Monday, September 25, 2023

Lesson Learned?

A cursory recall of the Navy’s recent failed surface ship programs includes the LCS, Zumwalt, Ford, MLP, etc.  That’s a lot of data and opportunities for lessons learned, right?  The Navy, through trial and [mostly] error should be getting pretty good at managing ship acquisition programs by now, right?
 
One of the major lessons learned has to have been that concurrency (simultaneous design and construction) never works.
 
I wonder how the new Constellation class frigate program is doing?
 
The GAO annual report has this to say, 
Program officials stated that over 90 percent of the FFG 62 functional design and 80 percent of the detail design—which adds 3D modeling to show the configuration of equipment on the ship—were completed when construction began on the lead ship in August 2022. They noted that these results align with the Navy’s general expectations for design maturity needed before construction begins. However, beginning construction with an incomplete functional design is inconsistent with leading practices and increases the risk of costly design changes and rework.[1][emphasis added]

So, defying all logic, common sense, and bitter, costly experience, the Navy began construction of the Constellation before the design was complete.  Way to learn a lesson, Navy.
 
Constellation - Which will be finished first, the ship or the design?



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[1]U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Weapon Systems Annual Assessment”, Jun 2023, GAO-23-106059, p.148

30 comments:

  1. Supposedly the frigate is an "out of the shelf" one.

    Why is impossible for US Navy to stop modifying the design?

    JM

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    1. Modifying the gear for the U.S. immediately meant the ship couldn't be close to the same. 3 face fixed panel radar, our VLS are larger and heavier, the survivability standards weren't nearly the same. The final powertrain is as close to a UK Type 26 as it is to a FREMM.

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  2. What do you expect? The people running this program have never built anything in their lives other than powerpoint presentations. The most they have done is tour the shipyards to "show" their concern and learn the messages the Contractors wants delivered to Congress to keep the money flowing. We have given up the people that have those skills and have promoted political careerists.

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  3. Can live with the 80 to 90% design finished when keel gets laid down, to me, its more the fact we going to start series production before testing anything and putting the first ship thru it's paces.

    How much are really saving if we put a 6 month to a year delay between the first or second ship and the series production?!?! Considering we will have to make modifications and refits on the series, are we really saving money by keeping the line hot? Why not stop after the first 2, wait for results, made designs changes and restart production?

    We dumped $32 BILLION on LCS.
    Even if LCS had panned out and if it worked and if it was somewhat useful, lots of IFs, was it really cheaper to do it that way?!?!How much money did concurrency save us?!?! Doubt it would have saved us anything EVEN IF IT WORKED! It didn't so it was just insult to injury.....

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    1. "Why not stop after the first 2, wait for results, made designs changes and restart production?"

      The Chinese Navy did just that with the Type 052 destroyer, until it had a design competitive with our Arleigh Burke class- then it put the Type 052D in mass production. Any wonder why the USN is falling behind, allowing its Chinese counterpart to catch up?

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    2. "How much money did concurrency save us?"

      It has been repeatedly demonstrated that concurrency doesn't save any money - it costs money! Inevitably, the ships built under concurrency will need to be reworked as the design is finalized and lessons are incorporated. This is what has happened to the F-35. We now have many hundreds of concurrency orphans that require more money to rework than is worth it to bring them up to current combat standards. We bought and built several hundred orphans that are now useless.

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    3. We have a major maintenance issue with the F35 :
      https://www.defensenews.com/air/2023/09/22/gao-blasts-contractor-led-f-35-maintenance-as-costly-slow/
      "But the F-35′s availability has lagged for years, and if a war broke out today, many fighters would be unavailable to fight. In March 2023, GAO said, the mission-capable rate for all F-35s was at 55%. That’s well below the 70% mission-capable goal the Air Force has for its F-35As, and the 75% goal for the Navy and Marine Corps’ F-35B and F-35C variants."
      According to this article we have and Air Force General working on this ! One would think this issue would have been worked out before production commenced !



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    4. "We have a major maintenance issue with the F35"

      The issue is much more serious and complicated than you think. The root of the problem is that the military is NOT responsible for F-35 maintenance and parts supply; the contractor is !!!!! The military doesn't even control its own maintenance and parts logistics. Lockheed controls it. That's insane! If the military wants parts they have to ask Lockheed. I addressed this issue in the following post:

      F-35C Reality Check

      The entire problem is compounded by the fact that the military does not have full data rights to the F-35! Again, the contractor retains those rights.

      No sane person would ever set up this kind of system. Only the military would be dumb enough to go along with this.

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    5. The F-35 uses the John Deere system. JD equipment has to be repaired with JD parts, said parts have to be registsted with JD by a JD tech on installation in what is called "your" tractor. The DOD should be backing "right to repair" laws in Congress.

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    6. I can sort of understand the manufacturer keeping the technical data rights if the weapon was bought off the shelf and the manufacturer paid for the development. But in this case the Navy paid for all the development. So it seem obvious that the Navy should own the data rights to the result of all the development that they paid for.

      How did we manage to accept this crazy deal, where we pay for the development and then had over the rights to the data that we paid for to Lockheed?

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  4. One wonders how many F35Cs currently make up an airwing these days with a 55% availability rate !!

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  5. Is this a panic move by the USN and DoD since I assume they're feeling pressured by the rise of their greatest adversary ?

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  6. I'm worried that the US navy is simply incapable now of building any new ship at all. The Ford, maybe I could give them a pass because it's so freaking huge. The Zumwalt and LCS had all sorts of new complex technology that would make them complicated to build.

    but the Constellation? cmon, it's just copying an existing design from France. it's a relatively small and simple ship. it really shouldn't be that hard to build. and yet they still mess it up.

    maybe we can get a skillshare/cross training program from some foreign shipyards?

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    1. Loss of skills what I was worried about most as globalization became a thing starting in the 80's.

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    2. "I'm worried that the US navy is simply incapable now of building any new ship at all."

      I'm assuming you're referring to programmatic difficulties because we most certainly have the physical capabilities to build ships and do so routinely. Programmatically, the ships we build are over budget, over schedule, and ineffective once built. This, however, is not due to construction issues but, rather, to program failures (lack of detailed design, no CONOPS, the use of unproven technology, no blueprints prior to construction, constant change orders during construction, etc.).

      "maybe we can get a skillshare/cross training program from some foreign shipyards?"

      Recognizing the above, that the issues are programmatic rather than physical, foreign shipyards have nothing useful to offer as we already know how to weld, plumb, wire, lift, and assemble. It is possible that we could take programmatic lessons from foreign programs but that's a separate issue. In addition, if you closely examine foreign naval programs, you quickly realize that they have their own set of problems and are almost always over budget and schedule, just like us.

      Can you name a foreign shipbuilding program that you think has been highly successful and could serve as a model for us?

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    3. 1. Nothing about Connie is Fremm aside from Fincantieri being involved and an LM2500+G4 gas turbine. If anything were to be remotely the same it would be propulsion and its not the same.
      - Totally different gensets
      -Fixed props vs CCP
      - Motors yet unspecified will not be the French ones used in Europe
      - The rest is obvious, our electric system is 60hz vs their 50hz and on from there. Our gear topside is entirely different.

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    4. Point 2: Yes we can't build ships. I blame NAVSEA and the government making it too hard for some smart shipbuilders to make the mistake of getting into Naval work.
      - Swiftships lost the 4th Overlord USV and LCU-1700 to Austal yet is still charged with building the MUSV prototype rather than the yard that built all prior vessels of the type.
      - OPC is behind/stagnant waiting on this davit situation and prop issue.
      - Austal has said they are behind on their new steel work which I assume means the ocean tugs which should be first on their now very long order book.
      - Bath, behind on a destroyer they've made for 30 years and down to getting about 1 destroyer every 2 years.
      - EB and NNS - behind on subs, giving work to Austal. Generally seems like carrier refueling are now behind schedule. CVN delivery is behind schedule.
      -MMC is rebuilding the yard, has to finish work that is behind on LCS while dropping the 4 Saudi ships, just to get to FFG.
      - Ingalls seems ready for more work having gone out to grab maintenance work and NSC wrapping up.
      - I'd say NASSCO s in good shape, but it sure seems like their maintenance side along with BAE's in San Diego leaves much to be desired. Permanently hung up cruisers in modernization. How long did that SEWIP III install take on the DDG they just floated out?
      -Philly is doing great, but they have a full book and only the one dock to build and launch from.
      - Then we all know the woes of sub maintenance in the public yards.

      Yeah, we really don't do ships right now. The other yards staying out of the biz are busy with wind/offshore work.

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    5. "I'm assuming you're referring to programmatic difficulties because we most certainly have the physical capabilities to build ships and do so routinely"
      I don't know what you mean by programmatically. In a literal sense, yes, the shipyards have built many hulls. But if they come out with no weapons, malfunctioning software, and cracking hulls, it's not much better than delivering nothing at all. I guess they do, eventually, become functional given enough time and money, but it's not practical or sustainable to give every new ship an expensive refit.

      "Can you name a foreign shipbuilding program that you think has been highly successful and could serve as a model"
      Well, the obvious answer is China, which seems to have no problem building in high volume. I guess they won't volunteer information, but we can still try to copy their production methods.

      For allied nations, Korea and Japan have had highly successful destroyer programs recently. Launched about 1 year after being laid down, cost about 1 billion, heavily armed and practical.

      Andy- fair point about the Fromm being internally different. I still don't see why building the Constellation should be so difficult, though.

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    6. Remember some years ago reading about the boss of NASSCO who insisted 100% of detailed design completed and all supplies contracted before start of build, said the most difficult part of the design was the last 5 to 10%, was in line with how the Korean shipyards operated. He also brought in Korean expertise on welding thick plate. Subsequently was moved to BIW to try to work his magic there but after a run in with the Unions GD sacked him.

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  7. And compounded by this:

    https://www.zerohedge.com/economics/chinas-shipbuilding-capacity-more-200-times-greater-us-leaked-navy-slide

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  8. It's not like this is anything new - the Perries were built concurrently, and all our tactical aircraft have been built concurrently with multiple blocks. The F-16 wasn't even really a full fledged finished aircraft until Block 40/42, with its own piles of concurrency orphans.

    The entire military industrial complex needs reforming.

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    1. "the Perries were built concurrently"

      I'm unaware of this. Do you have a reference?

      "all our tactical aircraft have been built concurrently with multiple blocks."

      You may be confusing and conflating separate issues. Concurrency refers to the practice of building while the design is still being developed. Block development is the planned introduction of improvements over the course of a production run and is a perfectly reasonable approach, if carefully managed. This is an evolutionary approach to extended production runs. I favor shorter production runs that don't require Blocks but that's a separate issue.

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    2. I looked into it a few years ago and did a spreadsheet of all US fighters and prototypes and early LRIPs and lots, might even have found info on a few foreign fighters, F35 is so far above and beyond what every program was considered "concurrency with 100s of F35s that have to be modified. Closest programs that get close , if I recall, was F100 that had issues with wings and F102 that pretty much was a failure into turned into F106....

      If we had to wait till Bock 4 F36 to get real capability, how long was the wait!and how much money was spent on all the previous fighters that need to be modified or retired basically because to expense to modify?!?

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  9. Construction of the leadship was concurrent with the testing at the PSLBTS, thus requiring timely resolution to the many operational, installation and design problems uncovered during testing. These included the complete restructuring of the d-c power supply distribution in the control system, the evaluation of re-designed engine fuel controls for Bodie stall problems, the reduction of lateral vibration in the reduction gear input shafts, engine duct installation problems, and engine vibration monitoring circuitry problems. The incorporation of these solutions and others into the lead ship design demonstrated the benefits of shore testing.

    https://asmedigitalcollection.asme.org/gasturbinespower/article-abstract/101/3/397/403300/USS-Oliver-Hazard-Perry-FFG-7-Guided-Missile?redirectedFrom=fulltext

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    1. That's not concurrency within the context of this discussion. In this context, concurrency is the act of simultaneous design and construction. The ship design and construction blueprints are being generated while the ship is being built.

      As far as I know, the Perry had a complete design and set of construction blueprints prior to commencement of construction. The engineering land site was a test facility for working out problems with the designed/blueprinted mechanical/power system. One could quite reasonably believe that the land testing should have been done prior to construction but that's not the type of concurrency we're discussing.

      A similar situation has occurred with the Constellation. The ship is under construction and as the land test site is being built. Again, a poor decision but not the type of concurrency we're discussing.

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  10. Failures are in two places:

    First, strategic blunder - arrogantly thinking US Navy will no longer fight a superpower thus LCS, DDG1000, ... you know.

    Second, technology failures - even power system, sensors, weapons planned in LCS, DDG1000,.... etc. failed. Now, what should I say:

    https://breakingdefense.com/2023/09/aussie-researchers-warn-chinese-overwhelmingly-ahead-in-sensor-research/

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  11. Then we had the debacle of the Constellation land based engineering plant (test facility) not being utilized with the Constellation construction well underway.

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  12. The first problem I see with the Constellations is that what the Navy really needs if a GP (ASW/ASuW) frigate like the FREMMs were, but what they did was to turn it into an Aegis/AAW platform to serve as a cheaper numerical replacement for the Ticos--but with 32 Mk 41 missile launchers instead of 122, a significant decrease in capability. It seems to me that the Navy would be better off with say 60 FREMM GP (ASW/ASuW) escorts, say 80 single-purpose ASW frigates ( ComNavOps's ASW escorts would be a good concept), and replace the Ticos with 20 true cruisers (15000T, not jammed into a destroyer hull) with say 2x2 8-inch guns, 192 Mk 41s (64 convertible into 16 large hypersonic or ballistic missiles), and a facility to handle UAVs, USVs, and UUVs. That along with the roughly 40 AAW Burkes until their lives expire and they are replaced, would give you an escort force of 20 cruisers, 40 AAW destroyers, 60 GP (ASW/ASuW) excorts, and 80 ASW frigates. That strikes me as a pretty stout escort force.

    I would give the replacement cruisers Aegis/AMDR, on the basis that they shout have enough ETs to keep it going as a maintenance-heavy component. For the GP FREMMs, I would retain the EMPAR multi-purpose air search radar, and would consider seeing if I could save enough topside weight (reduce some habitability space) to add the S1850 long range air search radar. This seems to be a more reliable system than Aegis, and more maintainable by a smaller crew, and the two radars could provide some redundancy. I would also keep the hull-mounted sonar in addition to VDS and tail, for a more viable ASW capability than the Constellations would have. That may create a problem if the FREMMs continue to be built at Marinette, because the Bergamini FREMMs with sonar dome draw 8.7 meters (28.6 feet), while the controlling depth in the Welland Canal is 8.08 meters (26.5 feet). I suppose the FREMMs could be built without sonar dome at Marinette, and then sailed to an east coast drydock where the dome could be added, although that seems an awkward way to build them.

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  13. Actually, my impression is that the biggest problem with concurrency is not that we don't have every single blueprint done before we start construction. I think it's that we install immature and unproven technology during construction and then try to debug it after it's in the ship.

    Consider the Ford. If we didn't have every last detail of the island designed while we were building the engine compartment (and NOT building the island), that probably wouldn't be ideal but is likely not a huge risk. On the other hand, designing the whole ship around an unproven catapult technology is a much larger risk. As we discovered.

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    1. "If we didn't have every last detail of the island designed while we were building the engine compartment (and NOT building the island), that probably wouldn't be ideal but is likely not a huge risk."

      And if the island were 100% isolated and independent from the rest of the ship that would be fine. However, what happens if we build the rest of the ship and then, when we get around to designing the island, discover that it needs more electronics and more power than we thought. We'll have to tear out and add larger/more power runs throughout the ship to route them to the island. What if we discover that we're going to have a larger admiral's staff than we thought? We already built the berthing. Now we have to rework some part of the ship to accommodate more people. What if we discover that radar panels need more cooling than we thought? Now we have to rework the ship's internals to get more cooling to the island. What if we discover that the island has to be physically bigger/heavier than we thought? Now the ship is unbalanced and has a permanent list and we've lost some deck space.

      And so on.

      It is foolish to begin construction without a complete set of blueprints. We don't build cars by starting them and then figuring out what they'll look like and what they'll do. We build cars by having a complete design before we begin. Why would you accept stupidity in the construction of a ship when you wouldn't accept it in the construction of car or home or anything else? The military has so lowered our standards and expectations that we now routinely accept exceedingly poor practices as normal. That's bad on the military's part and even worse on our part that we accept it and rationalize it. You're better than that. Don't lower your standards.

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