Lessons From Ukraine

What are the combat lessons from Ukraine?  There are no lessons from Ukraine!  Huh???

 

I didn’t want to do this post but the analysis from military observers is getting out of hand and we’re being fed a bunch of invalid conclusions and lessons that are beginning to take hold and that’s got to stop.  Everyone is spouting lessons they think they see from the Ukraine-Russia conflict but there are no valid lessons to be had.  Commenters on this blog have offered conclusions about the efficacy of UAVs, the demise of armor, and so on.  Now, the Marine Commandant seems to be doing the same thing.  From an interview he did,

 

The success of Ukrainian forces in countering Russian armored vehicle columns with missiles and rockets in the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine shows the vulnerability of tanks to missile-armed infantry, the Marine Corps commandant said, and seemed to reinforce his decision to shed tanks from the Corps as part of his Force Design 2030 concept.[1] 

 

Unless Berger has inside information direct from both Ukraine (unlikely but possible) and Russia (impossible), then he’s just speculating on largely public domain news bits just like the rest of us and, just like the rest of us, he’s lost sight of what that public information is.  It’s propaganda!  Whichever side is offering it, it’s propaganda.  As yet, there is absolutely no authoritative combat information in the public domain, that I’m aware of.  That being the case, how can he, or anyone, draw any valid conclusions?  Attempting to do so is a classic example of garbage in, garbage out!  Invalid information in, invalid conclusions out.

 

Here’s an example … I just watched a video on YouTube purporting to be a Ukrainian attack on a lone Russian tank.  The video showed an isolated tank with not another Russian unit visible within the quarter mile radius or so of the scene.  The tank was meandering along a road, in the open, by itself and it was hit by some weapon and blew up.  A tremendous individual victory for Ukraine and proof that tanks can no longer survive on the modern battlefield in the face of individual soldiers with anti-tank weapons.  …  …  …  …  Or is it? 

 

How do I know that the video wasn’t staged by Ukraine using a captured Russian tank and was intended as propaganda?  The mere fact that there was someone with a video camera in this remote, isolated area, in perfect position to capture this event clearly and cleanly on film strongly suggests that it was, in fact, staged.  So, now what’s the conclusion?  There isn’t any!  There’s no conclusion and no lesson to be had from this because it isn’t authoritative and verifiable.

 

In addition to the total lack of authoritative information, it also seems as if this is a very atypical ‘war’ for the following reasons:

 

• Initially, Russia appears to have significantly restrained their firepower, presumably to avoid angering the populace that they hoped to eventually rule.
• Multiple reports suggest that many Russian units did not even know they were in a combat situation and believed it was all part of an exercise.
• Reports suggest that some Russian units have refused to fight.

 

Note:  Bear in mind my own warning:  these reports may or may not be accurate.  I’m looking at the pattern of the totality of reporting to discern broad truths but, again, they may or may not be correct.

 

 

All those videos showing Ukraine UAVs roaming freely over the battlefield and raining destruction on the Russians clearly demonstrates the power of UAVs and the ineffectualness of Russian anti-air systems, right?   Wrong.  For a variety of reasons, it is likely that the Russians weren’t even trying to operate anti-air systems during the period those UAV videos were made.  Again, no valid conclusion or lesson can come from that.

 

The atypical nature of the Russian’s conduct of the war was acknowledged by Commandant Berger:

 

During a live-streamed conversation with Washington Post columnist David Ignatius, Gen. David Berger said the Russian forces seemed to be ineffective in using a combined arms approach in that they were not using “maneuver to bolster your fires or using fires to set up your forces for maneuver. In both cases, one without the other … is very ineffective.”[1] 

 

So, Berger acknowledges that Russian forces were not using maneuver or firepower in a supporting manner as any semi-competent military would.  This lends credence to the reports that the Russians were initially restraining themselves to avoid civilian casualties and civil facilities destruction.  Despite this recognition of the atypical behavior of the Russian forces by Berger, he then proceeds to draw conclusions!

 

What other atypical indicators does Berger recognize?

 

Berger also said Ukrainian forces seemed to be effective at causing confusion among Russian forces by stripping away Russian reconnaissance — which he said parenthetically that U.S. Marines “were very, very good at.”[1]  

 

So, another atypical behavior by the Russians in that they apparently didn’t conduct reconnaissance in force or in a supportive manner and did not, apparently, operate screens or counter-recon forces.  Despite this recognition of the atypical behavior of the Russian forces by Berger, he then proceeds to draw conclusions!

 

Is there more atypical behavior?

 

The commandant also noted Russian forces seemed to have planned for a very short war and lost momentum with poor logistics planning. He said the Ukrainian forces seemed to be able to strike at the Russian “logistics backside.”[1]  

 

So, acknowledging that Russia seemed to have planned for a very short conflict and did not bring the necessary logistic support, he then proceeds to draw conclusions!

 

Berger’s invalid conclusions are not limited to the Ukraine war.

 

“Instead of tank-on-tank formations, I would say if you look at Armenia and Azerbaijan, Lebanon, or even right now in Ukraine, it’s pretty clear the top-down missile attacks on the top side of heavy armor makes [tanks] pretty vulnerable,” he said.[1]  

 

None of those regions saw armor deployed in doctrinally correct fashion.  Every report I’ve seen indicates that tanks were deployed piecemeal and unsupported by air or infantry.  The only valid conclusion is that stupidity is a good way to die on the battlefield.  I’m pretty sure China isn’t going to be that stupid.

 

As best I can tell from very questionable reports, Russia attempted to half-ass a war with Ukraine in an attempt to pre-emptively placate a populace that they would eventually control and want to have good (or at least not fanatically hostile) relations with when the fighting ended.  If true, that’s theoretically laudable but realistically stupid.  As we’ve harped on in this blog, ‘in it to win it, or don’t get in it’.  You can’t half-ass a war.

 

As far as attempting to draw conclusions and lessons, I’m pretty sure China is not going to half-ass a war with us like Russia seems to be doing in Ukraine so why are Berger and the rest of us drawing conclusions from an atypical war?

 

My fear and suspicion is that Berger is doing the same thing with the secret war games he claims to be using to reshape the Marine Corps.  I suspect that he’s generating invalid war games and, therefore, drawing invalid conclusions.  If he’s clearly doing it with the Ukraine lessons, why wouldn’t he do the same with his war games?

 

For the rest of us, be patient and withhold your judgment.  Lessons will eventually come from the Ukraine war but not yet.

 

 

 

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Though not relevant to this post, Berger did make one baffling statement:

 

Berger noted that amphibious operations are very complex and the Russian forces seemed to unnecessarily delay their limited amphibious operations. He said amphibious operations remain very much the core mission of the Corps.[1]    

 

So, despite publicly and repeatedly stating that the Marines are out of the frontal amphibious assault business and saying that large deck amphibious ships were of limited value, Berger is now saying that amphibious ‘operations’ (he didn’t use the word assault but what other significant amphibious operation is there for Marines?) are the core mission of the Corps.  Wait, now.  I thought small unit, missile shooting was the core mission?  How many core missions do the Marines have?  By definition, you can only have one core mission.  That’s what the word, ‘core’, means!  Okay, Berger, which is it?  What is the Marine’s single, core mission?  If amphibious ‘operations’ is the core mission, why have the Marines shed their tanks and reduced their artillery? 

 

Does this guy have any idea what he’s doing?  It doesn’t seem like it.  He seems to be floundering and flinging everything he can think of at the budget wall to see what sticks and can get funded.

 

 

 

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[1]Seapower Magazine, “Berger: Ukraine War Demonstrates Vulnerability of Tanks to Missile-Armed Infantry”, Richard Burgess, 16-Mar-2022,

https://seapowermagazine.org/berger-ukraine-war-demonstrates-vulnerability-of-tanks-to-missile-armed-infantry/