Constellation Frigate Update

As you know, the Navy has terminated the Constellation frigate program with only the first two ships possibly being completed and even that now appears to be unlikely, according to the most recent GAO annual weapons assessment report.[1]
 

According to senior Navy officials, these two ships are under review for potential termination.  ... These officials further stated that in March 2026, the Navy directed its shipbuilder to pause ordering material for FFG 62 and FFG 63 to evaluate its necessity as those ships remain under review.[1]

With the continuation of the two remaining ships under review and the shipbuilder having been directed to stop ordering materials, the conclusion seems inescapable:  the two ships will be terminated.
 
Why does this kind of debacle continue to happen to the Navy?  The Navy knowingly continues to commit programmatic suicide by failing to follow best practices.
 

As we previously reported, the Navy had obligated over $3.4 billion to construct six ships before completing the frigate’s basic and functional design—an approach counter to shipbuilding leading practices.[1]

The Navy paid for a ship that didn’t even have a design.  Who could have anticipated anything would go wrong with that?
 
What went wrong?
 

The extent of design changes exceeded the original expectation of conducting limited design changes on the parent design.[1]

This tells me the Navy is incompetent on an almost unimaginable scale and failed to do their homework before committing.  How has no one been fired over this?
 
As weight growth became an issue, the Navy’s response was hilariously stupid.
 

Concurrently, the Navy and shipbuilder have evaluated weight savings opportunities, including removing redundant systems, removing primer from steel plating, and reducing firefighting system capacity, among other things.[1]

What could possibly go wrong by removing redundant systems (a vital element of combat survivability), removing primer from steel (of course the paint will stick without primer … won’t it??), and reducing firefighting capacity (every damage control effort in history has depended on firefighting – did the Navy learn nothing from the 202 fire aboard USS Bonhomme Richard?)? 
 
Eliminate primer and reduce firefighting?  Come on.  I couldn’t even sell that as an April Fools joke.
 
There’s stupid and then there’s Navy stupid which is just a whole ‘nother level of stupid.  How has no one been fired for even considering these changes?
 
I can only conclude that one of the requirements of for attaining flag rank is to undergo a lobotomy and a pretty extensive one, at that.  Either that or they’re all Chinese agents.  Nothing else can explain the non-stop parade of stupid ideas and decisions spewing forth from Navy leadership.

__________________________________

[1]Government Accountability Office, "Weapon Systems Annual Assessment", Jul 2026, p.144

Constellation Lessons

Christopher Cavas has a maritime podcast and recently offered a ‘lessons learned’ episode about the Constellation.[1]  In it, he speaks with former Under and Acting Secretary of the Navy Thomas Modly and retired Rear Admiral and former Fincantieri executive Chuck Goddard about lessons from the Constellation disaster.  Both Modly and Goddard were intimately involved with the Constellation.  Modly’s contribution was the usual worthless civilian nonsense.  Goddard’s thoughts are what we’ll focus on.  The podcast is interesting and worth listening to but not for the right reasons.
 
As you listen to the podcast, understand that both men were involved with the Constellation and, given the magnitude of the program failure, clearly neither man was part of the solution which means they were part – a very large part! - of the problem.  The entire interview, then, is the problem explaining what went wrong without being aware enough to even recognize that they were what went wrong!  The problem was trying to explain what the problem was!  The resulting discussion was exactly what you’d expect:  a mishmash of delusion and obvliviousness.
 
Before we go any further, it is important to understand Goddard’s background.
 

• Senior Vice President responsible for the FFG 62 Program for Fincantieri Marinette Marine (FMM)
• Capture Executive for the $5.5 billion FFG(X) program at Fincantieri Marine Group
• CEO, President and GM of FMM from Jun 2011 – Jul 2014
• Lockheed Martin director of Aegis Program Integration and Capture Manager for the Aegis Combat Systems Engineering Agent (CSEA) competition
• During his thirty-year career with the Navy, he led a variety of complex ship programs from destroyers to sealift ships, culminating in his role as the Navy Program Executive Officer, Ships
• Vice Commander Naval Sea Systems Command
• Chairman SUBSAFE Program review
• DDG 1000 Major Program Manager during design and development
• New Construction Officer at Supervisor of Shipbuilding, San Diego, CA overseeing AOE-10, Sealift Conversion and Sealift New Construction programs

 
He has been involved in a lot of failures and had an entire career to effect positive changes and completely failed to do so.  Almost every group he was with has been heavily criticized on this blog.  He has been part of, and known nothing but, failure his entire career.
 
As a general observation, Goddard utterly fails to grasp any actual lessons learned beyond the superficial and nearly irrelevant level which is typical of managerial incompetence.  Such managers simply can’t see or grasp the real lessons.  If they could, they would have changed things while they were in a position to do so.
 
For example, one of the major (perhaps the main) lessons from the Constellation was something we’ve harped on relentlessly:  the failure to generate a comprehensive Concept of Operations (CONOPS).  The Constellation never had a sharply defined mission/function.  It was a mini-Burke which is to say that it was all things to all people.  Goddard himself offers an observation that simultaneously demonstrates this and illustrates his complete failure to grasp what it means.  He noted that the Constellation eventually sank under the weight of the never-ending flood of change orders emanating from NAVSEA’s attempt to spec and build the frigate as a destroyer because they had no experience designing and building a frigate so they fell back on what they knew:  the Burke!  They designed and spec’ed the Constellation as if it were a Burke.  This demonstrates the lack of a CONOPS that would have filtered out any destroyer-like, non-frigate changes.  Absent a sharply defined CONOPS, there was no basis to reject any change order since each change, in isolation, seemed justifiable.  
 
While he fails to understand the true relevance of his observation, Goddard nevertheless identifies a key failing of the Navy:  they only know how to make one type of surface combatant, the Burke.  All their expectations, requirements, specifications, etc. are from the Burke.  I’ve repeatedly talked about the folly of continuing to build the Burke class (see, “Burkes – TheAnchor Around the Navy’s Neck”) and the folly of building large, multi-function ships, in general.  We should be building many types of single function ships and this is yet another reason why.  We need a Navy/NAVSEA that is comfortable with multiple ship types and understands why they exist, what their roles are, how they differ, and how to spec and build them.  The Chinese have extensive classes of missile boats, corvettes, frigates, destroyers, and destroyer/cruisers.  We have Burkes and that’s it.  We are a one-trick pony surface fleet and one-trick NAVSEA.  We know nothing else but Burkes.
 
Goddard’s comment about NAVSEA attempting to spec the Constellation as a Burke finalizes and confirms the observation that the Constellation was a mini-Burke rather than an ASW frigate or convoy escort or whatever else some observers wished it was.  Again, Goddard recognizes the change orders as a problem but fails to see that the mini-Burke mindset was a problem stemming from the lack of a CONOPS and that NAVSEA should have been “educated” and squashed from day one.
 
The entire NAVSEA attempt to spec the Constellation as a Burke also offers the larger issue of how to appropriately “downgrade” a ship from a high end destroyer to a low level frigate.  What degree of reduced structural strength is appropriate?  What level of reduced survivability?  How much redundancy?  What degree of separation of key components? And so on.  A frigate must be “less” than a destroyer or else it is a destroyer.  Navy/NAVSEA have clearly not come to terms with the appropriate level of downgrading for a frigate.
 
Goddard and Modly go on to offer other, multiple, supposed lessons learned but fail to accept even the slightest blame for their own involvement and failings.  For example, Goddard notes that the Constellation, still only partially complete, had already gained 1000 ton on what was intended to be a 7000 ton ship.  That’s more than a 14% growth even before the ship was half complete!  Despite that stunning failure, no one made any attempt to figure out why the weight gain was occurring and what to do about it.
 
The podcast is interesting but ultimately worthless in terms of any actual lessons learned and illustrates that the people running the Navy are so completely incompetent that they are inherently incapable of recognizing and learning any actual lessons.
 
 
 
__________________________________

 
[1] Defense & Aerospace Report CAVASSHIPS Podcast [Dec 04, ’25] Ep: 220 Tom Modly & Chuck Goddard on Constellation Lessons Learned, 4-Dec-2025,
https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/defense-aerospace-report-cavasships-podcast-dec-04/id1573063059?i=1000739767674

The Next Frigate Disaster

Now that the Constellation has failed miserably, the Navy has semi-formally stated that the next frigate will be a modified Coast Guard National Security Cutter (NSC, Legend class) and will be in the water by 2028.[1]  …  …  …   Sorry for the pause, there.  I had to retype that sentence several times because I kept making mistakes trying to type while laughing hysterically.  From vague concept to in the water in three years or less – that’s hilarious!
 

“We believe the future frigate can be in the water in 2028,” Jason Potter, the Navy’s acting acquisition executive, told attendees today at the Defense Forum here in Washington.[1]
 
[SecNav] Phelan also recently told attendees at a private dinner that the new frigate would be a modified National Security Cutter … [1]
 
Navy Secretary John Phelan said the new frigate would be based on an American design and stressed that any change orders would have to go through him.[1]

While such a timetable ought to be easily achievable, the recent record of Navy shipbuilding renders it a laughable fantasy.
 
Let’s set that aside and take a quick glance at the NSC and examine some potential issues.
 

National Security Cutter

Concurrency.  It’s not even a formal program, yet, and there’s already a potentially troubling bit of news, as indicated below.
 

He [Jason Potter] said the service was focused on using a design approach that separates finalizing the ship’s design from the construction of the lead ship … [1]

That’s a frightening statement because I don’t know what it means.  One of the Navy’s persistent, major problems with shipbuilding is concurrency which results in construction without a complete design.  In other words, unbelievably, the construction is treated as a separate issue from design.  Potter’s statement could be interpreted as saying that construction will NOT be linked to a requirement for a complete design (the “separation” he mentions).  If so, this would be simply repeating an approach that has failed every time it’s been used.  Did Potter just lay the groundwork for the failure of this program before it’s even become a formal program or did he mean something different and, if so, what did he mean?
 
Size.  The NSC, as it exists in Coast Guard service, measures 418ft long and 54ft in beam.  In comparison, the Constellation is 496ft x 65ft.  Thus, the NSC is 16% shorter and 17% narrower.  That’s a significant chunk of deck space and internal volume “gone”.  The Constellation was not exactly heavily armed to begin with and the reduced size of the NSC is, presumably, going to require significant reductions in the weapons fit compared to the Constellation.  If it comes with a commensurate reduction in cost, that might be okay but we’ve seen time and again that costs do not decrease in scale with capability decreases.  The Constellation was, itself, a third the capabilities of a Burke at 80%, or so, of the cost.  If the NSC “shrinks” at the same rate from the Constellation, we’ll have something on the order of 20% of the capabilities of a Burke at 60% of the cost.
 
CONOPS.  The discussion of capabilities leads us into the next troublesome issue and that is … of course you know what it is … CONOPS!  SecNav has apparently already chosen a ship to build, established a timetable, and is talking about design and construction processes but …  …  where is the CONOPS?  The Constellation never had one so they won’t be reusing that.  What is this frigate supposed to do?  What is its focus?  Its mission?  It’s going to have fewer capabilities than the Constellation, presumably, so it really needs to have a tight mission focus to ensure that it can be effective in whatever its role will be.  Otherwise, we’re going to wind up with a mini-mini-Burke.  Mini²-Burke?  I’m already sensing a ship that will attempt to do a very small amount of everything and will do absolutely nothing even slightly well.  To paraphrase … Jack of no trades, adequate of none?
 
Change Orders.  As noted above, SecNav has, apparently, identified change orders as a problem in shipbuilding, claiming that change orders will have to go through him.  If, by that, he means he won’t be approving any, that’s great.  On the other hand, if he simply means he’ll rubber stamp the change orders than we just have a sound bite with no actual improvement in the shipbuilding process.  As a reminder, all waivers for ship construction and trials must go through the CNO, personally.  The problem is that no CNO has ever met a waiver he didn’t approve so what’s the point of the approval process?  Will SecNav just become an automatic approval for change orders?  The mere fact that he even states that change orders must go through him implies that he will approve some/all.  This is the wrong approach.  He should have flatly stated that once the design is set there will be no change orders … period!  But … he didn’t.  Again, this is establishing the groundwork for failure, already.
 
Structure.  It is unknown whether the NSC meets Navy structural standards as regards strength, compartmentation, weight margins, etc.  The NSC is reportedly built to 80-90% military standards but what is lacking and how critical it is, is unknown.  As you recall, the Constellation program got in trouble trying to modify the FREMM to USN construction and survivability standards.  Will history repeat itself, here?
 
Testing.  The NSC has a near mythical reputation among naval observers who have constantly called for the Navy to adopt/adapt the NSC to naval use.  The reality, however, is that the NSC, like every ship, has problems that may render it unsuitable for naval service without extensive redesign and modifications (bye, bye budget!).  The Jan 2016 GAO report [2] noted,
 

The U.S. Navy, the Coast Guard’s independent test agent, completed initial testing for the National Security Cutter (NSC) in April 2014 and rated the NSC as operationally effective and suitable. Still, testing revealed 10 major deficiencies (some are shown in figure). Initial testing is an event designed to verify performance of critical systems to ensure assets are capable of meeting mission requirements. The event tests critical operational issues and key performance parameters. The NSC fully met 12 of 19 key performance parameters. Tests of one key performance parameter, as well as other critical systems, were deferred to follow-on testing. The Coast Guard and the U.S. Navy disagree on the NSC’s requirements for cutter boat operations. Without clear requirements the Navy and Coast Guard will not have a basis for determining actions to resolve any performance issues. Coast Guard officials acknowledged that clarifying these requirements would be beneficial.[2]
 
According to Coast Guard documentation, it may choose not to correct all deficiencies due to the cost of changes.[2]
 
During operations, the NSC has experienced performance issues that were not identified during initial testing, and the Coast Guard has planned design changes to some of the cutters’ equipment [ed. from an accompanying diagram, problem equipment includes CIWS, CIWS ammo hoist, engines, generators, boat, boat crane, 57mm gun, 57mm gun ammo hoist, TRS 3D radar, Nulka decoy launcher, and midships boat davit] …  However, the Coast Guard has not yet found the causes for problems affecting the NSC’s propulsion systems. As a result of these and other equipment failures, the NSC has been operating in a degraded condition in some mission areas. DHS has no plans for additional acquisition review boards for the NSC, which would provide oversight going forward.[2]

 
Discussion
 
The failure of the Constellation program presents an opportunity for the Navy to course-correct.  Assuming the NSC platform can be successfully adapted to meet naval combat and survivability standards at an affordable cost – no sure thing – the platform offers the ability to construct a small, focused vessel for the ASW frigate mission.    Instead of a bloated, overpriced, under armed, and unfocused ship with no defined purpose, the Navy has the chance to design a small, focused, affordable ASW-centric ship.  What the NSC does not offer is the ability to be a mini-Burke like the Constellation.  Whether the Navy will be wise enough to recognize this limitation and the opportunity it presents is an open question with an all too likely failed answer but time will tell.
 
 
 
_________________________________

 
[1]Breaking Defense, “Navy wants new frigate in 2028, says service’s acquisition head”, Justin Katz, 10-Dec-2025,
https://breakingdefense.com/2025/12/navy-wants-new-frigate-in-2028-says-services-acquisition-head/
 
[2]Government Accountability Office, “NATIONAL SECURITY CUTTER, Enhanced Oversight Needed to Ensure Problems Discovered during Testing and Operations Are Addressed”, Jan 2016, GAO-16-148,
https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/674924.pdf

Constellation Construction Progress

We’ll probably never know the real reason why the Navy decided to terminate the Constellation program but one of the factors certainly had to be the glacially slow pace of construction progress.
 
Constellation was laid down 12-Apr-2024 although, as with most modern ships, construction of subassemblies had already begun.  Now, Nov-2025, 19+ months later, the ship is reportedly 12% complete.[1]  That’s 12% in 19+ months.  That’s an average of 0.6% construction progress per month.  At that rate, it would require 167 months (13.9 years!) to complete the construction and even then, that would only be the basic hull.  Fitting out would require many more months.
 
Fourteen years to partially build a frigate?
 
If you were SecNav, would you have continued this program?

 

Constellation Under Construction?

 

 
________________________________

 
[1]USNI News website, “Navy Cancels Constellation-class Frigate Program, Considering New Small Surface Combatants”, Sam LaGrone, 25-Nov-2025,
https://news.usni.org/2025/11/25/navy-cancels-constellation-class-frigate-program-considering-new-small-surface-combatants

Navy Cancels Constellation Frigate Class

You’re probably thinking this is a ComNavOps April Fool’s piece that somehow got misplaced on the calendar, right?  Well, it’s not. 
 

The Navy is walking away from the Constellation-class frigate program to focus on new classes of warships the service can build faster, Secretary of the Navy John Phelan announced Tuesday on social media.
 
Under the terms negotiated with shipbuilder Fincantieri Marinette Marine, the Wisconsin shipyard will continue to build Constellation (FFG-62) and Congress (FFG-63) but will cancel the next four planned warships.[1]

This is not exactly surprising.  ComNavOps has heavily criticized the Constellation program since day one and the evidence of failure has steadily accumulated since then.  The program should never have gotten this far.  That said, I do give the Navy some degree of credit for recognizing and terminating a failed program before it got totally out of hand.  How much better off would we be if the LCS had been cancelled after just two ships?
 
I have not seen an official explanation for the cancellation although reasons abound.  I doubt we’ll ever know the real reason.  So, lacking any definitive information, we’ll instead discuss the implications of the cancellation.
 
ASW, never a Navy point of emphasis, fades further into the background … out of sight, out of mind.  We now have no surface vessel that even pretends to do ASW except the Burkes and no sane commander will risk a multi-billion dollar vessel playing tag with a submarine.
 
Replacement options unfortunately include additional LCS (perhaps the modified Saudi versions?) and, most distressingly, some cockeyed, garbaged up “family” of unmanned craft.  The latter strikes me as exactly the kind of thing the Navy would do although either option, bad as they are, is more than plausible. 
 
There is also the question of whether the Constellation even needs to be replaced?  ComNavOps has opined that a frigate is about last on the list of the Navy’s needs.  If they did opt for a new design frigate, it should be just that: a new design and something along the Visby lines.
 
Orphans have now being created, just as has happened with Zumwalt and the F-35.  We’ll now have a mini-class of two ships that require their own dedicated supply, maintenance, training, and support pipelines and that never works out well.  It is almost certain that in a relatively short time frame, the Navy will declare the two ships too expensive to maintain and operate and will retire them early.  We seem to be early retiring a lot of ships, don’t we? 
 
CONOPS were never developed for the Constellation but even if they had, this now completely invalidates any concept of operations.  How do two ships fit into the fleet?  Where do two ships, dissimilar to the rest of the fleet and too small in number to have an impact, fit into the warfighting scheme?  The ships will not only be physical orphans, they’ll be operational orphans, much like the Zumwalts.  No commander will know what to do with them.
 
Trust between Congress, who holds the purse strings, and the Navy has never been lower and this is just going to make it even worse.  Congress has been extremely upset with the Navy for failures, lies, and deceit for several years now and, after being told by the Navy how vitally important the Constellation class was and after being assured that the “parent design” would eliminate all risk, Congress is going to be extremely skeptical and reluctant to fund whatever idiotic idea the Navy comes up with next.
 
Land facilities, as you recall, were built or being built to provide ashore testing and support for the class.  Obviously, they no longer serve a purpose.  Can they be repurposed into support for the next class or will they be abandoned … more of Congess’ (meaning us, the taxpayer) money lost to the Navy’s incompetence?
 
Accountability has never been a strong suit of the modern Navy.  Will SecDef Hegseth fire the people responsible for this debacle?  I doubt it.  He’s been a major disappointment.  This is yet another opportunity for him to truly change the culture of incompetence but I’ll be surprised if he does anything.
 
Battle Force structure is terribly out of whack, as we’ve discussed many times.  In WWII, we had a range of ships from the ultimate battleships and carriers all the way down to destroyer escorts.  We could tailor forces for the capability and risk we faced.  Today, we have only one class of surface ship, the Burke, and carriers.  There is no range from which we can select and tailor forces.  Any task we have, no matter how big or small, will be performed by a Burke/carrier.  This is how we wind up with Burkes chasing pirate skiffs.  The Constellations, poor a choice as they were, would have provided a degree of range.  Now … Burkes.
 

Goodbye

 
Conclusion
 
This has been a debacle, without a doubt.  The only saving grace is that it’s being stopped at two ships.  This was the program that would not, indeed could not, fail thanks to the Navy’s insistence on requiring a parent design (which they instantly abandoned and modified to a mere 15% commonality).  If the Navy couldn’t make a parent design approach work, what approach can they successfully execute?  The last successful surface ship the Navy built was the 1980’s Burke.  That’s forty years of subsequent failure.  If you were Congress, would you give the Navy any more money for anything?
 
The ripples of this failure will spread far and wide and last a long time.
 
 
 
____________________________

 
[1]USNI News website, “Navy Cancels Constellation-class Frigate Program, Considering New Small Surface Combatants”, Sam LaGrone, 25-Nov-2025,
https://news.usni.org/2025/11/25/navy-cancels-constellation-class-frigate-program-considering-new-small-surface-combatants

Unmanned Nonsense

China is cranking out high end warships at an impressive rate … at least compared to our anemic shipbuilding effort.  That means they’re cranking out serious, high level firepower in various forms.  We, on the other hand, seem hell bent on ditching our high end firepower in favor of ever less lethal unmanned toys.  The latest idea I came across is Naval News website speculating about cancelling the Constellation program and replacing it with small, unmanned vessels.
 

With a price tag approaching $1.1 billion to $1.2 billion dollars each for the USS Constellation (FFG-62) frigate, Naval News asked RAND and CSIS if the Medium Unmanned Surface Vessel (MUSV) and the DARPA No Manning Required Ship (NOMARS) can replace the troubled FFG-62 frigate program.
 
… can MUSVs and NOMARS substitute for the FFG-62 frigates in terms of missions, roles, weapons coverage, and functionalities?[1]

As repeatedly documented on this blog, the Constellation is a poor excuse for a WARship but it is still worlds better than any unmanned asset.
 
The key point in the Naval News article is the following.
 

While the U.S. Navy, Congress, and the Department of Defense debate over whether to continue the FFG-62 program with government cost-cutting and downsizing …[1]
 
Mark Cancian, retired U.S. Marine Corps colonel, and Senior Advisor to CSIS’s Defense and Security Department answered this question via email to Naval News in March 2025. Cancian wrote, “Yes, the [FFG-62] Constellation program is a mess, and the Navy is reviewing it, along with other troubled shipbuilding programs.[1]

To be honest, this is the first I’ve heard of the Constellation being directly considered for termination.  I know that all programs are being reassessed by the new administration but this is somewhat ominous given the Constellation program’s stunningly poor performance to date.
 
That aside, let’s examine the Naval News question – with its implied answer of yes – and see whether unmanned assets can replace the Constellation.
 
 
Mission
 
Most missions require manned interaction, interpretation, and decision making.  No unmanned asset can even begin to approach that level of automated action.  The recent example of an unmanned automobile backing over and dragging an injured person after an auto accident thoroughly demonstrates this point.  We are nowhere near Terminator level artificial intelligence.
 
Most missions, peace or war, require human presence and reasoning:  managed response to provocative moves – such as close approaches by another vessel, foreign exercises, port visits, boarding (VBSS), rescue and salvage, ASW, tactical improvisation, etc.
 
As the article points out,
 

[Unmanned assets] work better as remote sensors and shooters connected to the fleet.[1]

 
Weapons
 
Let’s start with the simplest comparison which is VLS cells since those are the main weapon of any warship.  The Constellation will have 32 Mark 41 VLS cells for Tomahawk cruise missiles, ESSM, and Standard SM-6 missiles.  In comparison, the MUSV, which is the patrol boat size ISR vessel as opposed to the LUSV which is the corvette size missile barge, has no weapons provision at all, at the moment, and is too small to fit VLS cells even if we wanted to.
 
In addition, the Constellation will carry 16 rack mounted, small anti-ship missiles, presumably the Naval Strike Missile (NSM).  The MUSV, given its small size, might be able to carry some kind of rack mounted anti-ship missile system such as the NSM.  That would likely be 4-8 missiles, depending on how many racks could fit on the boat.
 
Constellation also has a Mk110 57 mm gun.  The MUSV could not mount any comparable gun.
 
Finally, the Constellation has a RAM anti-air weapon which probably could be mounted on a MUSV.
 
NOMARS, as exemplified by the USX-1 Defiant unmanned vessel, is claimed to have the capacity for 4-6 VLS, however, this is just a wish, not a reality, at the moment.  Further, if defense weapons and sensors are added, such as SeaRAM or CIWS, the space available for larger, more offensive weapons such as VLS, markedly decreases.
 

USX-1 Defiant / NOMARS

Seizure
 
We’ve already seen that China and Iran will not hesitate to seize unmanned assets so there is no reason to believe they wouldn’t seize an MUSV or NOMARS vessel.  The article also notes,
 

In peacetime, international law considers uncrewed vessels as derelict and subject to salvage.[1]

Repair
 
The following statement from the article says it all.
 

In wartime, it would be difficult to repair or retrieve such a vessel with a mechanical breakdown.[1]

Conclusion
 
It is, frankly, disappointing that anyone would even momentarily ask whether small, unmanned vessels can replace a frigate.  The lack of weapons and absence of human judgment as well as obvious maintenance issues unequivocally dictates the conclusion that unmanned vessels cannot replace a manned frigate, however flawed that frigate might be.  Unmanned vessels are, potentially, suited for ISR and acting as a very small weapons barge (mini-arsenal ship) if someone can come up with a secure communications system and a viable CONOPS.
 
What no one in the military seems to understand is that our emphasis on unmanned toys is the equivalent of asking whether an infantryman, armed with a knife, can replace an Abrams tank.
 
 
 
____________________________

 
[1]Naval News website, “Can Unmanned MUSVs and NOMARS Replace the Troubled FFG-62 Frigate Program?”, Peter Ong, 20-May-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/05/can-unmanned-musvs-and-nomars-replace-the-troubled-ffg-62-frigate-program/

USS Constellation Update

The Navy’s new frigate, the USS Constellation, is now expected to deliver 3 years late, or more (spoiler alert!  It will be more!).  What’s going wrong?  Let’s get an update.
 
 
Design
 
The Constellation contract was awarded in April 2020 which means the design work began more than 5 years ago and is still nowhere near complete.  That’s astounding.  Over 5 years to generate a design and it still isn’t complete.
 

… the U.S. Navy had to significantly modify the design to meet U.S. survivability and growth margin standards.
 
Speaking at the Naval Institute’s Defense Forum Washington event, Fincantieri Marinette Marine CEO Mark Vandroff said the Navy and the shipyard underestimated the complexity of altering the design.[2]

The entire point of the so-called parent design approach was exactly to avoid significant design changes and yet the Navy ignored that philosophy and instituted extensive changes.
 
Concurrency and Schedule
 
As we’ve seen with every acquisition program in recent years, concurrency (simultaneous design and construction) always causes cost and schedule havoc.  Despite this repeated, soul-deep lesson, the Navy opted for concurrency, yet again, beginning construction with only partial design plans.  Predictably (well … predictable by everyone except the Navy), this has caused schedule problems among other issues, with the ship now scheduled to deliver more than three years late.
 

The Navy’s decision to commence construction before completing the design has led to significant schedule slippages.[1]

Cost
 
As always, the Navy’s cost estimates have proven fraudulently underestimated.
 

Initially, the estimated cost for the first ship was around $1.28 billion, with subsequent ships expected to cost approximately $1.05 billion each. However, these estimates have proven to be overly optimistic. The actual costs have increased significantly, with some estimates suggesting that the final cost per ship could be as high as $1.6 billion. This 40% increase in costs has raised concerns about the program’s affordability and sustainability.[1]

Actually, those costs aren’t even true.  The Congressional Research Service Feb 2021 report notes,
 

The Navy’s FY2021 budget submission estimated that subsequent ships in the class will cost roughly $940 million each in then-year dollars.[emphasis added][2]

Weight
 

The weight of the ships has increased by over 10% from the initial estimates. This weight growth is attributed to design decisions and the challenges of adapting a foreign design to meet U.S. Navy requirements.[1]

Unfortunately, the Navy is now looking at reducing or eliminating other capabilities in order to compensate for the weight increase.  It is almost certain that the range and speed requirements will be downgraded among other detrimental changes.
 
Workforce
 

The shipyard is reportedly a “few hundred” workers short, which has contributed to delays in the construction schedule.[1]

Come on, now.  It’s not as if the builder didn’t know how many workers they had when the bid the project.  If they’re short of workers now, they certainly knew they were short of workers when they bid.  This is, again, fraud on the part of the builder and willful complicity on the part of the Navy who also knew the builder’s workforce compared to the project requirements.
 
Risks
 

The Navy has yet to demonstrate the full capabilities of the propulsion and machinery control systems … [1]
 
The Navy is considering additional land-based testing to mitigate these risks and ensure the reliability of the systems before the ships are deployed.[1]

When have we ever seen ‘risks’ not become problems?  The point of land based testing is to find problems and solutions before beginning construction.
 
Second Yard
 
Given the inability of Fincantieri to meet the contracted schedule, the Navy has begun looking at a second source shipyard.  Possibilities include:
 

… specifically mentioned Austal USA, Bollinger, HII’s Ingalls Shipbuilding and General Dynamics Bath Iron Works as potential second yards.[2]

 
Conclusion
 
The Navy’s absolute refusal to design and build a ship the proper way (complete the design and then begin construction) is, after so many demonstrated failures using this approach, a near criminal act of fraud and negligence perpetrated against the American taxpayer.
 
As we all knew, with 100% certainty, concurrency has, once again, caused schedule slippage and cost overruns.
 
The Constellation class is now in the process of having its requirements downgraded to compensate for weight increases.  So much for the supposed benefits of a parent design.  The Navy never had any intention of building the parent design.  That was just a ploy to evade additional Congressional oversight.
 
It bears noting that the yard’s manpower shortages are not exactly a new problem that suddenly reared its head.  Both the yard and the Navy knew they couldn’t build the ship in the required time frame with the workforce they had.  Essentially, the yard and the Navy conspired to hide the inability to meet the contract.
 
Worse than all the listed problems is the fact that even if there were no problems, it would only produce an obsolete design unsuited for modern combat.
 
There is no other way to describe this program than as a massive fraud and failure. 
 
 
 
____________________________

[1]1945 website, “The U.S. Navy’s New Constellation-Class Frigate Is In Big Trouble”, Isaac Seitz, 25-Feb-2025,
https://www.19fortyfive.com/2025/02/the-u-s-navys-new-constellation-class-frigate-is-in-big-trouble/
 
[2]USNI News website, “Navy: Constellation Frigate Design Will be Ready in May, Second Yard Could Come in FY 2027”, Mallory Shelbourne & Sam LaGrone, 13-Dec-2024,
https://news.usni.org/2024/12/13/navy-constellation-frigate-design-will-be-ready-in-may-second-yard-could-come-in-fy-2027

Constellation Train Wreck Gathers Steam

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has released a report on the Constellation class frigate construction program delays and it’s an eye opener even for ComNavOps who predicted exactly these kinds of problems long ago.
 
To review, the contract delivery date is April 2026.  Current estimates by the Navy put delivery sometime in 2029, three years late and seven years after the Aug 2022 start of construction (seven years to build a frigate?!), and you know that date is going to continue to be pushed further out with more delays.
 
As with all sizable ships, the Constellation is being built in sections, called blocks (although the Navy now calls them ‘Grand Modules’ in their typically PowerPoint-ish, pointless churn style;  someone undoubtedly got a promotion for coming up with the phrase, ‘Grand Module’) and, according to a diagram in the report, the Constellation has 31 blocks.  Of the 31 blocks, 11 are currently being manufactured despite not having completed design documents.  GAO lists the percentage design completion of the blocks under construction: 
 
3x   56-75% complete
2x   76-90% complete
6x   >91% complete
 
None of the block designs are complete despite being under construction.  How you build blocks (or anything!) with incomplete designs is a complete mystery and, as the report details, is a major reason why the Constellation is running around three years late already.
 
Worse, GAO cautions that the Navy’s method for estimating the degree of design completion guarantees that even these woeful achievements are overestimated and the designs are not really to the stated level of completeness.[1]  The designs have been ‘pencil whipped’ for reporting purposes.  GAO notes,
 

Now, over 18 months after lead ship construction start, the functional design remains unstable, which has undermined confidence in the accuracy and maturity of detail design products needed to construct grand modules—and construction progress has effectively stalled. The Navy and shipbuilder have resorted to correcting deficient drawings previously credited toward design progress, but the program continues to credit design progress based largely on quantity of deliverables rather than on the underlying quality of the document itself.[1][emphasis added]

The Navy has committed to fraudulent reporting to cover their failure to use best shipbuilding practices that are standard throughout the commercial shipbuilding industry.
 
In addition to design deficiencies, other problems are beginning to emerge. 
 
As of Oct 2023, the builder was reporting a 10% increase in weight growth over the June 2020 calculated weight.  Weight growth has both short and long term negative impacts, as GAO notes, 

Further, as we previously found in a July 2014 report evaluating the LCS program, unplanned weight growth during ship construction can compromise ship capabilities in the short term (i.e., upon delivery of the ship to the fleet) and in the long term, as the fleet seeks to alter and improve initial capabilities over the planned decades-long service life of the ship.[1]

And, 

The Navy disclosed to us in April 2024 that it is considering a reduction in the frigate’s speed requirement as one potential way, among others, to resolve the weight growth affecting the ship’s design.[1]

So, we can expect reductions in the ship’s specifications and performance requirements.  This is exactly what happened with the LCS.  Its specifications and requirements were continually reduced in response to weight increases and other problems that cropped up during construction. 
 
I thought the parent design concept was supposed to eliminate these kinds of problems?  Well, it might have if the Navy had actually used the parent design instead of hoodwinking Congress and designing, essentially, a brand new ship under the guise of a ‘parent’ vessel.
 
The Navy has learned absolutely nothing about ship design, acquisition, and program management from the lessos of the LCS, Zumwalt, and Ford fiascos. 
 
Well done, Navy.  Make us proud.
 
 
 
________________________

 
[1]Government Accountability Office, “Navy Frigate - Unstable Design Has Stalled Construction and Compromised Delivery Schedules”, May 2024, GAO-24-106546

Constellation Lies

How’s that Constellation frigate construction coming?  Time to check in.
 
 
Schedule
 
Here’s two statements:
 

• In January of 2024, SecNav Del Toro reported that the Constellation might be delayed a year.[1]
• In April of 2024, USNI News now reports that the Constellation may be delayed up to three years.[1]

 
What happened in three months to add an additional two year delay?
 
 
Design
 
Well, at least the Navy has learned from past shipbuilding mistakes related to concurrency and will never start another ship construction program again without a complete design … right?  Right????
 
Well … 

In August of 2022, when the Navy green lit Fincantieri to begin building the first frigate, Rear Adm. Casey Moton, then the program executive officer for unmanned and small combatants, said the detail design was just over 80 percent complete.[1]

So … the start of construction and another incomplete design.  I guess the Navy is incapable of learning a lesson.  But wait … it gets better.
 
That 80% design completion status as of Aug 2022 … 

… Naval Sea Systems Command chief Vice Adm. James Downey told reporters that the detail design for the frigate – which is based on Fincantieri Marinette Marine’s FREMM parent design that’s in service with the Italian and French navies – still isn’t complete. The goal is to finalize the detail design this year and the service and contractors are nearing 80 percent completion, Downey said.[1]

Now, two years after the design was reported to be 80% complete, the Navy is now reporting that the design is nearing 80%!!!!!  That’s right!  In two years the design has regressed from 80% to nearing 80%.  The design has actually gone backward!  Only in the Navy!
 
 
Commonality
 
Wasn’t the whole point of the ‘parent design’ to minimize changes, time, and cost by using an existing design?  Of course it was!  There must be … what would you guess … 95% commonality?  90%?  Maybe 85%, worst case?  Read this: 

While the design was based on a long-serving warship, design agent Gibbs & Cox heavily modified the FREMM design to meet NAVSEA requirements, like tougher survivability standards than those of European navies, Navy officials have told USNI News. 

At one point the Constellation design shared about 85 percent commonality with the original FREMM design, but the alterations have brought that commonality down to under 15 percent, a person familiar with the changes told USNI News.[1][emphasis added]

Less than 15% commonality?????  What was the point of the existing parent design requirement?
 
 
Conclusion
 
Let’s face it.  The Navy out and out lied about the parent design concept and used it as a transparent gambit to slip a new ship design by a skeptical Congress.
 
Now, as with any completely new ship design, we’re seeing cost increases, concurrency, and huge schedule delays. 

____________________________

 
https://news.usni.org/2024/04/02/constellation-frigate-delivery-delayed-3-years-says-navy

Constellation Fraud

The Navy assured us that the Constellation class frigate would be a zero risk, on-time, on-cost, romp through the park to build since it was, essentially, a copy of an existing Fincantieri FREMM design.  There would be only minor, inconsequential changes – the color of the paint, perhaps, or an extra bulkhead or two for greater compartmentalization – that would have no impact on the design or production of the ship.
 
Of course, when the concept drawings were released, it turned out that the ship had been heavily modified and actually bore little resemblance to the parent FREMM design.  The Navy had lied to Congress and the public by presenting the frigate as a minor variation of an existing design when, in reality, it was a nearly brand new design with little in common with the so-called parent.  I won’t bother reciting the litany of changes from the parent design as those are readily available on line.
 
So, how’s all that working out?
 
USNI News website reports that the ship construction and delivery is going to be delayed at least a year.[1]  Construction began in Aug 2022 and the Navy is now hoping for delivery in 2027.  Far more likely is a 2028-9 delivery.  That’s a five to seven year delivery for what the Navy claims is a minor tweak of an existing design!
 
This babbling, incoherent, pointless statement from Andy Bosak (deputy manager for the frigate program) tells you everything you need to know about the state of the program.  The Navy has no idea what’s happening, no idea how to fix it, and no idea when the ship will be delivered. 

We are doing our analysis, as the Navy does, of doing deep dives of causes and effects and various different levers of which we can pull within that shipyard,” he added. “And we need to, as a program, work with our leadership, kind of figure out what we want to do. And from that, we will make that assessment as to what the actual schedule impact is of where we are. And that effort is ongoing.[1]

The builder, Fincantieri, blames much of the delay on labor shortages, welders, in particular.  No doubt this is a factor but I suspect there are other, far more impactful problems.  For example, 

… Fincantieri … wrestled with Americanizing the FREMM design for two and half years before it hit the 80 percent design completion and could begin fabrication on Constellation in 2022.  The modification of the design altered almost every drawing of the FREMM and required review from NAVSEA … [1]

The labor situation was well known before Fincantieri submitted a bid and the before the Navy awarded them a contract so that should have already been factored into the schedule.  What wasn’t factored in was the extent to which the Navy would modify the design.  The modifications sent ripple waves of disruption spreading throughout the program, culminating in the major schedule slippage we learn about now.  Undoubtedly, the schedule will slip even further.  We’re likely looking at closer to a two year schedule delay for a ship that was supposedly a knock off of an existing design.
 
The Navy knew all this and understood what deviating from the parent design would mean. 

"[The Navy] and the shipbuilder agreed that design maturity was probably the single biggest factor we could do to reduce the risk of production,” former program executive officer for unmanned and small combatants Rear Adm. Casey Moton said in August of 2022.[1]

So, knowing full well what a modified (immature) design would do to the production schedule, the Navy went ahead and completely redesigned the ship anyway.  Not only is the Navy complicit in the current problems, they are the proximate cause of the problems!
 
Here’s yet another example of the ‘minor, insignificant’ changes the Navy made: 

… testing at Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock found that the modified design did not meet service standards for operating in heavy seas, necessitating design changes that ate into the schedule margin … [1]
 
“We were already into the functional and detail design when that report came from Carderock – something of a surprise because the parent design didn’t really have that,” Vandroff (Mark Vandroff, Fincantieri Marinette Marine’s chief executive officer) said.[1]

That was a surprise to you, Mr. Vandroff?  Seriously?  You completely changed the design to the point that it is a brand new, never before produced design and were surprised to find that created new problems?  You’re not an engineer, I’m assuming?
 

 
Conclusion
 
This program has been nothing but fraud and deception piled on fraud and deception from the very beginning and now it’s coming home to roost.  The Navy tried to hide a completely new ship inside the shadow – and lies – of an existing ship and now they’re acting surprised that the fraud is impacting the production schedule.
 
We need to also keep cost in mind.  Schedule slippages of this magnitude don’t come free.  The cost is going to skyrocket and the Navy will, again, act surprised and attempt to blame the builder.
 
By the way, do you recall that the Navy claimed that the follow on ships (2-20) would cost less than $800M?  Yeah, they said that.  Here’s the quote from RAdm. John Neagley:
 
“The follow-on objective cost for FFG(X) is $800 million. We think we can get below that.”[2]
 
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO), on the other hand, estimated an average cost of $1.2B per ship.[3]
 
As it turns out, the actual budgeted costs are around $1.1B-$1.2B, and that’s before the inevitable cost overruns, costs associated with schedule slippages, deferred completion costs for incomplete delivery, etc.  The true cost will be somewhere in the $1.5B+ range.
 

 
 
______________________________

 
[1]USNI News website, “First Constellation Frigate Delayed At Least a Year, Schedule Assessment ‘Ongoing’”, Mallory Shelbourne and Sam LaGrone, 11-Jan-2024,
https://news.usni.org/2024/01/11/first-constellation-frigate-delayed-at-least-a-year-schedule-assessment-ongoing#:~:text=The%20service%20has%20briefed%20Congress%20that%20the%20future,legislative%20source%20confirmed%20to%20USNI%20News%20this%20week.
 
[2]Breaking Defense website, “Navy Says It Can Buy Frigate For Under $800M: Acquisition Reform Testbed”, Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., 12-Jan-2018,
https://breakingdefense.com/2018/01/navy-says-it-can-buy-frigate-for-under-800m-acquisition-reform-testbed/
 
[3]CBO website, “The Cost of the Navy’s New Frigate”, Oct-2020,
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/56675

Constellation Land Based Engineering Test Facility

The Constellation frigate program is building a land based engineering test facility in Philadephia which will duplicate the ship’s power plant.  What a great idea!  The Navy deserves credit for this after the Freedom variant powertrain combining gear debacle, right?.  However, we can’t give the Navy any credit because they didn’t want the test facility.  It was mandated by Congress in the 2021 defense budget.[1, 3]
 
Well, regardless of who the credit goes to, it’s still a great idea.  The program can put the ship’s power plant through its paces and work out any problems before the ship is built.  Only … in true Navy fashion, the test facility will not be ready before the first ship is delivered and subsequent ships have been started.
 

The site should be ready around the time the first frigate is delivered and will continue to operate until the ship is ready for deployment.[1]

Uh … isn’t this backwards?  Shouldn’t the test facility be up and running long before the ship construction begins?
 

… the LBTS [land based test site] focuses on hardware, as a laboratory of different configurations to settle on a final propulsion system.[2]

Again, shouldn’t that testing to determine a final propulsion system be completed before the ship construction begins, not after the ship is delivered – at which point it is too late to matter?
 
Well, what’s the big deal?  The Constellation is, basically, the existing FREMM frigate so the propulsion system is already well proven.  Honestly, the land facility is a Congressionally mandated formality that isn’t really needed for an existing, proven propulsion system, right?
 
Unfortunately, the Navy did a bit of fraud bait and switch.  The Constellation is based only loosely and to a minor extent on the existing FREMM.
 

The propulsion system for the Constellation is a new configuration for the U.S. Navy, with a combined diesel-electric and gas turbine system. The CODLAG propulsion system takes a General Electric LM-2500+G4 and combines it with two MTU diesel engines to power the ship via an electric drive system.[2]

This is not what Congress intended.
 

In accordance with the Fiscal Year 2021 National Defense Authorization Act, the Navy must finish the LBES site for the frigate before the lead ship in the class delivers in 2026. The site must include shipboard equipment for systems ranging from the main reduction gear and the main propulsion system, to the power control modules.[2]

Cognizant of the LCS debacle, Congress intended for the land site to be up and running before the ship was built, not after.  Congress wanted to eliminate the problems before the ship was built.
 
 
 
 
 
____________________________________

 
[1]Breaking Defense, “Navy Says Constellation Hull Change Won’t Affect Internal Design”, Justin Katz, 4-Aug-2021,
https://breakingdefense.com/2021/08/navy-says-constellation-hull-change-wont-affect-internal-design/
 
[2]USNI News website, “Frigate Land-Based Engineering Site Taking Shape in the Philadelphia Navy Yard”, Mallory Shelbourne, 20-Jun-2023,
https://news.usni.org/2023/06/20/frigate-land-based-engineering-site-taking-shape-in-the-philadelphia-navy-yard
 
[3]From Congressional Research Service, “Navy Constellation (FFG-62) Class Frigate
Program: Background and Issues for Congress”, 27-Mar-2023, p.8 : 
Section 125 of the FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 6395/P.L. 116-283 of
January 1, 2021) requires the Navy to commence, prior to the delivery of the first FFG-62, a landbased test program for the FFG-62 engineering plant (i.e., its propulsion system and related machinery). The provision specifies how the test program is to be conducted and requires the Navy to complete the test program not later than the date on which the first FFG-62 is scheduled to be available for tasking by operational military commanders.

Lesson Learned?

A cursory recall of the Navy’s recent failed surface ship programs includes the LCS, Zumwalt, Ford, MLP, etc.  That’s a lot of data and opportunities for lessons learned, right?  The Navy, through trial and [mostly] error should be getting pretty good at managing ship acquisition programs by now, right?
 
One of the major lessons learned has to have been that concurrency (simultaneous design and construction) never works.
 
I wonder how the new Constellation class frigate program is doing?
 
The GAO annual report has this to say, 

Program officials stated that over 90 percent of the FFG 62 functional design and 80 percent of the detail design—which adds 3D modeling to show the configuration of equipment on the ship—were completed when construction began on the lead ship in August 2022. They noted that these results align with the Navy’s general expectations for design maturity needed before construction begins. However, beginning construction with an incomplete functional design is inconsistent with leading practices and increases the risk of costly design changes and rework.[1][emphasis added]

So, defying all logic, common sense, and bitter, costly experience, the Navy began construction of the Constellation before the design was complete.  Way to learn a lesson, Navy.
 

Constellation - Which will be finished first, the ship or the design?

___________________________________

 
[1]U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Weapon Systems Annual Assessment”, Jun 2023, GAO-23-106059, p.148

Constellation Class Frigate Cost

The Navy’s Constellation class frigate cost estimates were fraudulent optimistic in the extreme and everyone except the Navy knew that (and the Navy undoubtedly knew it also which is what makes it fraud).  The Navy’s estimate for the entire initial 10 ship contract was $8.7B (2020$ [3]) or $870M per ship.  Unsurprisingly, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimate was $12.3B which is 41% higher than the Navy’s.[1]  The CBO report lists the various absurd assumptions that went into the Navy’s lowball estimate and you can read the report if you’re interested in digging into it.  In the meantime, let’s take a quick check and see how the actual costs are shaking out, so far.

 

 

From the FY22 Navy budget document [2, Volume 1-217], we get the following Constellation costs:

 

 

	Year	Total Obligation Authority
FFG-62	2020	$1.3B
FFG-63	2021	$1.0B
FFG-64	2022	$1.1B
FFG-64	2023	$1.2B

 

Note: FY23 cost is from the FY23 Navy Budget Highlights document

 

 

Remember the Navy’s claims that the Constellation cost would drop significantly after the first one?  That’s not happening!  If the Navy’s estimate is to hold, the remaining 6 frigates will have to cost an average of $683M.  Does anyone believe that will happen?  At the moment, it appears that the CBO cost estimate is going to be just about spot on.

 

Note:  The costs cited above do not include things like post-delivery outfitting, Government Furnished Equipment (GFE), warranty repair costs absorbed by the Navy, phased delivery costs, etc.  The itemized breakdown of what is and isn’t included in the budget is unknown.  The real ship construction cost is much higher but we’ll stick with the ‘official’ costs for now.

 

 

Below is the Constellation construction budget breakdown, by the way (numbers rounded to nearest million).[2, Volume 1-219]  For those of you who still believe that ‘steel is cheap and air is free’ and that electronics constitute the major cost of a modern ship, you’ll note the basic hull structure is far and away the major portion of the cost, more than doubling the electronics cost which makes up only 21% of the total.

 

 

Constellation Budget Breakdown
Plan Costs	$131M	12%
Basic Construction/Conversion	$584M	54%
Change Orders	$23M	2%
Electronics	$231M	21%
Hull, Mechanical, and Electrical (HM&E)	$17M	2%
Ordnance	$52M	5%
Other Cost	$49M	4%

 

 

Just to give you a frame of reference, here’s a list of the type of items that are included in each category as they often do not make sense.  Hull, Mechanical, and Electrical, for example, does not include the hull or most electronics!

 

Construction

Basic hull and superstructure construction

 

Electronics

Enterprise Air Surveillance Radar

Aegis Weapon System

SQQ-89 ASW

SLQ-32v6 SEWIP

IFF/TACAN

CEC

Inertial Navigation System

EO/IR

SLQ-25 Nixie

Exterior Communication Systems

Internal Networks

 

Hull, Mechanical, Electrical

Aircraft Ship Integrated Securing and Traversing System (ASIST)

Internal Communication (IC) Voice

Advanced Flight Deck Lighting System (AFDLS)

Unclassified Video System (UVS)

Interior Wireless Communication System (IWCS)

 

Ordnance

Mk 41 VLS, 32-cell

Mk 48 Gun Weapon System

RAM

Nulka

 

 

 

So, there you have it.  In a 100% predictable result, the Navy is, once again, ridiculously low on its cost estimate.

 

When a cost estimate is ridiculously off once, it’s a mistake.

When cost estimates are ridiculously off, every time, for every program, it’s systematic and, possibly, criminal fraud.

 

 

___________________________________

 

[1]Defense News website, “US Navy’s cost estimate for new frigate won’t hold water, predicts government analyst”, David B. Larter, 14-Oct-2020,

https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2020/10/14/the-us-navys-cost-estimate-for-its-new-frigate-wont-hold-water-analyst-predicts/

 

[2]Department of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, May 2021

[3]CBO, "The Cost of the Navy's New Frigate", Oct 2020

https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2020-10/56669-New-Frigate-Program.pdf