The Electronic Battleship

One observation that has clearly come out of the Ukraine-Russia war is the prominent role of electronic warfare (EW).  We’ve seen GPS disruptions, weapon guidance disruption, intercepted communications, unit localization using signals intercepts, and probably many other aspects that are not yet common knowledge.  So, while the exact manifestations of EW’s prominence are not yet fully clear, the overall thrust is.  EW is a major factor/force on the battlefield and its influence is likely to continue to grow.
 
This is a naval blog so what does the EW lesson mean for naval forces?  Obviously, all the same considerations apply to the maritime battlefield as the land battlefield.  Enemy forces and weapons detection, weapons guidance disruption, localization using signal intercepts, etc. are all vitally important for naval forces.
 
Naval forces (and for the rest of this post we’ll focus on US Navy forces unless otherwise explicitly stated) have had EW capabilities to varying degrees for many decades now so what’s the big deal?  The ‘deal’ is that naval EW has long been the forgotten stepchild of naval capabilities (along with armor, large caliber guns, survivability, robust steel construction, weapon density … boy, the Navy sure has a lot of forgotten stepchildren, don’t they?!).  EW has been an afterthought, at best.  It is only recently that the Navy has begun to belatedly, and even then only in a minor way, address EW with the SEWIP modernization program.
 
Currently, each ship has its own small SLQ-32/SEWIP EW unit and the units are constrained by space/volume/mounting requirements, power limitations, placement challenges, manning constraints, training deficiencies, etc.  In other words, each individual ship can, at best, take care of itself but is of little or no help to other ships in the area.
 
If EW is so important, doesn’t it make sense to have a ship that is a behemoth at electronic warfare?  An electronic battleship, so to speak?  Where is our EW ship that can electronically dominate the naval battlefield?  Where is the ship that can electronically ‘swat’ UAVs and missiles from the sky?  Where is our area EW as opposed to individual EW?  We wouldn’t dream of not having area air defenses so why don’t we have area EW?
 
Where is the EW battleship?
 
What’s wrong with individual ship EW, you may ask?  Nothing except that, by definition, it’s limited to just the host ship and it’s haphazardly implemented and suffers from being at the bottom of the ship’s training priorities because it’s not the main mission of the given ship.  This is the same problem the Burkes face with ASW.  They are theoretically capable of ASW but they rarely train for it and are, therefore, ineffective.  Anti-air is the Burke’s main mission so that’s what they train for on the rare occasions that they train for anything.
 
Consider this historical example:  the USS Stark incident was instructive as it illustrated problems with the SLQ-32 performance, interface, false alarms, and lack of training, as noted below. 

The electronic warfare technician at the SLQ-32 console heard the F-1’s Cyrano-IV again lock on to the Stark. The lock-on signal ceased after seven to ten seconds.
 
Neither of the two SLQ-32 operators saw a [ed. inbound] missile warning. The main operator at the console, however, had turned off the incoming missile audible signal warning. He claimed later that the alarm was typically set off too easily, and distracted him from performing other signal analysis.[1]

 
We need a ship whose main – indeed, only – mission is EW so that it gets the training that is required to achieve and maintain proficiency.  We need an electronic battleship.
 
More than that, we need a multi-ship, coordinated EW effort.  Currently, each ship is its own EW entity, separate and isolated from any other ship.  There is no integrated, multi-ship or group EW effort as there is with missile control and usage via Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) and Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA).  Navy air defense utilizes a central command and control function typically located aboard the Ticonderoga class cruisers.  Again, we need a group wide, area EW control that integrates the EW of all the ships in the group.  We need an EW CEC.
 
Further, we need the group’s chaff and decoy systems tied into the EW control system.
 
Having established the need for an EW battleship and the general concept of large scale, area EW let’s now look at the specifics of an EW battleship.
 
 
EW Battleship
 
Analogous to a conventional battleship, the three main categories and levels of ‘weapons’ for an EW battleship are:
 

• Main battery - electronic attack
• Secondary battery - electronic protection
• Tertiary battery - electronic support

 
More specifically, the EW battleship requirements are, in no particular order:
 

• radar warning
• targeting support
• countermeasures
• situational awareness
• threat warning
• signal collection / SigInt
• direction finding
• laser warning
• drone/missile communications jamming
• false signal injection
• enemy GPS (GLONASS, BeiDou) disruption at point of attack

 
With the specific requirements in mind, what kind of specific equipment (EW ‘weapons’) should an EW battleship have?  An examination of the myriad existing aircraft, vehicle, and ship EW systems provides a good candidate list while understanding that each system would be significantly scaled up in terms of power and antenna size (both sensing and emitting).  For example, a small EW pod on an aircraft might be functionally duplicated for use on a EW battleship but would have, for practical purposes, unlimited power and emitters/receivers many times larger.
 
To give a feel for the types of equipment, here’s a partial list of existing EW equipment on various platforms:
 
 
Ship:
 

• AN/SLQ-32(V)2 – Initially the most common variant, the (V)2 expanded on the (V)1's capabilities with new receiving antennas for increased radio frequency coverage. It added the ability to detect high frequency targeting and fire-control radars, providing early warning against an imminent anti-ship missile attack.
• AN/SLQ-32(V)3 – The (V)3 added antennas with electronic attack capability, able to actively jam targeting radars and anti-ship missile terminal guidance radars.
• Sidekick – active jamming in a smaller package as an alternative to (V)3
• AN/SLQ-32(V)6 – Part of the Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program (SEWIP). (V)6 provides enhanced electronic support capability through upgraded antennas and open combat system interface. It is made up of the SEWIP Block 1B2, SEWIP Block 1B3, and SEWIP Block 2, which provide specific emitter identification (SEI), high gain high sensitivity (HGHS), and electronic support (ES), respectively.
• SEWIP Block 1 provides enhanced EW capabilities to existing and new ship combat systems to improve anti-ship missile defense, counter targeting and counter surveillance capabilities. The upgrade addresses obsolescence mitigation through introduction of electronic surveillance enhancements (ESE) and Improved Control and Display (ICAD) as well as incorporation of adjunct receivers for special signal intercept including specific emitter ID (SEI) and high gain/high sensitivity (HGHS). The SEI and HGHS capability provides improved battlefield situational awareness.
• SEWIP Block 2 provides early detection, analysis, and threat warning from anti-ship missiles by providing enhanced Electronic Support (ES) capability via an upgraded ES antenna, ES receiver and an open combat system interface for the AN/SLQ-32. These upgrades are necessary in order to pace the threat and improve detection and accuracy capabilities of the AN/SLQ-32.
• SEWIP Block 3 (AN/SLQ-32(V)7) will provide electronic attack (EA) capability improvements.
• SEWIP Block 4 is a future planned upgrade that will provide advanced electro-optic and infrared capabilities to the AN/SLQ-32(V) system.
• COBLU Command and Control Coordination - Integrates area ship sensors and provides a common picture using passive sensors.

 
 
Aircraft:
 

• EA-18G Growler: ALQ-218 Detection Pod  -  passive Radar warning receiver for airborne situational awareness and signal intelligence gathering. The AN/ALQ-218 detects, identifies, locates and analyzes sources of radio frequency emission.
• EA-18G Growler: ALQ-99 High Band Jamming Pods  -  radar and comms jamming
• EA-18G Growler: ALQ-99 Low Band Jamming Pod  -  radar and comms jamming
• EC-130H / EC-37B Compass Call – electronic attack;  disrupts enemy command and control communications and secondary EA capability against early warning and acquisition radars.
• MQ-1C Gray Eagle UAV - Multifunctional Electronic Warfare (MFEW) Air Large is the Army’s first organic brigade electronic attack asset mounted on an MQ-1C Gray Eagle drone.  brigade-level airborne electronic attack asset and providing limited cyberattack capabilities
• RC-135V/W is the USAF's standard airborne SIGINT platform.
• RC-135S Cobra Ball is a measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) collector equipped with special electro-optical instruments such an All Weather Tracking Radar and Medium Wave Infrared Array (MIRA) designed to observe ballistic missile flights at long range.[24] The Cobra Ball monitors missile-associated signals and tracks missiles during boost and re-entry phases to provide reconnaissance for treaty verification and theater ballistic missile proliferation.

 
Vehicles:
 

• Stryker - Tactical Electronic Warfare System (TEWS) which combines cyberwarfare, signals intelligence and electronic attack.

 

The EW battleship combines all these functions, each in its own 'mount', on one ship.

Antenna Size
 
The key concept that makes the EW battleship work is the available size and power of the various emitter and receiver antennae. 
 
For example, passive sensing is a function of sensor size.  Inter-galactic frequency sensors are massive in order to collect the faint signals from distant stars and galaxies.  A man-portable - or even an aircraft mounted – sensor is limited in size.  A ship, on the other hand, could mount Aegis sized sensor arrays, thereby vastly increasing the sensitivity and effectiveness of the sensor.
 
Similarly, one of the problems with Army man-portable or even mobile electronic warfare (EW) systems is that they are small and inherently power-limited.  Ship size systems with, for practical purposes, unlimited power would eliminate this constraint.
 
 
Dispersion and Redundancy
 
One of the [many] limitations of small EW package systems is that each package must execute several different functions, switching between them as needed.  On a ship, each function can be its own ‘mount’ and, therefore, be continuously available with no need to switch or ‘ration’ power.  The functions can be dispersed as stand alone, complete units.
 
Ships also offer the ability to have more than one of any given function, just as a ship has (or used to have when we still designed WARships) redundant guns.  This allows for both damage resilience and the ability to engage multiple threats simultaneously.
 
 
 
Note:  I’ve not specified any size for this EW battleship.  The term ‘battleship’ refers to combat power, not size.  If everything needed can fit on a canoe, that’s great.  If it requires a ship the size of an Iowa class battleship, so be it.  My pure guess is that something the size of Burke would suffice but I’ll leave it to the engineers to determine that.
 
 
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[1]https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1988/may/stark-report

SEWIP Problems

The Navy has, historically, relegated electronic warfare (EW) systems (SLQ-32 and the evolutionary SEWIP) on ships to a decidedly lower level of interest and importance.  We’ve covered the developmental history of EW systems (see, “SEWIP Update”) and it’s depressing.  We’ve also noted many times that historical data shows EW to be far and away the most effective form of anti-missile defense.  That makes the Navy’s apathy all the more baffling.

 

Now, SEWIP appears to be having serious problems although, since DOT&E caved into pressure to hide test results, we have only tidbits of information that have leaked out from the unclassified but controlled version of the Congressionally mandated annual report.

 

The electronic warfare capability scheduled for installation onboard several classes of Navy warships experienced multiple problems while in use on an aircraft carrier during testing in April 2021 … [1]

 

… testing last year on the aircraft carrier Gerald Ford (CVN-78) showed the system reporting “extraneous contacts for the radio frequency emitters it detects” and misidentifying “non-radio frequency emissions as [anti-ship cruise missiles],” according to the Pentagon’s chief weapons tester.[1]

 

Unfortunately, I have no more information than that.

 

 

SEWIP Block III

 

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[1]Breaking Defense, “Disrupting the ‘critical linkage’: What is the Navy’s SEWIP?”, Justin Katz, 4-Apr-2022,

https://breakingdefense.com/2022/04/disrupting-the-critical-linkage-what-is-the-navys-sewip/

SEWIP Update

The first Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program (SEWIP) Block 3 production unit was recently delivered so let’s do a quick review of the status of the program.  You can read a previous post on the subject, here.

 

SEWIP, is the Navy’s project to improve the venerable and increasingly obsolete SLQ-32 system.  The project is divided into a sequence of four Blocks, each of which adds additional capabilities to the overall system.  Not all ships will receive all four Blocks.

 

Here are the SEWIP Block descriptions as summarized from the Navy website (4)

 

• SEWIP Block 1 upgrade addresses obsolescence issues by replacing obsolete parts and installing improved control stations and displays.  It also adds additional threat signal receivers. 
• SEWIP Block 2 upgrades antennas and receivers and improves the signal processing. 
• SEWIP Block 3 provides active signal emissions to defeat incoming missiles. 
• SEWIP Block 4 is a future upgrade that will provide EO and IR capabilities.

 

SEWIP Block 3 Array Undergoing Testing

 

Let’s check a brief history of the program by looking at the timeline.

 

1974 - Northrop Grumman’s (NG) AN/SLQ-32(V)1 (‘Slick 32’) was launched

 

2008 – Lockheed Martin (LM) received contract to develop SEWIP Block 1

 

2009 - LM received contract to develop SEWIP Block 2 (AN/SLQ-32(V)6)

 

2010 – Navy approves LM Block 2 design

 

2011 – General Dynamics (GD) begins full rate production of Block 1

 

2013 - LM began LRIP of Block 2 and delivered the first SEWIP Block 2 system

 

2015 - NG received a $92M contract modification to a previous contract for SEWIP Block 3 engineering, manufacturing, and development intended to produce two prototype units.(2)

 

2015 – DOT&E testing found that Block 2 had severe deficiencies in generating and holding target tracks

 

2016 - LM received full rate production contract for SEWIP Block 2

 

2019 - Dept. of Defense approved the SEWIP Block 3 Milestone C to enable the start of low rate initial production (LRIP)

 

2020 - NG received a $16M contract modification to an existing contract to provide support for two Low Rate Initial Production SEWIP Block 3 systems.(3)

 

2020 - Navy issued a contract to Northrop Grumman for SEWIP Block 3 production systems.

 

The $100.7 million base contract is for the first follow on production lot of AN/SLQ-32(V)7 SEWIP Block 3 systems. The contract has a maximum value of $1.16 billion. (1)

 

 

2021 - NG delivered the first production SEWIP Block 3 to the Navy

 

 

There are a few noteworthy aspects to the SEWIP program:

 

Priorities – For reasons unfathomable, the Navy has never considered electronic warfare to be of much value.  The original SLQ-32 served for 34 years with only minor improvements.  For the last decade or so, the SLQ-32 was so obsolete as to be almost useless.  In contrast, during the same time frame, the Navy poured vast resources and funds into Standard missile development, clearly demonstrating where their priorities lay;  this despite the overwhelming evidence that electronic countermeasures have, historically, proven far more effective than hard kill measures.

 

Even with the commencement of the SEWIP program, it has taken 13 years to get the Block 3 into initial service.

 

The Navy misguidedly and unwisely continues to place little emphasis on electronic warfare.  The time span and leisurely pace of development demonstrates that the Navy is not particularly serious about shipboard electronic warfare.  We’ve discussed how the Navy should be hugely increasing the size, scope, capabilities, and power outputs of ship’s EW systems and should be building dedicated EW ships.  One has only to consider the vast resources and wide variety of equipment and capabilities being put into ground combat EW systems (with Russia leading the way!) to see that the Navy simply does not prioritize EW defenses despite overwhelming evidence of their effectiveness (see, “AAW – Hard Kill or Soft Kill”).

 

Block 3 – This is the development that adds active output transmissions and provides active countermeasures.  This needs to be thoroughly tested under realistic conditions and widely installed across the fleet.  The distribution is a concern because the previous SLQ-32 system was not uniformly distributed.  Ships received different, less capable versions depending on the ship type.  Once upon a time, when some ships were cheaper and therefore more ‘expendable’ this might have made some degree of sense (not really!) but today, with every ship costing $1B+, every ship should have the maximum possible protection.

 

Testing & Reporting - The last report from DOT&E on the SEWIP program was 2016.  In that report, SEWIP Block 2 was reported as operationally effective but not operationally suitable or survivable due to myriad reliability, training, reboot times, and cyber vulnerabilities.  Reports mysteriously stop at that point.  I don’t know if that means that the Navy has stopped conducting tests, which would be foolish in the extreme though not without ample misguided precedent, or if the Navy considers the SEWIP program ‘finished’, which would also be foolish since the system has never been tested in anything approaching an operationally realistic manner.

 

 

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(1)https://seapowermagazine.org/navy-awards-sewip-block-3-contract-to-northrop-grumman/

 

(2)https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Contracts/Contract/Article/621915/

 

(3)https://www.afcea.org/content/northrop-gets-contract-mod-continue-naval-sewip-block-3-support

 

(4)https://www.navy.mil/Resources/Fact-Files/Display-FactFiles/Article/2167559/surface-electronic-warfare-improvement-program-sewip/#:~:text=The%20SEWIP%20Block%203%20program%20is%20designated%20as,is%20a%20future%20planned%20upgrade%20that%20will%20provide

Unmanned Growlers - More Idiocy

Technology for its own sake.  How often have we seen that demonstrated in Navy research, development, and acquisition?  That’s right – far too often.  It’s almost become the norm.  Here’s yet another example.

The Navy and Boeing teamed up to demonstrate the remote control of two unmanned EA-18G Growler electronic warfare aircraft by a third F/A-18F Super Hornet.(1)  The Navy, of course, is touting the miracle benefits of this concept …  in very vague, non-specific terms.

Let’s think about this for a moment.

How does having the ability to remote controlled unmanned Growlers increase our combat capability?  At best, the unmanned Growlers have the exact same capabilities as manned Growlers.  More likely, the Growler is not quite as capable without a human pilot operating the aircraft and systems.  Certainly, it will be far less able to execute defensive aerial maneuvers and thus far more susceptible to loss.

The only benefit is that unmanned Growlers don’t put pilots at risk but that’s a very minor consideration since no one puts Growlers at risk anyway – the aircraft are far too valuable to risk.  Growlers are the very definition of a high value unit.  We only have a few of them and they are far too valuable to risk.  So, whether they are manned or unmanned is, at best, irrelevant.

Now, if you want to use unmanned Growlers in high risk, semi-suicidal missions then, yes, I guess they enhance our combat capability but, again, no sane commander is going to use Growlers in high risk scenarios.  They’re too valuable – and expensive! - to throw away, whether manned or unmanned.

To conclude … this was yet another technology stunt for the sake of technology and does nothing to improve our actual, operational combat capability.  The Navy steadfastly refuses to think operationally.  Instead, the substitute the pursuit of technology for strategy, doctrine, and tactics.

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(1)Naval News website, “Boeing and U.S. Navy Successfully Link Piloted, Unmanned Growlers”, Xavier Vavasseur, 4-Feb-2020,

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2020/02/boeing-and-u-s-navy-successfully-link-piloted-unmanned-growlers/

Electronic Warfare Magic Beans

Many times we have discussed the military’s abandonment of electronic warfare (EW).  Heck, the Air Force, Marines, and Army gave up their EW and let the Navy have it with the result that the EA-18G Growler is the only significant EW platform left.  Common sense trumpets the folly of that course of action but the military is not exactly known for common sense so they remain unmoved and steadfast in their desire to leave EW behind.  Now, however, the Russians have demonstrated the power of EW in the Ukraine and Syria and the military is, belatedly and ponderously, beginning to rediscover and refocus on EW.

While the renewed recognition of EW may be slow, hesitant, and, thus far, largely ineffective, it’s still good news, isn’t it?  Well, yes and no.  Yes, it’s good that we’re grudgingly admitting that maybe we should have some EW capability, however, in true US military tradition we’re attempting to leap a generation or two ahead and field a magic-level EW instead of investing in good, solid, functional EW that can be used today.

From a Breaking Defense article describing a new CSBA report on EW,

Despite rising budgets and high-level attention to electronic warfare, the Pentagon’s “efforts have been unfocused and are likely to fail,” warns a congressionally mandated study out today. What the US needs, the Center for Strategic & Budgetary Assessments report says, is a radically new approach that can outfox Russia and China. (1)

There it is …  instead of a good, solid, functional EW that can be used today, this report calls for “a radically new approach”.  Isn’t radical, revolutionary, leap ahead technology exactly what has failed miserably and repeatedly in the LCS, F-35, Zumwalt, Ford, etc.?  So, with that kind of dismal track record for radical new technology staring us in the face, CSBA wants us to do it again?  Does that make sense?

China and Russia have invested heavily in traditional platforms – planes, ships, and heavy trucks laden with high-power antennas – and the US just can’t match them on their own terms, CSBA warns. Instead, the US should leapfrog ahead of its adversaries by deploying a new generation of both technology and tactics. (1)

“leapfrog ahead” …

“new generation” …

Isn’t this exactly how we have failed, time and again?  How’s that Zumwalt Advanced Gun System doing?  How’s that LCS coming along?  How are those Ford magic elevators working?

Why do we need to ‘leapfrog ahead’?  According to CSBA, it’s because “the US just can’t match” the Russians and Chinese in conventional EW power.  What???  The greatest financial, industrial, and military country the world has ever known can’t match Russia and China?  Does that sound right to you?  Of course we can match and overmatch them, if we choose.  Will we choose to match or overmatch them?  No!  That’s not our way.  Our way is to abandon the tried, true, and effective for the promise of technological magic beans.

Sure, let’s develop a new, never before seen generation of EW.  Of course, it won’t be ready for decades.  What happens if we have to fight a war today?  We won’t have any EW.

Here’s the CSBA vision:

Imagine a multi-domain command and control network that can pull together forces from air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace, reorganizing as needed on the fly. The goal: create a dispersed, flexible force our authoritarian adversaries’ centralized systems can’t keep up with. (1)

Wow! 

“multi-domain”

“command and control”

“network”

“on the fly”

“dispersed”

“flexible”

No wonder our “authoritarian adversaries’ centralized systems can’t keep up with” us.  They don’t have a buzzword bingo scorecard!

Bingo!  I just won!  “Flexible” was the last word I needed to fill my score card.

Hey, all of that is great and it’s some magnificent buzzword stringing but where’s the real magic beans?  It’s right here:

… this kind of networked force could survive enemy attack – physical destruction, hacking, or jamming – by reorganizing itself to pass data around the damaged nodes, Clark & co. argue. (1)

The network reorganizes itself to make itself immune to damage!!!!!!!!!!  Whoa, I’m feeling faint.  The excitement is too much for me.

Does anyone else have a vision of the most advanced, wondrous, magnificent battle command and control center in the universe (hey, let’s really think big!) being stormed by an enemy soldier with a club, who’s never even heard of electrons, and skull-bashing all our PhD EW specialists without realizing that he was supposed to be helpless before our advanced electronics and artificial intelligence battle management ?  We’ll be the most well informed army to lose a war in the history of warfare!

Okay, having [rightfully] mocked yet another leap ahead technology idea, let’s get serious.  EW is a vital aspect of modern warfare.  We need to be EW capable both offensively and defensively.  However, we need a basic level of competency now, not decades from now.  The leap ahead F-35 is now pedestrian, if not bordering on obsolete because it’s taken decades to field.  Had a major war broken out while we were screwing around with the F-35 development (and we still are), we’d have been forced to fight with 1980’s aircraft.  If China provokes a war tomorrow, I don’t want to face them with promises of a future EW capability, I want to face them with actual, existing, functional EW.  That means building real capability today, not spending our EW budget on some future concept that probably won’t pan out.  How’s that rail gun coming along?  Twenty years ago, lasers were just around the corner.  Guess what?  They’re still around the corner.

Let’s get going on today-EW before we start on tomorrow-EW.  Once we’ve fielded actual, functioning EW throughout the military then, by all means, let’s start on the system of tomorrow – but not until then.  The US military is constantly chasing the dream of tomorrow at the expense of the capability of today.  We need to give up magic beans and stick with the cow (you know, Jack and the Beanstalk).

ComNavOps is all for a leapfrog, next generation EW capability … after we establish today’s capability.

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(1)Breaking Defense, “US Electronic Warfare: You’re Doing It Wrong”, Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., 21-Nov-2019,

https://breakingdefense.com/2019/11/electronic-warfare-youre-doing-it-wrong/

US Forces Not Ready for Electronic Warfare

Breaking Defense website has a short article about electronic warfare (EW) and EW training that states everything I've been saying about our woeful lack of preparedness and the military's steadfast determination to avoid realistic training.  

I'm not going to comment further.  The article says everything that needs to be said.  Please, please check it out:

"US Forces Untrained, Unready For Russian, Chinese Jamming"


Breaking Defense, Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., 30-Oct-2019

Boxer Downs Iranian Drone With Jamming

By now, you’ve heard about the downing of an Iranian drone by the USS Boxer while transiting the Strait of Hormuz.  The Drive/War Zone website is reporting that the downing was due to the action of a Marine anti-drone electronic warfare dune buggy chained to the deck of the Boxer rather than the defensive weapons of the ship. (1)

USS Boxer With LMADIS On Deck (1)

The Drive/WarZone published an article describing an anti-drone system known as the Light Marine Air Defense Integrated System (LMADIS).  The system consists of a RADA RPS-42 short range, S-band, hemispheric, AESA radar mounted on an MRZR dune buggy.  On top of the radar unit is a gyro-stabilized CM202 multi-sensor optical ball that provides positive visual identification of targets. (2)  The systems apparently operate in pairs.  When a target is designated, the targeting data can be fed to various systems such as a Modi jammer which is a backpack signal jammer. (3)  Theoretically, the targeting data could be fed to a ship’s hard-kill defensive systems but it is unknown (and probably unlikely) that this was possible, in this case.  It appears that the Modi jammer was used to disrupt the ground control signal to the Iranian drone thereby causing it to crash.

LMADIS On Kearsarge (2)

The article also details several other extremely close encounters with Iranian aircraft and boats during the transit.  It seems clear that the decision to down the Iranian drone was a retaliatory action for recent Iranian downings of US drones and the choice of the drone as the target rather than, for example, an Iranian Bell 212 helo that passed “yards away from the deck”, was due to the unmanned nature of the Iranian drone.  Drones ‘plinking’ would seem to be the new sport in the Middle East.

There are a few aspects to this that merit some consideration.

Drone Survivability – While we have no idea how sophisticated the Iranian drone was, this is yet another example of the inherent fragility and lack of survivability of drones in combat.  Despite this mounting evidence, the US military continues to count on UAVs for all manner of tasks.  Worse, many of these tasks are the foundation of our combat capability.  When the UAVs are found to be non-survivable in combat, what will become of our combat capability without the foundations they were designed on?

Simplicity – The outstanding aspect of this incident is the fielding of a very simple system with a straightforward, limited (meaning focused) capability assembled from largely commercially available equipment.  This is outstanding.  It provides an immediately useful, basic capability rather than waiting indefinitely for an exquisite, leap ahead technology that will never deliver.  Whoever cobbled this system together deserves a salute.  K.I.S.S. !

Ship Defenses – For all the ultra high end, sophisticated sensors, electronic warfare, and defenses of the USS Boxer, the ship used a cobbled together dune buggy EW system chained to the deck for its anti-drone protection.  This is both commendable and highly disturbing that the ship’s organic defenses couldn’t handle the job.  This should also tell us something about designing systems for use against high end threats and ignoring the low end.  Where is the Navy’s cobbled together, low end, anti-drone system?  Has our development and acquisition system become so complex that we can’t respond with simple, basic, useful systems that can be quickly fielded?  Of course, we know the answer to that is, yes, our development/acquisition system is too complex to be responsive and useful.  We keep talking about innovation and speed of development/response but the evidence is that nothing is actually being done about it.

Engagement Bar – When armed UAVs first appeared on the scene, the civilian authority (the Presidential Administration) and the military latched on to them and began an almost free fire reign of Hellfires on terrorist targets across the world.  The bar on engagement had been lowered.  UAVs somehow seemed ‘okay’ and ‘permissible’ to use with little provocation or thought as opposed to committing manned air or ground forces to the same objective.  I’m not going to debate the wisdom of that policy.  The fact is that the criteria to use deadly force was lowered. 

Similarly, the spread of smaller drones seems to have further lowered the bar on engaging one’s enemies.  Drones seem to be acquiring a status of ‘free fire’ targets.  Countries seem to be considering anti-drone actions, even in international airspace, as freely permissible with little or no rationale.  This can only encourage further hostile acts and will, eventually, lead to intentional or unintentional actions against manned assets. 

We need to carefully consider the implications of this standard of behavior as we move forward.  Do we really want to allow unfriendly countries to believe that they have a ‘right’ to freely shoot down our drones?  Do we really want to limit ourselves to shooting down unfriendly drones as opposed to a much more extensive and severe reaction, if the provocation was worth it? 

For example, in this case, if we believed there was a bona-fide threat to the USS Boxer, should we have limited ourselves to downing the drone, which will do nothing to prevent a recurrence in the future, or should we have destroyed the drone, its launch site, its control site, and the personnel responsible for threatening our ship?  If the threat was real then we should have acted to permanently remove the threat capability, not just one drone, and send an emphatic message.  If the ‘threat’ was just a pretext to engage in some tit-for-tat drone plinking then we need to carefully consider what kind of behavior system we’re establishing.

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(1)The Drive/The War Zone website, “Marine Anti-Drone Buggies On USS Boxer Knocked Down ‘Threatening’ Iranian Drone”, Joseph Trevithick, 18-Jul-2019,

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/29063/marine-anti-drone-buggies-on-uss-boxer-knocked-down-threatening-iranian-drone

(2)The Drive/The War Zone website, “USS Kearsarge Transits The Suez Canal With Anti-Drone Buggies Keeping Watch On Deck”, Tyler Rogoway, 20-Jan-2019,

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/26067/uss-kearsarge-transits-the-suez-canal-with-anti-drone-buggies-keeping-watch-on-deck

(3)https://www.sncorp.com/press-releases/snc-usmc-modi-ii/

Electronic Warfare Training – The Stupidity Is Stunning

ComNavOps has long stated that we should be conducting every training exercise with full electronic warfare (EW) being applied against the training force.  This would accomplish three things:

• It would provide valuable experience for our own offensive EW forces.
• It would make our forces learn how to function in a heavy EW environment when none of our networks, computers, GPS, comm links, and data sharing are working.
• It would reveal where our EW vulnerabilities are so that we can begin to correct them.

Instead, we train with only very limited EW application.  Why?  The rationale is that if we applied full EW the training would grind to a halt and be of no value.  Do you see the stupidity in this view?  The unmitigated, staggering stupidity?  If EW can bring our training to a halt, that’s exactly what we need.  That’s exactly what the Russians and Chinese, both purportedly more advanced in EW than we are, will do to us.  What are we going to do in a real war when we encounter massive EW, stop because it’s too hard?  Apparently so, because that’s what we’re doing in our training.

In a Breaking Defense article about wargames and exercises and the impact of EW,

The US has wargamed cyber and electronic warfare in field exercises, Work [Robert Work, former Deputy Secretary of Defense] said, but the simulated enemy forces tend to shut down US networks so effectively that nothing works and nobody else gets any training done. “Whenever we have an exercise and the red force really destroys our command and control, we stop the exercise,” Work said, instead of trying to figure out how to keep fighting when your command post gives you nothing but blank screens and radio static. (1)

It’s too hard to deal with EW in exercises so we quit?????  Here’s a wild thought: instead of quitting, how about ramping up the EW even more until we figure out how to deal with it.  How about forcing our military leadership to confront the ugly truth about our vulnerability?

Maybe we’re just overstating the threat?  Maybe ComNavOps is just an alarmist?  Well, former DepSecDef Work is saying the same thing I am.  Consider his warning,

The Chinese call this “system destruction warfare,” Work said: They plan to “attack the American battle network at all levels, relentlessly, and they practice it all the time.” (1)

They practice it all the time.

They practice it all the time.

They practice it all the time.

And what do we do?

We quit.

The Russians are using their EW in the field, in real combat, in Ukraine and Syria.  They’re seeing what works and what doesn’t.  They’re even applying it against our front line aircraft and, by all accounts, quite successfully.  Do you remember our own Gen. Raymond Thomas making this statement?

“Right now in Syria we are operating in the most aggressive EW environment on the planet from our adversaries. They are testing us everyday, knocking our communications down, disabling our EC-130s, etcetera.” (2)

“Disabling our EC-130s”?????  Does anyone else find that just a tiny bit alarming?

Do you remember that claim some time ago that a Russian aircraft ‘shut down’ the Burke class destroyer, USS Donald Cook in the Black Sea? (3)  We all dismissed it, at the time, but since then we’ve seen the extensive and successful Russian EW being applied in Ukraine and Syria and now I can’t help but wonder if there was an element of truth to the story.

Regardless, it’s clear that our military has a ‘head in the sand’ approach to EW.  We aren’t good at offensive or defensive EW so, instead of doing the hard work to get better, we just stop our exercises.  The sheer stupidity is staggering to behold.

ComNavOps has long stated that our over-dependence on networks is arrogant, misplaced, and foolish and is laying the foundation for defeat by leading to a state of helplessness when our electronic toys stop working.  These statements from former DepSecDef Work confirm my warnings.  We must relearn how to function when our toys die.  Every exercise should be conducted with no GPS, no network, no comm links, and no data sharing unless we can do so in the face of full EW attacks.  It’s time to quit sniveling in a corner crying ‘woe is me’ and put our big boy pants on and start relearning how to fight without our precious toys.

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(1)Breaking Defense, “US ‘Gets Its Ass Handed To It’ In Wargames: Here’s A $24 Billion Fix ”, Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., 7-Mar-2019,

https://breakingdefense.com/2019/03/us-gets-its-ass-handed-to-it-in-wargames-heres-a-24-billion-fix/

(2)Breaking Defense, “Russia Widens EW War, ‘Disabling’ EC-130s OR AC-130s In Syria ”, Colin Clark, 24-Apr-2018,

https://breakingdefense.com/2018/04/russia-widens-ew-war-disabling-ec-130s-in-syria/

(3)Voltaire Network website, “What spooked the USS Donald Cook so much in the Black Sea?”8-Nov-2014,

https://www.voltairenet.org/article185860.html

The Bare Minimum

In a recent post, we noted that the Army seems to be beginning to understand what a future war will entail (see, “Army Gets It”).  In particular, the Army seemed to recognize that, in combat, communications and networks would be significantly degraded and that equipment design should focus on the bare minimum rather than the ultimate possible.  This is an incredibly important point and I give the Army full credit for recognizing it (we’ll see whether they act on it, or not!).

As described by Maj. Gen. Peter Gallagher, head of the Army’s network Cross-Functional Team in a Breaking Defense article,

“Instead of optimizing the network to provide the best user experience in normal circumstances — the current standard — you optimize it to provide acceptable performance in extreme circumstances.” [article’s emphasis] (1)

This is worth restating …  We need to design for the bare minimum acceptable performance and design it in such a way as to ensure that minimum level is met regardless of circumstances.  We need a bare minimum baseline level of performance that the enemy cannot hinder.

Yes, we can also design in greater performance and, if circumstances permit (the enemy’s countermeasures aren’t present or aren’t as effective as anticipated), then we can enjoy the enhanced performance.  The point is that we can’t train to, and become dependent on, a higher level of performance.  We need to train to the bare minimum.

Hand in hand with designing to the bare minimum acceptable performance, we need to test our designs to the maximum extent possible.  ComNavOps has harped on this and will continue to do so.  The typical scripted, simplistic tests that currently pass for operational testing have to be dropped in favor of the most difficult tests we can devise because that’s the level of difficulty we’ll face in combat.

We need to make every effort to break our own designs so that we can learn how to build them so that the bare minimum acceptable performance is available no matter the circumstances.

That networked cooperative engagement type of capability sounds great on paper but will it function in combat?  Let’s get our best electronic warfare aircraft to plan and execute an attack on a Navy surface group.  Let’s give them access to every spec and secret of our networking so that they can take advantage of weaknesses.  You can bet China has all our specs and secrets and will do exactly that.  Let’s see if the group can establish and maintain a coherent tactical picture and a functional network in the face of that kind of attack.  If not – and I doubt they can – then we need to define the bare minimum acceptable performance and ensure that it is so secure that nothing can disrupt it.

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(1)Breaking Defense website, “Can’t Stop The Signal: Army Strips Down Network To Survive Major War”, Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., 26-Mar-2018,

https://breakingdefense.com/2018/03/cant-stop-the-signal-army-strips-down-network-to-survive-major-war/?_ga=2.141421307.876968781.1522068204-689266911.1437082743

Russian Jamming Is A Good Thing

Russia invaded Ukraine and immediately unleashed a storm of electronic warfare (EW).  This appears to have wakened and shocked the US military with many claiming that Russia is far ahead of us in tactical EW and, especially, small unit organic EW.

It should have been no surprise, then, that Russia would apply EW to its operations in the Middle East and Syria, in particular.  The Air Force has acknowledged that AC-130 gunships are being adversely affected by Russian/Syrian EW efforts.

"Right now in Syria, we're in the most aggressive [electronic warfare] environment on the planet from our adversaries," Gen. Raymond A. Thomas III [head of U.S. Special Operations Command] said April 25 before an audience at the U.S. Geospatial Intelligence Foundation's GEOINT 2018 Symposium.” (1)

"They're testing us everyday -- knocking our communications down, disabling our AC-130s, et cetera," Thomas said during his speech …” (1)

This is some of the best news I’ve heard in a long time.  It means that we’re being given a hard lesson in EW, we’re being forced to learn how to operate in an EW environment, and we’re being shown which of our equipment works and which doesn’t.  We can only benefit from this.

Recall that during the Cold War, the Navy became masters of modern ASW because there were Soviet submarines seemingly everywhere.  We were forced to practice real ASW against the actual opponents we would face in a war.  It made us better.  

There were reports of Russian aircraft directing EW attacks at the USS Cook in the Black Sea.  The claim was that they “shut down” the destroyer.  The claim has been generally discredited and it is even doubtful whether any attempted attack occurred.  I hope it did and I would like to see Russia conduct regular EW attacks against our naval forces.

There have been confirmed GPS spoofing attacks in the Black Sea, presumably by Russia although the source doesn’t really matter (2).  I just hope that our naval forces are subjected to GPS denial attacks.  It can only benefit us to be forced to learn how to navigate without GPS or in a GPS contested environment.

Russia is reported by USNI News website to have set up a mobile EW Murmansk BN system to eavesdrop on US ships in the Black Sea (3).

“Russia has installed a modern mobile electronic warfare system in Crimea to eavesdrop on U.S. ships in the Black Sea and potentially jam their communications, a U.S. defense official confirmed to USNI News on Monday.”

“The system is designed to both collect signals emanating from adversary ships or aircraft as well as jam high-frequency communications.” (3)

The article cited sources that suggested that the Aegis system would not be affected but that data links could be.  I can only hope that Russia attempts to use the full capabilities of their system against our ships.  We can only benefit from the attempts.

An obvious corollary to Russian EW attacks is the question, why aren’t we conducting our own EW directed at Russian assets?  To be fair, it’s possible that we are and just aren’t talking about it.  However, if we were, I’m sure that Russia would be screaming to the world about our use of death rays and brain zappers against passive, law-abiding Russian service members.  Thus, it seems obvious that we aren’t.  This may be due to a desire to keep our abilities secret, which is understandable if misguided, or may be due to a lack of effective capabilities, which is a more likely reason, or may be due to a paralyzing fear of escalation and a lack of intestinal fortitude to confront the Russians, which is the most likely explanation.

Withholding EW actions due to a desire to keep capabilities secret is theoretically valid but fails the reality check test.  Russia and China undoubtedly know all about our capabilities through their extensive hacking so there’s not much point trying to hide the capabilities.  We’ll gain more by real world testing than we’ll lose by protecting secrets that are unlikely to actually be secret.

So, regarding the Russian EW aimed at our forces, ComNavOps says, “Thank you Russia!  You’re doing us a huge favor.”

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(1)DoDBuzz website, “General: Electronic Jamming a Growing Problem for Aircraft in Syria”, Oriana Pawlyk, 30-Apr-2018,

https://www.military.com/dodbuzz/2018/04/30/general-electronic-jamming-growing-problem-aircraft-syria.html

(2)The Maritime Executive website, “Mass GPS Spoofing Attack In Black Sea?”, Dana Goward, 11-Aug-2017,

https://www.maritime-executive.com/editorials/mass-gps-spoofing-attack-in-black-sea#gs.T3EV2QM

(3)USNI News website, “U.S. Official: Russia Installed System in Crimea to Snoop on U.S. Destroyers, Jam Communications”, Sam LaGrone, 1-May-2017,

https://news.usni.org/2017/05/01/official-russia-installs-system-crimea-snoop-u-s-destroyers-jam-communications