Naval Marines

A reader recently suggested using detachments of Marines on Navy ships to conduct small land actions and, further, to supplement them with sailors who have been give some land combat training.  The reader noted that this was once a common practice.
 
The idea is intriguing and I’d like to run with it a bit. Is it a feasible idea, today?  Would it be effective?
 
Let’s do a brief review of some historical naval Marine actions to remind ourselves how they were used.
 
 
Sandwich – In May 1800, at Puerto Plata, Commodore Talbot, aboard the USS Constitution, sent a raiding party of 90 sailors and Marines under the command of then Lieutenant Isaac Hull to ‘cut out’ the Sandwich, a French privateer that had been plaguing the area and was being refit under the protection of the nearby Spanish fortress.  They quickly surprised and overwhelmed the Sandwich but needed time to prepare the ship for sailing.  Hull ordered the Marines to seize the nearby fort which they did with no casualties, ensuring the safety of the operation.  The Sandwich was successfully sailed out of the harbor.
 
Barbary Pirates – In Feb 1804, at Tripoli, Captain Stephen Decatur led a small unit of Marines in a clandestine night attack on the previously captured frigate Philadelphia, now being used as an enemy gun battery.  They successfully boarded the vessel and burned it, thus denying its use to the enemy.
 
Marquesas Islands – In Dec 1813, a detachment of Marines and sailors from the frigate USS Essex, Captain David Porter commanding, landed on Nukuhiva and secured the island to enable refit and R&R operations.  They established a small fort and mediated a cessation of a local tribal war.
 
Cape Antonio - On December 16, 1821, USS Porpoise, conducting anti-piracy operations under the command of Lieutenant James Ramage, located five pirate vessels and the merchant brig Bolina. Forty sailors were lowered into five boats and Ramage led an attack which burned the vessels and freed the Bolina.
 
Matanzas – In Nov 1822, near Matanzas, Cuba, USS Alligator, commanded by Lieutenant Allen as part of the Navy’s West Indian Anti-Piracy Campaign, launched small boats carrying 40 men to attack a group of three pirate schooners and five prizes.  The pirates were routed although Allen was killed in the action.
 
 
It is interesting to note that shipboard Marine detachments ended in 1998.  Beyond that, the Marines did, at one time, experiment with a Company Landing Team (CoLT) concept.  I don’t know what became of that.
 
 
Analysis
 
Now, let’s analyze the historical examples to understand why they worked and whether those same conditions for success would apply today.
 
In earlier times, the absence of timely long distance communications meant that ship’s captains had to act as an arm of the country’s diplomatic efforts, often creating policy on the spot.  This offered captains a great deal of latitude in the choice of options and force was often a preferred and effective choice.
 
Another major factor that allowed the success of these small naval Marine actions was the localized nature of affairs.  An enemy couldn’t respond quickly to bring reinforcements to bear.  Indeed, it would often be days or weeks before the enemy’s higher command or nearby forces even learned of the action.  Thus, if the naval Marines could overcome the local resistance, they and their host ship were assured of safety for days or weeks.  Today, with instantaneous communication, aircraft, missiles, long range artillery, etc., any local operation can potentially be countered with overwhelming force in a matter of minutes or hours.  A very lightly armed raiding force simply cannot withstand aircraft, armor, missiles, etc. and, further, the ship that they operate from is placed in immediate danger as well.
 
Today’s instantaneous communications means that the entire world will hear about an action almost on a real time basis which means that any action will have global political repercussions, good and bad.  This, among other factors, has made today’s leaders extremely reluctant to engage in the kind of ad hoc naval Marine actions we’re considering.  In earlier times, communication lags meant that it would takes months or years for an action to become known around the world and, by then, it was a past event and limited global consequence.
 
Along this same line, small actions generally mean small consequences.  A small naval Marine action would, almost by definition, have limited physical consequences – the political repercussions being a separate concern, of course.
 
Manpower was another reason why naval Marine actions were feasible.  Sailing warships carried large crews both for manning the labor-intensive cannons and to make up boarding and prize crews.  Thus, ships had an abundance of sailors and Marines available for off board actions.  Today, with minimal manning compounded be extensive at-sea billet gaps, there simply aren’t enough personnel to even consider such actions.
 
Yet another aspect of these actions is the defensive weapons that an enemy could bring to bear.  In earlier times, the attacking naval Marine force would face only weapons similar to their own with the exception of cannons which had limited, if any, mobility.  Thus, the attacking force could not be overmatched in weapons.  Today, with highly lethal, mobile, and often armored tanks and vehicles along with artillery, missiles, rockets, and aircraft, the attacking force, with only light weapons, is quite likely to face far superior defensive weapons.  Thus, even a small, local defense force may well possess superior firepower compared to a naval Marine force.
 
Finally, the most important factor in any potential naval Marine action is the willingness to take decisive, forceful action.  In earlier times, we were willing to use force as a part of war or as an arm of diplomacy.  Contrast that with today’s timid policy of avoidance and appeasement.  Even if we had naval Marine forces, we wouldn’t use them.
 
 
Potential Uses
 
Understanding why earlier actions were successful and the limits imposed on today’s potential actions, where/how could we use naval Marine forces, today, if we did have them?  Here’s a few examples.
 
Anti-Piracy – On any number of occasions, a naval Marine force could have used small UAVs to track today’s pirates back to their bases of operation and then conducted raids to eliminate them.
 
Anti-Small Boat – A raid against any of Iran’s swarm boat facilities would be a potential use for naval Marine forces.
 
Illegal Islands – As China attempted to build their illegal islands in the South China Sea, naval Marine forces could have conducted raids to destroy the island building efforts.
 
Cutting Out – Chinese vessels that violate allied nation’s territorial waters could be ‘cut out’ and seized.  China has repeatedly, and illegally, sent swarms of fishing vessels and “Coast Guard” vessels into Vietnamese, Philippine, and other waters.
 
 
Conclusion
 
Naval Marine forces for off board actions have been an historically useful and fairly common occurrence.  Today, for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is timidity, this is no longer practiced.  There are, however, situations that could benefit from such actions if we had the mindset and wished to allocate the required resources.
 
Timidity aside, the main drawback would seem to be the potential for the attacking force to run into a level of weaponry that it cannot handle.
 
As an alternative, many of the contemplated actions might seem worthy of SEAL involvement although the need to transport SEALs to the action site would largely negate the benefit of having an organic action party always at hand.
 
It seems that there are situations that could benefit from a naval Marine force but the infrequency of such combined with the cost in additional manning and resources would seem to preclude the practice.  A much better alternative would be to make greater use of SEALs on carefully planned, small missions.  Of course, that assumes a level of fortitude we have not exhibited for many years.

Light Or Heavy - Either Could Work

The US military has for some time been pursuing a path of “lightness”.  The Marines have drastically scaled back their tank companies and dropped the 120 mm towed mortar, for example.  The navy has totally abandoned armor for ships and considers the non-survivable LCS to be a warship.  The Army pursued a vision of lightly armed Strykers.  All manner of light “jeeps” have been pursued.and procured.

I guess the theory is that our speed of movement will cancel out and overcome the enemy’s firepower, numbers, and armor – a questionable proposition, at best.

We’re now trying to mount 20-30 mm guns on top of jeeps.  We’re looking seriously at developing light/medium “tanks” that have large guns and only lightly armored bodies.  Hit hard, move fast, I guess.

Is this trend to lightness viable on a modern battlefield?

Well, consider this.  The Russians and Chinese are developing artillery that fires submunitions that are far deadlier than previous conventional artillery shells.  These submunitions include enhanced fragmentation and thermobaric explosives.

“Over the past 20 years the Russians have improved on our steel rain technology by developing a new generation of bomblet munitions that are filled with thermobaric explosives. These munitions generate an intense, blast wave of exploding gasses that are far more lethal than conventional explosives. A volley of Russian thermobaric steel rain delivered by a single heavy-rocket launcher battalion produces a lethal area 10 times greater than an American MLRS battalion firing conventional, single-point detonating warheads.” (1)

Imagine that firepower being applied against a bunch of US soldiers running around the battlefield in essentially unarmored jeeps.

Or, consider the prospects of a bunch of light tanks when confronted by a bunch of heavy main battle tanks like the new Russian and Chinese ones.

So, are we saying that a light, mobile, unprotected force can’t win on the modern battlefield.  This is probably going to surprise you but the answer is that they can win, however, there is a massive caveat.  The caveat is numbers/attrition.  If the light force has sufficient numbers and is willing to accept significant attrition, they can win.  Those light tanks will suffer massive casualties (and their crews with them) but with sufficient numbers can eventually kill the heavy tanks.  Those soldiers running around in JLTV (Joint Light Tactical Vehicle) “jeeps” will suffer massive casualties when exposed to firepower but with enough of them they can achieve their objectives. 

Joint Light Tactical Vehicle

The degree of attrition will be massive but victory can be attained.  The problem is that the US military has neither the requisite numbers of vehicles nor personnel to absorb the kinds of losses that such a force would suffer.  Neither do they have the transportation capacity to get such numbers to the battlefield even if they had the numbers.  Further, the degree of callousness required to plan for and accept that level of attrition is beyond any mentality the US has shown in recent times, if ever.  The closest we’ve come to accepting that kind of horrifying attrition is the Civil War and that’s because we didn’t know any better way of fighting.

The other approach, the heavy approach, will also work and with a lot less casualties.  A thermobaric bomb, or heavy artillery, or cluster munitions, or armored divisions can prevent a lot of friendly casualties and seems the far more sensible way to approach war.

We need to carefully evaluate our approach to war and make sure that we are fully committed to whichever path we choose and we need to thoroughly understand the ramifications if we choose the path of lightness.

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(1)Breaking Defense website, “Bring Back Artillery Submunitions; Russian Threat Too Great” Bob Scales, 21-Oct-2016,

http://breakingdefense.com/2016/10/bring-back-artillery-submunitions-russian-threat-too-great/