Well, the Navy has decided
the role of the aircraft carrier for the next couple of decades. Is it a deep strike platform using long
legged strike aircraft whether manned or unmanned? Is it an air superiority platform to carve
out large swaths of airspace from enemy control in order to support Air Force
deep strike bombers? Is it an escort
platform to protect Burke Tomahawk shooters as they sail to their launch
positions? All of these are potentially
viable roles depending on the overall strategy being undertaken. So, what’s the Navy’s choice?
Ahhhh ……. They punted.
They opted for none of the above.
As reported by Breaking
Defense website, the Navy has decided that the UCLASS is dead. In its place the Navy will pursue a non-stealthy,
unmanned tanker, more Super Hornet E/F’s, and more F-35Cs (1). ComNavOps has no problem with dropping the
UCLASS. I’ve doubted its feasibility and
applaud the decision. The problem lies
with the other actions that the Navy is now committing to. Let’s look a bit closer at what this means.
On the plus side, the Navy
desperately needs a dedicated tanker.
Using Super Hornets, the front line strike fighter, as a tanker was an
example of stupidity of monumental proportions.
At least now the 4-6 Hornets being used as tankers on each carrier will
be able to return to being combat aircraft.
The decision to purchase
more F/A-18E/Fs is a place holder decision.
It accomplishes nothing. It
doesn’t move the combat needle forward. It’s
just more of what we have. The Hornets are
a solid, capable aircraft at the moment but will become increasingly
outclassed as China Russia
Buying more F-35C’s is
doubling down on an already bad bet.
We’ve beaten this poor horse to death but the F-35 has neither the range
to operate effectively in a thousand mile A2/AD zone, the weapon carrying
capacity to fight other stealth aircraft, nor the maneuverability and combat
characteristics to be an air superiority fighter. To paraphrase, it’s a jack(ass) of all trades
– bad at everything and good at nothing.
It’s a misfit for the roles that the carrier should be performing.
We’ll now have a carrier
with an air wing that is short ranged, not very stealthy, can’t establish air
superiority, and has no long range strike capability. So what can the carrier do? Well, that’s the $14B purchase price question
for the Ford and subsequent carriers, isn’t it?
These capabilities describe
a carrier and air wing that is limited to low intensity, third world
operations. In a high end fight against
a peer, our carriers will be marginal contributors with this air wing. This leads inexorably to the question, “Are
carriers worth the cost, anymore?” I can
no longer say yes.
Well, that takes care of the
problems but it’s easy to criticize.
What’s the solution? What should
the Navy have done?
The answer begins with the
deep strike mission. After all, strike
is how you win wars. The UCLASS two
thousand mile, deep penetration, autonomous, super stealthy unmanned miracle
aircraft is just a fantasy that is technologically unachievable, as yet, and
would just have become the next F-35 – decades overdue, technologically
failing, and utterly unaffordable. So,
where does that leave us?
There are only two sources
of long range strike: Air Force bombers
and cruise/ballistic missiles. We’re
talking about the Navy’s role so that means cruise/ballistic missiles which, at
the moment, means Burke and submarine Tomahawks with their barely adequate
thousand mile range. Thus, there is no
high end combat strike role for the carrier.
That means the carrier exists to escort and protect the Burke shooters
and to establish air superiority in support of the Air Force. To do that requires a top end, long range,
air superiority fighter. Unfortunately,
that is not the Hornet or the F-35.
Buying more Hornets and F-35s simply extends the lack of capability
further into the future.
What should the Navy
do? The Navy should drop the F-35 and
procure the Advanced Super Hornet (ASH).
That would at least move the combat needle forward a bit and provide a
bridge to a new design air superiority fighter.
The ASH offers increased range, conformal tanks, improved stealth, better
avionics and sensors, etc. The bits of
the F-35 and other aircraft that have been proved out, like radars, sensors,
and weapons, can be incorporated into the ASH.
It doesn’t get us to an F-22-like performance but it improves on the
Super Hornet and, unlike the F-35, is already available and nowhere near as
expensive. It buys time to develop a new
design fighter while improving air wing capability.
 |
| Advanced Super Hornet |
A new design air superiority
fighter should be akin to the F-22 but the main design emphasis has to be
achievability. Every function and
capability must already exist. Trying to
develop a ship or aircraft that depends on non-existent technology is how we
got the LCS, Ford, and F-35 fiascos.
Beyond that, the aircraft must have great range and a large weapon
payload. Payload is paramount given that
we’ve already identified that shooting down stealth aircraft will require many
missiles per kill. Limited payload is
one of the major weaknesses of the F-35.
As we’ve stated, stealth versus stealth air combat may well devolve into
classic eyeball dogfights so maneuverability is mandatory. In short, a new design air superiority
fighter needs to be all the things that the F-35 isn’t.
If we can stick to existing
technology and maintain a sharp focus on the mission and nothing more, we
should be able to field production aircraft in 5 years. The reason the F-35 is taking so long is that
its technology is non-existent. The F-35
program isn’t trying to simply verify existing technology, it’s attempting to
develop brand new technology while testing.
Of course that takes forever!
The unmanned tanker is fine
if it can be procured cheaply. That
would offer valuable incremental experience in operating unmanned, presumably
autonomous, aircraft on and around the carrier.
At the same time, the Navy
needs to develop a supersonic, stealthy, longer ranged Tomahawk replacement and
an intermediate range (2000-3000 miles) ballistic missile.
Finally, if the Navy thinks
long range, unmanned strike aircraft are the way to go (and I have severe
doubts about that), then they can work on it as a strictly research project.
A carrier that is only able
to operate in low end combat is not worth the $14B price tag. If the Navy won’t upgrade the air wing then
we need to get out of the supercarrier business and revert to small carriers
for handling the low end, “peacetime” tasks like plinking terrorist pickup
trucks.
If the Navy wants to remain
a credible high end combat force then it needs to understand the role of the
carrier and being redesigning the air wing to support that role.
(1)Breaking Defense, “Good-Bye,
UCLASS; Hello, Unmanned Tanker, More F-35Cs In 2017 Budget”, Sydney
J. Freedberg Jr., Feb 01, 2016 ,
http://breakingdefense.com/2016/02/good-bye-uclass-hello-unmanned-tanker-more-f-35cs-in-2017-budget/
