Dropping Like Flies

The Air Force has publicly stated that large UAVs are not survivable on the modern battlefield.  ComNavOps has emphatically stated that, also.  Despite that, many commentators remained convinced that our UAVs will somehow, magically, provide us with total situational awareness.  Well, here’s some evidence that supports ComNavOps’, and the Air Force’s, belief.  From the Atlantic Council  (a supposed non-partisan think tank) website,
 

Since November 2023, the Houthis have claimed responsibility for downing fourteen MQ-9 Reaper drones …[1]

I’ve read unverified, updated reports that the Houthis have shot down as many as 20 MQ-9 Reapers.
 
I have no verification of the reports and no sense of the credibility of the Atlantic Council but it does fit exactly with what I believe and what seems patently obvious:  that slow, non-stealthy, non-maneuverable UAVs are simply target drones on the modern battlefield.  Similar reports from other sources vary in number of Reapers shot down but all are in the 14-20+ range.
 
 
Further evidence comes from the current strikes against Iran, as reported by Air & Space Forces website,
 

MQ-9 Reapers are flying numerous orbits over Iran, gathering intelligence and taking out missile launchers in Operation Epic Fury. Yet Iran has managed to down about 10 of the armed drones …[2]

If a thoroughly decimated military like Iran can manage to down that many drones, imagine what a coherent, peer enemy like China could do.  Large UAVs have a lifetime measured in minutes against a competent peer enemy and have no place on the modern battlefield.
 
One of the fears that I have is that the US will take “lessons” from this Iran conflict and apply them inappropriately to a future war with China just as we seem to be doing with the Ukraine “lessons”.  Both conflicts involve utterly inept militaries which renders any “lessons” invalid.
 
The only valid lesson is that large, slow, non-stealthy, non-maneuverable UAVs are not survivable in a contested air space and we are foolish to count on them.
 
 
 
_____________________________

 
[1]Atlantic Council website, “How the Houthis’ strikes on US MQ-9 Reaper drones serve a wider regional agenda”, Leonardo Jacopo Maria Mazzucco, 26-Feb-2025,
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/houthi-strikes-on-us-mq9-reaper-drones/
 
[2]Air & Space Forces Magazine website, “MQ-9s Over Iran: Striking and Finding Targets—But Taking Some Losses”, Chris Gordon and Stephen Losey, 11-Mar-2026,
https://www.airandspaceforces.com/mq-9s-over-iran-striking-and-finding-targets-but-taking-some-losses/

We’re Doomed

China has announced its UAV mothership/carrier, a UAV capable of launching 100 drones.  Well, that’s it.  We’re doomed.  I don’t know about you but I’m starting right now to learn to speak Chinese because I’m certain this means the US will be conquered within a year or two.  The Chinese can’t be stopped and this proves it.
 

The world's first drone mothership, Jui Tian, took to the skies for its first-ever flight on December 11th, 2025, in the Pucheng region of Shaanxi province in China. The massive remotely piloted jet carries up to 100 drones, which it can launch while airborne to reach faraway targets. Able to take off with a payload over 13,200 pounds and with a wingspan of 82 feet, Chinese military aviation analyst Fu Qianshao noted that it can carry more weapons and equipment than modern fighter jets and bombers. It has designated hardpoints for guided missiles and bombs on top of the 100 drones.[1]

Some Chinese reports suggest an endurance of 12 hours and a range of 7,000 km.
 

No doubt about it.  This is a weapon system that is absolutely invincible.
 
The fact that it is large, slow, non-maneuverable, and not particularly stealthy, all of which are the definition of a target drone, should in no way diminish the awesomeness of the aircraft.
 
Similarly, the fact that the hundred UAVs it carries would each be on the order of a foot or two wingspan and something around a one pound payload which makes them incredibly short ranged and of no significant lethality relative to a ship should in no way diminish the sheer terror these tiny UAVs inspire.
 
And, of course, none of these miniature UAVs can mount any sort of useful sensor so, unless they have a very close controlling/sensing aircraft nearby (how does a controlling aircraft survive near a combat ready ship?), they’re blind and helpless but that doesn’t diminish the fearsomeness of the system, at all.
 
Being that small and with that small a payload, they certainly can’t have any defense against electronic warfare but that doesn’t lessen the war-winning capability of these tiny machines, in the least.
 
As I consider all this, I can only conclude that we should preemptively surrender.
 
 
 
[1]Redstate website, “China's Giant New 'Flying Aircraft Carrier' Completes Debut Flight”, Ward Clark, 30-Dec-2025,
https://redstate.com/wardclark/2025/12/30/chinas-giant-new-flying-aircraft-carrier-completes-debut-flight-n2197616

Large, Slow, And Non-Stealthy Is No Way To Go Through Life

There are many naval observers who espouse the idea of balloons of some type (aerostats, for example) as a means of providing long range surveillance.  ComNavOps has scoffed at those ideas as being devoid of realistic usefulness and, worse, a detriment to surrounding forces due to being easily detected.  Well, here’s further evidence of the impracticality of such aerostats.  Israel, who famously implemented the Sky Dew aerostat system amid much fanfare and proclamations of miraculous capabilities, is now leaning towards abandoning the entire concept due to unaffordable repair costs, questionable usefulness, and demonstrated vulnerabilities following a Hezbollah suicide drone strike that hit the balloon and rendered it inoperable (see, “You Had One Job”).
 

Israeli defense officials are reevaluating the future of the military’s Sky Dew project, a high-altitude balloon system designed for aerial threat detection, following a series of setbacks including weather damage and an attack by the Hezbollah terror group.[1]
 
In light of these repeated setbacks, defense officials are now seriously considering terminating the project. The vulnerability of the system, its high costs, and the excessive time required for repairs have all factored into this revaluation of a program that has already consumed millions in defense spending.[1]

It’s not just enemy actions that threaten the aerostat;  weather is also a threat.
 

… severe weather had rendered the system inoperable months earlier.  After a protracted repair process, the balloon was redeployed in January [2024] … [1]

Setting aside the actual performance failure of Sky Dew in failing to detect a drone which was its exact intended function, the aerostat has been found to be vulnerable to weather and highly susceptible to enemy attack.  Is this surprising?  No!  Any large, slow (non-mobile, in this case), non-stealthy object is easily detected and simply waiting for the enemy to get around to it on their ‘items to destroy at leisure’ checklist.
 
So, what does this mean for us?
 
This is yet another example demonstrating that large, slow, and non-stealthy aircraft such as AWACS, E-2 Hawkeye, P-8 Poseidon, all large non-stealthy UAVs (Predator, Global Hawk, Reaper and the like), etc. are simply not survivable on the modern battlefield.  It doesn’t matter whether it’s a balloon tethered to a ship or a P-8 Poseidon lumbering around looking for things, large, slow, and non-stealthy is simply not viable.
 
 
 
_______________________________

 
[1]JNS website, “Israel weighs shutting down multi-million-dollar ‘Sky Dew’ project”, Lilach Shoval, 29-Aug-2024,
https://www.jns.org/israel-weighs-shutting-down-multi-million-dollar-sky-dew-project/

Surface Ship Aviation

It has been some 80+ years since WWII and in that time we have seen some truly remarkable advances in tank design, aircraft design, missile development, sensors, etc.  One would think that ship design would have advanced at least as much and yet this is clearly not the case.  Not only has ship design not advanced, in many respects it has regressed.  Armor, weapon density, survivability, redundancy, endurance, sailing range, etc. have all regressed.  Well, at least we can say that surface ship aviation has advanced with the development of the helicopter … right?  Or has it?  Let’s look.
 
As a reminder, WWII US cruisers typically carried four seaplanes operated from two catapults and recovered with one or two cranes.  The seaplanes they used included, primarily, the OS2U Kingfisher and, at other times in the war, the Curtis SC-1 Seahawk and Curtis SOC Seagull.  Today, Burke class destroyers Flt IIa and beyond carry one SH-60 type helo (theoretically capable of two but never done, as far as I know) and provision for a small Fire Scout type UAV which have rarely been used and are being phased out (see, “Fire Scout Status”).  Flt I/II Burkes, have no hangar and carry no helos.  The Constellation class carries one SH-60 type helo and one Fire Scout type UAV.  The LCS carries one SH-60 type helo and one Fire Scout or smaller UAV.
 
 
Aircraft
 
Just as the value of an aircraft carrier is wholly dependent on the size and abilities of the air wing, so too is the surface ship aviation value dependent on the aircraft they carry.  Following is a comparison of the primary aircraft from WWII surface ships and today’s surface ships.

OS2U Kingfisher

Discussion

 
The main function of ship’s aviation both in WWII and today is scouting/targeting.  In WWII, ship’s planes, with a few hundred miles of search radius and an enemy ship speed of advance of only 30 kts maximum, a ship/scout could ensure the ship’s safety for the better part of a day.  Today, with enemy weapons having a speed of advance of several hundred miles per hour or more, long range searches are more critical than ever and yet today’s shipboard aircraft have around half the range of WWII aircraft.  Does that make sense?  What ship designer thought, “Hey, let’s cut the range of our shipboard aviation in half and go with that.”  and everyone agreed with him instead of laughing him out of a job?
 
The other notable regression is in the number of embarked aircraft.  A WWII cruiser carried four aircraft.  Today’s ships carry one full size helo and a small UAV.  Quite a drop!  Admittedly, a WWII cruiser is a bit bigger than even a Burke but the WWII cruiser also didn’t have the 100 ft flight deck and enormous hangar that a Burke has.  Approximately one third of a Burke’s total length is devoted to aviation.  WWII ships devoted almost no length to aviation.  Catapults were placed wherever there was a small amount of room available, including on top of gun turrets!  

The one area where an argument can be made that aircraft have significantly improved is anti-submarine warfare (ASW).  Helos have proven quite useful and effective at this thanks to sonobuoys, dipping sonar, and air-dropped torpedoes.  Unfortunately, the reduction in number of embarked aircraft have rendered the ASW helo only marginally useful unless several ships can pool their aircraft.  As the saying goes, if you have one helo, you have none.  This is recognition of the very high maintenance demands of helos and their inability to maintain a high readiness rate.
 
So, while ASW helos are theoretically significantly improved, the reality of reduced numbers and readiness rates have rendered any theoretical improvement only marginally useful.
 
As with so many other aspects of ship design, today’s surface ship aviation capabilities have not significantly improved and have, in many ways, regressed.  Today’s ships carry fewer (half or less) aircraft with significantly shorter ranges.  
 
How can we address the shortcomings in surface ship aviation?  We have, potentially two possible alternatives to today’s aviation problems:
 
1. Revert to shipboard seaplanes.  With modern engines, enhanced aerodynamic designs, stealth shaping, etc., we should be able to design a ship’s seaplane with range in excess of a thousand miles and a reasonable degree of stealth for survivability and the ability to scout without being instantly detected.  Four (to use the historical number) such aircraft would go a long ways towards providing ships with effective situational awareness and target detection.
 
2. UAVs.  We’ve discussed the use of small, stealthy UAVs for shipboard surveillance many times.  Operated by the dozens at a time, small UAVs can be quite effective while representing little financial risk if some are lost (see, “UAV’s – Numbers Matter”).

Reaper Losses

ComNavOps has long stated that UAVs, especially the larger ones, are utterly ineffective, unsuited, and non-survivable over the battlefield and the Air Force has publicly agreed with that assessment.  Despite my statements, many (including the Navy) continue to believe that UAVs will provide omniscient awareness about our enemies.  Well, we’re finally starting to accumulate some real world data.  We know that Iran has downed multiple UAVs in the past [2] but now we have combat data from the Navy’s engagement with the Houthis in Yemen.  What does the data show?
 

Seven Reaper drones have been brought down by the Houthis since the beginning of March, with six of them occurring since March 15 and three of them over the past week, the official said. At least 15 Reapers have been brought down by the Houthis since October 2023 … [1]

Bing’s AI search engine reports (unsourced),
 

Houthi rebels in Yemen have downed seven US MQ-9 Reaper drones since March 31, 2025. Since November 2023, the Houthis have claimed responsibility for downing fourteen MQ-9 Reaper drones. Yemeni forces have shot down seven US MQ-9 Reaper drones this month and 22 since October 2023. Each MQ-9 is worth about $30 million, so that means the US has lost $660 million worth of drones over Yemen in about a year and a half.[1]

Other sources have similar or larger reported loss numbers.  The point is not the exact number of losses but the fact that this proves that larger UAVs are not survivable over the modern battlefield.  In this case, the conclusion is even more emphatic since the Houthis are far from a modern, top tier military force like the Chinese and because these losses are occurring in the face of supposed high intensity attacks on the Houthis – and yet they somehow manage to routinely shoot down our UAVs?  I guess our attacks aren’t very effective, are they?
 

MQ-9 Reaper

How is it possible that the Houthis can manage to operate radars and SAM launchers while supposedly being overwhelmed by US military attacks?  We can’t stop the Houthis from doing this but we think we’ll take on the Chinese?

 
I don’t have a target list for this anti-Houthi campaign but, clearly, we’re not hitting the right targets.  Our UAVs are being shot down and drones/missiles are getting close enough to our carrier to make it take evasive action.  Against a tenth tier military force with no air force, aren’t we supposed to own the air?  A mosquito shouldn’t be able to fly from Yemen without a missile heading up its backside.
 
All of this is screaming at us that we need to re-evaluate our ideas about how to fight China.
 
 
_____________________________

 
Fun fact:
 
The U.S. Air Force has about 280 Reapers in its inventory, each costing about $28 million, according to the Congressional Research Service.[1]
 
Cost aside, these losses are starting to cut into the military’s inventory of Reapers and we can be sure that we are not seeing all the operational losses from around the rest of the world.
 
 
 
_____________________________

 
[1]ABC News website, “Houthis shoot down growing number of US drones”, Luis Martinez, 23-Apr-2025,
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/houthis-shoot-growing-number-us-drones/story?id=121099082
 
[2]As one example, on 20-Jun-2019, Iran shot down an RQ-4A Global Hawk BAMS-D with a Khordad SAM. 

Stealth UAVs

ComNavOps has long stated that conventional UAVs are useless in high end combat against a peer enemy because they’re not stealthy which means they’re not survivable.  Worse, being non-stealthy, their operation will lead directly back to the controlling unit’s location.
 
The lack of stealth means that they can’t be used for naval recon and targeting because they’ll be spotted and destroyed long before they can find the enemy.  Some have claimed that, being UAVs, they can fly at wave top height to avoid detection.  This is true but it also means they can’t see anything.  If you want a useful field of view (range), you have to operate at some significant altitude.  If a non-stealthy UAV is at a significant altitude, it will be spotted and destroyed before it can accomplish anything.
 
All of this changes, however, if the UAV is stealthy.  Stealth, in this context, refers not just to reduced radar signature but also to reduced infrared and visible signatures. 
 
Let’s briefly consider the known stealthy UAVs in the US inventory.  I’m only aware of two: 
 

• RQ-170 Sentinel
• RQ-180 ?White Bat?

 
Let’s look at a few of their specifications in the following table.

^a The RQ-180 specs are speculative with estimates putting the size in the RQ-4 Global Hawk category so specifications have been adapted from that.  Photos have fairly accurately determined the wingspan and length.

 

RQ-170 Sentinel

 

Both the RQ-170 and RQ-180 have the now common stealthy ‘bat’ shape of the B-2 bomber.
 
The key specification is the size.  The RQ-180 is huge!  Even the RQ-170, while smaller, is far too big to operate off surface ships.
 
The existence of the stealth UAVs likely explains the Air Force’s loss of interest in the more conventional UAVs such as Predator, Global Hawk, etc. as the Air Force has publicly stated that such UAVs are not survivable over the battlefield.
 
Let’s turn our attention to naval UAVs.  The Navy seems to be counting on the P-8 Poseidon and MQ-4 Triton for maritime surveillance, distributed lethality (is that still a thing?) targeting, and anti-surface targeting which seems unwise in the extreme.  As the Air Force has noted, large, non-stealthy aircraft, whether manned or unmanned, are not survivable.
 
ComNavOps has called for large numbers of small UAVs for the surface group surveillance and targeting mission.  The caveat is that these UAVs must be stealthy in order to survive long enough to accomplish their mission.  Losing them is not a concern but they must survive long enough to find targets and transmit their findings back to the host ship.
 
The naval UAV mission calls for a stealthy UAV with the following characteristics:
 
Cheap – The mission is high risk and calls for the use of many UAVs to establish and maintain situational awareness and target detection.  Affordability is a mandatory requirement.
 
Small – These UAVs will operate off various surface ships so they must be small enough to be operational in limited deck space and be stored in large numbers.  The size goal is something on the order of RQ-21 Blackjack (8 ft long x 16 ft wingspan)  or Scan Eagle (5 ft long x 10 ft wingspan) which can be launched with mini-catapults.
 
Range – A useful scouting range is a minimum of 200 miles on out to 500 miles.
 

Conceptual UAV Size for Surface Group Surveillance

Discussion
 
As we’ve discussed in the past, the vast majority of the sensing capability would be passive (EO, IR, SigInt) in keeping with the stealth and survivability requirements.
 
A small, stealthy UAV would give surface ships the ability to establish situational awareness and conduct surveillance without automatically giving away their own presence.
 
Consider what small, stealthy UAVS can do.
 

• They can extend the situational awareness out to 200+ miles.
• They can act as early warning detectors of attacking aircraft and missiles.
• They can act as fire control spotters for naval guns and missiles.
• They can provide targeting for anti-ship missiles.

 
And, they can do this survivably with a reasonable chance of not being detected.  Isn’t that exactly what we want in a naval surveillance asset?
 
The concept of operations (CONOPS) would be to continually operate a dozen or more (work out the effective number in exercises) UAVs in all directions while concentrating on the expected threat axis.  As needed, a UAV could be sent on a one-way mission which would double its range.
 
The major challenge in this concept is communications and I simply don’t know enough to offer a solution.  Satellite communications are an option if we have sufficient surviving satellites.  High altitude communications relay aircraft using line-of-sight is another option.  As I said, I just don’t know.  Communications experts would have to work that out.
 
Larger UAVs, on the order of the RQ-170, can be operated from dedicated UAV carriers and thought should be given to routinely integrating a UAV carrier with every surface group.

ASW Drones

Unmanned is the fad of the day and using drones for anti-submarine warfare (ASW) is an idea that keeps cropping up.  So many people seem enamored with the idea and yet no one has examined the actual use.  Typically, proponents enthusiastically cite the usual drone characteristics, such as extended endurance, without understanding what that means … or doesn’t.  Let’s take a closer look and see if ASW drones are a good idea or not.
 
Let’s examine the characteristics, claimed and actual, of an ASW drone.
 
Endurance.  Proponents claim that the greater endurance of drones will revolutionize ASW, however, that ignores the reality that once any ASW aircraft, drones included, have expended their weapons/sensors they become useless regardless of their remaining endurance.  A drone with a month’s worth of flight time is finished as soon as its sonobuoys and/or weapons are expended.  It doesn’t matter how much longer it can fly.  ASW aircraft are sensor/weapon limited, not endurance limited.  Thus, drones offer no advantage and, in fact, depending on the exact drone, would very likely have fewer sensors/weapons than a manned aircraft and would, thus, have LESS effective endurance than a manned aircraft!
 
Signal Processing.  Manned ASW aircraft such as the S-3 Viking, P-3/8, and helos carry on-board computers and analysts to interpret the sensor signals.  Drones have no on-board analysis capability and must continuously communicate with the host ship.  This is a continuous, broad band transmission which is highly susceptible to detection and localization by the enemy.  The host ship, in turn, has to broadcast control signals to the drone.  Elementary analysis of the locations of drones performing ASW reveals the likely location of the host ship to the enemy.
 
Size and Operation.  Proponents never quite specify the size of the drone they’re calling for.  There are only two possible drone platforms, currently:  Burkes and amphibious ships.
 
The reality is that destroyer size ships (like a DDH) have no large flight deck or recovery area and are limited to something in the Scan Eagle size (5 ft long, 10 ft wing span, 30-40 lb empty weight, 11 lb payload) or the somewhat larger helo-type UAV such as Fire Scout.
 
Helicopter carriers could operate larger drones but even they have limits.  For example, the Wasp class LHD has a [roughly] 104 ft wide flight deck.  A commonly cited drone is the MQ-9 Reaper and I'm moderately sure that, in theory, a 1000 ft x 104 ft flight deck would allow a Reaper to take off. The caveat is that the Reaper does not have an immensely powerful engine so the acceleration might, actually, turn out to be insufficient. That would have to be tested but, for the sake of further discussion, let's assume it could take off.
 
More problematic is that the Wasp island extends close to half way across the flight deck amidships. That reduces the usable flight deck width to around 50 ft, at that point. The Reaper has a wingspan of 65 ft. which puts the nose wheel at 33 ft from either wing tip. Allowing for, say, 10 ft of wing tip clearance from the island (the Navy would probably insist on a greater safety margin than that), that would put the nose wheel 43 ft away from the island which would be within 10 ft or so of the deck edge. That, in turn, puts the wing wheels within a few feet of the deck edge. The slightest deviation and the aircraft is off the edge! In short, it would seem that the full length of the deck cannot be safely used. That leaves only a few hundred feet forward of the island for takeoffs. Now, I'm really not sure an unassisted takeoff is possible!  In fact, it seems unlikely.
 

Wasp Class - note the island extending into the flight deck

So, a Reaper would be the maximum size drone that could operate off a big deck amphibious ship with catapults and arresting gear and it’s likely even that is too big. 
 
Of course, we could purpose design a drone carrier that could operate large UAVs but that would be decades down the road and, likely, unaffordable if we continue buying $20B Fords.
 
Then, there's the issue of storing/hangaring large UAVs (Reaper is 36 ft long x 65 ft wide, for example). It would need some serious wing folding to get an acceptable spot factor so that we could operate more than one UAV.
 
Carrier Adaptation.  Adaptations such as beefed up landing gear, arresting hooks, folding wing mechanisms, etc. all add weight to the aircraft and negatively impact already limited payload capacities as well as unaided takeoff and landing distances.
 
Payload.  To give some frame of reference as we talk about drone payload capacities, here are some relevant sensor/weapon weights:
 
Sonobuoy - 35-40 lbs, depending on specific type
Torpedo - The Mk54 lightweight torpedo weighs a little over 600 lbs.
 
What is a useful payload size and composition?  A reasonable minimum would be something on the order of 40 sonobuoys and 2 lightweight torpedoes.  Thus, a payload of two torpedoes plus 40 sonobuoys = 2800 lbs without launchers, pylons, and associated equipment.
 
Drone payload capacities vary widely, depending on the size of the aircraft.
 
Drone Types.  With the characteristics we just discussed in mind, let’s now review the basic drone types and see how they mesh with the characteristics.
 
Small.  Small UAVs, such as Scan Eagle or RQ-21 Blackjack size, can operate off destroyers.  The drawback is that they have a very small payload to the point of being incapable of effective ASW work.
 
Scan Eagle, as an example, is very small and has a mere 11 lb payload capacity.  A standard A-size sonobuoy is around 5” diameter x 36” long and weighs 39 lb.  A Scan Eagle size drone couldn’t even carry one sonobuoy! 
 
Medium.  Intermediate size UAVs such as the vertical takeoff and landing MQ-8B Fire Scout has a theoretical maximum payload of around 500 lbs, however, the practical payload is around 100 lbs.  Thus, it could not carry even a single torpedo and only a few sonobuoys.  This is simply not an effective payload. 
 
The larger MQ-8C Fire Scout has a maximum theoretical payload capacity of around 700 lbs with a practical payload of around 300 lbs. 
 
These drones are capable of operating off a destroyer but cannot carry a combat-useful payload.

Fire Scout

Large.  Larger UAVs such as the MQ-9 Reaper, Predator, Global Hawk, etc. have payload capacities that begin to be useful but they require actual aircraft carriers with catapults and arresting gear to operate from.  The MQ-9 Reaper, for example, has a theoretical maximum payload of 3800 lbs and a practical capacity of around 1000 lbs on a wingspan of 65 ft and a length of 36 ft. 

 
 
Land Based
 
So far, we’ve limited our discussion to ship based drones but land based drones are also an option.  While concerns about takeoff/recovery are not an issue, payloads, effective endurance, and signal processing communications are and still impose limitations.
 
Presumably, most naval operations will occur well out to sea (thousands of miles) which is certainly within reach of large UAVs (noting, of course, the inverse relationship between payload and range/endurance!) but is not a tactically responsive situation.  For example, a surface group that requests drone ASW support will have to wait many hours for a response under even the best of circumstances.  Land based ASW aircraft, whether manned or unmanned, are best employed as a base defense rather than as a task force support asset. 
 
Attempting to supply a constant ASW presence using land based aircraft would require a constant stream of aircraft flying to and from the operating area.  It would require something on the order of a dozen aircraft to maintain one continuously – and effectively – on station.  Remember, that in a war, sonobuoy and weapon usage will be staggering and all the endurance of an aircraft will be rendered moot as the aircraft quickly empties its payload and is rendered ineffective.
 
 
Conclusions
 
1. Very small drones can operate off destroyers but are incapable of performing any effective ASW due to payload limitations.
 
2.  Larger, vertical takeoff UAVs can operate from destroyers but, again, their payloads are so limited as to render them nearly useless and not worth the support and operating effort.
 
3. A big deck amphibious ship for moderate size UAVs is feasible although they would likely need to have catapults and arresting gear.  Again, there are payload concerns although they begin to approach a somewhat useful load.  This is an expensive option.
 
4. Land based ASW drones could possibly carry a useful payload but are tactically inefficient and are best relegated to patrolling around their base.
 
5. A reasonable alternative would be to modify a large commercial vessel to operate large UAVs by eliminating/minimizing superstructure and adding a long flight deck.  This would likely be the cheapest and best option.
 
 
Considering the above conclusions, it is hard to visualize effective, efficient ASW drones.  They simply don’t have the characteristics necessary to perform combat-effective ASW.  In other words, there is no viable CONOPS for ASW drones.  Further, given that we have existing ASW helos and P-8 Poseidons, one has to wonder why so many people want to force fit drones into a task they are clearly not suited for.

Goodbye Triton?

As you may recall, the MQ-4C Triton UAV was going to solve all the Navy’s surveillance monitoring requirements.
 
The Triton is a large, high altitude, long endurance (30 hrs) UAV derived from the Global Hawk.  It was intended to team with the P-8 Poseidon under the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) concept.  Triton would conduct high altitude surveillance and the P-8 would focus on anti-submarine and anti-surface surveillance.
 

MQ-4C Triton

The first demonstration aircraft flew in 2013 and, ten years later, Initial Operating Capability was just announced.  Plans called for 70 aircraft to be produced.  Groups of 4 aircraft were planned to operate from 5 sites, keeping 20 aircraft in active operations at any one time. 

 
A USNI News article notes the wonders of Triton,
 

… Triton is poised to bring significant improvements that will increase its effectiveness in the battlespace, enabling our manned-unmanned team to maintain awareness in the maritime domain,” Rear Adm. Adam Kijek, the commander of the Navy’s patrol and reconnaissance group, said in the service news release. “The Indo-Pacific theater is the ideal arena to demonstrate the advanced capabilities that Triton brings to our Fleet Commanders and the nation.”[1]

This would certainly sound like amazing news if it weren’t for the fact that the Navy, having just declared IOC, is halting production and severely cutting the Triton inventory.
 

The IOC benchmark comes as the Navy looks to halt the MQ-4C line. The Fiscal Year 2024 budget proposal sought to buy the final two MQ-4Cs in the next fiscal year, drastically cutting the program of record from an original 70 airframes to 27, according to service budget documents.
 
“The MQ-4C Triton inventory requirement has been re-assessed by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), which has modified MQ-4C Triton’s Capability Development Document (CDD) to reduce total inventory requirement,” the budget books read.
 
“The total number of aircraft are attributed to the program as 22 production, and 5 development … ” [1]

So, the Triton inventory is being cut from 70 to 22 production airframes.  In addition, the number of operating sites has been reduced from 5 to 3.
 
Why?
 
No explanation has been given.  My speculation is that the Navy has concluded, as has the Air Force, that large, slow UAVs are not survivable in the modern aerial battlefield – something they should have realized before development even began!
 
Does this sound eerily reminiscent of the LCS which the Navy is retiring almost as fast as they’re being produced?  Or, perhaps it reminds you of the Zumwalt which went from being the absolutely vital, future of naval warfare to being deemed entirely unneeded by the Navy in a matter of months?  Or, maybe it sounds like the brand new Mobile Landing Platforms (MLP) which the Navy attempted to retire, was thwarted by Congress, and was, instead, placed in Reduced Operating Status (retired in all but name)?
 
This is what happens when you produce assets without any Concept of Operations (CONOPS) – you quickly realize that they have no use and then you’re forced to dump them. 
 
Humiliating.
 
 
 
____________________________

 
[1]USNI News website, “MQ-4C Triton Reaches Initial Operational Capability, UAV on 2nd Guam Deployment”, Mallory Shelbourne, 14-Sep-2023,
https://news.usni.org/2023/09/14/mq-4c-triton-reaches-initial-operational-capability-uav-on-2nd-guam-deployment

MQ-25 Control Concept

The Navy’s unmanned tanker, the MQ-25, is supposed to be able to take off, fuel aircraft, and land, all autonomously.  That’s quite an accomplishment and, if successful, adds a vital tanking capability without adding remote pilots or requiring complicated control communications schemes which would add to the burdens of a carrier rather than subtracting from them.  It is the hands-off nature of the unmanned tanker that is appealing.

 

However, the latest rumblings from the Navy hint at a somewhat different story.

 

Boeing has successfully demonstrated for the first time the ability for the P-8A maritime patrol aircraft to take control of the MQ-25 Stingray drone mid-flight …

 

The event was a follow-up to a demonstration to one the company held last year which showed how the Stingray, the Navy’s new carrier-based, unmanned aerial tanker, could be controlled by an F/A-18 Super Hornet or E-2D Advanced Hawkeye pilot mid-flight while performing its core tanking mission.[1]

 

This is moving into dangerous territory.  Is this suggesting that a supervisory aircraft will need to be present in order for the unmanned tanker to perform its task?  That would be a very disappointing development – almost an overall negative for a carrier air wing that has few enough aircraft, as it is, and can ill afford to dedicate a control aircraft to babysit an unmanned tanker.

 

However, I think this suggesting that the Navy could, via an intermediary aircraft, take control of a tanker in order to issue new mission orders.

 

The value in pilots being able to task MQ-25s mid-flight lies within a core assumption the Navy — and more broadly the Pentagon — has about the future battlefield: all communications will be subject to attack. The shipboard controllers may not always have contact or permission to communicate with the MQ-25 depending on the situation. If that’s the case, then a pilot of a nearby manned aircraft may need to redirect the unmanned tanker without assistance from the ship.[1]

 

Of course, this raised the question, if the shipboard controller can’t communicate with the unmanned tanker due to enemy disruption of communications, why would we think that we’ll be able to communicate with the manned aircraft to tell the pilot to redirect the unmanned one?  That’s a logical inconsistency.  Military thinking just teems with this kind of logical inconsistency.

 

Here’s a bit of additional delusion and logical inconsistency:

 

“If you’re doing an ISR mission, you can be doing an ISR mission with this airplane [the unmanned tanker] 1,000 miles from the carrier,” he said. “You’re not going to be talking to the carrier to do that ISR mission. More than likely you might be talking to a P-8.”[1]

 

If you believe a large, slow, non-stealthy, broadcasting surveillance aircraft like the P-8 is going to survive to operate a thousand miles from a carrier, in enemy controlled/contested air and water, you’re deluding yourself.  And, in a bit of logical inconsistency, if you can survivably operate a P-8 in the area then you don’t need an unmanned tanker/surveillance aircraft because the P-8 can do it.

 

This attempt to redirect and repurpose an unmanned tanker into other missions is typical of the Navy.  Instead of developing a single function and getting it to work at an affordable price, the Navy is already attempting to add additional tasks and control schemes onto an as yet unproven aircraft.  Common sense says to develop the main functionality first before moving on to others.

 

 

 

____________________________________

 

[1]Breaking Defense website, “Boeing successfully demos MQ-25 control through P-8, autonomy software”, Justin Katz, 8-Sep-2022,

https://breakingdefense.com/2022/09/boeing-successfully-demos-mq-25-control-through-p-8-autonomy-software/

Turkish UAV Carrier

Although it is not yet 100% certain, it appears that Turkey is following through on plans to modify a LHD amphibious ship (the Anadolu, L400) to act as a drone carrier after having the option of operating F-35Bs terminated due to political issues and removal from the F-35 program. 

 

As previously reported by Defense News, the Turkish government hopes to convert its landing helicopter dock Anadolu into a carrier ship for attack drones because the Turkish navy lost the ability to launch a fixed-wing aircraft from Anadolu after the United States removed Turkey from the F-35 project.[1]

 

Anadolu will be capable to deploy between 30 and 50 Bayraktar TB3 folding-wing drones.[1]

 

Let’s take a closer look at Turkey’s UAV carrier.

 

 

Air Wing

 

As with any carrier, the carrier’s value lies entirely in its air wing.  In this case the air wing consists entirely of unmanned UAV drones.

 

Turkish UAV Carrier Anadolu

 

The Turkish UAV carrier will use an indigenously designed and built drone, the TB3, based on the Baykar TB2 family.

 

The new armed drone will have a takeoff weight of 1450 kilograms [ed. 3190 lbs] and will be able to fly 24 hours a day, according to an infographic in the presentation. In addition, the TB-3 will be able to fly at high altitudes, and its wings will fold when on the ship.[1]

 

Turkey’s Defence Industry Chief Ismail Demir stated that Anadolu will be capable to deploy between 30 or 50 Bayraktar TB-3 drones.[5]

Turkish UAV Carrier Concept Illustration - Note 

Size of Aircraft and Folding Wings

 The TB3 is a modification of the TB2, already in operation.  The TB3 will launch using a ‘roller’ and pulley/cable mechanism powered by an electric motor [4] and recover by flying into a net, the belief being that having the propellers mounted to the rear will allow the net recovery with no damage.  Other reports have suggested that aircraft recovery will be via a ‘hook’ of some sort.[5]

 

TB3 Drone

Roller Style Launch System

 

Here’s some basic specs and features of the TB3 [2]:

 

 

TB3 Drone Specs and Features
Wingspan	14 m (45.9 ft)
Length	8.35 m (27.4 ft)
Height	2.6 m (8.5 ft)
Max Take Off Weight	1450 kg (3190 lb)
Cruise Speed	125 knots
Max Speed	160 knots
Max Payload	280 Kilograms (616 lb)
Endurance	24+ hrs (one report claims 50 hrs[8])
Communications	Line Of Sight and Beyond Line Of Sight
Take Off and Landing	Fully Autonomous

 

 

 

As shown in the specs, this is a big drone.  It’s about the same size as the well known MQ-1 Predator.

 

Turkey is also developing an unmanned air-to-air combat UAV.

 

Selcuk Bayraktar [Chief Technology Officer of Baykar Co.] also stated that MIUS, an unmanned combat aircraft currently in concept design, would operate alongside the TB-3 on the LHD Anadolu. A MIUS prototype is planned to fly in 2023. LHD Anadolu would deploy two types of fixed-wing unmanned air assets once trials were completed.[1]

 

The first flight of prototype MIUS is expected in 2023. Currently in design phase, MUIS will be jet-powered, with a payload of up to 1.5 tons, Baykar top boss added. The autonomously maneuvering craft will be capable of operating in tandem with piloted aircraft, and may carry air-to-air missiles.[3]

 

“MIUS will operate at a cruising speed close to the speed of sound; the further prototypes will fly at the supersonic speed. It will have a payload of around 1500 kilograms. It will be able to deploy air-to-air, air-to-ground missiles and cruise missiles.”[5]

 

Turkish MIUS Combat Drone Illustration

 

It appears that Turkey is attempting to develop both a strike/ISR and an air combat drone and their schedule is extremely aggressive.

 

On a related note, Turkey has developed a UAV air-to-surface weapon, the MAM-L smart micro munition.  It is 1m long, weighs 22 kg, and has a range of 8-15 km, depending on options.[6]

 

 

CONOPS

 

We have no formal information about the Turkish UAV Carrier Concept of Operations (CONOPS), however, we can reason out a general concept.

 

Turkey is clearly aiming to develop combat drones as opposed to surveillance drones although I’m sure they’ll use the drones for surveillance, as needed.  This would provide them with a carrier-mobile strike/combat aviation capability to replace the lost F-35B capability, to a degree.  The TB3, in particular, seems to be a surveillance drone with a surface-to-ground missile capability, likely akin to the US Hellfire equipped drones.  The MIUS drone, on the other hand, appears to be a pure combat UAV.

 

Of note is the fairly large number of embarked drones.  Numbers in the 30-50 range have been reported.[7]  This is significant in that it allows for massing of firepower effects to produce a militarily significant impact and allows for inevitable attrition. 

 

Note: some reports have suggested that simultaneous control is limited to around 10 UAVs.[8]  If true, this would limit the massing benefit.

 

On the negative side, the Turkish TB3 drones are large and slow and, as has been demonstrated in the real world, large, slow drones will have a very short life over a high end battlefield.  The MIUS, as described, would be quite fast and maneuverable, making it potentially quite suitable for high end combat.

 

All of this suggests that the carrier is intended to operate in lower threat scenarios (as opposed to a China/US type high end combat setting) where the larger, slower TB3 can still be effective.  The apparent control limit of ten or so UAVs also suggests lower threat scenarios where the UAV can provide situational awareness and an ‘aerial sniper’ type of ground support/attack as opposed to mass attacks.

 

If successfully developed (an ambitious undertaking by any standard!), the MIUS will be fully capable of high end combat and would, presumably, come to eventually comprise the majority of the air wing.

 

All of this strongly suggests that the UAV carrier will be used as a ground support platform rather than a stand alone strike asset.  The MIUS would be used to establish local air superiority thereby allowing the TB3 drones to conduct sniper attacks on ground targets.  An ambitious concept, if correct!

 

 

Summary

 

As stated, the value of any carrier is its air wing.  Turkey’s UAV carrier air wing is, currently, mostly conceptual although the scope of that concept is impressive, to say the least.  Of course, as the US has seen, repeatedly, the road from concept to working asset is difficult and, more often than not, results in failure.  The more ambitious the concept, the greater the chance of failure and Turkey’s concept is ambitious in the extreme with the envisioned MIUS supersonic air combat vehicle as the cornerstone of the concept.  It will be fascinating to see whether they can make it work.

 

ComNavOps has long advocated a UAV carrier although with a different intended mission from Turkey’s LHD.  The Turkish CONOPS may work for whatever uses Turkey has in mind but they would not work for the US.  The US has many different forms of strike and air-to-air capability, all far more efficient and effective than a large, slow drone or even an air-to-air combat UAV.  What the US needs is a large amount of small, cheap, expendable surveillance drones for which a UAV carrier would be ideal.  Similar ships, different CONOPS.

 

One cannot help but admire the vision and ambition of the Turkish arms development industry.  If they can transform their visions into successful, working assets they will, if not revolutionize, certainly significantly impact the future conduct of war.  The US Navy considered a combat UAV but ultimately settled on an unmanned tanker, instead.  Our vision was more restrained, opting to take the safer route and develop unmanned carrier operating experience before revisiting the combat UAV.  Which country’s approach will prove more successful (or both, or neither) remains to be seen.

 

I find it embarrassing that Turkey is exploring a UAV carrier when the US Navy will not.  We have amphibious ships to, literally, throw away and it is nothing short of criminal to not use one as a prototype for a UAV carrier.  The USS Whidbey Island (LSD-41), for example, is being retired this year and could easily serve as a prototype for a year or two.

 

We’re enamored with unmanned aircraft and yet, inexplicably, we seem to have no interest in figuring out how to integrate them into the fleet.

 

 

 

______________________________________

[1]Defense News, “Turkey’s Baykar preparing shipborne fleet of combat drones”, Tayfun Ozberk, 6-Aug-2021,

https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2021/08/06/turkeys-baykar-preparing-shipborne-fleet-of-combat-drones/

 

[2]https://baykartech.com/en/bayraktar-tb3/

 

[3]https://www.defenseworld.net/news/30761/Baykar_to_Test_Bayraktar_TB3_Sea_Based_UAV#.YiFGcfZFyM8

 

[4]https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2021/05/10/behold-the-turkish-navys-drone-aircraft-carrier/?sh=dcfa87839daa

 

[5]Naval News website, “Turkey to deploy MIUS unmanned combat aircraft from LHD Anadolu”,Tayfun Ozberk, 22-Jul-2021,

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2021/07/turkey-to-deploy-mius-unmanned-combat-aircraft-from-lhd-anadolu/

 

[6]https://navyclippings.nl/index.php/2021/03/18/turkish-navys-ucav-engages-sea-target-for-the-first-time/

 

[7]Defense News, “Turkey plans to deploy attack drones from its amphibious assault ship”, Tayfun Ozberk, 11-Mar-2021,

https://www.defensenews.com/global/2021/03/11/turkey-plans-to-deploy-attack-drones-from-its-amphibious-assault-ship/

 

[8]https://vpk.name/en/579043_in-turkey-the-flight-of-the-deck-bayraktar-was-announced.html