The Navy is floundering. They’re wandering aimlessly, throwing ideas against the wall to see if anything sticks. Thus far, nothing has – or at least nothing worthwhile and supported by rigorous analysis, combat exercises, and experimentation. The only two things that have ‘stuck’, in the Navy’s mind, are networks and unmanned vehicles and neither of those enjoy significant support outside the Navy.
As an example of the Navy’s floundering, consider the issue of fleet size. That should be a simple, straightforward statement of fleet size based on a professional warrior assessment of our combat needs, right? Any semi-competent, professional sailor should be able, off the top of his head, to put forth a required fleet size (and composition) based on years of expertise, experience, and study. The Navy, however, seems utterly incapable of elucidating a fleet size as evidenced by study after study calling for seemingly random fleet sizes.
Over the last few years we’ve seen plans calling for a fleet size anywhere from 300-500+. As recently as April of this year, the Navy presented Congress with a 30 year shipbuilding plan that offered not one, but three different plans and fleet sizes! The three fleet sizes ranged from 316 to 367. The Navy couldn’t even muster enough professional expertise and analysis to come up with a single plan. Instead, they offered three plans to cover their collective rear ends from any criticism and to circumvent the need to commit to something, thereby risking their reputations (such as they are).
To hammer home the randomness of the Navy’s ‘planning’, the following table presents some recent naval studies and the range of fleet sizes they called for. Note the wildly varying numbers in a short span of time. That’s a Navy that is floundering.
|
Recent Navy Fleet Size Studies |
||
|
Year |
Study |
Fleet Size |
|
2016 |
Force Structure Assessment |
355 manned |
|
2020 |
Integrated Naval Force Structure Assessment |
390 manned 435 manned + unmanned |
|
2020 |
Future Naval Force Study |
337-404 manned 440-540 manned + unmanned |
|
2020 |
Battle Force 2045 (SecDef Esper) [1] |
500+ manned + unmanned |
|
2021 |
PB22 Jun 2021 Ranges |
321-372 manned 398-512 manned + unmanned |
|
2022 |
30 Year Shipbuilding Plan – Option 1 |
316 manned |
|
2022 |
30 Year Shipbuilding Plan – Option 2 |
327 manned |
|
2022 |
30 Year Shipbuilding Plan – Option 3 |
367 manned |
|
2022 |
Future Navy Force Study |
355 manned |
|
2022 |
CNO Navigation Plan 2022 [2] |
350+ manned |
Despite this plethora of [random] fleet size studies, CNO Gilday has now released yet another plan with yet another fleet size goal, the Chief of Naval Operations Navigation Plan 2022 [2] which calls for a fleet size of 350+ (he couldn’t even pick a fixed number !).[3] This plan differs markedly from the one he sent to Congress only a few months ago and it differs from the several plans generated in the last couple of years.
The Navy can’t seem to settle on a plan. That’s called floundering.
Rep. Mike Gallagher, R-Wisc., took to Twitter today to criticize the Navy for its constant number swapping following a POLITICO story that reported fierce in-fighting at the Pentagon over the Navy’s future fleet.
“The fact that Congress has received four different answers from the Navy in the past three months alone sparks confusion and ultimately, less effective advocacy,” he said.[3]
Exactly! Why would Congress support and fund any plan since the Navy can’t seem to settle on a required fleet size and a rationale for that requirement?
Responding to Gallagher’s criticism, CNO Gilday couldn’t/wouldn’t even defend his nebulous goal.
Asked to comment on Gallagher’s criticism, Gilday said the NAVPLAN “is not a perpetual end state. It can’t be.”[3]
CNO Gilday is basically stating that the latest plan isn’t really a plan, that the desired fleet size isn’t really a requirement, and that the desired fleet size will certainly change, likely sooner than later. Is that supposed to inspire confidence?
A noteworthy aspect of this latest plan is the decision to sacrifice quantity for modernization.
Amid inflation pressure, Gilday says the Navy "will prioritize modernization over preserving force structure."[3]
Shrinking the fleet is not a good trade off especially when the quantity you’re giving up contains significant firepower and the modernization you’re attempting does not. Modernization that does not increase firepower is a poor choice, indeed.
Rep. Rob Wittman, R-Va., had this to say,
“By any measure, China has much more capability than we have, we must modernize our Navy [and] we need to do it with a sense of urgency,” he said.[3]
Wrong Mr. Wittman! We need quantity and firepower, not misguided modernization for the sake of modernization.
Conclusion
The Navy is hopelessly lost. Fleet size and composition plans are a dime a dozen and none seem to last more than a few months. Our joke of a Navy leadership would rather conduct study after study than commit to a plan. That’s understandable because they recognize that they have no rationale for any plan. They lack the professionalism and expertise to conceptualize a plan.
To a very small extent, this is understandable since no Navy leader has every seen naval combat or even a realistic exercise. That being the case, why/how would they have any rationale or experience on which to base a fleet size/composition plan? Worse, they exhibit absolutely no knowledge or grasp of history’s lessons which could provide the experience they lack and no desire to learn from history.
Our Navy and our nation are being well and truly screwed by Navy leadership. The horrifying reality is that, barring the emergence of a Rickover or Halsey, only a combat disaster can alter the failed path we’re on.
__________________________________
[1]https://www.csis.org/analysis/secretary-esper-previews-future-navy
[2]https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/22121320/navigation-plan-2022_signed.pdf
[3]Breaking Defense, “‘More than 350 manned ships’: CNO lays out de facto Navy shipbuilding request in new NAVPLAN”, Justin Katz, 26-Jul-2022,
"The horrifying reality is that, barring the emergence of a Rickover or Halsey, only a combat disaster can alter the failed path we’re on."
ReplyDeleteAnd unfortunately, given how long it takes us to build ships these days, that combat disaster may well be permanent. Sigh ....
I think its obvious that top USN leadership is completely beholden to the industry. There's absolutely no reason whatsoever to buy 100s of USV when they haven't figured out all the bugs, mission or even basic CONOPs. None!!! But USN is already including 100s of hulls in its future inventory.....more than anything else tells me they have no clue what they doing and pretty much taking orders from the industry instead of doing their job.
ReplyDeleteThere's more to it than just what you describe. Navy leaders could be totally beholden to industry (let's accept that premise for sake of discussion) while still producing good ships. Industry doesn't care what it builds as long as the contracts continue to roll in. Industry would be just as happy to build WWII battleships as modern unmanned combat canoes. They don't care. It's the Navy specifying worthless ship designs. Why? That's where my understanding falls apart. You can curry just as much industry favor asking for good ships as bad so why not ask for good ships?
DeleteThere's something else at play here and I don't know what it is. Utter incompetence and lack of professionalism is a big part of it but there's still something I'm missing. I'd love to talk to the former CNOs and say, "You knew the LCS was a poor idea and yet you pushed ahead with it, anyway. Why?".
Hmmm, maybe I should add the complete loss of institutional knowledge? WW2, Korea and even Vietnam Navy and Marine ops is really ancient history now. With ships just seen as another "platform" (and that could be an issue in itself!!!) who has real life experience of naval warfare, how to build, what to build, how many, etc....its all war games, what industry wants and some magic dust, no one inside has "experience". Its a serious problem for everyone, have friends in the industry and not easy making sure the next group of employees have the know - how to build a radar or jet engine.....how to transmit and move forward this information isn't easy.
Delete"who has real life experience of naval warfare"
DeleteNo one, obviously. This is where REALISTIC exercises come into play and are so important. The pre-WWII Fleet Problems provided the realistic combat experience (to the degree possible) that the commanders of the time lacked. We don't even pretend to do that today. We need to reinstitute realistic, combat-focused fleet problems utilizing the ENTIRE fleet not the half dozen ships we send to RIMPAC or the one or two ships we send to other so-called exercises.
Sort of OT but really "professional warrior" The appropriate would be professional sailor or soldier. I really do dislike the way warrior has slipped use as synonym for soldier it is not.
ReplyDeleteNoted and ignored !
DeleteOn fleet size it seems a bit mistake really. At a time when the navy continuously puts off maintenance, can't apparent get around to solving its paint problem (industry did) , can't decide it needs to reduce sailors or is short on recruiting, can't build effective ships, can navigate in the Pacific... I would say fleet size number is kinda trivial and pointless since can't seem to run the navy it has let alone some 100+ more ships.
ReplyDeleteI mean realistically until the UN can update its yards and and radically reduce its backlog of maintenance why bother coming up with some 300-400 ship number since you can't maintain a smaller fleet.
DeleteThe goalposts keep changing. Is it possible to get a fleet size set by Congress so the ship building industry can plan how they can meet the needs/demands of what Congress mandates as the size of the fleet? The Navy is not batting a thousand, in fact they are below the Mendoza line, when it comes to recent ship and aircraft design and subsequent purchase and production.
ReplyDeleteDoes the current fleet even reflect what the current naval strategies are? How hard is it to address the capabilities where the Navy is glaringly deficient in such as ASW or MCM? There is way too much talking and very minimal action.
https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2022/07/26/navy-moves-to-align-its-strategy-with-national-defense-strategy-priorities/?utm_source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=dfn-ebb&SToverlay=2002c2d9-c344-4bbb-8610-e5794efcfa7d
ReplyDelete26 July 22....all this changed with the article linked above. Now the number is as follows:
Unlike the original navigation plan, the updated document includes a Force Design 2045 plan, a vision of the future fleet that mirrors what Gilday has called for in other recent documents.
It calls for 12 Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines as the undersea nuclear deterrent, 12 aircraft carriers, 66 attack submarines and large payload submarines, 96 large combatants such as destroyers, 56 small combatants such as littoral combat ships and frigates, 31 traditional amphibious ships, 18 light amphibious warships, about 150 unmanned surface and undersea vessels, 82 logistics and auxiliary ships, and a sophisticated blend of manned and unmanned aircraft to complement the fleet."
78 submarines, 213 ships of various classes, 150 various unmanned platforms with 82 various auxiliaries to support it.
Good on you Navy...in the span of two years you have change the "end result" of your fleet 10 times.
Yet, we still have issues with subs getting their overhauls, manning issues at all shipyards, and supply chain issues.
"Lawmakers panned the 30-year shipbuilding plan, with Navy hawk Rep. Elaine Luria, D-Va., saying the service does “not have a strategy that defines actual requirements” for the Navy and Congress to work towards." The only thing I like about her is she holds the Navys feet to the fire....but not enough. She is a retired CMDR SWO....she KNOWS the CNO is blowing smoke...but will not come out and say it.
ReplyDeleteSetting aside her other political positions, she's competent regarding naval stuff. She's had many sharp exchanges with naval representatives, she's reasonably knowledgeable, and generally correct. I generally agree with her about naval issues. I wish we had many more representatives with her naval interest and knowledge. As you note, she stops short of being outspokenly effective.
Delete"...31 traditional amphibious ships, 18 light amphibious warships..."
ReplyDeleteThat seems like a pretty big amphibious component (especially when the Marine Corps seems to want to get out of the amphibious business).
What kind of capability would an amphib fleet of that size provide for us?
Lutefisk
"What kind of capability would an amphib fleet of that size provide for us?"
DeleteAs you know from your study of historical amphibious assaults, it would provide very little capability or capacity. As we note from history, the amphibious and support fleet for the Okinawa assault consisted of :
84 attack transports
29 attack cargo ships
LCIs, LSMs, LSTs, LSVs, etc.
52 submarine chasers
23 fast minesweepers
69 minesweepers
11 minelayers
49 oilers
@Lute. The 18 LAWs is really a joke. Between maintenance, training, in between cruises, etc....how many do u really have ready for war? 10? 18 is joke, especially once China finds them , sinks a few, how much time and money was wasted on this? If the LAW really "works" my guess you would need at least double or triple that number.
DeleteCNO and NICO, thanks for your replies.
DeleteIt seems like too few and too many at the same time.
I would want to have amphibious assault capability.
I could see 'semi-forced' entry at places like the Philippines, Africa, Middle-east...some place where we could establish local air and see dominance while we put marines ashore.
What quantity of troops could be forced ashore with that amphib fleet? A battalion, brigade, division?
It seems like I remember CNO saying we should maintain a small fleet of amphibious ships to maintain the knowledge through training, but expand the capability during wartime if needed.
Lutefisk
"It seems like too few and too many at the same time."
DeleteCorrect. It is far too few to conduct a major (or even semi-major assault) and far too many for peacetime needs. We did not conduct the Normandy or Pacific assaults with our pre-war fleet. We built an amphibious fleet during the war as we learned what we needed. We built up to it. Similarly, we won't conduct a major amphibious assault in the first month of a war, today. We'll have to build up to it.
That leads to my contention that we only need a handful of amphibious ships during peacetime for the purpose of maintaining (and expanding, hopefully) the institutional knowledge of how to conduct an amphibious assault.
When was the last time you heard of an amphibious exercise involving more than one amphib ship? The answer is never. So why do we insist on maintaining a fleet of 31 ships that do nothing but sit pierside or go off on worthless globe trotting luxury cruises?
I've also stated that there is no strategic need, that I can see, for amphibious capability unless we allow the Chinese to take over the Pacific, as the Japanese did.
"The Marines realized that they couldn't do a proper assault from LHAs/LHDs"
DeleteWe've discussed this. This is an incorrect statement so I deleted the comment.
The Marines decided that precision guided weapons, missiles, in particular, precluded a successful frontal assault. It had nothing to do with LHx size, placement relative to the shore, or anything else. In fact, the Marines continue to ask for more LHx which proves your statement is incorrect.
The last time there was a plan to use multiple amphib ships was Desert Storm....but that was only to hold Iraqs divisions at bay by the threat of an assault.
Delete" In fact, the Marines continue to ask for more LHx which proves your statement is incorrect."
DeleteAt the same time as they have for the record abandoned the amphibious assault mission. Something here does not pass the smell test. I agree that your dismissal of my statement is consistent with official explanations. What I am saying is that I do not believe the official statements because they are nonsensical.
While my statement does not comport with the company line, it is the only thing that makes sense to me. So I think the company line is a lie. One thing I believe to be absolutely correct is that you cannot conduct a viable amphibious assault off an LHx, regardless of opposition missiles and other weapons.
I suppose I can concede that maybe the Marines are saying, whether you can run an assault off an LHx is irrelevant, because we are getting out of the assault business, so let the Navy build them to their heart's content, just so long as we get some (equally useless for other reasons) LAWs.
To be clear, I am offering these as opinions not facts, since I do not have access to (presumably classified) underlying facts. Your opinion is different, and I respect that.
"I am offering these as opinions not facts"
DeleteI have no problem with that, whatsoever. Opinions, whether I agree with them or not, are always welcome.
I would suggest, however, that you are looking for intrigue where none exists. The Marines, in the form of the Commandant, have plainly stated that precision weapons preclude frontal assaults. Whether you agree with that view or not, it is plain, simple, and direct and explains their subsequent missile-shooting fantasy. I take it at face value.
The only part that doesn't make sense is the Marine's continued desire for big deck amphibs. That's logically inconsistent but I put that down to maintaining the 'empire'. Without those ships, serious questions would likely be raised about the size and purpose of the Corps.
The simplest explanation is, invariably, the correct one and, in this case, the Marines have presented a simple explanation. Unless some new information surfaces, I see no reason to look for a more convoluted explanation.
If the Marine's only objection to assaults was the LHx, I have to believe they'd say that. They (the Commandant) haven't been shy about expressing some pretty controversial positions leading to this missile-shooting scheme so why would they refrain from saying that LHx is the real reason they're out of the assault business?
Accept the simple until you have reason not to.
" I do not believe the official statements because they are nonsensical."
If just being nonsensical is your criteria for rejecting something, then there must not be anything coming out of the armed forces that you believe !
"let the Navy build them to their heart's content"
The Navy is not building them. The Marines have requested them. The Navy would prefer to spend its budget on Burkes, Fords, and unmanned crap. They build amphibs because they have to not because they want to. If they could, the Navy would retire the amphibs today and use the money for unmanned vessels.
"I've also stated that there is no strategic need, that I can see, for amphibious capability unless we allow the Chinese to take over the Pacific, as the Japanese did."
DeleteSo, there will be a strategic need for amphibious assault capabilities.
"If just being nonsensical is your criteria for rejecting something, then there must not be anything coming out of the armed forces that you believe!"
DeleteYep. And I would say yours too. At least we agree on something.
"The Navy is not building them. The Marines have requested them. The Navy would prefer to spend its budget on Burkes, Fords, and unmanned crap. They build amphibs because they have to not because they want to. If they could, the Navy would retire the amphibs today and use the money for unmanned vessels"
DeleteWhich would probably be the one bigger waste of money than LHAs/LHDs.
"I've also stated that there is no strategic need, that I can see, for amphibious capability unless we allow the Chinese to take over the Pacific, as the Japanese did."
DeleteWell first, unless we turn our "Pacific pivot" into an actual pivot, that may be exactly the situation in which we find ourselves. So maybe there is a strategic need for amphibious assault capabilities. Not that those capabilities are enhanced by our current LHx/LPD-17 "big deck amphib" fleet, nor by the proposed LAWs.
And second, I don't ever foresee an opposed amphib landing on the Chinese (or Russian) mainland. Among other things, those anti-ship missiles will see to that. But some kind of island-hopping around the first island chain or the eastern Med, or in the Baltic or Persian/Arabian Gulf, might be places where that threat might not be present, and those could be very realistic amphib assault targets.
"some kind of island-hopping around the first island chain or the eastern Med, or in the Baltic or Persian/Arabian Gulf"
DeleteThis is the kind of nebulous, unconnected to reality, generic thinking that I despise. What specific strategy would call for an amphibious assault in the Baltic? What first island chain island would require an assault as opposed to a few dozen cruise missiles? And so on.
If you can come up with a LIKELY scenario requiring an amphibious assault then great; there's your justification. However, just generically saying there MIGHT be some future, undefined, unspecified need is lazy operational thinking. Incompetent, lazy military thinkers fall back on 'you just never know' because they're too incompetent to game out actual scenarios and strategies. War Plan Orange wasn't a 'you just never know' plan. It was a plan based on intense study, near certainty of enemy intentions, and rock solid requirements.
To be fair, you're not a professional naval strategic or operational planner but even in this blog I'd like to see some degree of realistic planning and scenarios. I abhor 'some kind' of ops planning.
Step it up. Offer a specific AND LIKELY scenario and describe the amphibious force it would require. If you can't come up with a scenario then consider dialing back your amphibious fleet size.
Also, bear in mind that the existing amphibious fleet is very unlikely to ever execute an assault in a war. As in WWII, we would need to build up forces, including amphibious ships, in order to conduct an assault with a reasonable chance of success. Too many people have the misguided notion that the current fleet would be our war fleet. I've stated, repeatedly, that we should have only a handful of amphibious ships whose only purpose is to maintain, and develop, the institutional knowledge to reconstitute an amphibious force if it is ever needed. Maintaining 30+ amphibious ships during peacetime serves no purpose.
I don't mind options and floating numbers if they have details and explanation as well as obvious thought and reasoning. These don't have that. They are ultra high level written for Congress and their associated special interests and that's the bother. No real talk about how these numbers accomplish defined goals. Its just feeding big Congress, Big Navy, and Big Shipbuilding. No ingenuity.
ReplyDeleteHow does MCM get done, for instance?
"I don't mind options and floating numbers if they have details and explanation as well as obvious thought and reasoning."
DeleteIf plans have details and reasoning then they won't be 'options' and 'floating'. They'll be well-crafted, well-reasoned, logical plans based on strategic and operational requirements. When plans are not based on strategy and ops then we get floundering, as we have today.
The equation changes by what the threat develops into. If then statements should be a given. If China starts cranking out 6 SSNs a year we would want to up to 3 SSNs a year and procure "n" additional P8s.
DeleteIf you get into a war with China any US naval vessels that get anywhere near Chinese shores will be sunk by missiles, bar submarines.
ReplyDeleteSuppose your naval top brass realise this. Then it's not surprising that they can't come up with policies that are both practical and able to keep their cushy careers in being.
Seems in the end we should be building a few hundred submarines and not work so hard at surface ships. Very stealthy, hard to find and hard to sink, and with cruise missiles can pack the punch we need instead of the alternative of a few carriers and a couple of dozen surface ships to protect them.
ReplyDeleteWhile few would argue with building more submarines, surface ships are also necessary for convoy escort, air control, amphibious assault, naval gun support (if we had any!), etc. which subs cannot do.
DeleteA sub has only one level of firepower: total destruction at a very high cost. Ships can modulate their firepower from boardings to small caliber gunfire to medium caliber gunfire, to missiles. That's a very useful ability.
A perfect example from today's news about a floundering Navy.
ReplyDelete"At least 10 Navy helicopters were damaged in a sudden storm that blew through Norfolk Naval Station, Va., Tuesday afternoon, USNI News has learned. According to a Navy initial assessment reviewed by USNI News, the storm resulted in 10 Class A ground mishaps – mishaps that result in more than $2.5 million in damage or the total loss of the aircraft."
https://news.usni.org/2022/07/27/10-navy-helicopters-suffer-major-damage-several-blown-over-in-sudden-norfolk-storm
Why weren't the aircraft moved into protected shelters the moment the unit realized a storm was imminent? Was the unit even aware the storm was coming, or did the brass EPIC FAIL to receive the news and then pass it- along with appropriate orders- to their subordinates?
DeleteHaving suffered due to the results of poor communication on the brass' part, as a soldier in the US Army, I'm also morbidly certain the brass will use the lower enlisted as scapegoats for this EPIC FAILure, instead of admitting their mistakes and endeavoring to fix them- which will allow this incident to repeat itself again and again and again...
From the article: "When given enough warning, aircraft in the path of bad weather are taken into their hangars or tied down. However, the storm came at a time when aviation maintainers are usually in the midst of a shift change. It’s likely that most of the personnel were indoors and would have limited time to bring the aircraft in the hangars, USNI News understands."
DeleteSo.....yeah...... shift change.
This is just lazy incompetence. There are no 'sudden' storms. An aviation facility should be monitoring the surrounding weather on a minute by minute basis. This is just gross incompetence.
DeleteFace it, the whole DoD doesn't know what the hell it's trying to accomplish, and therefore can't figure out how to it. The Navy and Marine Corps are just symptoms.
ReplyDeleteI have mentioned "2-1/2 wars" as an aspirational goal. I don't know if it's right, but I do know it's something, and that's what we don't have now. So we put out these pretty brochures and white papers full of meaningless platitudes and make consistently stupid decisions because nobody know where the hell we are trying to go.
At the most basic level, what should be our national mission and vision statements?
What should be our grand strategy for achieve that mission and vision in the 21st century world?
What military goals and objectives do we need to meet in order to accomplish that strategy?
Is "2-1/2 wars" right? If not, what is?
When I was on active duty, the USN was pretty much the unchallenged master of the seas worldwide. It's not any more. Do we try to get back there, or do we modify our approach to reflect reality?
Sorry to be asking "why is there air" questions, but nobody seems to be asking--or answering--them. And I think we need to answer at least some of them before anybody--USN, USMC, DoD, anybody--can come up with meaningful and sensible plans.
"2-1/2 wars"
DeleteThe problem with any x-x/x number of wars is that it's a concept in isolation. It's divorced from any realistic geopolitical reality. 1 war? 2-1/2 wars? 6-5/8 wars? Pick a number at random. You see how silly it is from a reality perspective?
War Plan Orange wasn't a x-x/x war plan; it was a specific plan to deal with a specific geopolitical reality.
We need a War Plan China, War Plan Iran, War Plan NKorea, War Plan Russia, War Plan Terror, and whatever else. Hmm ... that's '6 wars' so your '2-1/2' plan is woefully inadequate and that's the point I'm making. Any x-x/x plan is inadequate because it isn't connected to any geopolitical reality.
If you're going to the [commendable] trouble of postulating a naval force, why not link it to an actual geopolitical reality instead of a disconnected-from-reality x-x/x plan? I know the x-x/x approach appeals to the spreadsheet-ist in you because that allows you to neatly divide ships into equal, evenly distributed packages but that's not the way military planning should be conducted and that's not how wars are fought. Our Navy in WWII wasn't evenly divided into regions. It was concentrated where it was strategically and operationally needed.
You've got the enthusiasm. You've got the knowledge. Now, connect it to realistic geopolitical and military strategies as you develop your force levels. Also, remember that you don't win a war with the military you start with; you win with the military you build during the war. The military you start with just allows you to hold on while you ramp up. You don't need a war-winning, day one military because you can't afford it.
"We need a War Plan China, War Plan Iran, War Plan NKorea, War Plan Russia, War Plan Terror, and whatever else. Hmm ... that's '6 wars' so your '2-1/2' plan is woefully inadequate ..."
DeleteThat's 5 plans, but that's a quibble and I pretty much agree with the point you are making. War Plan China and War Plan Russia are the two in 2-1/2, obviously. War plan NKorea is either an appendage to War Plan China or fits as part of the 1/2 along with Iran and Terror. As far as the spreadsheet comment, I am merely using a spreadsheet as a communication medium. I think I've actually approached it more from the standpoint of strategy and operational requirements than you've given me credit for, maybe more than even you have, and certainly more than the Navy and/or USMC have, but that kind of stuff is almost impossible to communicate in 4,000 characters.
As self-criticism, I think my numbers may be too heavily weighted toward the Russia scenario (particularly since Russia is revealing itself to be pretty inept militarily in Ukraine), and some of that capability can be pushed toward the half wars. I do think the China side would be pretty effective, at least until China comes up with the numbers of carriers and large combatants to compete in the blue water arena instead of primarily intimidating its neighbours, but long-term there may be need to move assets from the Russia threat to the China threat.
The other thing is that these War Plans need to be trained on under realistic circumstances and revised accordingly. My spreadsheet is a start, not a finish. I’m pretty sure that War Plan Japan looked vastly different in 1940 from 1925 and changed drastically by 1945 to win the war. Planning needs to be an iterative process and tested with boots on the ground and not just tabletop war games.
"If you're going to the [commendable] trouble of postulating a naval force, why not link it to an actual geopolitical reality … ? "
Again I really think I have done that, I just can’t reduce the details to 4,000 letters. I actually think my spreadsheets link to actual geopolitical and military reality more directly than your Force Structure tab, but maybe that’s just my perspective of knowing intimately how the details of mine came about. I’d like to see you connect yours more directly, and then compare on that basis. We actually end up very close to the same fleet numbers, so we’re either both pretty close to right or both far wrong.
"You've got the enthusiasm. You've got the knowledge. Now, connect it to realistic geopolitical and military strategies ..."
I’m not sure how current is my knowledge, since it’s been 48 years since I got off active duty, and 30 since I retired from the reserves. That’s one reason why I really invite comment from those with more recent experience. As far as connecting to realistic geopolitical and military strategies, I’d like to make a similar request of you and other posters on here. My whole approach is to develop a force to meet what I see as viable geopolitical and military goals and objectives. I would like to see how you and others navigate that side of things.
As for the ramp up comment, agree 100%. We absolutely have major shortages in shipyard capacity to build and maintain the war-winning Navy. Unfortunately, I don’t see the USA shipbuilding industry as willing or able to make the investments needed. That’s one reason behind my looking at adopting some foreign designs. If we can give the likes of Damen, Naval Group, Navantia, ThyssenKrupp, and others long enough production runs to justify making investments here (like what Naval Group has done at Itaguai, for on order of 4 SSKs and 1 SSN), then we can jump start our shipbuilding capabilities. We need to be careful. My understanding of one reason why the Constellations don’t have a bow sonar is that it would add too much draft to fit through the Welland Canal, so maybe Fincantieri/Marinette is not the right place to be building ASW frigates.
"there may be need to move assets from the Russia threat to the China threat."
DeleteThis kind of illustrates that you have a spreadsheet philosophy instead of an operational approach. In your mind, you've allocated x number of ships to the Russia threat and another amount to the China threat and so on. That's not the way we'll fight so why would you plan that way?
When we fight China (we won't fight Russia unless we're stupid so ... maybe) we'll allocate ALL of our assets to that war, not just the ones laid out in a spreadsheet. We'll fight using everything we have. That being the case, why are you neatly dividing up ships into regions/threats? You should be deriving the number of ships needed to fight China based on whatever geopolitical and military strategy you envision us using. Those ships are then HOME-BASED to train for that military strategy on a relentless, realistic, non-stop basis. There is NO ROOM for deployments as well as no point.
Assemble a realistic China war navy and everything else becomes a subset of that albeit with some minor tweaking.
We're not going to fight 2-1/2 wars simultaneously so why plan for it? Plan for the one war that we know is coming.
Regarding strategy, I know you envision some kind of containment strategy but that's already invalid as evidenced by China's worldwide bases. They're already escaped containment. However, have you considered what a containment strategy actually requires? It's not carriers or surface ships; it's submarines and lots of them! So, if containment were your strategy, your force structure doesn't reflect it. That's what I mean by planning to a strategy instead of a spreadsheet.
DeleteIf Russia is ever going to do something even further on the dumb end, it will be under the opportunity of a huge Chinese Navy pushing the US while we are occupied, so I think the US is better prepared if they plan that way. I don't think adding in the .5 war (Iran, not N. Korea) is going to end up feasible, but it sure as hell promotes the fact the Navy should be looking at what they need to fight in the logical theaters should this all blow up, and what logically would you put where if it happened? Getting the last carrier scheduled to go to TX for breaking up, the old Kennedy, and instead give it a role, which could be a Naval reserve vessel, with a skeleton crew, maybe acting as a training carrier in the meanwhile, may suffice if say we had to send something to the Middle East while fighting China and Russia in the Pacific and North Atlantic. Keeping Tarawa classes, perhaps with some old Harriers, would be the last resort but could respond to something in Africa if need be and be there again as last resort should we lose a good chunk of the Wasp and America class ships. They need to budget for worst case, and figure out how to make it happen. Get rid of every un-needed position or fluff job, put some in Civilian guise, but they need to fund the manpower and yes, they will need ships that probably go to 55-60 years of life. We may win the next war, but lost most of what we have in doing it. Not a good thought, and they need to stop in thought of efficiencies and buying new, new, new and instead how to use every last ship/sub/plane until they just can't get it going. Instead of selling oil to China from the strategic reserve, sell it and use the funds to put more op dollars in the hands of the Navy to keep some more LA class subs running. Hell, reserve P-3 squadrons with ASU Missiles adds more firepower in a platform that simply works and costs less to support if they want to use that argument.
Delete"under the opportunity of a huge Chinese Navy"
DeleteAnd that would trigger NATO obligations and we can let all of Europe fight Russia while we handle China. Given Russia's problems with just Ukraine, Europe would have no trouble dealing with Russia.
Speaking of Ukraine, even taking loss numbers and dividing them in half, sure looks like its a meat grinder for men and material. Nice to see FINALLY a few people in DC start to worry about weapons stocks,etc...Europeans aren't there yet but hopeful slowly starting to wake up.
DeleteHistory
ReplyDeleteDec 8, 1941 fleet 740 by Aug 14,1945 totalled 6,798
https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/us-ship-force-levels.html
Actually, if you subtract the 100 patrol boats and 210 non-combat auxiliary craft and so on, the table lists only 225 surface ships and 8 carriers as our effective fleet. There were also 112 submarines though many were obsolete S-boats and similar. The Gato's didn't begin to enter the fleet until 1942.
DeleteThanks for showing the reality behind basic numbers
DeleteWhat the table and numbers show is that we started WWII with very little in the way of a modern, effective fleet. We built what we needed to win the war. Today, everyone seems to [incorrectly] think our current fleet is the one that must win a war. That's not true. A war with China will be long and destructive and the winner will be the country that can build new weapon systems the fastest. Unfortunately, at the moment, that does not appear to be the US.
DeleteIn WWII, we went from a fleet of 200 to 6000. Today, we'll go from a fleet of 200 to ... ... ... what? What's our shipbuilding capacity during war? It's not good.
Building ships, or in fact most warfighting materiel requires a long list of skilled trades.
DeleteSince the push over the last 40 or so years that you're a failure if you don't have a degree, the pool of available skilled trades has fallen off precipitously.
So it isn't just lack of shipyard capacity, its the ability to staff those shipyards, and that takes many years of training and experience. Its worse now than WWII as you have rightly pointed out that many of the systems used can't be commissioned and won't stay operational without highly trained civilian contractors, and there aren't going to be enough of those either, particularly ones that would be willing to go into a war zone.
"When we fight China (we won't fight Russia unless we're stupid so ... maybe) we'll allocate ALL of our assets to that war, not just the ones laid out in a spreadsheet. …"
ReplyDelete2-1/2 wars gives us cushion if we only have to fight one. It's an aspirational target. We have to get out and conduct realistic boots-on-the-ground training (not table-top war games) to prove up what works and figure out what doesn't. I am shooting for what we think in the abstract we would need for 2-1/2 wars, then adjusting up or down based on what we figure out we actually need and where. I'm pretty sure the Japan War Plan looked very different by 1940 from what it did in 1925 (if we even had one that early) as a result of the Fleet Problems, and it changed a whole bunch more by 1945, but having an iterative plan that we were constantly exercising and adjusting stood us in far better stead. As Eisenhower said, “Plans are worthless, but planning is essential.”
I think I have proposed a realistic China war navy. 8 carriers in 4 CVBGs (2 CTFs)--2 CVBGs south to cover Malacca and Sunda, and take out the artificial islands, and 2 CVBGs between Japan and the Philippines to stop any Chinese breakout--should be plenty, at least for 20 years or so until China gets more carriers and better carrier aircraft. And having 2-3 SAG/HUK groups between the Pacific and Indian Oceans should be enough to bottle up whatever Chinese units happen to break through. And each task unit includes 10+ AAW/ASW/ASuW escorts.
I find it very interesting that my 2-1/2 war proposed fleet looks a whole lot like your proposal, both numbers and types. Either we are both pretty close to right, or we are both terribly wrong. I figure if we started out to build mine and ended up with yours, or vice versa, we’d be in pretty good shape.
"I know you envision some kind of containment strategy but that's already invalid as evidenced by China's worldwide bases …”
I think you have misinterpreted my use of the word containment. What I mean is keep China off the first island chain. It’s an aggressive, not passive, strategy. I would pursue it diplomatically by trying to bribe up an alliance in the area, like Truman did to stop Soviet expansion after WWII. If we hold the line there, then PLAN is going to have a very difficult time breaking out to mount any kind of blue water threat. I don’t think we can realistically contest China inside the China Sea, at least not until we somehow take out most of their A2/AD capability. A ship’s a fool to attack a fort and all that. But if we keep them off the first island chain, we then have a great opportunity to dominate in blue water. China’s economy depends on freedom of navigation worldwide both to get in the oil they can’t do without and to get out the exports that are their cash supply. If they can’t access the world, their economy crashes and their people starve in very short order. I personally think we make a huge mistake not get a ton of diplomatic leverage from their current dependence on the USN for protecting their SLOCs.
I totally agree on the importance of submarines for blue water operations. That’s why my proposed submarine force has 122 subs to your 82. Now 30 of mine are SSKs which take over choke point assignments to free SSNs for blue water, and you seem to want to discount those. The other 10 of the difference are that I have 20 SSGNs (which I see as the primary conventional strike platforms) versus your 10. But even without those, my remaining sub force is the same size as yours, so not sure what your point about not enough subs is referring to.
As for the advance ports they are developing, I see diplomatic and military efforts to neutralize them. When the debts to China come due, instead of letting China foreclose, we pay the debts and take over and drive the Chinese out. If they still have any ports when war starts, those look like perfect opportunities for your Marine port seizure mission. That is one task we need to practice and perfect now.
"in the abstract we would need for 2-1/2 wars"
DeleteWhat reasonable scenario involves 2-1/2 wars by the US? You're basing everything on a non-existent possibility.
"Either we are both pretty close to right, or we are both terribly wrong"
DeleteMy entire force is devoted to a China war. You're parceling out ships across the globe in nice neat packets. For example, you say,
"a realistic China war navy. 8 carriers"
Every carrier I've proposed would be thrown in a China war. You're allocating 8 and, as best I can tell, in groups of 2 which is non-survivable and combat ineffective. I've posted on the requirements for a carrier air strike and 2 carriers can't do it. Four barely can (or maybe can't).
" the word containment. What I mean is keep China off the first island chain."
They're already on it! Setting that aside, in order to stop a Chinese assault on first islands, you'd have to enter the E/S China Seas to contest them and you stated, "I don’t think we can realistically contest China inside the China Sea". So, how do you propose to stop them?
Just out of curiosity, are you proposing to invade, say, Philippines, Malaysia, or Vietnam to stop a Chinese invasion? If not, how do you propose to stop it? Suppose those countries don't want our help? They certainly don't now!
"China’s economy depends on freedom of navigation worldwide both to get in the oil they can’t do without and to get out the exports that are their cash supply."
DeleteI don't think you understand how a war is fought. During a war, China will be energy independent thanks to rationing, travel restrictions, etc. They're also continuously increasing their oil importing to explicitly mitigate any oil blockade we might attempt. During a war, China not export anything because there won't be any buyers. Japan and Germany didn't export anything during WWII and yet their economies functioned just fine until they were bombed out of existence. You need to study the economic aspects of Germany and Japan during WWII before you start basing strategies on blockades.
People keep forgetting China is also a CONTINENTAL power. There are overland pipelines through which Russia exports oil to China, against which a naval blockade will do NOTHING to halt that supply.
DeleteThese people need to stop deluding themselves and others with the idea they can beat China "on the cheap." Any Sino-American War will be long, bloody, and expensive.
"I don't think you understand how a war is fought. During a war, China will be energy independent thanks to rationing, travel restrictions, etc. They're also continuously increasing their oil importing to explicitly mitigate any oil blockade we might attempt. During a war, China not export anything because there won't be any buyers."
DeleteOh, I understand wartime economies. My point is a different one. China will not be able to keep domestic peace if it puts its economy on that kind of war footing. There is no cohesive national identity, much less so than in the USA. The warlike north hates the commercial Yangtze Valley, and none of them get along with South China. They hold it together by exporting cheap consumer goods, and using the cash flow to finance projects (the empty cities, for example) that have no economic viability but serve to keep the peons too busy to have time to revolt. The USA made rationing work in WWII because of our shared national identity. China doesn't have that. I'm not sure the USA could make it work today, but I am pretty sure China can't.
Also, I am more about avoiding war than winning one. Not appeasement to avoid war, but avoiding war by showing strength. Right now, China exists because the USN protects the world's trade routes. Without the USN, PLAN can't do it for themselves. Why we don't make greater use of that as leverage in diplomatic negotiations is beyond me.
"China will not be able to keep domestic peace if it puts its economy on that kind of war footing."
DeleteChina has demonstrated forcefully imposed COVID mandates that wrecked their economy, they've dealt with protests by killing protesters, they've established what amount to concentration camps for various factions, they've forcefully locked down Hong Kong when needed, and so on. They'll have no trouble suppressing any unrest that might occur during a war.
"serve to keep the peons too busy to have time to revolt."
What do you think will happen during a war? The people will be kept busy as draftees or as war production slave labor. Your own statement demonstrates why your previous statement about being unable to keep domestic peace is false. You're contradicting your own statements!
"Not appeasement to avoid war,"
Come on, now. At least be honest with yourself. You're all about appeasement. The most you've suggested doing is sailing bigger ships around in useless displays. Your war strategy is containment which is appeasement since it automatically grants China the entire E/S China Seas and territories ... to the extent they don't already have them.
I've asked you before what specific actions you'd take against China and you've offered nothing except sailing bigger ships around in the fantasy that that will somehow intimidate China. You've offered nothing to deal with China's overt territorial incursions, artificial islands, illegal claims, UNCLOS violations, etc.
"I've asked you before what specific actions you'd take against China and you've offered nothing except sailing bigger ships around in the fantasy that that will somehow intimidate China. You've offered nothing to deal with China's overt territorial incursions, artificial islands, illegal claims, UNCLOS violations, etc."
ReplyDeleteIf I recall correctly, I once offered some cases in which I would shoot, and got basically accused of starting WWIII.
You have this really dim view of the impact of presence, and have stated before that presence has never really worked. I can give one example where it did, very effectively, and for a long time--western Europe, 1945-1989. It worked IMO because the presence was permanent, and because there was never any doubt that if pushed they would shoot back. And it worked until Reagan could exert enough economic pressure to bring down the evil empire. We granted the Soviets the Iron Curtain because it was really a fait accompli that we couldn't reverse, but we very clearly said, "Not one step further," and they very clearly never took that step.
That's my template. It will have to be executed somewhat differently, because there are some clearly unique problems. There is no country, save possibly Australia, big enough to absorb the numbers of troops we put into Germany. The area is mostly water rather than land. The countries involved do not have a history of as much trade and peaceful interaction as western Europe did. The ethnic differences are greater. China has already exerted considerable influence upon many of them. But I don't think any of them want to surrender their sovereignty to China. They just don't have the military might to contest them. We can provide that, and the largest consumer market in the world for their industry, just like we did for Europe 75 years ago. It takes some work to get it right, but it can still be done. And we are going to have to fight China economically and diplomatically to succeed.
As far as presence, the occasional FONOP or deployment is never going to send a strong enough signal. What is needed is constant presence of a force that is bigger and stronger than China wants to deal with. When we sent two carriers into the area simultaneously, China blasted it as "provocative." Anything less than "provocative" is useless. So two carriers starts to look like a minimum, at least until PLAN gets three. And it needs to be a steady state, not a "provocative" one-off.
It's a different approach from what we have taken. But what we have taken hasn't worked. And this did, at least once very effectively. Will it be scary? At times, yes. But so was Germany in the fifties, where in the words of an Air Force Colonel uncle of mine, "One drunk soldier in Berlin could set off World War III." But that one drunk soldier never did.
"I can give one example where it did, very effectively, and for a long time--western Europe, 1945-1989."
DeleteI've pretty well debunked this. After the fall of the Soviet Union, it has been established that the SU never had any plans to invade Europe. They had plans to defend against NATO but there hasn't been even a whisper of any unprovoked invasion planning. You can't deter something that was never a possibility. You're claiming correlation without any evidence of causation. Admittedly, it's impossible to prove a negative but one would think that some hint of SU invasion plans would have come out over the previous decades if there had been any plans.
So, no, that was not an example of deterrence.
"What is needed is constant presence of a force that is bigger and stronger than China wants to deal with."
I don't know why you deny the reality of this. We've had the entire 7th Fleet in the Pacific and it hasn't deterred China from anything. We could pack our entire military onto Japan and it wouldn't stop the Chinese from anything because - this is the part you refuse to understand - it isn't how many ships or planes you have in an area, it's whether you're willing to use them ... and we aren't ... any you've offered no circumstance under which you'd use force, that I can recall. Therefore, you have no deterrent effect regardless of how many ships you have in the area. I don't know why you can't understand that.
We've have overwhelming force in the Middle East and that didn't stop Iran from mining ships, harassing our Navy, illegally (act of war) seizing our riverine boats and crews, exporting terrorism, etc. Your concept has been proven a failure.
"But what we have taken hasn't worked."
You acknowledge that and yet you want to do more of it with just adding one additional carrier. Baffling.
I think you make the assumption that I would propose to conduct a containment action the way the US and particularly the USN have conducted themselves in the past couple of decades.
DeleteAnd as far as western Europe after WWII, whether the Soviets actually ever planned an invasion or not, certainly the risk was there. Right after the war, they were pretty much worn out from the war, like the rest of Europe. But as the evil empire built its military forces up in subsequent decades, there would certainly have been times when an invasion would have been pretty easy to pull off if not for the presence of US troops.
What we had to have in Europe was a force large enough that the Soviets did not want to take it on. What we need around the first island chain is a similarly capable force today. Big difference is that the force in Europe was primarily Army, secondly Air Force, while the force in WestPac will have to be primarily Navy. What I have in mine is something a few orders of magnitude larger than what the USA currently has in the region. Shut down the MidEast ops and let them kill each other (a move that creates serious problems for China), and reduce the footprint in Europe to free up bodies. Make China believe that they're not getting onto the first island chain, and if they try us, then we will close down their shipping worldwide (which would kill their economy) and that all those advance ports they have built would quickly be occupied by US Marines. And like the interregnum Fleet Problems, go ahead an practice realistic scenarios around those objectives to show that we mean business.
G2mil has proposed basically shutting down or vastly reducing our footprint in Okinawa and South Korea, and moving those forces to Guam and the neighboring Marianas. Those islands would provide useful places to practice island-hopping evolutions that might be required in and around the first island chain.
I do not have time to get into the nitty-gritty details, but I do think it is time for the "Pacific pivot" actually to pivot, and I think our planners need a very firm kick in the butt to get them started figuring things out.
"We could pack our entire military onto Japan and it wouldn't stop the Chinese from anything because - this is the part you refuse to understand - it isn't how many ships or planes you have in an area, it's whether you're willing to use them ... and we aren't ... any you've offered no circumstance under which you'd use force, that I can recall."
DeleteI think you are making the incorrect assumption that containment to me means the same thing as it does to the US Navy. I have commented about situations where I would shoot back. If we do, two possibilities would be presented, 1) China would escalate, or 2) they wouldn't. I think the wouldn't is a lot more likely, at least as long as PLAN cannot go toe-to-toe with the USN outside their A2/AD umbrella. I think China's position is basically what you describe as the Soviets' post-WWII position--mostly defensive, with some intimidation of weaker neighbors to achieve modest goals.
We don't have a strategy or plan for China that I can discern. If you don't have a purpose, then you can't really do anything. Right now, my working objective would be, "China, you can have the SCS as your private lake, but you can't set foot on the first island chain." Then put sufficient force in place to enforce that. And then shoot if and as needed to enforce that. Be prepared to drive China off existing artificial islands if we get to a shooting war. In the meantime, use force to prevent them from establishing any more. If they start hauling supplies to create another, then sink the ships carrying those supplies.
"Make China believe that they're not getting onto the first island chain, and if they try us, then we will close down their shipping worldwide"
DeleteOverall, this has been the closest you've come to a definitive, actionable statement so congrats on that. However, you're still speaking largely in platitudes rather than specifics.
1. What's your definition of 'getting onto the first island chain'? I ask because China has already done that. They've repeatedly entered the territorial waters of various countries. They've established the beginnings of 'peaceful' occupations of the Philippines and other countries via emigration and various cooperation pacts. They've constructed illegal artificial islands and made claims of associated territorial waters which, if uncontested, would give them control of most of the E/S China Seas. And so on.
Does your threat only apply to military invasions? If so, China is well on their way to annexing the first island chain without firing a shot and you'd stand idly by. If your threat applies to any form of acquisition then you're already behind the curve.
2. You say you'd 'close down their shipping'. Are you proposing to conduct unrestricted warfare against China's entire merchant fleet which would, undoubtedly, trigger a full war? Are you suggesting a full war if China occupies, say, a Philippine island?
Platitudes tend to fall apart when specifics rear their head.
“After the fall of the Soviet Union, it has been established that the SU never had any plans to invade Europe. They had plans to defend against NATO but there hasn't been even a whisper of any unprovoked invasion planning.”
ReplyDeleteRight after WWII, the entire Soviet military was pretty much worn out, just like all of western Europe’s were. By the time they rebuilt a force that could accomplish an invasion, we had enough troops in place to increase the level of difficulty beyond what they wanted to risk, so of course they never developed a plan to do so.
I actually think China is in a very similar position. Their viewpoint historically is more defending than attacking, and other than intimidating their smaller and weaker neighbors, they really are not yet building a blue water Navy that could protect their SLOCs worldwide.
"We could pack our entire military onto Japan and it wouldn't stop the Chinese from anything because - this is the part you refuse to understand - it isn't how many ships or planes you have in an area, it's whether you're willing to use them ... and we aren't”
I don’t have the time to look back and find it, but I did have a post where I proposed actually shooting, and got criticized for starting WWIII. I think we need to realize that China doesn’t want WWIII any more than we do, or the Soviets did in 1950, so we can push the envelope a bit without triggering thermonuclear holocaust.
"You acknowledge that and yet you want to do more of it with just adding one additional carrier.”
Not at all. I’m not sure where you even got the idea. I’m proposing adding a lot more than one additional carrier, and I’m proposing getting right in China’s face with it.
" I’m proposing getting right in China’s face with it."
DeleteAnd doing what aside from parade sailing back and forth? Will you shoot at something?
You can line up a thousand ships but they're useless if you won't shoot. That's why Iran didn't hesitate to commit an act of war by seizing our boats and crews despite vast US forces in the area.
The Middle East is EXACTLY your concept in action - huge numbers of ships, aircraft, bases, etc. in the area - and it hasn't prevented Iran from mining ships, seizing our drones, exporting weapons, sponsoring terrorism, conducting missile attacks, harassing our ships, threatening genocide, etc. Why do you think your concept will work against China when it has failed utterly against Iran and under far better circumstances?
I think you’ve misread Esper’s 500+ figure from your CSIS link. That was for manned and unmanned combined.
ReplyDelete