CNO Richardson Must Be Fired

Since the report came out about the lapsed certifications among the deployed 7^th Fleet ships and crew, I’ve been trying to find out more about the mechanism by which this state of affairs was sanctioned.  The mechanism was the “risk assessment and management plan” (RAMP).  Apparently, RAMP was used to directly and consciously bypass mandatory Navy training and certifications.  Among 7^th Fleet deployed destroyers and cruisers, around 40% of crew certifications in damage control, navigation, flight operations, and basic seamanship had lapsed (1)

Despite my efforts, I’ve been unable to find any mention of RAMP as an official Navy program.  It appears that it may have been a locally (local to the 7^th Fleet) devised and implemented program that lacked official Navy sanction.  Whether it was universally know throughout upper Navy leadership and unofficially sanctioned is unknown.

The conclusion from this is obvious.  The program has led to disasters, deaths, and horribly damaged ships.  Someone must be held responsible and pay the price and, indeed, VAdm. Joseph Aucoin, commander of the 7^th Fleet, has been relieved.  Of course, the firing may have been largely symbolic since he was due to retire in a few weeks, anyway.

There is another person who must pay the price and that is current CNO Richardson.  

If he did not know about an unsanctioned program intended to bypass mandatory Navy readiness certifications for an entire major fleet then he should be fired for incompetence and obliviousness.  

If he knew about the program then he should be fired for violating the trust of the country, the Navy, and the sailors serving under him and hazarding the military preparedness and security of the country.  

Either way, he has to go.

Get used to it.  You’re going to hear me continue to harp on this.  CNO Richardson is the Captain of the Navy and the Captain is accountable for everything that happens on his ship – his ship being the entire Navy.  I have lost confidence in his ability to command.

Richardson has allowed, and may have actively aided and abetted, the readiness and basic seamanship of the Navy to fall to dangerously low levels.  If our Navy is no longer capable of basic navigation, anchoring, and other acts of basic seamanship, how are we going to fight a war?  If we no longer have a grasp of basic seamanship, what are the odds that we’re tactically trained and proficient?  Through actions and inactions he has endangered the security of the country.  That’s tantamount to treason.  Further, he is directly responsible for the deaths of sailors and hundreds of millions of dollars of damage to US military assets.  He should be court-martialed and punished severely.

Let’s be fair.  This didn’t all happen on Richardson’s watch.  His predecessor, Adm. Greenert is at least equally culpable.  He should be recalled to active duty and court-martialed. 

A Chinese or Russian mole agent could not do more damage to the Navy and our nation’s security than our own Navy leadership is doing.

____________________________________________

(1)Defense News website, “US Navy worked around its own standards to keep ships underway: sources”, David B. Larter, 7-Sep-2017,

https://www.defensenews.com/breaking-news/2017/09/07/us-navy-worked-around-its-own-standards-to-keep-ships-underway-sources/

Well, That Didn't Take Long

Well, that didn’t take long. 

“Retired Adm. Jon Greenert, a former chief of naval operations, has been named to the board of directors of BAE Systems Inc, the company announced this morning.” (1)

We’ve decried the practice of recently retired Admirals taking positions in the very defense industry companies that they previously had a business relationship with.  Now, we learn that recently retired CNO Greenert has taken a position on the board of directors of BAE Systems, Inc.  This stinks of kickback and impropriety.  While it’s possible that there is no quid pro quo at work here, the conflict of interest and the appearance of cooperation having been bought is impossible to ignore.  In these kinds of cases, the appearance of impropriety is as damning as the reality.  It calls into serious question every decision Greenert and the Navy, at his direction, made regarding BAE Systems during his tenure.

Regular readers know my opinion of CNO Greenert was about as low as it could get and this merely solidifies that opinion.

This practice has got to stop.

______________________

(1)Defense News website, “Former CNO Greenert Named To BAE Board”, Christopher Cavas, 19-Apr-2016,

http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense-news/2016/04/19/greenert-cno-bae-navy-chief-naval-operations/83224862/

CNO's Design

The old CNO, Adm. Greenert, has left and the new CNO, Adm. John Richardson, has taken over.  Regular readers know that ComNavOps has been highly critical of Greenert, considering him to be one of the worst CNOs ever.  Will Adm. Richardson be an improvement?  Time will tell.  Let’s take a look at his first formal effort, his vision for the Navy as laid out in his “Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority” document (1).

The document begins by identifying three global forces that he claims are impacting the environment in which the Navy must operate.  They are,

• Maritime traffic
• The global information system
• Technology

There’s nothing wrong with that list and certainly they do impact the global security environment but the list omits a couple of key forces that have a greater impact.

Competition for Resources – the competition for resources is increasing and since the world’s land masses are essentially 100% claimed, new resources can only be obtained by taking them from someone else.  China, for example, is seizing the South and East China Seas and working to subjugate surrounding countries in large measure to obtain more resources.  Russia is working to secure more resources from surrounding countries and the Middle East.

Evil – Evil is a palpable human force and is on the rise as evidenced by ISIS, Russia, China, Iran, and NKorea.  Evil does not behave as we do, does not honor agreements, does not respect boundaries, and does not hesitate to engage in barbaric acts.  Left unchecked, evil expands – always.  To paraphrase, all that is needed for evil to succeed is for good men to do nothing.

So, the document stumbles right out of the gate by failing to recognize a couple of the major forces at play which are shaping the global environment and should be shaping our response.

Moving on, the document then proceeds to explicitly name our potential enemies:  Russia, China, Iran, and NKorea.  Interestingly, Islamic Jihadism is not named.  Well, this is a vast improvement over CNO Greenert who refused to name China as even a competitor let alone an enemy and refused to discuss incidents out of fear of escalating tensions.  At least now we’ve mustered the courage to speak our enemy’s names (excepting Islamic Jihad). 

Next, CNO discusses “Lines of Effort” through which the Navy will meet its requirements.

• Strengthen naval power
• High velocity learning
• Teamwork and leadership
• Partnerships

Strengthening naval power comes close to the mark but the discussion gets bogged down in information warfare rather than recognizing that, ultimately, it’s about explosive power and numbers.  Warfare has not fundamentally changed throughout history and failing to recognize that cannot lead anywhere good.

The other three “Lines” are just buzzword bingo.  High velocity learning - seriously?  All in all, a very poor effort at “Lines of Effort”.

In summary, this is a better effort than his predecessor’s but still weak.  CNO Richardson is not off to a strong start.  We’ll keep watching and hope for better.

(1)http://www.navy.mil/cno/docs/CNO_STG.pdf

The Chickens Have Come Home To Roost

The chickens have come home to roost.

For years now, we’ve discussed and bemoaned the Navy’s short-sighted and ill-advised focus on new construction to the detriment of maintenance.  Well, now the chickens have come home to roost.  The Navy is facing a strikefighter shortfall of their own making, as Defense News website reports (1).  As CNO Greenert plainly puts it,

"We have a shortfall in Super Hornets, we do."

As the article points out, the shortfall is not new.  It's been anticipated for some time and the Navy thought they could "manage" their way past it.  However, depot funding cuts, greater than anticipated aircraft usage, greater levels of corrosion than anticipated, and continued delays in the F-35 program have combined to worsen the fighter gap.

On paper, the Navy has plenty of aircraft, however, the earlier Hornets have exceeded their service lives.  The Navy has around 600 F/A-18 A/B/C/D in inventory but many are not serviceable.

"The fleet has about 600 F/A-18C Hornet "legacy" aircraft — pre-Super Hornet strike fighters — in its current inventory ... About 300 of the 18Cs are out of service, according to the Navy."

The lack of legacy Hornets impacts the Super Hornets.

"With fewer F/A-18Cs flying, newer E and F Super Hornets are being used up at higher rates than planned."

All of this ties back to the Navy’s decision, many years ago, to reduce depot level maintenance funding.  This ill-advised decision resulted in increased wear and premature retirement of aircraft in addition to backlogs of idled aircraft awaiting maintenance.  The Navy is now scrambling to restore depot funding but is finding that maintenance capabilities, once lost, are not easily restored.

"Greenert told reporters Tuesday that by this summer he would have the depots fully staffed ..." (2)

However, funding alone will not solve the depot problems (1).

"While the Navy has restored the depot funding, the backlog has expanded from 65 to 100 aircraft, and the service is struggling to hire more skilled labor to work on the planes."

The Navy is also looking at extending the service life of the aircraft.

"Thus the legacy Hornets need to keep flying longer. While they were rated up to a lifespan of 6,000 flying hours, the Navy figures it needs a service life extension program (SLEP) to get 150 of those planes out to 8,000 hours."

The issue is only going to worsen as the Super Hornets shortly begin reaching their mid-life maintenance points.

"Another key factor, Manazir [Rear Adm. Mike Manazir, the Navy's director of air warfare] noted, is the Super Hornet mid-life refit program expected a decade from now.

‘I have to get 563 Super Hornets out to 9,000 hours,’ he noted. ‘Ten years from now I'm going to be in the middle of SLEP'ping 563 airplanes. Do I have enough depot capacity?’ “

The Navy is now suggesting a need for 36 new Super Hornets to meet the coming fighter gap.

-------------

USNI News website also sums up the problem (2).

"Adm. Jonathan Greenert explained the problem as a multifaceted one: the Navy is working to extend the life of its legacy Hornets, the Boeing F/A-18 A-D Hornet frames. ‘We’re finding that’s it’s very complicated and it’s harder than we imagined,’ he said. So as the Navy depots keep the legacy Hornets out of commission for longer, the F/A-18 E/F Super Hornets are picking up the slack and eating through flying hours faster than planned."

Hmmm ……  That makes the decision to cut depot funding look pretty bad!

"The Super Hornets have been further drained over the past decade with a high operational tempo in the Middle East and the fighters often acting as tankers to refuel other planes."

We see, then, another short-sighted decision coming home to roost.  The Navy abandoned its tanker aircraft and opted to use its front line fighters as tankers.  This not only reduced the number of available fighters (4-6 are always used as tankers and, thus, unavailable for strikefighter duty) but added flight hours and wear to the front line aircraft.  This is an absolutely idiotic use of the mainstay aircraft of the fleet.

The Navy is now looking at extending the service lives of the Super Hornets.

"While pushing for more Super Hornet sales, Boeing is also working with the Navy to determine what it would take to bring the planes from a service life of 6,000 flight hours to 9,000 flight hours, to help mitigate the fighter shortfall.

"He [ed. Dan Gillian, Boeing’s F-18 Super Hornet and Growler program manager] expects that the Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) for the Super Hornets will go smoother than for the legacy Hornets ..."

He expects the Super Hornet SLEP to go smoother???  Why?  Nothing goes as smooth as predicted.  Only an idiot would expect the next SLEP to be easier than the previous ones.  Remember the definition of insanity – to repeat a set of actions and expect a different outcome?  The Super Hornet SLEP will not go smoothly.  It will take longer and cost more than anticipated.

The years of poor decisions have come home to roost.  Maintenance is the last place to cut funding when facing a budget shortfall.  The depots should have been fully staffed and funded all along.  This is simple mismanagement and incompetence on Greenert's part.

Unfortunately, the poor decisions continue unabated.  Hornets are being used to plink pickup trucks in the “war” against ISIS.  What a waste of service life!  Every pickup truck that a Hornet destroys is a win for our enemies around the world as it shortens the life span of our front line aircraft.  We continue to operate Hornets as tankers with no plans to procure a low end, dedicated tanker.  Instead of buying that next LCS for half a billion dollars, why not invest in a tanker?  As a reminder, S-3 Vikings are sitting idle and would be perfectly suitable as restored tankers.

The Navy will jump through any number of hoops to continue LCS production but won’t make any effort to intelligently manage its fighter shortfall, improve depot maintenance, or procure tankers.  That’s just incompetent management.

Welcome the chickens home!

As an aside, there are shortfalls in carriers, submarines, and surface combatants coming and the Navy is doing nothing about them, either.  Way to learn a lesson, Navy!

(1) Defense News, "US Navy Details New Strike Fighter Need", Christopher P. Cavas, 13-Mar-2015,

http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense-news/2015/03/12/navy-carriers-aircraft-fighters-strike-fighters-f-18-fa-18-super-hornet-boeing-f-35-joint-strike-fighter-jsf/70243170/

(2) USNI News, "CNO Greenert Warns Congress of Fighter Shortfall, Boeing Super Hornet Line to Close in 2017 Absent New Orders", Megan Eckstein, March 12, 2015,

http://news.usni.org/2015/03/12/cno-greenert-warns-congress-of-fighter-shortfall-boeing-super-hornet-line-to-close-in-2017-absent-new-orders

Burke Upgrades Cancelled

The Navy has cancelled planned ballistic missile defense (BMD) upgrades for five Burke class destroyers due to budget constraints (1).  The ships will not receive the Baseline 9 Aegis combat system upgrades.  The cuts in modernization funding will save around $500M over five years.

The cuts also impact the ship's networking and target data sharing capabilities.

"Additionally — without the Baseline 9 upgrade — the ships will not be wired into the Navy’s emerging Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA (pronounced: nifk-kah)) that would allow destroyers to download targeting information from assets outside of the range of their SPY-1D radars to attack air and BMD threats with the Raytheon Standard Missile 6 (SM-6)."

Well, that’s very unfortunate that we can’t afford those upgrades but as CNO Greenert said,

"When asked about the reductions following a House appropriations hearing on Thursday, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. Jonathan Greenert told USNI News the cuts were a result of hard fiscal choices and reflected the service’s priorities."

Well, CNO Greenert is right.  When you have a limited budget, you have to make hard choices based on your priorities and …  wait … let me go back to that cost number …  $500M ?!! … to get 5 BMD and network capable Burkes? … $500M – isn’t that the cost of a single LCS?  So, CNO Greenert is telling us that the Navy’s priorities are that they would rather have an LCS than five BMD/network capable Burkes?  Does that make sense to you?!  I’ve said all along that Greenert is completely focused on low end and peacetime activities at the expense of warfighting and readiness and this just proves it.

I recently posted that, for reasons totally obscure to me, the Navy considers the LCS untouchable and this yet another example.  The Navy would rather pass on five BMD/network capable Burkes than give up one LCS. 

However, according to the article,

"Currently, the Navy’s number one priority is the $100 billion design and construction effort for a new nuclear ballistic missile submarine to replace the aging Ohio-class boomers (SSB)."

I'm not sure if the Navy's internal top priority really is the replacement SSBN.  As I’ve pointed out, the LCS looks to be the Navy’s top priority.  Still, it demonstrates the domino effect that occurs when a program, the SSBN replacement, in this case, is so expensive that it not only limits itself but cripples other programs.  The F-35, for example, is gutting the Marines and Air Force by forcing those services to cancel other badly needed programs to pay for the F-35.  Similarly, the SSBN has long been predicted to gut Navy shipbuilding, operating, and maintenance funding and now we're seeing the first concrete results.

We’ll continue to watch the SSBN funding play out but I predict that we’re going to see many more examples of early retirements, deferred maintenance, cancelled upgrades, and truncated shipbuilding to pay for the SSBN unless the Navy can get the funding shifted to a higher DoD level (of course, that just means that every service will have its budget cut a bit more to pay for the SSBN – there are no free lunches).  This is further evidence that the Navy’s 30 year shipbuilding plan is pure fantasy.  Many future ships will have to be cancelled to pay for the SSBN.

Seriously, how do you defend prioritizing the LCS over five Burke BMD/network upgrades?  Every time I think the Navy has hit rock bottom in decision making they dig a trench and lower the bar a bit more.

(1) USNI, "Navy Again Reduces Scope of Destroyer Modernization, 5 Ships Won’t Receive Any Ballistic Missile Defense Upgrades", Sam LaGrone, 3-Mar-2015,

http://news.usni.org/2015/03/03/navy-again-reduces-scope-of-destroyer-modernization-5-ships-wont-receive-any-ballistic-missile-defense-upgrades

CNO's 2014 Position Report

CNO Greenert has issued his latest Position Report (1).  If you’re interested in reading it you can follow the link below.  I’m not going to critique it.  It’s largely a work of fiction and spin combined with a handful of trivial facts – not worth ComNavOps’ time to write about.  I simply offer the link as a courtesy to readers.

(1) http://www.navy.mil/cno/docs/141104_positionreport.pdf

CNO's Focus on Peace

CNO Greenert is a prolific writer and speaker.  Unfortunately, he is also a prolific purveyor of pacifistic policies (a little alliteration, there).

Greenert has authored another of his frequent Proceedings articles (1).  This one espouses the global networked navy, a variation of the 1000-ship Navy idea.  He describes a loose network of navies that form a global force for good (couldn’t resist that one) and whose individual members come and go as their individual national interests presumably come and go relative to specific issues.

Aside from the obvious problem of trying to count on network members who may or may not participate depending on what the issue of the moment is, the main problem is that this concept is dependent on a group of navies that are, frankly, not very capable.  While this may be fine for dealing with pirates or providing humanitarian assistance on a small scale, it fails utterly when it comes to actual combat against  even a moderately capable enemy. 

This focus by CNO Greenert illustrates his main failing.  He is a peacetime, peaceful activity oriented leader.  We've previously discussed his failure to follow his own tenets (see, "CNO's Tenets - Walking or Just Talking?").  His focus is on the very low end of the naval mission spectrum.  He wants the LCS because it’s a smaller ship that won’t intimidate the navies of other countries and can better engage with them and their small vessels (he has actually stated that).  The Pacific Pivot seems to consist of sending LCS’s to Singapore.  He wants generic platforms that can accept any payload (we’ve already debunked that idea - see, "Payloads Over Platforms?") which is an accounting approach to combat rather than a warfighting approach.  He’s sacrificing ship maintenance, flight hours, and readiness in favor of humanitarian assistance.  He’s focused on building JHSVs, MLPs, AFSBs, etc. – and counting them as warships! – rather than MCMs, combat capable frigates, strike cruisers, and whatnot.  If push comes to shove, he’s already indicated that he’ll retire a carrier rather than halt LCS production (or the LCS follow on).  I can go on but you get the idea and you know the litany as well as I do.



The Navy Uncaged?



While peacetime activities make up 98% of the Navy’s tasking, it’s the CNO’s job to feed and care for the gorilla that only gets let out of its cage 2% of the time.  Do that and the 98% will take care of itself.  Fail to do that and the 2% will not take care of itself.  Instead, the Navy will find itself lacking and in desperate trouble when we need the gorilla and find we have only a tiny, but cute and cuddly monkey.



The Navy desperately needs a warrior as CNO.

(1) US Naval Institute Proceedings, “Forging a Global Network of Navies”, Adm. Johathan Greenert, USN and RAdm. James Foggo III, USN, May 2014, p.22

Industry In Charge

In an interview (1) with Real Clear Defense (RCD), CNO Greenert expressed concern about the Navy’s lack of anti-ship weaponry.  As RCD reported,

“Greenert said that while he is comfortable now, it’s “reasonably fair” to say there is a real long-term concern about being out-sticked in the future. “I’m not dissatisfied, let’s just say impatient in the near term to get something out there with what we have. Industry can come up with some pretty interesting payloads pretty quickly, and I’d like to see what they’re going to do in the nearer term. “

The Navy chief emphasized that the military does not “think of things like, ship-to-ship, air-to-air,” but rather places emphasis on systems. But he acknowledged “the need is there to deliver something from the ship.” “

Greenert’s statement demonstrates exactly the point I’ve been hammering on for some time, now, with regard to the Navy’s lack of in-house expertise.  He notes that “Industry can come up with some pretty interesting payloads …” and wants “… to see what they’re going to do in the nearer term.”

The Navy wants to see what industry is going to do about our national defense and about the Navy’s capabilities!?!  Not only does the Navy no longer have the expertise to design weapons and systems in-house but they don’t even have enough grasp of strategy, tactics, and requirements to come up with a list of requirements to present to industry for development.  The Navy should be telling industry what to build not waiting to see what industry comes up with and hoping it meets a need.

Aside from my absolute disgust with Navy leadership, we also can see a system that is ingrained with an industry-first bias.  A company is going to propose and develop the products that it can make a larger profit on and that enhance and support its existing product lines rather than developing weapons and systems that are actually needed.  That’s understandable.  That’s why industry exists – to make a profit.  That’s also why, when you approach industry, you tell them what YOU want rather than having them tell you what THEY will give you.  If a company can’t deliver what you want you go to another company that can.

This is incompetence and irresponsibility on a scale that makes our naval forefathers roll over in their graves.  This CNO hasn’t got a clue how to run a Navy.

(1) Real Clear Defense, Justin Walker, 19-Nov-2013, “Navy Chief Impatient To Avoid Being Out-Sticked”,

http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2013/11/19/navy_chief_impatient_to_avoid_being_out-sticked_106966.html

State of the Navy

CNO Greenert delivered a State of the Navy briefing to reporters at the Pentagon on 19-Jul-2013 (1).  Here are some highlights.

• A year ago we had 3 CSGs and 3 ARGs surge ready to support the deployed fleet in the event of emergencies.  Today, and moving forward, we have only 1 CSG and 1 ARG.

• The Navy’s portion of the sequestration and budget cuts is $14B.  You’ll note that that’s equal to an entire year’s shipbuilding budget.  Each account (shipbuilding, operations, maintenance, manpower, etc.) will take a 10% cut in FY14.  If manpower accounts are  excluded, as was done in FY13, each remaining account would be cut 14%.

• CNO made clear that he wants to maintain shipbuilding at current planned levels and is willing to allow other accounts to take a greater hit to do so.

• Half of the 60 ship maintenance availabilities that are planned for FY14 will be indefinitely deferred.  Again, that demonstrates that CNO will maintain shipbuilding to the detriment of all else.  In fact, the cynical among us might suspect that CNO is not altogether displeased with this.  It allows him to ignore ship maintenance, thus shortening lifespans and increasing the need for new construction, while claiming to have no choice due to budget cuts.

• We will maintain 1 deployed CSG and ARG in the Western Pacific and 1 CSG and ARG in the Arabian Gulf.

• Air wings are undergoing reduced certification activities, which is affecting their readiness.

• CNO wants the ability to reprogram cuts to emphasize some accounts and de-emphasize others to achieve the prioritization he feels necessary.  This is laudable except that his idea of priorities is questionable, at best.

• CNO stated that sexual assault is the “challenge of our time”.  Indicatively, he spent 2X-3X as much time discussing this topic as any other.  Given our previous discussion of the issue and the fact that military sexual assaults are significantly less than civilian assault rates this seems to be a Tailhook-like politically motivated witch hunt that is soaking up time and resources that could be better spent elsewhere.  CNO listed numerous new programs, resources, and personnel that will be devoted to this issue.  This was the only area that was cited as gaining budget!

• Pre-deployment air wings are down to 11 hours per month flying time.

• Q&A made it clear that CNO is focused on peacetime activities and is shorting warfighting capabilities.

• CNO likes the trend that US-China relations are on.  Hmmm …….  He must not be reading the same reports and stories that I am!

• Addressing capabilities, “Our benchmark, in all of those, remains the Western Pacific.”    It was clear from the context (I think) that the warfighting needs are being measured against the Chinese A2/AD scenario.  That said, it’s hard to reconcile the statement with our actual procurement plans which do little to address the needs of total war in an A2/AD environment.

• CNO stated we need a fleet of 306 ships.  That’s a joke to anyone who has read the 30 year shipbuilding plan and studied the budget.

What comes across, crystal clear, from this CNO is an obsession with new construction and a focus on the low end, peacetime functions of the Navy.  Maintenance, manning, and all other functions will be sacrificed to achieve new construction.  Warfighting is being allowed to atrophy.  Under this CNO, the Navy is being transformed from a combat fleet to the seagoing equivalent of a nation-building police force – a glorified Coast Guard – that exists to promote civilian political agendas.  While the Navy has had some stunningly bad CNOs in its history, Greenert is rapidly working his way towards becoming the worst ever.

(1) http://news.usni.org/2013/07/19/cno-adm-jonathan-greenerts-state-of-the-navy-friday-press-briefing

Whatever You Want It To Be

There has been a trend over the last decade or two by the military to say whatever serves its purpose.  Kind of a vague statement, I know.  Let’s look at a few specific examples.  Maybe that will make my meaning clearer.

The LCS was originally sold to Congress and the public as a kick-butt littoral combat vessel that could conduct ASW, ASuW, and MCM without needing help from anyone else.  Why, a single LCS could win a war all by itself, it was claimed!  Later, after many failures, and with Congress showing signs of balking at additional purchases, the story changed to a much more limited mission set with the LCS being described as operating around the periphery of a conflict and under the protective umbrella of Aegis ships and carrier aviation.  Why are we committing a quarter of our future combat fleet to a ship that can only function around the periphery of combat?  But, I digress …

The Zumwalt DDG-1000 started life as the absolutely vital ship of the future, the Navy claimed, before suddenly being cast off as obsolete on the modern battlefield in the most amazing and abrupt change of story I’ve ever witnessed in the annals of weapons procurement.  Astoundingly, though, the Navy is building three of these obsolete ships and now claims that the ship is the wave of the future, maybe.  Yes …  No …  Well, let’s build it and then we’ll figure out what to do with it.  But, I digress …

You get the idea.

In similar fashion, AirSea Battle (ASB) started life as a way to defeat an adversary (China, though no one will say it out loud) who had the technology to implement an Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy.  The original CSBA AirSea Battle document described a war of attrition resulting in the rollback of China’s A2/AD capabilities as a prelude to offensive operations.  Now, according to CNO Greenert and General Welsh (1), Chief of Staff of the Air Force, ASB is more of a defensive concept aimed at breaking the enemy’s kill chain, meaning the ability to stop an enemy weapon from hitting us by disrupting one of the steps (location, targeting, launch, impact) in the chain that leads to a weapon impact on target (US forces being the target).

As a secondary goal, ASB also encompasses a fantasy wish list of anything-can-do-anything capabilities such as using submarines to defeat airborne threats (in some mystical, unspecified manner), having F-22s retarget Tomahawk missiles (when, how, and why would an F-22 ever have better targeting information than the Tomahawk possessed upon launch?), having Army land units guide Navy surface-to-air missiles (when would they ever be in position to do that better than the Navy could?), and so on.

In short, ASB is morphing into something very different from what it started as.  Now, this alone is not necessarily a bad thing.  We should constantly be examining our weapons and strategies and changing them when necessary.  However, there is a difference between changing for valid military reasons and changing for political reasons. 

I see the latter happening with ASB.  What started out as a valid, though poorly articulated, military concept seems to be changing to support procurement wish lists of the Air Force and Navy.

Disturbingly, I also see a movement away from the original generalized combat philosophy document and towards a gold-plated, fantasy procurement wish list that bears a remarkable resemblance to the LCS technology wish lists that crashed and burned so badly.  Failing to learn from the LCS debacle, this latest offering from Greenert and Welsh calls for a host of non-existent, technically complex capabilities that are unlikely to be achieved in any relevant time frame and have little practical use that I can see, even if they could be achieved.

I’m firmly convinced that, whatever it started as, ASB is now just a marketing tool for the Navy and Air Force to pressure Congress into giving them more toys.  Keep a close eye on ASB and let’s see where it goes.  My bet is nowhere useful.

 (1)   http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/16/breaking_the_kill_chain_air_sea_battle?page=0,0

Surface Force Commander's Vision

Defense News website (1) reports on a classified memo, “Vision for the 2025 Surface Fleet”, from VAdm. Tom Copeman, Naval Surface Forces, that contains a number of fascinating recommendations.  Among them are,

• Discontinue the dual buy LCS at the 24 already built or on order and, instead, select one or the other or, alternatively, an up-gunned version of one or a completely new ship.

• Recommends against building the DDG-51 Flt III in favor of a larger purpose-designed cruiser.

• Recommends increased reliance on mobile landing platforms (MLP) and afloat forward staging bases (AFSB).

• Recommends new amphibious construction scaled down to the size forces more commonly used.  Presumably, this is directed towards Company size landing forces.

• Calls for new electronic warfare systems to replace the SLQ-32.

• Calls for more effective ship launched ASW weapons.

• Calls for more effective anti-ship missiles.

A few things are interesting about this.  The top surface warfare commander is advocating for an end to the LCS, at least in its current form.  He appears to recognize the developmental difficulties facing the modules.  If the value of a carrier lies in its air wing, the value of the LCS lies in its modules and those modules are many years away from achieving even a modest level of usefulness.  While not offering a specific alternative, the suggestion is that the current incarnation of the LCS is a failure. 

While that’s hardly a surprise to the rest of us, it does represent a radical departure from the Navy public relations line and that’s the other interesting aspect to Adm. Copeman’s LCS position.  The Navy has been ruthless in ensuring that anyone connected to the Navy has nothing but glowing remarks about the LCS.  Either Adm. Copeman is displaying career ending candor in going against the Navy line or he is merely reflecting a growing sense of disappointment within the Navy about the LCS and the sentiment is strong enough that he feels safe to state it publicly.  I suspect the latter.

ComNavOps has talked repeatedly about the overabundance of Navy amphibious capability relative to reasonably foreseeable need and has advocated the use of Company size ships and landing forces.  Adm. Copeman seems to be echoing this though, again, we’re lacking specifics.

The call for a new electronic warfare system is a recognition that Aegis/Standard is not the only way to deal with incoming missiles.  In fact, Aegis/Standard may not even be the most effective way.  Regardless, a new, more effective electronic warfare system will provide a means to upgrade the effectiveness of every ship in the fleet.  Whether such a system can be developed remains to be seen but it’s at least casting an eye in the right direction.

The call for more effective ship launched ASW weapons is outstanding.  The current ship launched torpedos are not really adequate.  If we’re going to use the LCS (or Copeman’s successor platform) in an up close and personal ASW role then we definitely need more and better ASW weapons.  A modernized version of the Hedgehog system would be a good starting point.

Taken together, Adm. Copeman’s comments paint a vastly different picture of the future of the surface Navy than the official version.  We’ll have to wait and see what, if anything, comes of this.  Regardless, I applaud Adm. Copeman for his vision and courage in going on the record with it. 

By the way, you’ll recall that this is the same Adm. Copeman who I singled out for praise in an earlier post for recognizing that the Navy has been hollowed out and for suggesting a different means of dealing with the sequestration than CNO Greenert is using.

Perhaps Adm. Copeman should be the CNO?

(1)http://www.defensenews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/201303171213/DEFREG02/303170001, 17-Mar-13

Budget Cuts - A Different View

In the last post, Budget Cuts, we saw that CNO Greenert has announced that the Navy will begin cutting back on maintenance in order to meet budget limitations.  We noted that there was no call for cutting new ship construction.  We concluded that CNO Greenert was either being recklessly irresponsible or was playing a dangerous political game.  Well, we have a counterpoint to the CNO’s plans from within the Navy itself.

Navy Times website (1) reported on comments from Vice Adm. Tom Copeman, commander of Naval Surface Forces, who was responding to audience questions at the Surface Navy Association’s annual symposium in Arlington, Va.

“Vice Adm. Tom Copeman said the surface fleet was ‘pretty close’ to going hollow …”

“When a combatant commander says a ship’s supposed to leave on deployment and it doesn’t leave on time for whatever reason, then we know we’ve probably gotten there, “ Copeman told an audience of hundreds of officers and industry leaders.  “And there’s ships right now that aren’t doing it.”

“In a speech that centered on the challenges of shrinking budgets, Copeman warned that the surface Navy may need to sacrifice ships in the coming budget battles to ensure the ones it keeps are fully manned and equipped.”

“We’re cross-decking people like crazy to get ships on deployment, out the door.  And what does that do?  It allows the ships that are deployed to do their mission, but the ones back home – we can’t certify them because we took the people off of that team.”

“… Copeman cautioned that deploying ships in the first three quarters of next year may have to leave [on deployment] with degraded capabilities.”

 

Quite a difference from the CNO’s plans, huh?  Adm. Copeman sees, though dimly, that the surface Navy is on the verge of becoming a hollow shell.  In reality, it already is and has been for some time.  The cross-decking he refers to, along with several years of increasing failure rates for INSURV inspections, badly neglected maintenance, fleetwide degradation of Aegis capabilities, atrophy of ASW capabilities, and so forth have provided plenty of evidence that the Navy has been hollowed for some time now.  Still, it’s good to see that someone in Navy leadership sees the problem, however poorly, and is willing to say so.  It’s this latter aspect that really caught my eye.  Copeman just publicly told the Emperor that he has no clothes.  He’s right, of course, but I suspect that he will be severely reprimanded at the very least and, more likely, will be quietly shuffled off to a backwater post in the relatively near future.  His comments had to be embarrassing for the CNO.

I’m also struck by Copeman’s response to budget pressures.  He advocates the common sense approach of cutting back on new construction in order to ensure that the existing ships and aircraft can be properly maintained and operated – exactly what I called for in the previous post.

Perhaps this is the man who should be CNO.

(1) http://www.navytimes.com/news/2013/01/navy-sna-surface-warfare-boss-tom-copeman-sounds-readiness-alarm-011513w/, 15-Jan-2013

Budget Cuts

A 25-Jan-13 San Diego Union – Tribune website article (1) reported on CNO Greenert’s initial efforts to implement anticipated budget cuts.

“The Navy’s top officer Thursday outlined plans for spending cuts that could affect a large segment of San Diego’s naval and shipyard communities.

The Navy plans to cancel some ship and aircraft maintenance, fire temporary employees, freeze civilian hiring, drastically limit travel and halt pier and runway projects, according to a memo from Adm. Jonathan Greenert.

The issue is a $4.6 billion shortfall in the Navy’s $39.4 billion operations budget. About $3.2 billion of that is because Congress has not yet passed a 2013 appropriations bill. The Navy must spend at 2012 levels until it does.

“Because of this, we need to cut back on ops and maintenance to get our spending rate down,” Greenert said in a memo to his admirals and senior civilian leaders. “We are making the following reductions, starting now, to ensure we can fund ongoing deployments and other mission-critical activities.”

He offered a list of near-term reductions. He also outlined more drastic steps that would be taken if Congress doesn’t pass legislation by March 1 to avert sweeping automatic spending cuts known as sequestration.

Cuts the Navy is planning now:

- Cancellation of the majority of surface ship maintenance at private shipyards between April and September. This would affect about 30 of 187 warships, but Navy officials couldn’t say Thursday how many of those are in San Diego.

- Cancellation of all aircraft work at maintenance depots from April to September, affecting about 250 aircraft.”

 

This is what I’ve come to expect from CNO Greenert and Navy leadership, both civilian and uniformed.  The logical reaction to draconian budget cuts would be to cut new construction spending in order to ensure that existing ships and aircraft are well maintained, fully combat capable and deployable, and available for their maximum lifespans.  In fact, the entire $4.6B budget shortfall is about the cost of a single new Zumwalt.

Instead, CNO Greenert proposes further shortening the lifespans of ships and aircraft by deferring maintenance and accelerating the effects of wear and tear.  Sending sailors to sea in poorly maintained ships and aircraft is a gross violation of the trust of the people for whom CNO is responsible.  I’ve previously pointed out that the Navy worships at the altar of new construction to the exclusion and detriment of everything else.  This is merely further proof. 

Of course, it’s not outside the realm of possibility that this is political gamesmanship being played by the military.  The Navy deliberately sets up a scenario involving actions that they don’t really intend to take but that intentionally lead to all manner of dire results with the idea being to put pressure on Congress to revoke the budget cuts.  This is not a political blog so I’ll leave that aspect alone beyond saying that I would hope that the military was above that sort of thing.  Sadly, my read of the situation is that the Navy is, indeed, posturing in an attempt to influence Congress but that if the budget cuts happen, the Navy will do exactly as CNO outlined.  The entire naval force will be further hollowed out to ensure that new construction continues unabated.

(1) http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2013/jan/24/Navy-outlines-cuts-due-to-budget-shortfall/

CNO's Remarks

CNO Greenert’s public remarks continue to reveal a man who is either delusional, lying, or is the consummate political animal in a military uniform.  The latest comments came at a National Press Club luncheon on 16-Nov-12.  Consider these tidbits.

“We’re not downsizing, we’re growing … The ship count is going up and the number of people is going up.”

Huh?!  From www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq65-1.htm the total manning for the Navy over the last several years is

2005    362,941

2006    350,197

2007    337,547

2008    332,228

2009    329,304

2010    324,400

2011    ?

2012    318,406 (as of Nov 2012)

We’ve already thoroughly discussed the fleet size in previous posts.  It’s not only shrinking, it’s getting weaker as the LCS, MLP, and JHSV replace Aegis cruisers, amphibious ships, and Perry class frigates.  The only way one can count the fleet as increasing in numbers is by counting non-combat ships.  CNO’s statements are misleading, at best.

CNO discussed OpTemp and longer deployments. 

“OpTempo has been a little higher than I expected at this time a year ago.  We need to reconcile how we’re going to continue to support that.”

Adm. John Kirby, Chief of Information for the Navy, has stated that deployments for carrier groups and SSBNs are going to increase to an average of up to eight months, well above historical norms and Navy goals.  If the fleet is increasing in size, as CNO claims, how is it that deployments are getting longer?

CNO is unsure how to support higher OpTempos?  How about building more ships and more useful ships instead of the useless LCS.  OpTempos are going to continue to increase as the LCS replaces retiring ships because it can’t be used for anything worthwhile and it has no endurance so some other higher end ship is going to have to pick up the slack.

On the subject of mine warfare, CNO stated,

“You don't need a mine countermeasures ship and a large helicopter drawing a sled to clear these things out.  Smaller ships [from foreign navies] can become very effective."

What the ... ?!  I thought we had to have a 380 ft, 3000 ton, 45 kt LCS in order to perform mine countermeasures.  That’s what we’ve been told all along.  Now we find out that we don’t need a mine countermeasures ship and helos?!!  Well that would have saved some money if we had known that.  Presumably, now that we know this, we won’t be building anymore LCSs!  Anyone remember the small mine clearing ships called the Avenger class?

Regarding the rash of CO firings, CNO had this to say. 

“I don’t understand why they’re misbehaving but I’m concerned about that.”

The number of CO firings has gone up on his watch.  Where’s the accountability from him?  Perhaps he should fire himself for failing to correct the epidemic of firings.

Seriously, most of what this CNO says is totally at odds with facts and reality.  Is it any wonder why we have an epidemic of leadership firings?  It’s clear the Navy is no longer selecting for integrity, honesty, and character.