We are honored today to have a guest post from Carlton Meyer. You may know him as username ‘G2mil’ and the author of many outstanding articles posted on his website at www.g2mil.com. Carlton has a two (maybe three?) part series of posts describing his proposal to scrap two carriers. In today’s post, he lays out the background and basis for his proposal. The second part, which will come later in the year, will describe the results and ramifications of his proposal.
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Scrap Two Carriers!
Carlton Meyer
The US Navy is out of balance. Most funds are devoted to
maintaining a fleet of eleven supercarriers to keep two or three "on
patrol" for eight months at a time, ready for the Soviet Navy to reappear.
If war begins with a major power, carriers should remain far from danger.
Aircraft carriers are useful, but must remain in safe seas until land-based
aircraft and submarines clear the seas of most enemy subs and destroy enemy
long-range missile sites and air bases. Then they can arrive for strike
missions or to escort amphibious groups to support an invasion. They are also
useful against weak nations, but the USA doesn't need 11 supercarriers, in
addition to the 10 large carriers used by the Marines, which are larger than
World II Navy carriers. Shrinking to nine supercarriers frees funds and
manpower to rebalance the fleet with more surface combatants and aircraft.
If admirals quickly dispatch carriers to the Western Pacific
in time of war with China, they will suffer the fate of the mighty British
battleship HMS Prince of Wales along with the heavy cruiser HMS Repulse when
they sailed from Singapore to confront the Japanese Navy at the beginning of
World War II. As their respected admiral executed World War I era tactics for a
great ship battle, his first-class warships were attacked by a swarm of pesky
land-based aircraft and sunk. Experts agree that if Japan had focused
production on aircraft and submarines rather than battleships, it would have
taken the USA another year or two to prevail. For example, tremendous resources
were devoted to the three massive Yamato class battleships. Admirals feared
committing them to any serious naval engagement knowing the embarrassment
should one be sunk, as will be the case with current American supercarriers.
When forced to deploy toward the end of the war, all three super-battleships
were easily sunk by torpedoes from submarines and aircraft.
This occurred before torpedoes and bombs had guidance
systems! Japanese kamikaze attacks were the first guided attacks on ships.
These older aircraft were flown by new pilots with no experience and 81% were
shot down or crashed at sea. Yet these attacks killed more American sailors
than kamikaze pilots, sunk 47 ships and damaged 365 others. This tactic may not
be dead. A nation may send four dozen old supersonic fighters flying Mach near
sea-level toward an American carrier, loaded with dumb bombs and blazing away
with 20mm gatling guns. These need not even be suicide missions if pilots eject
prior to impact.
American admirals fear war with a peer nation because they
know a single hit may explode an aircraft carrier filled with aviation fuel,
missiles, and bombs, alongside 6000 sailors. One hit below deck and the ship
may blow up like an ammo ship - killing everyone! Or carriers may be sunk by a
single lurking submarine or a volley of long-range cruise missiles. The USS
Forrestal was severely damaged during the Vietnam war after a minor fire caused
a single 20mm round to fire, which set off a chain of explosions that caused
mass casualties and set the ship ablaze. In 1969, a small rocket fired off an
aircraft aboard the USS Enterprise set off a series of 18 explosions,
blowing eight holes into the flight deck and killing 28 sailors, with 314
injured and 15 aircraft destroyed.
The US Navy needs only nine supercarriers that can still
rotate deployments so that one can arrive anywhere within a week or two for
small crises. Carrier cuts may soon occur automatically because of the USS Ford
disaster this blog has recently covered. It looks certain that the Ford program
will require billions more dollars and several years to modify the two
completed Fords and two more under construction. Will cuts to naval aviation
and surface combatants be required to fund this, making the current imbalance
worse? Today’s US Navy fleet has become imbalanced as the number of escorts for
each carrier has fallen to about half that common in the Cold War, so each
carrier is even more vulnerable. Two fewer carriers solves this problem as it
frees their escorts for other carriers and frees funding and manpower to
procure more escorts, and helps solve the Navy 5000 man shortage for at-sea
billets recently covered in this blog.
Half of the savings from two carrier deactivations would
allow for increased purchases of naval aircraft to fill the decks of the
remaining carriers. US Navy carriers now deploy with around 25% fewer aircraft
than during the Cold War due to rising aircraft costs. Admirals excuse this by
claiming carriers need fewer aircraft since they are now more capable, although
they can’t deny that more aircraft are better. In addition, the Navy and Marine
Corps have almost no spare aircraft for wartime attrition. Downsizing to nine
carriers would allow them to deploy with a full complement of aircraft and
fleet replacement or reserve squadrons with 100 spare aircraft for wartime
attrition. Another option is to maintain two carrier air wings ashore overseas
that incorporate Marine Corps squadrons. A post about this concept will appear
later this year.
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Carlton Meyer is a former Marine Corps officer whose writings appeared in the Marine Corps Gazette, Naval Proceedings, and the Navy Times. He became irritated when some articles approved by editors never appeared after the Marine Commandant’s office and the CNO’s office began to preview publications and block articles they didn’t like. This explains why their articles have become bland. He began posting his ideas at www.G2mil.com in 2000.
Supporting your argument back in Oct 2019 Thomas Modly Under Secretary of the Navy noted ''that the carrier strike group has always been a large expense for the Navy but that today it constitutes a much larger percentage of the bill. In the 1980s, the carrier strike group cost about 14 percent of the total Navy operating cost. Today it’s 31 percent // he called the 355-ship goal, based around 12 carrier strike groups, a “very aggressive goal” that would be hard to meet or sustain'' // “If you look at what it would take to do that – and we laid this into our 30-year shipbuilding plan – it’s going to be very, very difficult for us to do that, A) based on that force structure, and B) based on the budget and top line. So we’re all sort of coming to this realization now that there’s a math problem that we need to try to solve, and we have to be creative about how we’re going to solve it”
ReplyDeleteModly did set up a task force to look at possible future options to follow on from the horrendously expensive Ford class but think task force died when he resigned, my personal view is that the nuclear carriers are just black holes for the Navy to keep shoveling money into, seen mention the next CVN RCOH will be $6 billion, Navy should revert to conventional propulsion cutting procurement cost and O&S costs.
PS Expect the 31% percentage figure for operating cost of carriers has only increased with the Ford berthing barge, just recently Ford wrapped up another of its numerous maintenance availabilities since commissioned back in July 2017 and yet to be fully operationally deployed any time soon.
That is definitely a math problem, but perhaps not exactly in the way that Modly was thinking of it. In the 1980s the Navy had 15 carriers and presumably 15 carrier strike groups out of 600 ships. Today the number of carriers (and presumably carrier strike groups) is down to 11 but the number of total ships is down under 300.
DeletePercentages are calculated from a numerator and a denominator. Wen the numerator (a function of number of carriers) goes down by about 27%, and the denominator (a function of total number of ships) goes down by 50%, the percentage will obviously go up.
My real takeaway from this, plus other extensive analyses that Mr. Meyer does at g2mil.com, is that the real culprit is out of control administrative/overhead costs. When admin/overhead costs are 77% of total defense spending, as suggested by consulting firm McKinsey (1), the real problem is too much fat and not enough muscle. But as Mr. Meyer notes at is website, when the generals and admirals are the ones making the cuts, they tend to protect the cushy staff jobs for themselves and their buddies, and cut muscle instead of fat.
(1)https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/dotcom/client_service/Public%20Sector/PDFS/McK%20on%20Govt/Defense/MoG_benchmarking_v9.ashx
"(and presumably carrier strike groups)"
DeleteJust a reminder, we currently only have 9 air wings so we can only field a maximum of 9 carrier strike groups.
And a carrier "group" with one carrier would be a terrible idea anyway.
Delete"Just a reminder, we currently only have 9 air wings so we can only field a maximum of 9 carrier strike groups."
DeleteTrue that.
Also, I'm guessing that we are assigning fewer escorts to a carrier strike group today than in the 1980s (for one thing, we obviously don't have as many) so my ratio of carrier strike group ship numbers to total ship numbers is probably overstated in today's USN.
I had landed on 10. No reason for 11 or 12.
ReplyDeleteAndy, the Navy has their super secret "Policy Wheel",
Deletelike Wheel of Fortune. Spin the wheel to determine what the Navy wants to do today. "Ship Name Report",
"Fleet Restructure Light". Sadly the "Create CONOPS"
space was omitted during a repainting of the wheel about 1989. It was replace a additional "Ship Names Report" space.
Im going to have to disagree with the majority of this post. There IS a major imbalance in the Navy, but its repaired by fixing the procurement system, cutting shore billets, halting wasteful spending on LCS and unmanned idiocy, and halting the massive expenditures on wasteful 'deploymemts', among other things. Getting the Navy refocused on warfighting, and firepower, and nothing else is the cure. While CVNs should be looked at as support for other ships to do strike missions, they are still the premier platform for American naval power. We need more carriers, not less. Reshuffling priorities and budget to make that happen (along with bigger airwings and escorts) is whats needed.
ReplyDeleteAs an aside, misrepresenting incidents like the Forrestal and Enterprise fires (which actually demonstrated the resillience of the ships and crews), or making statements like "American admirals fear war with a peer nation because they know a single hit may explode an aircraft carrier...", doesnt further your position at all. Stating that a carrier is vulnerable to a modern day land based Kamikaze strike shows a lack of understanding of how a CVBG would be placed/used by all but the most inept commander in a peer war isnt a good talking point.
Yes, the Navy is a mess, and the ridiculous expenditures on the Fords hurt us now and well into the future. But rolling over and accepting a lesser fleet, bowing to budgetary constraints, and getting rid of some of the most powerful ships/platforms on the planet, imho, is NOT the answer.
If we looked at cold war fleet balance, we would scale to about 6 carriers given 295 ships.
Delete@AndyM
DeleteAre we aiming for balance, or should we build around national mission requirements?
Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the intent was to operate 2-4 carriers in a fast carrier task force against select targets, because that was the mission requirement.
Not saying you are right or wrong, but the implication of 6 carriers is the ability to field a single carrier task force, or two very weak carrier task forces. How does that impact national planning? What options does it give us, and do those options justify the cost of maintaining the carrier force?
GAB
Posted a comment which promptly disappeared. CNO, is it a spam box issue Ive seen others talk about sometimes??
ReplyDeleteYes, it's a spam issue. I've now moved the comment to the regular folder and it's now visible.
DeleteThis issue seems to come and go for no apparent reason. All I can do is check the spam folder several times a day. I know it's frustrating.
It was a first time for me. No frustration or worries...!!
DeleteIt's worth knowing why the USN has settled on eleven carriers, apart from "The aviation community wants as many as possible."
ReplyDeleteWith nine, it would presumably be possible to have three deployed, three training for deployment, and three refitting? Does that allow for the long refits that go with nuclear refuelling, or are extra carriers required to cover for that?
Does Mr Meyer's scheme consider routine carrier deployments useful? They seem to be considered useful by US politicians, since they're a chunk of military power that can show up and be menacing, without any requirement for troops or aircraft to operate from bases in the region of interest.
"Scrap Two Carriers!"
ReplyDeleteHow about scrapping the four Fords and pretending they never existed?
Fixing the Fords would be way cheaper, if it's possible. Have there been studies on what would be lost by reverting the unbuilt ships to conventional catapults, arresting gear and weapon elevators? It may be too late to do this to the first two, but the unbuilt hulls could be changed.
DeleteWe converted the original JFK from nuke propulsion to steam after construction had started, so lots of changes are possible.
DeleteI am all for improved force structure, but where I see the U.S. Navy's greatest imbalance is in amphibious forces (too many) and submarines (too few).
ReplyDeleteThe USMC has demonstrated a complete lack of emphasis on amphibious operations, and the 30+ amphibious ships represent a massive investment to float 2-3 infantry battalions around, literally praying that they will be in the right spot if a crisis appropriate to their meager combat power arises.
What to do? I would mothball the two (2) CVNs and all of the amphibs save a small training squadron on the west coast so the USMC can train and continue to experiment with amphibious craft, as well as doctrine. I would divert the O&M funds to redress the maintenance crisis in the surface fleet, and reprogram acquisition funds to building more submarines - possibly another shipyard.
GAB
I agree on the amphibs. Lots of ways the Marines could do their thing with other platforms eventually. Especially when you are talking $2-4B a pop. That 3-1 deal they are fighing about over at HI could be 2 destroyers and 2 subs.
DeleteHere's another question to ponder wrt. amphibs: how's the MPF doing these days? And how is our ability to use our amphibs in their envisioned role affected if the answer to that first question is "not great after two decades of neglect due to constant deployment of other assets"?
DeleteAmphibs and the MPF are different things. Amphibs are overspecialized, lack volume, and are slow. They make a laughable addition to the MPF or MSC.
DeleteGAB
I think it's a good idea.
ReplyDeleteAlso think the number of amphibs needs to go down. Now that contested landings are out, does the navy really need 9 amphibious assault ships and 11 amphibious transport docks?
I do think the US needs more submarines including replacing those modified Ohio cruise missile subs (SSGNs) as well as reintroducing cheaper and more numerous SSKs back into the fleet (maybe acquiring a licence to produce those funky new Japanese Taigeis or even German U212s).
The SSGNs have massive offensive firepower (154 cruise missiles) which is far less difficult to locate or target than a carrier battle group.
And the SSKs can be used to obtain critical mass in western Pacific or be used in more friendly waters ala Atlantic and allow the Virginia's to focus on Pacific.
And in addition to subs and more conventional surface warships, USN also needs to completely re-establish a large MCM fleet (let's call them minesweepers!) and by focusing on well tried methods, not some new fangled laser thing.
I think we start to get our stealth warshots back via the bomber rather than the subs. My math shows you can buy 13.86 B-21 for 1 Columbia. Figure 1 rotary launcher in the B-21. 14 B-21 with 8 rounds is the same 112 shots as Columbia with 16 x 7.
ReplyDeleteInteresting, but, what are the odds of all those B-21-carried weapons getting launched at a target, vs the Columbia's?? Are they as stealthy/surviveable up to the point of launch?? Maybe, maybe not, but I feel like planes, stealthy or not, are still more vulnerable to detection/attack than an SSBN. In all the nuclear exchange scenarios, the seaborne leg of the triad has always seemed to be the one you could count on.
DeleteEach has advantages. Bombers can be anywhere relatively fast compared to the sub. They can also be more places. They can also reload and be back again faster.
DeleteProblem with bombers is they might be taken out in a preemptive strike.
DeleteThey also aren't very fast as they're subsonic. Russian/Chinese radars can't get a lock on a stealth aircraft but they can get a rough glimpse of them.
And as the Serbs proved in 1999, if you use a bit of maths and observation/deduction you can actually get a hit on a stealth aircraft
"as the Serbs proved"
DeleteWhat they proved is that if you're stupid enough to fly repeatable patterns in combat, you deserve to die.
@AndyM: "Bombers can be anywhere relatively fast compared to the sub. They can also be more places. They can also reload and be back again faster."
DeleteI do not think your argument holds. 1) I very much doubt that the *total program cost* of the B-21 is competitive with the Colombia - consider the cost of enabling systems like air-to- air refueling. 2) These are strategic systems, and a FBM submarine is infinitely more effective as a total strategic weapon system than land based ICBMs, or strategic bombers. 3) The amount of B-21s procured seem unlikely to exceed the number of B-1/B-2 aircraft purchased because they are less effective than FBM submarines, meaning they are unlikely to have much of a conventional impact.
GAB
GAB, I'm looking at the conventional rather than strategic/nuclear. Pretty clear from the lets end the world now perspective the SSBN moved decisively ahead long ago. Again, this is a where is the balance discussion in my mind. Costs also go beyond supporting assets. Certainly crew, navaal shipyard maintenance capacity would all factor in to total weapon on target delivery price, similar to tankers for bombers.
Delete@AndyM
DeleteThe point is the USA ‘needs’ a strategic deterrence force, of which a FBM is vital component; but the ‘need’ for a strategic bomber or land-based ICBM is not clear.
Keep in mind that the B-21 is being justified as a strategic platform: the costs are completely unjustified if we argued its use in a conventional role. The sortie rate for anything ‘stealth’ is abysmal, add in very long round-trip flights and the value of such aircraft is low. I am aware of the USAF argument for using bombers in Afghanistan and I am not convinced.
The USAF tanker force was designed and justified to refuel strategic bombers, the flying boom really was not designed around fueling fighters.
GAB
"They can also reload and be back again faster."
DeleteNot really and not for any sustained period of operation. A global ranged mission, such as you're discussing, requires days to plan, assemble supporting resources, execute, return, and then undergo extensive post-op maintenance. One mission per week would be the maximum sortie rate and likely not even that.
While no platform, sub or aircraft, is invulnerable, aircraft, even stealth bombers, are far more susceptible to combat attrition than a sub. The inevitable combat losses will quickly negate the 'back again faster' claim. Add to that the inevitable non-combat 'losses' (unavailable maintenance/repair parts, accidents, mechanical failures, etc.) and a small bomber force can only operate for a limited time before they're depleted. Subs, with much better survivability and reliability, are a long term available asset.
Finally, sortie rate is not the useful measure of combat effectiveness; weapon delivery rate is. A sub can deliver 154 Tomahawk cruise missiles in one mission. A bomber can deliver ?16? cruise missiles. I don't follow Air Force matters so I don't know whether the B-2 is even certified for cruise missiles and I don't know how many it can carry, if at all, but the capacity is far less than a sub. Wiki cites 16x 2000 bombs as one measure of weapon capacity so I assume cruise missiles would be something on that order. Feel free to correct me if I'm way off. The point is that a B-2 would have to make multiple trips to accomplish what a sub can in one trip. So, which one is actually 'faster'? It's the one that only requires one trip.
In fact, the 'faster to reload', even if true, is actually a detriment, in a sense, in that every sortie is additional chance for attrition. If a bomber has to go back multiple times to accomplish what a sub can in one trip, the odds of being shot down go way up.
Bombers have their uses but to argue that bombers are a better use of the budget is misguided.
I like this guy's website. He's got a good article on why 8 inch guns should be brought back vs the 5 inch standard of today.
ReplyDeleteAs for having 9 carriers, I think Jjbatie's comment is quite good.
If the last 20 year's had not been a $100bn failure (LCS Zumwalt Ford, + no frigates), there'd be better balance.
But it's true, in war, the forward deployed carrier might not have enough defense. If a war breaks out and Xi/Putin fire 500 missiles at just one carrier, can the US bring forth 1000 missiles to stop them (assume 2 missiles needed to stop 1 attacking missile)?
It'd be worth sending $500m of missiles, to sink a $11bn carrier/planes/crew/fuel/ordnance, due to the psychological impact. It would either cow the US, or once again, wake the sleeping giant, as Pearl Harbour did
Andrew
If we adopted the ER-GMLRS we already have its like having a 10 inch gun with 73nm range. These munitions are also in line with the pricing given for guided shells.
DeleteThanks Andrew. You're probably right about the forward carrier being vulnerable. That's another good reason to bring it home. Id like to think we would be aware of a move towards war, and no CVN would be at sea with the ridiculous "CVBG" composition of 2-3 escorts we see now regularly, but who knows?? With a further reduction in CVN numbers, its makes putting together a 3-4 CVN force nearly impossible, especially on short notice. Having to focus on one side of the globe would leave us short handed and unprepared elsewhere. Current events, and the loose Chinese/Russian alliance makes our need for a Two Ocean Navy 2.0 clear. I understand the budget gets a vote, but WISE spending vs what we've been doing is the fix. Any cuts in force structure and size is ill-advised, including carrier AND cruiser retirements. Trading 'now' capability for future dreams is foolish. The old adage "a bird in the hand..." couldnt be more true and relevant right now!!!
DeleteYou make it seem like all they have to do and is press a button and 500 missiles will be screaming towards the carrier. Executing something like would be complex and would require a massive amount of coordination on top of the USA putting everything they have into disrupting that kill chain.
DeleteHi Ken,
DeletePutin had months to move his pieces into position. Plenty of time to plan and coordinate. No reason Xi anyone else couldn't do it either.
Andrew
This idea has come up before, and it still has merit. If I was "CNO for a Day", Id have a standdown. Not for safety or some zampolit-sponsored political silliness. I'd have an expenditure and deployment standdown. Bring the fleet home. Regroup, reorganize. Take a hard look at all the waste, especially at shore installations and billets. Bring in some corporate headhunter types if necessary to help cut the fat. Ruthlessly. Almost everything with "Joint, Liasion, Advisory, or Staff" attatched to it would be history. The political ramifications would be high, but civilian workforces on bases would be culled (I have personal insight into some of the extreme waste here). Also, we'd have to get some legislation going to reduce the number of O-7 and up by at least 50%. Just those staffs could crew a few ships!! But by bringing the fleet home, the "operations" budget, and the maintenance backlog could be seriously reduced, as well as the wear and tear of long deployments. Drastic thoughts, but the mess our Navy is in needs drastic changes to fix, or the death spiral will only continue...
ReplyDelete"Bring in some corporate headhunter types if necessary to help cut the fat."
DeleteYou don't need outside help to do that. Just run everything through the filter of, 'does it enhance combat effectiveness?' If it doesn't, cut it. If it does, keep it. It really is that simple!
'does it enhance combat effectiveness?'
DeleteThat's not a vary solid definable answer because what does effect combat effectiveness. You can shave that in many ways. I think its clear the Russians undervalued logistical planning as part of combat effectiveness.
Men and women sitting at desks might not be all glitz like the Airborne Troops but if the latter land and the supporting column of heavy infantry never arrives they are not combat effective.
"That's not a vary solid definable answer"
DeleteIt couldn't be simpler!
Of course logistics enhance combat effectiveness. Why would you think otherwise?
Examples of things that don't enhance combat effectiveness:
Diversity
Gender equality
LCS (as implemented)
Lawyers/legal
human resources (beyond a simple assigning of people to units)
paperwork
UAVs for the peer fight (as implemented)
crew comforts
admirals
admiral's staffs
Chief of Naval Operations
Green energy and climate initiatives
focus on 'radical' groups in the military
Secretary of Defense
NAVSEA
acceptance trials (as implemented)
reduced/minimal manning
dual crews
57 mm guns
Mk 57 VLS
information warfare units
females in combat
…
Stop me when you've grasped the concept.
"I think its clear the Russians undervalued logistical planning as part of combat effectiveness"
DeleteMaybe; a lot of the Russian logistics trucks have gotten stuck in the mud with flat or semi-inflated tires. The big problem seems to be dry rot tires, which may be a symptom of many things including commanders stealing maintenance funds; a familiar problem anyone who has worked security assistance in developing countries. The Russians know how to build effective vehicles, there is no way HEMTT sized 8x8 trucks should get stuck.
GAB
" flat or semi-inflated tires."
DeleteDoes this change your thinking on the combat-wisdom of tires versus tracks?
While I would be inclined to scoff at the notion that the US would allow neglected maintenance to affect our tires, I've seen the Navy neglect entire ship maintenance to the point of having to retire ships early so ...
@CNO: "Does this change your thinking on the combat-wisdom of tires versus tracks?"
DeleteIf anything, my opinion of wheeled AFVs has improved slightly, but it is hard to imagine an army that does not feature wheeled logistics vehicles as the primary type, nor tracked vehicles as the predominant for a 'heavily armored combat' AFVs due to the simple geometry versus weight implications.
Trying to minimize the weight of AFVs for a specified level of protection is hard and Rolf Hilmes provided a very convincing diagram showing the (negative) impact of a wheeled suspension system on vehicle characteristics versus tracks in his book on MBTs.
Nonetheless, wheeled vehicles like the HEMTT (8x8), MTVR (6x6), and MAN HX77 (8x8) have impressive off-road characteristics, and none of the on-road issues that tracked vehicles have.
GAB
Slightly related, I just came across the bones of a Ford GTB outside Portland, OR, and am going to try and get it running and find it a home before it succumbs to the scrappers torch... What a cool vintage vehicle, still wearing some of its navy grey paint!! I kinda feel its probably quite capable off-road, being AWD!!
DeleteUS Army trucks deployed from Japan to Korea in the summer of 1950 had the same problem. Tires that were years old and an extremely peacetime mentality in the occupation of Japan, plus lack of money. Poor training standards in the infantry, too. Well documented failures.
DeleteMr. Meyer,
ReplyDeleteYour guest post prompted me to check out your website for the first time. I am in the process of working trough everything there, and wile we do not agree 100% on everything (what two people do?), I find your comments to be very thought-provoking and well-needed. I particularly enjoy (and agree with) your proposals regarding cutting admin/overhead headcount and costs.
Unless you can change the nation's habit of meddling in international events (they always say national security at stake), you cannot reduce carrier group.
ReplyDeletePoliticians always worry that they need to fight multiple wars at the same time. Indeed, if you support their "patriotism" to meddle, then, even add more carrier battle groups are insufficient.
In the news today related to this topic. Our new SecNav, who was a Navy officer for over 22 years, declared the USS Ford has no problems and is ready to deploy and fight, and our Navy needs 11-12 supercarriers.
ReplyDeletehttps://www.yahoo.com/news/uss-gerald-r-ford-absolutely-214700782.html
"In the news today related to this topic. Our new SecNav, who was a Navy officer for over 22 years, declared the USS Ford has no problems and is ready to deploy and fight, and our Navy needs 11-12 supercarriers."
DeleteI think he is delusional.
Delusional about the Ford, but Ill agree with his carrier count, with airwings to match.
ReplyDeleteConcur, except that, like ComNavOps's proposed fleet, I would go for a lot more carriers.
DeleteI would expect to free up the funding and personnel through some measures that Mr. Meyer proposes at his g2mil.com website--specifically, massive cuts in admin/overhead spending and headcount. He identifies about 100,000 Army and 33,000 Marine admin/overhead positions that can be eliminated. I did not see similar posts for Navy and Air Force, but I would expect comparable numbers for them.
Some Navy cuts are mentioned elsewhere. For example, close Gitmo since the base has no real mission. A former head of the U.S. Atlantic command, Marine Corps General John Sheehan, wanted it closed two decades ago. It supports 7500 Americans with all the personnel support amenities our modern Navy expects, including a school for the 331 children of sailors. It has a hospital, a church, a movie theater, recreation facilities, a McDonalds, and even a veterinarian clinic. No combat forces are based there, or even combat support forces. There are no ships, no aircraft, no weapons, nor munitions based at Gitmo.
DeleteGitmo was established after the Spanish-American war because the U.S. military always builds bases in newly conquered areas. Its mission as America’s first foreign base was to serve as a “coaling station” where coal-powered ships could refuel. When longer-range oil-powered ships entered the fleet, a new mission was invented. The base watched for enemy fleets heading toward the Panama Canal. This was before aircraft and satellites, and when the USA controlled the canal.
The small ship maintenance activity at Gitmo was shut down in 1995 and the fleet training group moved to Florida that same year. Gitmo is now a rarely used airfield that was retained to irritate Castro. Relations with Cuba should normalize as Castro has died. Closing Gitmo is a good step, and one that will save the U.S. Navy millions of dollars a year and eliminate 3000 base personnel slots. Gitmo is expensive to operate since every support item must be shipped from the USA, and the base must generate its own electricity and produce its own fresh water. It is considered a hardship post since sailors are not allowed outside the gates. They could turn out the lights at Gitmo tomorrow and fly everyone home, and the rest of the Navy wouldn’t notice.
The only plausible element at Gitmo is a small “joint drug task force,” which is found at every U.S. military base in Latin America to help justify their dubious purpose. The Navy already has an air station at Key West, Florida for whatever Caribbean contingency arises, plus access to airfields in Puerto Rico and dozens of airfields at friendly nations in the region. Unfortunately, the U.S. military never closes a base voluntarily, even when they no longer serve a purpose. Someone should inform President Biden that he should order the closure of the entire base at Gitmo, for the good of the Navy and the nation.
@G2mil
DeleteThe USA should shut down most of its overseas bases; I point specifically to bases in and around Europe.
Europe should pay for its own defense, their GDP is ~the same as ours, and they are more populous than we are. We need at most a few ammunition bunkers on airbase ramps and a handful of EOD and logistics personnel to oversee them. Toss in some IDIQ contracts for aviation fuel, and quay space for MPF ships and call it done. We had some 30,000 troops Europe around 2010 - mostly enjoying the skiing in places like Bad Tolz, or the sun in Rota; this while European defense spending was less than half of what ours.
GITMO is ringed by hills with observation and surveillance positions, so the idea of using its runways or piers for anything other than the most overt missions is a joke. We seem to maintain GITMO more as a thumb in the eye of Havana than for any other reason, although it is some minor use in repatriating migrants.
GAB
I learned and honed a lot of skills at Gitmo. But with the RefTras no longer being there, it's value is certainly questionable. I will say that with it by no means being a liberty port, it certainly helped the crew focus on the training. Nobody looked forward to going. Wonder if thats the case in Florida??
Delete