ComNavOps has stated that the Marine’s primary mission should be port seizure. The Ukraine-Russia war has provided an illustrative example of exactly that mission so let’s take a look and see what we can learn from it.
Incident
Russia had seized the port of Berdyansk and was using it as a logistics and resupply point. However, on 24-Mar-2022, Ukraine struck a Russian Alligator class amphibious landing ship (reportedly, the Orsk) while it was docked in Berdyansk along with two other amphibious ships.[1] Satellite photos confirm the ship has sunk.
 |
| Sunken Ship and Damaged Facilities |
After the attack, the other two Ropucha-II class landing ships were observed quickly leaving the port. Some reports suggest that one or both also suffered damage from the attack. In addition, facilities on the dock were damaged, as confirmed by satellite photos.
It is unknown whether the Orsk was loaded and, if so, what the cargo/troops was. The Orsk can carry 1000+ tons of cargo or around 400 troops and vehicles. Presumably, since it was docked, it was in the process of unloading though, if so, to what degree it had completed its unloading is unknown.
The weapon used was speculated to be an OTR-21 Tochka (SS-21 Scarab) which, depending on the version, has a range of 43-70 miles, an accuracy (CEP) of 229-490 ft, and a thousand pound HE or fragmentation warhead. The Tochka missile is unguided and uses inertial navigation.
It is hard to believe that an inertial guided missile with a CEP of hundreds of feet could hit a single ship which is only 370 ft long and 50 ft wide. Of course, that ship may or may not have been the intended target. Regardless of the delivery method, the Orsk suffered some type of major explosive attack.
Berdyansk
Berdyansk is a port city of about 100,000 people and is located along the northwestern shore of the Sea of Azov. The port is some fifty miles or so directly across from Russia territory and ports on the eastern side of the Sea of Azov. Berdyansk fell to the Russians sometime around 27-Feb-2022, shortly after the start of the invasion.
 |
| Berdyansk Location |
Implications
This incident demonstrates both the vital importance of having a secure port to provide logistical support for ground forces and the extreme difficulty in securing said port and operating it under combat conditions. One of the consistent reports from Ukraine concerns the apparent lack of logistical support for Russian ground troops with reports of shortages of food, ammo, fuel, and parts. Thus, a port such as this is mandatory for successful sustained ground operations.
It shouldn’t need to be said but let me say it clearly and forcefully, anyway: it is not possible to logistically support a significant ground war by air. A secure and functional port is an absolute necessity.
Russian state media reports that the Russian Navy is using the captured port of Berdyansk - located on Ukraine's Sea of Azov coastline - in order to funnel more arms, armor and ammunition to the front lines of the invasion of Ukraine.
Berdyansk is just 50 road miles west of the city of Mariupol, which has been encircled and besieged by the 8th Combined Arms Army and the Russian Black Sea Fleet. From the start, the operation has been characterized by heavy artillery bombardment, which requires extensive logistics support for sustainment. With relatively limited in-house trucking capacity, Russian maneuver units need to stay within about 90 miles of a supply stockpile or risk running out of ammunition, according to U.S. Army analyst Lt. Col. Alex Vershinin. The early seizure of Berdyansk has helped the invading force to meet this distance requirement for operations between Crimea and Mariupol.
According to Russian state-controlled outlet Zvezda, 10 ships are assigned to resupply runs from nearby Russian-controlled ports to Berdyansk.[2]
Clearly, the port is vital to Russian logistical support efforts. Russia managed to seize the port but has, thus far, been unable to secure it, as demonstrated by this attack. On the other hand, no matter how secure the port, a docked ship is at risk unless the port is out of range of enemy weapons. Of course, if it is out of range of enemy weapons it is also probably quite far from the very ground forces that it is supposed to support.
This incident suggests that we need to come to grips with the reality of combat losses when trying to operate a port while under fire.
The incident also points out the need to have specialized rapid port repair capability for when the inevitable port damage occurs.
In addition, there is a need to be able to clear sunken ships so that port operations can continue.
Port Seizure
We’ve discussed port seizure in previous posts (see, “Amphibious Assault – Port Seizure”).
As a reminder, here are some of the requirements to seize and secure a port facility:
- Elimination of enemy forces from the immediate area
- Establishment of C-RAM (Counter-Rocket, Artillery, Mortar) protection
- Establishment of cruise and ballistic missile defenses
- Establishment of long range attacks against enemy rocket, artillery, mortar, cruise, and ballistic weapons (best defense is a good offense)
- Establishment of secure transportation routes out of the port to enable distribution of supplies to the ground forces
Since most (all?) ports are intimately associated with surrounding, built up, urban areas, eliminating enemy forces from the area will be difficult and will require a degree of urban fighting with all its attendant challenges. This will require a very highly trained and specialized force, thoroughly familiar with the unique tactics of urban warfare. This will also require a great deal of specialized equipment such as breeching equipment for anything from doors to smashing through reinforced walls. Another example might be barricade erection machinery to provide a secure barrier for cleared areas.
Hand in hand with specialized tactics and equipment is the requirement for specialized rules of engagement. Urban warfare simply cannot be fought with any regard for civilian casualties or collateral damage to structures. To do so is to guarantee unnecessary friendly casualties. In urban warfare, lots of people are going to die. There’s no way around it. The goal is to make sure that as few of the deaths are US soldiers as possible. The only good thing about a war is ending it as quickly as possible and the way to do that, with as few deaths as possible, is to conduct the war with overwhelming force and violence. If there’s a sniper in a building, you don’t do a floor by floor, room by room search which winds up with a dead sniper and a dozen of your own soldiers killed; you demolish the entire building, with no friendly casualties, and move on.
Verticality is another consideration in port seizure and defense. In most built up areas, tall buildings are a reality and they impose their own unique impact on both offense and defense. For example, tall buildings may block lower arcing artillery, rockets, and missiles while allowing higher arcing mortars. Buildings will block the field of fire of defensive weapons. A C-RAM, for example, has to be placed where it has a clear field of fire and that will be a challenge to accomplish. It may be that we would need an entirely new type of defensive weapon, one that is much more vertically oriented.
Conclusion
Port seizure is a highly specialized military action and requires dedicated, specially trained units to accomplish the mission. Despite the difficulty, ports are a mandatory requirement to logistically support ground forces. Currently, we have no forces trained or equipped to accomplish this mission. The logical organization to take the mission is the Marines. Unfortunately, they seem to have zero interest in the mission. To be fair, no one in the entire US military seems to have any interest in the mission and I’m unaware of anyone having even spoken about it. The US military seems to assume that free and easy access to ports is our birthright, just as we assume that we’ll have uncontested and unhindered use of air bases. Unfortunately, when China comes knocking, we’ll find ourselves having to fight for ports and bases, if we want them. We’re going to have to learn how to fight for ports and how to defend and operate them while under fire – something we haven’t had to do since Guadalcanal.
‘Conquest is easy, control is not’ and this adage certainly applies to port seizure. Merely seizing a port is not enough. The port has to be secured sufficiently to enable shipping operations with a reasonable degree of safety and the ability to deal with the damage from successful attacks, should they occur.
____________________________________
[1]Naval News website, “Ukraine Strikes Russia’s Alligator Class LST With Ballistic Missile”, Tayfun Ozberk, 24-Mar-2022,
[2]The Maritime Executive website, “Russia Uses Captured Port of Berdyansk to Resupply Southern Front”, 21-Mar-2022,
I wonder if whatever missiles the ukranians have, have had their guidance upgraded so that it is a lot more accurate. Otherwise it was a very lucky shot as it could have fallen into the water very easily.
ReplyDeleteWe have very little definite information. They could have fired a volley of a dozen missiles/rockets and only one hit. Alternatively, they could have been aiming for a facility a thousand feet away and instead hit the ship. Or, it may not have been a missile (that was speculation by the authors of the reports) but might have been sabotage by infiltrators (almost seems more likely to me given the inaccuracy of the missiles).
DeleteWho knows?
Well given how much the Ukranians boast on social media about all the so-called tank kills etc they are doing, it is actually surprising they haven't boasted about this. Could it be the result of an accident on the Russians part??
Delete"Could it be the result of an accident on the Russians part?"
DeleteCertainly possible and that's the point of my previous warning post about drawing conclusions. We have very little definitive information coming out of Ukraine. That's why I treated this incident as illustrative (doesn't matter if the facts were correct or not) rather than definitive. The incident illustrated all the points about port seizure without requiring that the incident narrative be correct.
That and cluster munitions?
Delete"If there’s a sniper in a building, you don’t do a floor by floor, room by room search which winds up with a dead sniper and a dozen of your own soldiers killed; you demolish the entire building, with no friendly casualties, and move on."
ReplyDeleteI appreciate where you're coming from with this sentiment, but this methodology also plays into the enemy's hands. It forces you to expend your time and your munitions on destroying structures, which buys him time and constrains your own munitions supply. It also means that you don't get to use the buildings for your own purposes in defending the port.
As an aside, with regards to the sniper in the building, this is the thinking behind the high elevation autocannon turrets in the BMPT and T-15, born of the Russian experience in Grozny, where their BMPs and BTRs were unable to elevate their guns to engage attackers in high rise buildings. I expect to see more high elevation autocannons showing up in IFV designs in the next decade or so, because being able to point up high is very useful - you can shoot into high rises, you can shoot back if you're ambushed by helicopters to ward them off.
But that's the cost of doing business.
Being pinned down by a sniper also plays into the enemies hands. I suppose it partly depend on how much ordnance you have and whether or not that particular building is needed more than any other. If not then blow it up if you can't be surgical in a timely manner.
Delete"It forces you to expend your time and your munitions on destroying structures, which buys him time and constrains your own munitions supply."
Delete??????? It requires far less time to lob a few shells into a building than it does to conduct a room by room, floor by floor sweep and then have to recuse and treat your own casualties from the operation.
If a commander is more concerned about saving munitions than his troops lives then he's the wrong commander.
This is the peacetime mindset. We need to abandon that thinking and relearn what war is really like and how to wage it efficiently and with the least risk to our own troops.
Examine the WWII photos and film of what urban fighting was like. There weren't many intact buildings after an urban engagement and no one wasted time searching for snipers room by room.
"Being pinned down by a sniper also plays into the enemies hands."
DeleteIt does .... which is why you drop the building and move on.
"surgical"
This is a peacetime concept. Drop the building and move on! You don't want to get bogged down like the Russians.
If a commander can pinpoint the snipers location and can take them out quickly by a surgical strike, so say blowing up just the apartment they are in etc, rather then the whole building, then that IS what should be done.
DeleteSure, if you can instantly and precisely spot a sniper and have surgical means at hand. Seriously, how bad would a sniper have to be to be instantly spotted?
DeleteIt's war and you have an objective. Stopping a playing tag with a sniper is a mission kill. Drop the building and keep moving!
"??????? It requires far less time to lob a few shells into a building than it does to conduct a room by room, floor by floor sweep and then have to recuse and treat your own casualties from the operation."
DeleteI'm responding to your own words: "...you demolish the entire building, with no friendly casualties, and move on." Though I guess you're walking that back.
Demolishing the entire building, particularly once you start getting into multistory high rises taller than 5 floors, is far more time and ammunition consuming than firing a few shells into the building. As you've said, verticality is going to be a challenge.
And there are buildings and there are buildings. A 2-story house can be serviced with a 120mm HE-frag round. The same can't be said of a 6-storey parking structure. A friend of mine related his experience from Iraq - insurgents were using a 4-storey office building, a fairly sturdy concrete structure, as strongpoint. His battalion commander decided to make an example and sent a company of tanks to demolish the structure, which they did, but that mission used all of their ammo. 14 tanks fired 560 rounds to completely demolish the structure.
"This is the peacetime mindset. We need to abandon that thinking and relearn what war is really like and how to wage it efficiently and with the least risk to our own troops."
Efficiency is in my mind as well. I think you've misunderstood - my concern is from the operational aspect, given the relatively limited ammunition loads tanks and IFVs have (MBTs typically average 40 rounds, IFVs typically average several hundred rounds of autocannon ammo and a couple ATGMs). When armored fighting vehicles are unloaded from ro-ros onto the port, when artillery guns are being brought forward, they've only got the immediate combat load on them. Until ammunition supplies can be unloaded from supply ships and distributed to the combat units, that load of ammo is the only ammo they've got.
It doesn't matter if I have a thousand tons of ammo at the port, if right now my tank has only 10 rounds left, and I don't know when my resupply is coming. I'm going to behave very differently (more conservative, more cautious) versus if I have a full load of ammo in my tank (more aggressive).
A savvy attacker is going to do all he can to force your vanguard to expend as much of their ammo as possible, because your units are operationally constrained by ammunition usage. Your vanguard can't make a breakout from the port if they've used up all their ammo securing the port; they'll have to stop and be resupplied. It's the tarpit concept, just on a smaller scale. (Of course, you can mitigate this with having second and third waves in the assault force, accepting that every assault wave you frontload costs you capacity you could have used to unload supplies. It is what it is.)
Going back to the story my friend related: great, they've demolished the structure. But they used up all their ammo and now need to be relieved. If this was a peer war situation instead of COIN, they've have been in trouble.
Please don't misunderstand me: I'm not disagreeing at all that you should put fire into buildings that the enemy is strongpointing. I'm just pointing out that it won't necessarily be as easy as "just demolish the building and move on". And sometimes, you can't demolish the building, because the rubble will block your path of advance, and then you're going to be stuck while you wait for engineering units to clear the rubble. (And then there's the sufficiently motivated defender who deliberately demolishes his own buildings to form obstacles to stall your advance and funnel your forces into killzones of his choosing...)
But, well. That's the cost of doing business. Sometimes, you have to roll the hard six. This is one of those times.
@ComNavOps: Please don't misunderstand me, I'm not rebutting you or anything. I'm just trying to do for you what you do for the Navy - be another set of eyes, reminding you of things you might not have considered.
Delete"Though I guess you're walking that back."
DeleteOh good grief. I'm not suggesting a literal building by building total destruction. I'm saying to apply enough overwhelming firepower to totally eliminate the threat instantly rather than play around with it. If a touch of hyperbole is beyond your comprehension then you might wish to find a blog that's on a more basic level.
"Until ammunition supplies can be unloaded from supply ships"
Let's assume two things:
1. I understand logistics.
2. I recognize arguing for the sake of argument. I'm looking for productive discussions, not pointless nitpicking arguments which is what this is. Again, you might find another blog to be more to your liking. This seems not to be the one for you. Good luck and best wishes.
"2. I recognize arguing for the sake of argument. I'm looking for productive discussions, not pointless nitpicking arguments which is what this is."
DeleteI thought we WERE having a productive discussion. I was trying to build up from your blog post and expand the discussion a bit more, to talk a little bit more on the challenges imposed on the attacker and the defender. It's unfortunate that I've given you that impression - I just think there were some things you glossed over in your main post, either because they didn't occur to you or because they were cut for conciseness, and I thought it'd be interesting to talk about these things.
"If a touch of hyperbole is beyond your comprehension then you might wish to find a blog that's on a more basic level."
I meant to put a smiley there to indicate I meant this in a jesting tone - I apologise if I have offended you.
The lack of interest in port seizure mirrors the Air Force's lack of interest in base defense. I'm of the opinion that this is institutional inertia from the Cold War. Consider REFORGER: all the planning and thinking for REFORGER envisioned Army divisions being unloaded at friendly ports in western Europe, and then driving east to meet the Soviets.
ReplyDeleteWhen that's the inbuilt assumption, it's easy to see how you end up with a Pentagon that doesn't seriously consider port seizure as a mission to take. It does seem as though the Army expects to unload at a friendly port, and then drive into the neighbouring enemy nation to fight, instead of making an opposed landing right into said enemy nation.
(Although I suppose it's always possible that the Army intends on making like the Russians and driving overland to seize the port from the land side, instead of from the sea.)
"The lack of interest in port seizure mirrors the Air Force's lack of interest in base defense."
DeleteNow that's an astute and worthwhile observation! It casts severe doubt on the survivability and viability of Guam and other sites.
"Army divisions being unloaded at friendly ports in western Europe, and then driving east"
While likely true, the prevalence of modern cruise and ballistic missiles with thousand or multi-thousand mile ranges renders the concept of safe and friendly ports highly suspect. Are we focusing on base defense which is the key to air supremacy? No, we're focusing on gender issues, diversity, climate, etc. and when we do focus on military issues, it's things like vast regional and world wide networks, artificial intelligence assisted command and control, and the like instead of actual firepower.
If we are, indeed, suffering from institutional inertia, as you suggest, we need to shake it off immediately and start preparing for real war not some semi-peacetime, high technology showcase dust up with goat herders (how'd that work out in Afghanistan?).
Now, take your excellent observation and expand on it:
What weapon systems do we need to defend a base against super long range cruise and ballistic missiles?
Is it more effective to focus on defense or offense - meaning, striking against the launch sites of the enemy missiles? - we need both, obviously - How do we conduct offensive strikes that will produce defensive results?
What kind of base repair support do we need to keep a base operating after it's been hit? What do we have now, if anything? How do we replace bulk fuel storage that's been destroyed?
How do we logistically support bases that are under constant attack?
And so on.
You've opened the door to a great potential discussion. Now, continue it. You may have to do some research but it's worthwhile.
What is the closest port that isn't within range of Russian cruise missiles and strike craft?
ReplyDeleteOne would think all the Baltic ports are off the table. The closest I imagine you could get would be Hamburg, and who knows if you can rely on the Germans to make it and the necessary railways and highways available to us for actual warfare. Then, you have hundreds of miles of highway and railway you have to protect from strikes, which requires more resources and manpower that could be used elsewhere.
The question then becomes whether the cost of maintaining and defending that long supply line is less than what it would require to capture, maintain, and defend a more forward position. Sometimes the answer will be yes and sometimes no. However, right now we don't even have the option to ask that question.
Furthermore, the ability to capture and hold ports, even if it went unused, would at the very least require the enemy to allocate more resources to protect them. It seems that in an era where the Marines need a way to differentiate themselves, this is a worthwhile endeavor.
"The question then becomes whether the cost of maintaining and defending that long supply line is less than what it would require to capture, maintain, and defend a more forward position. Sometimes the answer will be yes and sometimes no. However, right now we don't even have the option to ask that question."
DeleteWhat a great comment!!! You summed up the issue in three sentences. You should be writing my posts!
Now, go a step further and answer your own question. What kinds of specific considerations would determine whether to use ports for long land supply lines? Does the Ukraine-Russia war offer any insight (supposedly, Ukraine small units are wreaking havoc on Russia's supply lines)? Is there a general preference between port and land?
"Furthermore, the ability to capture and hold ports, even if it went unused, would at the very least require the enemy to allocate more resources to protect them."
Yes!
"It seems that in an era where the Marines need a way to differentiate themselves, this is a worthwhile endeavor."
That's my contention but the Marines don't agree!
There clearly are issues in maintaining a supply line through an occupied area. Whether it's small regular units, or local partisans, if you have a rifle or can create an explosive device you can significantly slow down a supply line.
DeleteIt also appears that Russia lacks the manpower to do the kinds of missions in its occupied zones to cut down on attacks. They have to pick between manning the frontlines and the rear and they're picking the frontlines. However, that choice may cause their front to starve due to a lack of resources.
Land routes should be made as short and defensible as possible. Unlike sea lanes, land routes can be hindered by destroying a section of road or rail, necessitating the defense and maintenance of its entire length at all times. As a result, in this sort of conflict, it's far easier to keep your sea lanes secure than your land routes.
"They have to pick between manning the frontlines and the rear and they're picking the frontlines."
DeleteHow does this compare to WWII? Is it just a matter of manpower (we had multiple, large armies operating in Europe in WWII) or is there more to it than that?
Does this tell us anything about trying to do combat operations with minimal manpower, bearing in mind that the US (Marines, at least) are trying to move away from armies and towards battalion/brigades or smaller units? Are we forfeiting our ability to maintain our supply lines due to lack of manpower?
"it's far easier to keep your sea lanes secure than your land routes."
Assuming the enemy is like Ukraine and doesn't have mines and a navy. Why didn't Ukraine prepare for war by laying in a vast supply of mines, given their incredible effectiveness? Perhaps Ukraine didn't prepare properly?
Corruption and incompetence are not just a Russian thing: they're a problem for Ukraine, too.
Delete(And for the US, but that's another story.)
And yes, manpower is a major, major issue.
You can bomb all you want (if you have AS), but occupying large amounts of territory inhabited by hostile people requires lots and lots of old-fashioned manpower, which is a problem nowadays.
Putin could - maybe - draft young Russians en masse to do so, but it'd be risky and he knows it, so he doesn't do it.
If Biden (or any other US president) ever needed to employ large amounts of manpowers, I think he simply couldn't as the population simply wouldn't comply.
As for China, they hope that a small percentage of a very large population will be enough.
Which isn't guaranteed, either.
"occupying large amounts of territory inhabited by hostile people"
DeleteYou just hit on a key point! In WWII Europe, the populace was friendly so we didn't have a rear area insurgency to worry about. The lesson here is to be the good guy! A lesson that Russia/Putin didn't care about and which has now bit them in the behind.
"And yes, manpower is a major, major issue."
DeleteAnd yet N Vietnam managed to supply its forces without a population of hundreds of millions to draw on. How did they succeed and are there any lessons from that for use to learn?
For Vietnam, (who also had help from nearby, very populous China), the war was an existential one.
DeleteIf you're fighting off a foreign army on your own soil, survival is at stake, and almost everyone who can will fight.
(That the VC weren't exactly concerned with manners helped, too.)
Americans are not really willing to die overseas for war they're not involved it, understandably: while the country was already involved in WWII, only after Pearl there was real national unity and will to fight.
(See also: 9/11, to a lesser extent.)
If Chinese troops were to magically land on then West Coast, then suddenly America won't have manpower issues anymore.
But barring that kind of ludicrous scenario, the country is very divided by multiple fault lines (cultural, racial, religious, political, etc.), which will make obtaining this kind of manpower impossible or nearly so.
Note that Ukraine's Russian population is effectively on Russia's side despite their citizenship status.
" the war was an existential one."
DeleteNot really. There was no actual plan or threat to take over NVietnam. Setting that aside, we were discussing logistic support and the manpower requirement for that effort. Having lived through the period (though too young to serve) I do not recall a massive, manpower logistic effort. Yes, they used manpower for much of the actual transport but I don't recall any suggestion that it involved millions of people or even hundreds of thousands or even, perhaps, tens of thousands.
Possibly, one of the lessons from that is that the actual combat troop numbers were never that large so the logistic support effort didn't need to be that large? Also, they were a low tech force which means that large, complex equipment was not part of the logistic supply effort. Perhaps there is another lesson in that? Recall that I just did a post about complexity?
The Vietnamese logistic train would make an informative dissertation, wouldn't it? I wonder if anyone has done something on it?
"Perhaps Ukraine didn't prepare properly?"
DeleteDing ding ding. This has been my feeling. Much of Ukraine (outside of the Carpathians) is very flat and not easily defensible. Your best defensive positions lie at river crossings.
If you're Ukraine, a Russian invasion is the defense issue that should take priority over everything else. Significant effort should have been put into fortifying ports and river crossings. They've been on notice since at least 2014 (and I'd argue since 1991) that a Russian invasion was on the table. What has been done since then? Loading up on Western-made arms is somewhat beneficial, but Russia has geography and manpower on their side. I don't see that anything was done to address those issues.
I don't see much of a coherent defensive strategy on the Ukrainian side, and many others have commented similarly. Right now, it looks as if Ukraine's strategy is just to inflict as many casualties as possible wherever they can. While that is a strategy, I would argue that it isn't a very sustainable one for Ukraine.
"fortifying ... river crossings"
DeleteWhat kind of defenses would you have suggested for river crossings, recognizing that anything you establish is a fixed location which is susceptible to missile, rocket, mortar, and artillery attack? I'm not a land combat guy so rivers seem like a great opportunity for defense but also a difficult one to implement given the fixed location. In general, fixed locations are losing propositions.
One thing should have been remote command detonated explosives on every road and bridge, one would think.
So, what would you have suggested?
"Vietnamese logistics"
DeleteI don't have the time to write a post on that, but it would make for a very interesting subject.
It is estimated that a VC division in the south typically required just three tons of supplies per day.
Total requirements to run North Vietnam's overall war machine were comparatively small, an estimated 6,000 tons annually in 1967, well below port and rail capacity.
US Intelligence estimates of all non-food requirements in the South averaged about 1.5-3 ounces per man in low intensity periods.
Diversified methods of delivering supplies, from the Trails to rivers, were also quite important.
Interesting andgood comments my question is C-Ram was mentioned Do the Marines have this capability currently also could or would it be possible to mount a Sea-Ram missile system on a vehile or would the system be to heavy for a vehicle
ReplyDelete"C-Ram"
DeleteThe Marines do not have C-RAM capability and seem to have no interest in it.
"Sea-Ram"
SeaRAM is the missile version of C-RAM (same mount) so it would require the same mount/transport system which is a massive truck. As such, it would not be suitable or practical for an initial assault but might be able to be brought in for subsequent defensive efforts after an objective (port) were seized.
This is exactly the kind of thing the military should be exercising to see what's useful and practical ... but they're not.
Do you think it's worthwhile to construct mobile port facilities, like the Mulberry harbors used on D-Day? Or do you think they're too vulnerable to enemy attack, and the opportunity costs of making them survivable against cruise missiles and other modern weapons, means the USN and USMC are better off simply focusing more on port seizure exercises?
ReplyDelete"Mulberry harbors "
DeleteThe temporary harbors were just that ... temporary. They were intended to be used only until the actual ports were captured and put into use.
The harbors were susceptible to weather and, in fact, Harbor A was so severely damaged by a storm that it was never completed and was abandoned.
If a temporary structure is needed then, yes, they would be worthwhile but, if at all possible, the actual port should be seized instead.
Also, bear in mind that the harbor components 'only' had to cross the channel. Trying to transport them across the Pacific, say, would be quite another matter!
So, barring a unique circumstance where an artificial harbor is needed, we would be much better off concentraing on actual port seizure, repair, and operation under fire.
What do you think?
Your analysis seems fair. I'm sure with modern technology, we can make a Mulberry capable of crossing the Pacific; but doing so will require a LOT of resources, imposing opportunity costs the USN needs on carriers, air defense cruisers, destroyers and other escorts that are useful in far more situations than a Mulberry.
DeleteNow if only USN and USMC officers can think at least as clearly.
"Now if only USN and USMC officers can think at least as clearly."
DeleteIf they could, what would I blog about?
"Now if only USN and USMC officers can think at least as clearly."
DeleteIf they could, what would I blog about?
Well, there are always the cat videos !!! :-)