AFSB - Looking For Something To Do

How many times have I said it?  Before you build a ship you spell out a concept of operations (CONOPS).  Well, the Navy has violated that simple requirement yet again and now we’re seeing the Navy flounder yet again, trying to figure out how to use a ship.  This time it’s the Afloat Forward Staging Base, USNS Lewis B. Puller, which is replacing the USS Ponce – yes, I know, the Navy is resorting to another of their gimmicks to try to make the size of the fleet appear larger by commissioning the Puller into the Navy instead of residing in the Military Sealift Command where all other similar ships and, in fact, its sister ship reside.  That aside …

The floundering is highlighted in what was, no doubt, intended to be a celebratory article on the USNI News website (1) about the arrival of Puller to the 5th Fleet.  Read the following snippets and you’ll get a sense that the Navy has a ship with no pre-defined role and is desperately searching for something it can do.  The ship’s Captain appears to have been tasked with trying to “sell” the ship to the rest of the Navy/Marines and find something for it to do.

“… Femino [Capt. Joseph Femino, commanding officer of Puller’s gold crew] said the ship has been busy working with Marines, special operations forces (SOF) and even French amphibious forces to learn how Puller could best support other naval platforms.”

“… Marines put a Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team (FAST) platoon on the ship to start learning their way around the ESB.”

“The U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) force surgeon has visited the ship to look into possible medical applications.”

“In October, a SOF team came out to practice fast-rope drills from their helicopters onto the flight deck and to learn how to bring their small boats onto the Puller mission bay with the ship’s crane.”

“Work with the mine countermeasures community is moving a bit more slowly – even though the Ponce and then Puller were initially requested by 5th Fleet specifically to support the MCM mission – but the crew have been aboard to assess the mission planning spaces and other assets Puller could provide.”

“This ship is a blank canvas. Whoever wants to come assess what they want, develop what they want, we’ll work to try and get that,” Femino said …”

A “blank canvas”???  Seriously?  It’s not supposed to be.  You’re supposed to have a detailed CONOPS and be working on implementing it – not looking around for something to do.

“Femino said there has also been an element of just trying something and seeing if it works.  “People bring their things and let’s see how they fit. And then if we need to modify then we’ll modify,” he said.”

There’s an element “of just trying something”????  This is a ship looking for something to do because it didn’t have a CONOPS.

“[Femino] made clear, “we are not an amphib. … The question is, how can we enable the amphibs to do things better?”

Question?  There aren’t supposed to be any questions about the function of the ship.  The CONOPS is supposed to have spelled that all out.

When asked what they needed to do to better utilize the ship, Capt. Femino responded

“… address the mine countermeasures mission in a more meaningful way; figure out how to work alongside an Amphibious Ready Group and embarked Marine Expeditionary Unit, rather than bringing smaller groups of Marines onboard Puller itself … “

AFSB Puller - Does Anyone Need Me?

Mine countermeasures (MCM) was supposedly the main function of the vessel and yet the Navy is trying to figure out what to do with the ship in that role????  This is what a CONOPS is for!  You’re supposed to already know what you want to do and how you’re going to do it.  Sure, you’ll still have to figure out which line to throw over which pulley but the basic concept is supposed to have been worked out years ago!  Instead, MCM is “moving a bit more slowly” and the ship’s Captain is trying to address MCM “in a more meaningful way”.  The Navy hasn’t got a clue what to do with this.  There was, clearly, no CONOPS and no one was prepared to do anything with the vessel.  Didn’t we learn a thing from the LCS debacle which lacked a CONOPS and now no one knows what to do with them?  Apparently not!

“On the MCM mission, “we’ve done a little bit of work with mine warfare, but quite frankly we haven’t really [fleshed] out all of the mine warfare,” Femino said …”

Again, MCM was supposed to be the main function!

“The reason there was an RFF, the reason they created Ponce was I believe for a request for forces (RFF) to support the mine countermeasures process,” he said …”

The Captain of the ship isn’t completely sure what the purpose of the ship is although he “believes” it was to support MCM.  If there was a CONOPS, he’d know what the ship’s purpose is.

“Also on the to-do list, though, is working with the Avenger-class MCM ships in 5th Fleet to see if Puller could help refuel them or support them in any other way.”

It’s on the to-do list to see if the ship can support MCM Avengers?  Again, that should have been spelled out, one way or the other, in the CONOPS!

It gets even more unbelievable.

“The skipper said he’d also like to work with a carrier at some point, but that overall he has to balance working with a lot of different potential customers versus becoming proficient at working with some of them.”

So, the Captain wants to work with everyone even if that means not becoming proficient at any one thing?  Wasn’t the ship, like every other ship, built to be extremely proficient at one main function?  I guess not.  That’s what happens when you don’t have a CONOPS.

Again, you get the distinct impression that the Captain was told to go find a mission.

The Navy is incapable of learning any lessons and this – to develop a CONOPS before designing and building a ship – is one of the most basic.  We have absolute idiots leading the Navy.

_______________________________________

(1)USNI News website, “USNI News Video: Sea Base USS Lewis B. Puller Finding Its Way in 5th Fleet”, Megan Eckstein, 3-Apr-2018,

https://news.usni.org/2018/04/03/usni-news-video-sea-base-uss-lewis-b-puller-finding-way-5th-fleet

AFSB and MCM

The Navy’s first purpose designed Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB) is the USNS Lewis B. Puller (T-ESB-3).  It was delivered to the Navy in Jun 2015 and is being readied for a Mid East deployment late next year.  As a reminder, the ship is a Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) with a flight deck added some 40 ft above the main deck (yes, that raises questions about stability).  The interesting thing about this ship is that it’s primary mission is mine countermeasures (MCM)(1).

“The baseline requirement, the threshold requirement, is MCM capability.”

Apparently, the ship will conduct MCM primarily through the use of helicopters, specifically the MH-53E.  The ship has space for two helo parking spots on the flight deck, two operating spots, and two in the hangar.  The article suggests that the Navy is looking at increasing the operational spots by converting the parking spots to operating.

The interesting aspect of this is the focus on helicopter MCM versus the LCS’ emphasis on remote unmanned underwater vehicles.  Previously, the Navy MCM focused on two main components:  helicopters and in-the-water operations from small MCM vessels like the Avenger class.  Now, the Navy seems to be attempting to use the LCS for the in-the-water ops and the AFSB for the helicopter operations.

Afloat Forward Staging Base

Of course, the AFSB could also operate in-the-water vehicles although this would, of necessity, place a very large ship very close to the minefield.  We’ll have to see how this develops.  Again, I get the feeling that the Navy is stumbling its way through mine countermeasures warfare rather than having a very clear plan developed from operational experience and wargaming analysis.  For instance, how will an AFSB conduct MCM against a peer in a contested environment?  I’d really like to see the Navy game out its MCM efforts, specifically in these scenarios:

• Contested amphibious landings
• Contested restricted passages
• Lightly contested, wide area mine clearance
• High speed movements (for example, a carrier group attempting a high speed transit through potentially mined areas)

Like so many Navy developments, this is a small piece of a much bigger picture and the piece is developed seemingly in an operational vacuum.  We’ll have to wait to see how the AFSB integrates into the overall MCM force and operations.

(1)USNI, “Expeditionary Mobile Base Chesty Puller May Receive SOF Upgrades Before 5th Fleet Deployment”, Megan Eckstein, November 2, 2015,

http://news.usni.org/2015/11/02/expeditionary-mobile-base-chesty-puller-may-receive-sof-upgrades-before-5th-fleet-deployment

MLP Update

Let’s take an updated look at the Mobile Landing Platform, MLP, vessel program, once the hottest thing in the Navy but now largely quiet.  The MLP, you’ll recall, is intended as a mobile, floating pier allowing cargo transfers between large transports and smaller vessels or connectors.  In addition, the Navy has developed an Afloat Forward Staging Base, AFSB, variant of the MLP which incorporates an elevated flight deck.  The base MLP is built on a commercial oil tanker hull and is 764 ft long with accommodations for 250 personnel.  The ships will be operated by the Military Sealift Command, hence the USNS designation.

To date, four vessels are complete or under contract with two configured as MLPs and two as AFSBs.

MLP-1                        USNS Montford Point           2013 delivery

MLP-2                        USNS John Glenn                 2014 delivery

MLP-3 / AFSB           USNS Lewis B. Puller          2015 delivery

MLP-4 / AFSB           USNS ??                                2018 delivery

I’ve scoured the media for MLP contract announcements and here is the contract history.

Mar 2009       $3.5M             MLP design

Dec 2009       $7M                ?

Apr 2010        $10M              ?

Aug 2010       $115M            long lead items for MLP-1

May 2011       $744M            addition to contract for first two MLPs

Jul 2011         $60M              long lead items for MLP-3

Feb 2012       $360M            MLP-3

Jun 2013        $11.2M           MLP-3/4 design work

Dec 2013       $21.4M           MLP-3/AFSB

Mar 2014       $128M            contract addition to convert MLP-3 to AFSB

Jun 2014        $64.1M           long lead items for MLP-4

Dec 2014       $498M            MLP-4 as AFSB

Total =            $2.022B

So, as best I can piece together, here are the individual ship costs.

MLP-1                        $440  

MLP-2                        $440

MLP-3 / AFSB           $581

MLP-4 / AFSB           $498

The higher price for the second pair is understandable as they have the AFSB additions.

There are no concrete plans for additional ships, as far as I know and the continuing budget limitations probably preclude any additional vessels.

As far as usefulness, I’ve heard remarkably little, good or bad, about the ship’s performance and utility.  Of course, to be fair, the first vessel is just now achieving operational status so there has been little chance for hands on experimentation.  USS Ponce, which was converted to a makeshift AFSB, was reported to be quite useful in the MCM mothership role.

This is a vessel and concept that I’m somewhat dubious about.  The cargo transfer function seems like an unnecessarily inefficient extra step that ought to be addressed by designing larger ships with the ability to transfer cargo directly to connectors.  The MLP also represents an enormous vulnerability.  If the bulk of an amphibious assault’s cargo must pass through the MLP, that would make the ship a very high priority target and a single point of failure for the entire assault.  Regardless, having only two (or four if the AFSBs are counted) MLPs seems woefully insufficient to support a major amphibious assault.



MLP - The Jury Is Out



As an MCM mothership, I’m sure the ship would be very useful but I’m also sure that a smaller, dedicted, purpose built MCM mothership would be a better option for that role.

As with the JHSV, this seems to be a ship design that lacks a clearly defined and necessary mission.

The ultimate value of the ships will lie in how the Navy chooses to use them and for that we’ll have to wait and see.

Tarawa, LHA-1 - Additional Service?

We saw in the last post that the Tarawa (LHA-1) class amphibious ships were retired early at just 30 years of service and with no real justification.  All right, let’s set that aspect aside.  Given that the class was retired, the next logical question is could any further worthwhile use have been gotten from the class even in another role?  Well, here’s a few possibilities.

LCS Mothership.  The LCS is going to be operated in squadrons (maybe – the Navy still isn’t sure what it’s going to do with the LCS!) which, given the concept of off-board maintenance for the LCS, just cries out for a mothership as the anchor for a group of ships.  The Tarawa mothership can provide the centralized, off-board maintenance support the LCS’s need, as well as providing refueling, rearming, reprovisioning, centralized command and control, and additional aviation support that would enhance the effectiveness of the LCS’s.  With no embarked Marines to support, the Tarawa should be able to operate with greatly reduced crews.

ASW/MCM Mothership.  The main platform in both ASW and MCM appears to be helos, at least until the magic remote unmanned vehicles pan out, and what better vessel to host helos than a former amphibious ship.

Littoral Combat Ship.  What are the attributes that the Navy claims make for an effective littoral combat ship?  They include extensive helo support and large flight decks, the ability to launch and recover remote unmanned vehicles, and sufficient weaponry to fight small boat swarms.  The Navy also claims that stealth and speed are necessary but the speed requirement has already been pretty well debunked and stealth is a debatable characteristic, at least for the ASW and MCM missions.  The Tarawas have the requisite characteristics in spades, other than stealth.  A single Tarawa operating a couple of dozen helos and with the capacity to launch and control dozens of remote, unmanned vehicles would be many times more effective than even a squadron of LCS’s.  Additional guns could be added to deal with small craft in the ASuW role.

Afloat Forward Staging Base.  This has already been done, just not with a Tarawa.  If AFSBs are a useful asset, the Tarawas are ready made and already paid for.  They simply need a relatively minor conversion.  Again, the crew requirements ought to be greatly reduced.

I can go on but you get the idea.  I leave it to you to come up with other uses.  You’ll note that these conversions would generally require only modest upgrades or conversions and would result in reduced crew sizes.

Normally, I would end the post at this point but I’m going to go a step further.  The post discussions have been disappointing of late.  People are fixating on trivial, ancillary details rather than the larger themes presented in the posts.  I’m going to attempt to improve the quality of discussion by explicitly pointing out what the larger themes are and challenge you to think and dig a bit deeper.

I have no problem with someone offering an amplifying thought about one of the uses I’ve proposed but that’s not really the point of the post.  The main theme is the Navy’s tendency to retire usable ships early without giving any consideration to alternate uses even if the ship is no longer suitable for its original purpose.  Combine this with the budget challenges facing the Navy and the dwindling size of the fleet and the overarching question is why can’t the Navy extract additional useful service out of older ships, ESPECIALLY CONSIDERING THAT THEY’RE ALREADY PAID FOR?  How do we justify the policy of early retirement of ship classes that can still provide useful service?  How does the Navy reconcile their stated desire for a larger fleet with their demonstrated policy of early retirements coupled with, generally, numerically smaller replacement classes?

A Commercial Navy?

Not withstanding some of the recent examples of new ships, naval vessels are generally characterized by strong construction, a degree of armor, extensive compartmentation, enhanced firefighting systems, high speed, and other features designed to allow a ship to fight, take damage, continue fighting, and survive.  Commercial vessels lack most of those characteristics and would be ill-suited for combat scenarios.

Consider, though, that the majority of combat scenarios we can reasonably anticipate will involve lower end threat levels and somewhat more permissive environments.  For example, putting small forces into African nations, staging anti-terrorist raids, conducting rescues, clearing mine fields, etc. would all involve combat with little risk to an offshore staging/basing vessel.  For that matter, even more intense combat scenarios would often be conducted in a protected, reasonably permissive environment under the watch of an Aegis escort and/or friendly air cover.

If we are willing to accept a reasonable degree of risk, many of these functions can be filled by commercial type cargo/barge vessels at a fraction of the cost of naval vessels.  I’m not suggesting that commercial standard vessels should replace naval amphibious ships or operate in extreme forward, high threat environments.  I am suggesting that commercial vessels could supplement our naval vessels in many scenarios at a fraction of the cost.  In concept, the USS Ponce which has been fitted out as an Afloat Forward Staging Base is an example of this type of vessel except that it is a full fledged naval vessel.  Given that it was due for retirement anyway, the low cost conversion to an AFSB was warranted.  The Navy has indicated a desire for additional AFSBs but budget constraints have derailed those plans.  Commercial vessels might well be able to fill the AFSB roles in many scenarios at an affordable price.  Heck, forgoing a single multi-billion dollar new construction amphibious ship would fund several commercial AFSB type ships.  The Navy has got to face the reality of constrained budgets for the foreseeable future and selective use of commercial vessels offers an alternative way to maintain as much capability as possible.

If the requirements for combat and damage control are removed from consideration, as we’re discussing here, what’s left is, for all practical purposes, a commercial barge or cargo vessel, is it not?  One could easily imagine a small fleets of commercial vessels providing the backbone of a permanent African presence, supplementing the standing Mid East forces, and assisting in presence and patrol duties in select areas around the Pacific.

Barges, in particular, offer a great deal of capability, under the right circumstances, for next to no cost.  Consider the photo of the barge in this post.  It’s quite large and was designed by Cross Marine in Utah as a floating hospital complex for use in remote regions.  Picture it as a base for Special Ops, helo units, UAV intelligence gathering, small unit basing, a mothership of sorts for small patrol craft, etc. 



Cross Marine's Hospital Barge



The possible uses for commercial vessels and barges are virtually unlimited and offer a viable, low cost option to supplement naval capabilities during these budget constrained times.  It’s worth thinking about!

USS Ponce - Afloat Forward Staging Base

Navy Times has posted a short article (1) describing the initial deployment of the USS Ponce which is the amphibious ship that was converted into an afloat forward staging base.  Among other possible uses, the ship will provide mine countermeasures support, SOF support and command facilities, area surveillance via UAVs, mothership maintenance support to smaller vessels, and so forth.  This is still a somewhat experimental concept in terms of opertional concepts and usefulness but it is good to see the Navy get more use out of an older amphibious ship rather than retire it.



USS Ponce Recovering UAV



 The most interesting aspect of this is that the ship is largely crewed by civilians with roughly ¾ from the Military Sealift Command (MSC) and the remaining ¼ from the Navy.  Given that the ship is intended to operate close to the action, that raises the likely possibility of combat operations by a civilian crewed ship.  MSC has operated supply ships for the Navy for a long time and I’m sure the legal aspects of potential combat have long since been dealt with, however, this is the most extreme example of a civilian crewed ship intended to be very near the action that I’m aware of.

I wonder how combat, damage control, command, and discipline are handled?  I know little about this aspect of the Navy but it’s a fascinating area.

(1) Navy Times, http://www.navytimes.com/news/2012/09/ap-navy-floating-base-gets-workout-092212/, Adam Schreck, Sep 22, 2012