac. There will only be a pilot and boom operator on board.

    Needless to say, a lot of people are unhappy with the lack of redundancy this entails.

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    1. Tells me USAF doesn't think they are very survivable vs China. They want to operate with only 1 pilot so they ONLY LOSE 1 pilot at a time when China shoots them down.....

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    2. They might get off with it if the pilot hasn't had the Covid jabs,

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    3. How long does the Air Force intend to keep the tankers in the air? For any time longer than two hours, they will NEED the copilot, so the pilot can use the toilet, take a nap, or have help in case of in-flight emergencies and other unexpected events.

      Flying such a vital aircraft with only one pilot, seems like yet another "buy cheap, pay twice" kind of idiocy the various services have gotten into since the Cold War ended- the Navy's plans to man the Littoral Combat Ships being another example.

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    4. Some have conjectured pilot co pilot cross trained as boom operator, but its all crap from my view. Do these things get a load master when carrying cargo?

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  3. Squarely on Boeing management, there is no way in heck that the engineers in the back office thought they could pull this off for $5 billion!!!! No way, no how!!! They were told to shut up and sales team came up with a number they knew USAF couldn't refuse. I bet the guys from Airbus laughed their heads off when they heard they lost the contract and BA was going to be on the hook for whatever was past the $5 billion. Im not sure even Airbus with a far more mature product in MRRT could have delivered for $5 billion and that's without any design changes!!!! Just straight off the production line and I bet $5 billion was a tough target.

    UASF wanted the moon and they got it, BA was stupid enough to say yes to something that gold-plated. I never got a real good answer why USAF couldn't just have gone for a straight up KC767 that Japan and Italy bought but NOOOOO, USAF needed a spaceship......

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  4. I've never understood why this was such a problem for Boeing. The KC-46 is a converted commercial airliner, the Boeing 767, which has been in production and widespread service for decades. And Boeing had converted the very same airliner to a tanker a decade or so ago. And actually sold some. I just don't understand what happened.

    When I consider all the problems with this program, together with the 737 Max issues, I wonder if Boeing has serious rot in their engineering organization.

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    1. @Bob. Well, that's the problem, it wasn't a plain vanilla 767, that's the KC767 that was sold to Japan and Italy. Pretty much just a tanker. Why USAF couldn't just buy that? Don't know, guess it wasn't "good" enough for USAF!

      USAF wanted a spaceship so Boeing had to cobble together a Frankenstein 767, it's not a regular cargo 767, it's really different bird, cockpit and wings i think are different. Now, add on stupid 3 D glasses for the operator, some gold plated wiring and other extras to survive nuclear WW3 and maybe even an alien invasion, plus all the "regular" trouble at Boeing like Max and 787 debris problem and voila, you lose billions.....

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    2. but its not a converted commercial airliner. The USAF requirements were such that no COTS airline met the requirements. Both the 330 and the 767 basically required a complete rewire to meet the damage disparity requirements that the USAF pushed (and yes, that means that the MRTT doesn't meet the requirements).

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    3. "required a complete rewire to meet the damage disparity requirements"

      I don't follow AF matters and I have no idea what 'damage disparity requirements' is/are but the underlying concept that a standard commercial aircraft wouldn't be suitable to dispense fuel is kind of the point of the post. The task is simple AND IT'S NON-COMBAT so why did we make it more complex than was necessary? If a tanker ever gets into an air-to-air engagement it will die no matter what modifications it has so, again, what's the point?

      K.I.S.S. We've forgotten what that means and why it's so important.

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    4. basically standard redundancy wasn't sufficient, they wanted it plumbed such that the redundancy was distributed as wide as possible.

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    5. " wanted it plumbed such that the redundancy was distributed as wide as possible."

      That's a wise design philosophy for a warship but pointless on a tanker. If it's engaged, it will die no matter what. Increasing the cost several times over for an aircraft that should never see combat is just wasteful.

      Delete
  5. If a contractor's FFP bid is less than the INDEPENDENT Government Cost Estimate (IGCE), acquisition regulations require the Government to tell the Contractor that they may lose money on this contract. The Contractor can say thank you and stick with his bid becuase he may want to cover his fixed costs to keep the business operating becuase they have something else in the works that will make them more money. This was taught to me by a former President of Hazeltine at a week long DAU cost estimating class in 1986.

    However, I have recently seen and sometimes experienced several instances where the Government did not comply with these regulations. This is more evidence of the growing ineptitude of the Government Acquisition workforce. Additionally I doubt many of the Government workforce knows how to estimate program costs, nor even how to research using prior data to produce an IGCE. The political hacks at the top jsut take the Alan Greenspan approach and say why would a company take on this risk, they must know what they are doing. Well that was the run up to the 2008 financial crisis, remember that?

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    1. "Well that was the run up to the 2008 financial crisis, remember that?"

      Are you suggesting that it's the govt's responsibility to ensure that private companies don't lose money?

      "INDEPENDENT Government Cost Estimate (IGCE), acquisition regulations require the Government to tell the Contractor that they may lose money on this contract."

      Do the private companies not have access to the IGCE? Are they unable to read and understand it if they have access to it?

      "growing ineptitude of the Government Acquisition workforce"

      That being the case and, given that the IGCE is prepared by the govt, why would a private company be guided by the IGCE or feel it has any credibility? I wouldn't accept anything the govt says at face value. I'd make damn sure to do my own homework!

      "regulations require the Government to tell the Contractor that they may lose money on this contract."

      You're describing the situation where the bid and the govt estimate don't agree. Of course, there's also the situation where an unanticipated, seemingly endless series of problems crop up during execution of the contract (let's call that the KC-46 scenario) which leads to the manufacturer losing money. Is it still the govt's responsibility to protect the company from that? If not, what's the difference between protecting the company from a bad bid and protecting the company from bad problems?

      Related thought: do we care if a company goes out of business due to its own ineptitude? Isn't that a Darwinian process to weed out unfit companies? Isn't going out of business a good thing, in the long run?

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    2. Not arguing with you; just exploring the ramifications of the various policies and what's good or bad about them.

      Military acquisition contracts are often not like buying fully developed, proven widgets. We're often buying products that have never been built before and are, with near 100% historical certainty, subject to unforeseen problems. It seems like we need a new type of contract structure along with a healthy dose of common sense such as PROTOTYPING. Had we insisted on a fully proven, production-representative, KC-46 prototype we wouldn't be having this problem and both Boeing and the govt would be much better off now. Boeing wouldn't have lost $5B and the govt would have had the opportunity to rethink their requirements and select some other aircraft - possibly a standard, existing aircraft with a fuel boom strapped on. (K.I.S.S.)

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    3. No, my comment was to show what happens when you bet that company's will do what is logical and long term vs greedy and short term. In this case Boeing got a similar result (losing thier behind) as we did in the financial crisis.

      The Government is not under any obligation to share the IGCE. They have to tell them if they feel the contractor will lose money on the FP contract but not provide the rationale for their estimate. Competition, the submitted proposal, and any discussions identify big disconnects.

      A FP contract has a specification with it. The Contractor has to deliver a product that meets that specification. If the specification is vague the contractor should bid the moon. You imply that the contract has to accept changes to the specification (or SOW) without bidding the cost of each change. That is not the case, the contractor bids the cost of each change and the cost fo the base contract is modified after the change is agreed to by both sides. If the Gov tries to force the Contractor to accept a change, the contractor can refuse and just deliver what the original contract required.

      If the government issued a FP contract for something that needed major development, then they misused the contract type. If Boeing accepted a FP contract for a major development risk, well they are the Boeing we all know a love after Phil Condit and Jim McNerney got through with them. Remember the 737 Max and Dreamliner issues?

      It is possible to misuse FP contracts to try to limit development work that is uncertain. SecNav Lehman did this on the V-22 and pressured Bell Textron to convert the development work from a CP to a FP contract. Bell Textron foolishly agreed. This eliminated any cost overruns on the development work, which is all SecNav wanted while he said that Bell Textron could push back on changes from the Navy. Bell Textron got told by their lawyers that they signed a FP contract and had to deliver no matter the cost. Read the book "The Dream Machine" for a great account of this misuse.

      I think I responded to your main points, good discussion.

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  6. Remember the history. Both Boeing and Airbus submitted proposed aircraft--Boeing based on the 767 and the Airbus based on the A330. As noted above, there is a plain vanilla 767 tanker in service with Italy and Japan, and the A330 MRTT is in service with the RAF, the Aussies, Singapore, and the Saudis. Both were essentially off-the-shelf aircraft that could have been ready in numbers by now.

    But no, the Air Force couldn't buy off the shelf and had to impose a whole bunch of extra requirements. So you end up with the mess we have now. Among the problems is that the selection process was apparently riddled with corruption and went back and forth between the two designs. In part that is because the two designs have some inherent strengths and weaknesses compared to each other making one of the other more suitable for different mission profiles.

    What would have been wrong with the Air Force buying 90 Boeings and 90 Airbuses off the shelf? They'd have had them quicker and cheaper, and a bit of rivalry among the two contractors would have kept both on their toes. And operational commanders would have had two different aircraft at their disposal, to be able to use the one best suited for any purpose.

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    1. "What would have been wrong with the Air Force buying 90 Boeings and 90 Airbuses"

      Unless there were/are truly two different refueling missions that require two different, incompatible sets of requirements, the penalties associated with having to maintain two different sets of supply chains, two different logistic support trains, two different pilot training pipelines, two different mechanic training pipelines, etc. outweigh any minor benefits.

      If, on the other hand, there really are two distinctly different, incompatible mission sets than, yes, two different aircraft would be justified.

      I don't know the missions sets but I find it hard to believe that they differ enough to justify two different aircraft. You pass gas; that's all there is !

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    2. I don't recall all the details, but the Airbus was bigger and carried more cargo (15-20% more fuel per Wikipedia).

      My main point was that both Boeing and Airbus had working aircraft that are currently in service with multiple air forces, and therefore had the USAF not added in a bunch of requirements (many of questionable value) they could have had new tankers already flying operationally by now.

      I also don't like sole sourcing, and my thinking was let both of them build some in competition with each other which would probably promote better products from both. Fly them both, and if one turns out to be way better than the other, then build more of it and less of the other.

      As far as the bean counter issues, I'm a bean counter myself and I tend to think we let them rule too many decisions. In Ranger we operated two different fighters (F4, F8) and five different attack aircraft (A3, A4, A5, A6, A7) and our supply chain could keep up. And front end savings from going with off-the-shelf aircraft could offset a lot of back end training and supply chain costs.

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    3. "I also don't like sole sourcing, and my thinking was let both of them build some"

      Ahh ... you favor the successful LCS dual build model ! Well, that worked out okay, I guess.

      "we operated two different fighters ... and five different attack aircraft"

      Today, we struggle to keep a single aircraft type flying. What's different? What has changed?

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    4. "'I also don't like sole sourcing, and my thinking was let both of them build some'
      Ahh ... you favor the successful LCS dual build model ! Well, that worked out okay, I guess."

      No, not at all, because as I said, my primary point was to buy off the shelf when possible, and nothing about the LCS was off the shelf. The USN is making the same mistake with one of the same vendors by bastardizing the FREMM (which could be a useful GP ASW/ASuW frigate, which the Navy needs) into one more AEGIS platform. If it ain't broke, don't fix it.

      "'we operated two different fighters ... and five different attack aircraft'
      Today, we struggle to keep a single aircraft type flying. What's different? What has changed?"

      Good question. We've gotten weak and lazy, and our hardware has been overwhelmed with Rube-Goldberg-ish "innovations," which are at least part of it, but they don't explain it all.

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    5. "We've gotten weak and lazy"

      That's a nice platitude but it offers no specific reason why we can't support multiple aircraft types.

      I think the reason we can't is because we don't. We don't support multiple types so we've come to believe that we can't. Similarly, we haven't got room on our aircraft carriers for 90+ aircraft because we don't have 90+ aircraft on our carriers and have come to believe, therefore, that it's not possible - despite having done it in the past.

      Why can't we fit 90+ aircraft on a carrier today? Because we've taken up the space with treadmills and weight machines and other crew comforts that no one thinks can be eliminated. But, I digress ...

      Our modern thinking is that we can't do it because we don't do it and since we don't do it, it proves we can't do it.

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    6. "Why can't we fit 90+ aircraft on a carrier today? Because we've taken up the space with treadmills and weight machines and other crew comforts that no one thinks can be eliminated. But, I digress ..."

      I'm not as big on eliminating physical fitness stuff as you are, because physical fitness is a combat capability and one that we have too often ignored. But I agree that we gone become way, way overboard on a bunch of that other stuff, and we need to return to building warships.

      "Our modern thinking is that we can't do it because we don't do it and since we don't do it, it proves we can't do it."

      That's what I mean by weak and lazy.

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    7. Just a thought. Subs don't have many of the amenities we put on other ships, because subs don't have the room. But subs can attract and retain people. Why? Because the mission attracts people--and the right kind of people. We need to get back to the mission as a motivator.

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    8. fyi, main detriment for the MRTT is the aircraft simply didn't fit within the existing infrastructure. The 767 based design fit within the infrastructure footprint of the 135 while the MRTT would of required worldwide infrastructure construction.

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    9. "But subs can attract and retain people. Why? Because the mission attracts people--and the right kind of people. We need to get back to the mission as a motivator."

      Too be fair the list of bonus and regular pay bonus for officers and enlisted who go sub/nuclear is pretty impressive.

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  7. As for the multiple contractors, letting multiple contractors build designs that are already in operation and proved to work does not seem like it would bring the LCS problems into play. One other thing, if something happens to cause you to lose confidence with one supplier (as might be argued with Boeing recently) you are not stuck with them as your sole source.

    I have also wondered if it wouldn't have made sense to split the P8 order between Boeing and the Kawasaki P1 (assuming a US builder, like perhaps NorthropGrumman or LockMart, for the P1). The P1 clearly has some operational capabilities that the P8 lacks (the ability to do low-level ASW, including MADVECS, for one), so a mix might be better suited for multiple and different threat levels.

    I think we are poorly served by the concentration of the defense industry. I'm not sure how we could go about separating Boeing from McDonnell from Douglas or Lockheed from Martin, but I think we'd be better served if we had more players. Maybe invite some foreigners--Dassault, BAE, Kawasaki--to open US subsidiaries to bid their designs in. Same thing for shipyards--Damen, Naval Group, possibly Navantia (although the Norwegian incident causes some concern there). If Naval Group joined with a USA shipyard or started a USA subsidiary to do something like what they did with ICN at Itaguai, that could give us another submarine shipyard that we badly need, and we could buy enough Barracudas to make that economically viable. Or perhaps do the same with Mitsubishi on the west coast to build SSKs.

    Bottom line, we need way, way more construction and maintenance capability for both ships and aircraft. I don't see it coming from the merger-happy USA industries. So maybe injecting some foreign-based competition would be a good thing.

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    1. Competitive split buys between multiple contractors worked well for fighter engines (the split purchase of P&W F100s and GE F110s for different blocks of the F-16, with some of one later used for the F-14B and D and some of the other later used for the F-16C and E, and the two being again competed for the F-15EX).

      Competitive split buys between multiple contractors didn't work well for the LCS. I don't think I need to go into detail there.

      More examples are needed to come to any firm conclusions, but based on those two cases I think we can say that:
      - higher total volumes make ongoing competitive split buys between multiple contractors work better, because they allow economies of scale even after the volume is roughly halved
      - iterative designs (F100-PW-220 based on prior F100-PW-200, GE F110-GE-100 and F110-GE-129 based on prior F101-DFE which itself was based on the prior F101) make ongoing competitive split buys between multiple contractors work better, because each competitor needs to have a high enough chance of succeeding for their entry to be a credible threat to the other - if both designs are high-risk, each team will laugh at the other's problems and assume they've got it in the bag, defeating the purpose of the exercise


      Happily, these factors are also beneficial when not doing a competitive split buy.

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    2. I am a moron who can't find the 'preview' button any more, but in my prior post I meant "later used in the F-15C and E" in place of "later used in the F-16C and E".

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    3. The recent Google 'upgrade' to the blogger comment function seems to have eliminated the preview function as a feature.

      Delete
    4. @JM
      "Sinking of Norwegian frigate"

      I've deleted your comment because it contains incorrect or unverifiable statements. The article does not say that 80% of the crew was female. It says that 4 of 5 navigators were female. The article does not say that the crew was 'green'.

      The article was also written before the investigation report was released and, therefore, fails to address the design and construction flaws that allowed the flooding to spread.

      And so on.

      Make sure your statements are factual. That's mandatory on this blog. Opinions are welcome but statements of fact MUST be correct.

      Also, if you wish to address this topic, there is a dedicated post discussing the Helge sinking.

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    5. OK. Sorry, but I posted the first related article that I could found because I can't remember where I read the original source.

      If I got time I'll search for the original.

      Thanks for your answer.

      JM

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  8. The most frustrating part is this could have been agile development. Start building and add the hard part once its ready. I mean start with the A model and go from there. We'd be on C or D by now a generation ago and have happy useful airplanes.

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  9. The KC-K programme has been screwed up from the start, and probably has more twists to come. It started out as a plan to lease tankers, even though this was more expensive than purchasing them. There was never an explanation for leasing, except fashion, or graft. KC-767 was selected for that in competition with Airbus.

    Then it emerged that a corrupt civil servant had given Boeing sight of the Airbus bid, before she moved to a senior job at Boeing. She went to jail, as did a Boeing executive, and a new competition was started.

    Airbus/EADS/Northrup Grumman won that, but then Boeing appealed, and there were many more months of bureaucracy, and a final set of bids. Eventually Boeing got the deal, and EADS did not appeal that, saying that Boeing's bid was overly aggressive and stood a high chance of loosing money.

    Boeing seems to believe it has a right to win these contracts and to be supported if it messes them up. And since the government is probably scared of the prospect of Boeing going bankrupt, it gets to act as if it had those rights.

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    1. US Air Force mulls skipping tanker competition as confidence in Boeing’s KC-46 builds.
      https://news.yahoo.com/us-air-force-mulls-skipping-151608430.html?fr=sycsrp_catchall (
      This article is in" Defense News." ( recent article )
      The competitive tanker is LM's / Airbus Tanker version of the A330.

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    2. The KC-46 should be a good airplane. It's based on a good airplane--the 767. As far as I know, the A330 is a good airplane too. The difference between splitting the USAF tanker aircraft between the two, and splitting the LCS between two yards is that neither version of the LCS was a good ship.

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    3. "neither version of the LCS was a good ship."

      And the KC-46 is a disaster of a tanker aircraft, arguably worse than the LCS. The A330 tanker is a non-existent aircraft in the US inventory. So, I don't really see that there's any difference between splitting the tankers and splitting the LCS, at this time.

      "It's based on a good airplane--the 767"

      An appealing argument that doesn't hold water. The Independence LCS as based on a proven ferry design and yet turned out to be a disaster. A good base doesn't guarantee a good final product.

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    4. Read somewhere that the A330 tanker is flying with some of our European allies

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    5. the A330 MRTT is flying, but the KC-45 was NOT a A330 MRTT. The KC-45 was based on the A330 MRTT just like the KC-46 is based on the KC-767.

      both KC-45 and KC-46 required extensive changes from the aircraft they were based on.

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    6. Australians, UK, Emeratis, and Saudis have been flying A330 MRTTs for some time, apparently successfully. So why can't the USAF not just go with what already works elsewhere? What is so important that they have to change?

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  10. TheDrive currently has an article on Air Force interest in flying the KC-46 with a crew of two in high-end conflicts.

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  11. Unrelated but something CNO talks about all the time and been for years BUT dawns on EU and others just now with Ukraine about resupply,
    production rate, replenishment etc ....somethings I wonder: are we the only geniuses here or are they really that dumb?!?
    Seriously though, is this military industrial stuff this hard?!?!? I've been reading about military since little boy, was in service, avid reader, comments on excellent blogs like CNO, maybe I take this stuff for granted, maybe it is hard for people to get?!?


    https://breakingdefense.com/2022/07/ukraine-shows-need-for-nato-magazine-depth-raytheon-exec/

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    1. Interesting article. It would be easy to criticize because of the vested interest, but reality is that we would run out of everything including TLAMs and their cousins frighteningly quickly in a peer war. And they take so long to build that would leave a huge problem.

      The Chinese are far better at mass production of high tech systems than anyone else currently. Its important to keep that front of mind. The ability to build rapidly is not the same as the ability to design new systems, something we seem to forget.

      The fact that we simply can't replenish either Stingers or Javelins quickly should strike fear into the hearts of military planners.

      “My logisticians are a humorless lot … they know if my campaign fails, they are the first ones I will slay.” – Alexander the Great

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    2. Eh? Give the general TLAM specifications and source them from multiple people and they would be cheaper and have higher production. Nothing about the TLAM is complex wrt modern manufacturing, its just the manufacturing being used is 40+ years old.

      Its like the ULA people that were openly laughing at spacex and their plans.... the disconnect was that SpaceX wasn't doing things the way ULA does/did.

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