The Marines believe that the Navy abandoned them at Guadalcanal so they developed their own air force in a massive duplication of effort and overlap of responsibilities.
Today, the Army believes that the Air Force is not providing intelligence (ISR) quickly enough for the Army’s Long Range Precision Fires program and so they’re looking to develop their own ISR effort in a massive duplication of effort and overlap of responsibilities.
… Army leaders, which for decades have complained that they [do] not receive the battlefield-ready ISR it needs in a timely manner from either the Air Force or the Intelligence Community (IC), are now seeking to develop their own ISR satellite payloads that they can task for themselves. (1)
Key … to the Army’s overarching plan for high-speed future warfare, is the ability for taskable, over-the-horizon sensors that provide the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) to enable targeting of the service’s developing arsenal of very long-range weapons, or in Army-speak, long-range precision fires. (1)
The Army is developing their own long range precision missile strike capability (out to 1000 km) which is the Air Force’s responsibility and will result in a massive duplication of effort and overlap of responsibilities.
The Marines, fearing budgetary irrelevance, have scrapped their main mission and equipment and are morphing into a small unit, light infantry, missile-shooting, coastwatcher organization and are demanding their own long range anti-ship missiles, private amphibious/logistics fleet, and some type of anti-submarine warfare capability in a massive duplication of effort and overlap of responsibilities with the Navy.
The Army has a massive navy of their own with Besson class landing ships (LSV – Logistics Support Vessels – 300 ft, 4000 tons), LCM landing vessels, and a myriad of other logistics ships, barges, and other support ships. The Army operates around 90 large ships and hundreds of watercraft.
As we dig down, we find that the scope and scale of duplication between the services is breathtaking and, equally astounding, is increasing. The end result is we’re slowly but surely developing four services that are complete duplicates of each other.
- We have four air forces.
- We have three navies.
- We have four long range missile strike forces.
- We have four ground combat forces (Army, Marines, Navy SEALs/EOD/medical, Air Force Special Warfare).
- We have four cyber forces.
- We have four ISR forces.
This is unwise, inefficient, and unsustainable. Each service is spending precious budget dollars duplicating the other service’s capabilities while their own core responsibilities suffer. For example, the Marines have no significant mobile, armored, anti-air capability and yet they’re spending their money on anti-ship and ASW. The Army lacks mobile, armored artillery vehicles and yet they’re spending their money on duplicating the Air Force’s deep strike. And so on.
We desperately need a central, controlling authority to put a stop to this massively wasteful duplication of effort. We have several levels of such authority (President, Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs) but none seem willing to do their jobs and just say no to the various services.
Everyone is trying to fight everyone else’s battle for no good reason other than budget grabbing. For example, the Marines were in a panic about being rendered irrelevant by the China/Pacific scenario and have been frantically encroaching on the Navy’s mission in order to remain budget-relevant.
This must stop. We need someone in higher authority to put a stop to this. It’s costing us untold sums of money to duplicate capabilities.
______________________________________
(1)Breaking Defense website, “Project Convergence 2021 Kicks Off; Showcases 110 New Technologies”, Theresa Hitchens, 12-Oct-2021
Who was it that said:
ReplyDelete"Why does the Navy's army need its own air force?"
Belonging to the Armed Services of the United States does not engender the same degree of comradeship as belonging to a service. 2 major examples are: The Air Force does not want to do CAS, the Navy does not want to do Naval Gunfire. There are many more. If you know it is your service members that are down there getting chewed up, you get down and get dirty to pull their bacon out of the fire.
ReplyDeleteIf you only look at efficiency, then why not have only a divisional S-4 instead of replicating that function all the way down to the Battalion? Remember that German soldiers surrounded in Stalingrad were sent condoms instead of more fuel, ammo, or food. Someone, even within the German Army, looked up what an Army gets and just sent it, without any direction from the unit starving and getting chewed up. Air Force supply drops for Fox Company in Korea often fell outside the lines, whereas the Marine supply aircraft came in low on target and got bullet holes in their aircraft. Being responsible to, and belonging to, the local service commander forces the teamwork that is required to win.
I am not against getting more efficient, but the stove piped services do not give enough appreciation of the contribution, and difficulties, that other services can make and have. Sometimes inefficient organizations perform the best. Until we can truly get the services to feel for each other like they do their own, then efficiency will only lead to finger pointing when things do not work. We tried to get officers to have to serve joint tours to learn those abilities and limitations, and the wailing against the requirement has been non-stop.
Leaders can get services to work together. Eisenhour did it for D-Day, Nimitz did it in the Pacific, Grant did it in the Civil War. But once the combat need went away, so did the leaders, and the integrated team work.
You negated your own argument with the statement,
Delete"Leaders can get services to work together."
If you see differences in the level of 'effort' put forth by dissimilar services then it's either a training issue. I don't, for a moment, believe that a service member would make less of an effort to help/save someone from a different service. History is replete with examples to support my statement and you, undoubtedly, know them as well as I do so I won't bother listing them.
I am not sure I negated my argument I recognize that leaders can get organizations to work together.
DeleteIf you propose a way to get leaders to surface in a non-wartime environment and force the services to work toward the greater good, then I fully support your position. We have both commented on the current dearth of leadership in the services, so I don't see a leader emerging that can address your important topic.
However, as outsourcing, just in time, hold no inventory practices have increased business efficiencies, the global supply chain political instability issues have shown that long term they are not as efficient at keeping customers satisfied.
War, by definition, is inefficient, maybe the organizations that fight need some degree of inefficiency to perform the best. But I agree whole heartedly with you, we have to get more efficient as we do not have a bottomless pit of money to spend on defense.
"If you propose a way to get leaders to surface in a non-wartime environment and force the services to work toward the greater good, then I fully support your position."
DeleteAbsent a visionary, charismatic leader (Rickover or some such), there is no way to get peacetime leaders to work towards the greater good. The system we have is geared towards rewarding everything except combat and budget efficiency. HOWEVER (and this is the big one!), that does not mean that we should capitulate and accept gross inefficiency. On that path lies our ultimate failure and destruction as we see happening to our military today. Instead, we need to strive to at least set in place the correct pattern even if we often fail to follow it. Why should we do so? Because, when war does come - and it inevitably will - we will have combat leaders emerge. It's guaranteed through the Darwinian selection process of combat. When those leaders emerge, they'll need a proper system in place to make use of.
This is an unfortunate product of the US political system. While Representatives and Senators get campaign contributions fairly directly from federal money spent in their home areas, and money is vitally important in winning campaigns, duplication and other ways of wasting money will continue.
ReplyDeleteChanging it would require placing limits on the money that could be spent in election campaigns. There are huge vested interests opposing that, as well as the sacred cow of freedom of speech.
Uh ... I don't completely understand the point you're trying to make and how it's linked to the duplication discussed in the post.
DeleteThe duplication is independent of Congressional funding (if that's the point you were making?) and could be stopped with a single word from the President, SecDef, or service chiefs.
The President, SecDef and service chiefs need to avoid strong political opposition to their orders. Cutting duplication will mean money being taken away from quite a few congressional areas. That will produce strong political opposition.
Delete" Cutting duplication will mean money being taken away from quite a few congressional areas."
DeleteTrue and false. You're only seeing the one side of the equation when, in reality, the equation balances. It's a net zero. Yes, eliminating duplication *may* reduce money in some area but the flip side is that it will INCREASE money in other areas. For example, telling the Army to stop duplicating the Air Force's deep strike mission will decrease some funding for the Army's deep strike missiles, it will increase the funding for the Air Force's deep strike mission. So, it all balances.
Some areas will make a net loss. The complaints from those will make a lot more noise than the areas who gain. It's neutral for the country as a whole, but the legislators aren't thinking in those terms.
Delete"Some areas will make a net loss. The complaints from those will make a lot more noise than the areas who gain."
DeleteThe small gains/losses are minor points. That's why we have 50 states worth of Senators and Representatives ... so that not just one location controls the overall actions of the government.
We have an extensive history of individual areas gaining and losing defense contracts. Individual representatives may protest but their single vote(s) are overwhelmed by the remaining states. If that wasn't so, we'd still be manufacturing sails, cannon, and muskets because nothing could ever be shut down.
You're correct that individual representatives may protest but it's not enough to cause the kind of useless duplication that's occurring today. That duplication is caused by shockingly inept military leadership, both uniformed and civilian.
The duplication we're seeing is not caused by Congress, it's caused by the service leaders attempting to absorb each other's budget slices. Congress aids and abets this behavior but they do not cause it.
It is vanishingly rare for Congress to get involved in actual military decision making. The services submit their budget requests and Congress makes minor adjustments, at most. It is the services that decide what we spend our money on.
Why am I discussing this point? Because it's important that we understand where the fault lies so that we can correct it. In this case (duplication), the fault does not lie with Congress but with the service leaders, President, and SecDef. Admittedly, Congress could, if they wished, get more involved in their oversight and withhold funding for duplicitous requests but that's asking more from Congress than we can expect.
I'm actually ever so slightly pleased with the ever so slightly increased level of oversight Congress has been exerting the last few years. They've stopped some truly horrendous decisions by the military. I just wish they'd greatly increase their involvement and oversight because, honestly, they're better at military decision making than the military currently is. I wonder if I should do a post on this?
"The duplication we're seeing is not caused by Congress, . . ."
DeleteThat may be, but some of that duplication is enshrined in federal law. Per 10 U.S. Code § 8063, the Marine Corps "shall be so organized as to include not less than three combat divisions and three air wings, and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be organic therein."
Yep, and that needs to change.
DeleteFighting Irish: "some of that duplication is enshrined in federal law. Per 10 U.S. Code § 8063, the Marine Corps "shall be so organized as to include not less than three combat divisions and three air wings, and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be organic therein.""
DeleteThe USMC has played this BS since 1947 and acts like it is a Constitutional Amendment, while ignoring Article I, Section 9, of the U.S. Constitution (the Appropriations Clause – all authorizations are subject to appropriation). Annual manpower authorizations are set forth in law by the National Defense Authorization Act or NDAA and all the while submitting it manpower REQUESTs to the President to be rolled up into the Budget Request.
No Congress is beholden to previous Congress/law; there are at least three committees that could modify or reinterpret this legislation without bringing it in front of the Senate or the entire Congress (SASC, HASC, HAC); likely on a telephone call to the Chair and ranking member.
GAB
The Marines don't actually have divisions now other than administratively in order to comply with the law. The Marines aren't organized around divisions, they don't train as divisions, they don't deploy as divisions, they don't fight as divisions, and they have no coherence as divisions. They do all that as smaller MEU/brigades/wings and, more recently, as forward deployed platoons, apparently!
DeleteThe divisions exist on paper as administrative HQs but do not exist as coherent combat units.
@CNO: "The Marines don't actually have divisions now other than administratively in order to comply with the law. The Marines aren't organized around divisions, they don't train as divisions, they don't deploy as divisions, they don't fight as divisions, and they have no coherence as divisions."
DeleteYes, but citing the antiquated National Security Act of 1947 works great justify people at beltway cocktail parties...
CNO, Marines are still organized as divisions for fighting purposes. Every year, 1MarDiv does Steel Knight which is a Division level exercise on the West Coast. The East coast has similar exercises at Lejeune. Only 3MarDiv in Okinawa is more flag than fleshed out and that is the only Division being re-organized into MLRs ((AKA Missile Marines).
DeleteAs always, some duplication is necessary. Army needs some ISR and Corps level CAS/DAS because USAF keeps trying to eliminate CAS platforms and USAF DAS platforms are the same as for air superiority so the aircraft are often not available. Maybe Army aviation should operate A10s and do DAS / deep strikes with missiles so USAF can focus on pointy nosed stuff they are good at.
Marines need CAS at the Division level which requires Reapers and some A29 or OV10 type aircraft with a few F35Bs. There is no need for service specific aircraft and no need for Marines on Aircraft Carriers.
Someone just needs to look at the duplication as it makes sense in operations plans and limit the duplication to what is necessary to eliminate creep for budget grabs.
"Every year, 1MarDiv does Steel Knight which is a Division level exercise"
DeleteAre you sure? I'm pretty sure it's not. Here's a quote from an official Marine website:
"The exercise takes place at Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, Calif., and the Combat Center and involves over a dozen units from both installations."
The article went on to describe how some individual companies were able to participate. Nothing indicated that it was an entire division exercise. It may be organized through division HQ but it seems to be a very low level exercise with scattered units.
Double check and let me know.
"some duplication is necessary"
DeleteYes and no.
Yes, some duplication of EQUIPEMENT is necessary. I'm not suggesting that, because the Army uses rifles, no other service can have a rifle. Common equipment is fine.
No, it is wrong and wasteful to duplicate wholesale capabilities such as Marine Air or Army deep strike. It is interesting that your own example of Army ISR is not actually a duplication of anything. Army ISR is, presumably, focused on shorter range, more immediate threat surveillance whereas Air Force ISR is focused on longer range threats. I also have no problem with 'duplicating' a capability that some other service is supposed to provide but isn't ... because that wouldn't actually be a duplication, would it? If the AF won't provide CAS (I'm not going to jump into that debate) then the Army MUST provide it, if they want it. However, to duplicate CAS when the AF can and will provide it, is wasteful.
". . . the fault does not lie with Congress but with the service leaders, President, and SecDef."
DeleteThere's a part of this that may be harder to sort out than issuing the right orders. The services don't trust each other to do tasks that help other services, or not promptly.
As you said, the Marines want their own aviation, because they felt the Navy let them down at Guadalcanal. That's the biggest example, but there are lots of others. Each service plans to do its core missions pretty much by itself, and prioritises those. The things they do for other services don't get the talented people or enough money.
Inter-service rivalry is a significant part of US service culture. It isn't as strong as some historical examples, like WWII Japan, but it needs to be toned down. How would you do that?
Army, Marines, Air Force; all interested in or have recently fielded a new long range anti-ship missile.
ReplyDeleteSomeone has to do it as the Navy doesn't seem interested.
Unless tomahawk4ever counts...
To be fair, the Navy has moved to acquire the LRASM and then the future version 2 of the long range missile. Admittedly, the Navy's progress has been glacially slow.
DeleteThis is where a competent and forceful President, SecDef, or CNO needs to impose some heavy-handed 'guidance' on the Navy and the other services, instructing each to stay in their land and attend to their responsibilities.
I firmly believe that federalism is the answer to many of our political ills.
ReplyDeleteI just didn't expect the military to be the ones to put it into practice.
Lutefisk
Being wary that we don't devolve into a political/social/civics discussion, we have a federalist government in that we have state and local governments bound by an overall guiding federal government. Thus, I'm missing your point. Perhaps you're using a different definition of federalism? Feel free to explain. I don't want to go too far down this discussion path but I'd like to understand your main point.
Delete"I don't want to go too far down this discussion path but I'd like to understand your main point."
DeleteI was just intending to make a light-hearted comment, not trying to go down the politics rabbit hole, which I'm sure you don't want either.
I was looking at something like having 50 different state level departments of education, all trying different approaches and hopefully finding better ways to accomplish the mission.
I like that idea...but find dark humor in the military branches attempting a similar approach to war preparations.
Sorry for a poor attempt at light humor.
I would be much more interested in talking about all the ways the Fletcher design could be adapted to modern combat after your post about that the other day. :)
I've been thinking about different variations and uses since that post.
Lutefisk
"50 different state level departments of education ... military branches attempting a similar approach to war preparations."
DeleteThere's a key difference. The 50 state education departments are ONLY responsible for their OWN, LOCAL areas. Michigan does not attempt to impose their education system on Indiana. In contrast, the services are attempting to duplicate each other's missions and take them over. In the 50 states, there is no duplication of effort and money. They each spend for their own state and no other. The services, in contrast, are spending to duplicate the other services. That's true waste.
"I would be much more interested in talking about all the ways the Fletcher design could be adapted to modern combat "
DeleteSo go ahead and proposed some! I'd love to hear ideas.
While you're considering that, give some thought to these questions:
What was the primary purpose of the Fletcher?
Does its mission still exist today?
If so, what platform, if any, fills that mission today?
If not, why not? Where did the mission go?
Why don't we have a modern Fletcher?
What attributes of the Fletcher should we have in today's ship design?
"So go ahead and proposed some! I'd love to hear ideas."
DeleteI just want to point out that you asked for it. ;)
The next few responses is my wordy disgorge of the ideas floating around in my head after reading your blog (hopefully this is in a somewhat organized and understandable format).
Lutefisk
The Fletcher class of destroyers is something that CNO has been highlighting for a while now. But for me the light bulb didn’t go on until I read his recent post that asked the question of whether a WW2 Fletcher would be a useful ship in the present.
DeleteThe answer, at least to me, is that it would be. And it wouldn’t require much adaptation to make it a powerful ship on today’s seas.
As many people here know, I am an army cavalry person and I believe wholeheartedly in firepower. The more the better, that’s what wins engagements.
I also believe that within a few hours of naval hostilities, the ships (the ones that are going to survive) are going to be practicing EMCON. The surface fleets are going to operate similarly to submarines, but instead of swimming around trying to be silent, the surface ships are going to be floating around trying to broadcast zero electronic signals to avoid being located and targeted.
I don’t believe that modern naval combat will be the precise, fog-of-warless, long-range engagements in which actuaries compute the number of missiles that are required to intercept a given number of incoming missiles of a given type and detection range.
Instead, I predict that surface fleets will be moving around like a game of blind man’s bluff and that a high percentage of actions will be meeting engagements within visual range in which the two opposing surface groups blunder into each other.
In those types of barroom brawls, firepower will reign supreme. I see the Fletchers as being well suited for this type of naval combat.
Lutefisk
I pulled out my copy of Nimitz’, “The Great Sea War”, history of WW2. I started reading about the blind alley knife fights between the British and German destroyers in the fjords of Norway.
DeleteAnd there are a fair number of uncomfortable environments in the seven seas in which radar detection would be limited; maybe the Spratly’s?, certainly the Philippines, the Solomons, Indonesia, Aleutians, the Aegean, the Skagerrat and Kategatt, Scandinavian fjords, Northwest Passage, Queen Elizabeth Islands, the Caribbean, the Aleutians, and I’m sure there’s more if the globe is studied more closely.
That kind of environment would not work well for Burke class ships, or anything else that the US Navy could sail out there right now. And even though it’s not our preferred blue-water battleground, you have to duke it out where the fight is.
The Fletcher would be well-suited for this and was the first of three nearly identical variations.
The Fletcher class had five 5” guns in 5 single mount turrets.
The Sumner was basically the same but had six 5” guns in three double mounts.
The Gearing was the third variation in which the hull was stretched about 15’ to accommodate more fuel, and provide 15’ extra feet of precious deck space.
Lutefisk
For the surface combatant role, the ship would be the three-turret variation.
DeleteTotal armament would be six 5”/62 guns, 24 VLS cells, one SeaRAM, one Goalkeeper CIWS, two Phalanx CIWS, a 5-tube torpedo launcher with Mk 48 torpedoes.
Layout would put the three turrets in the standard American configuration of two fore and one aft.
Above and behind the ‘B’ turret would be the 30mm Goalkeeper CIWS facing forward, and above and behind that would be one of the 20mm Phalanx CIWS, also facing forward.
The torpedo tubes would be mounted amidships and able to rotate to launch to port or starboard.
Behind the stacks would be the SeaRAM, oriented aft and the second Phalanx, also oriented aft.
Then the ‘C’ turret facing aft over the fantail.
The 24 VLS cells would need to be divided between the fantail and amidships.
This would have a TSR 3D rotating radar.
But the goal would be to operate in stealthy EMCON as much as possible.
To accommodate this, I would utilize the electro-optical and IR search technology used on aircraft to identify enemy at a distance.
To assist this goal of seeing the other guys first, the sight would be mounted on a telescoping mast that would be raised high above the superstructure, as high as architectural limits (and sea conditions) would allow.
This would give the ship a non-emitting method of searching for enemy vessels and aircraft with a very small visual or radar signature.
I believe that this would be superior to using a drone as the drone would require flight commands to be transmitted from the ship which would produce electronic emissions.
This ship would also have a bow mounted sonar, more for situational awareness than for sub hunting.
The VLS would be set up with a combination of quad-packed ESSM and ASM. The ASM would give the ship a longer reach for engagements that occur beyond 5” gun range.
The MK48 torpedoes would be the primary method of attacking any discovered submarines and also used against enemy warships.
The one change that I would reluctantly consider would be to replace the 5” guns in the ‘B’ turret with rapid firing 76mm guns. These would be primarily to deal with small fast craft like those employed by the Iranians.
I would anticipate that the common tactic used would be to drive forward towards the enemy to shorten the range as rapidly as possible. The ‘A’ turret 5” guns could engage against enemy warships and the 76mm guns could be used when in range and against smaller craft.
The 76mm could also serve as an anti-ASM weapon to complement the forward oriented Goalkeeper and Phalanx. This head-on approach would also present a small target for enemy fire.
Armor would be the same as the WW2 configuration but supplemented by Kevlar armor in key locations.
These ships would be very capable of winning a surprise meeting engagement within visual range. The high volume of 5” gunfire would be devastating to unarmored modern warships.
I would employ these in three ship task forces, at least initially, with emphasis on congested, non-radar-friendly waters.
Lutefisk
The second configuration that I would utilize would be as an ASW escort.
DeleteThe primary ASW ship that I would use would be an updated Perry class, and it would be a Cadillac of ASW. But those would need to be supplemented with numerous (and less expensive) ASW escorts.
The starting point for these less expensive ASW escorts would be the Fletcher configuration (the one with five single mount 5” guns).
I would remove all the 5” guns except for the farthest forward. That deck space would then be used for two RBU/hedgehog launchers forward and two more aft. One five-tube torpedo launcher with Mk 48 torpedoes, 24 VLS cells, one SeaRAM, one Goalkeeper, and two Phalanx.
For ASW work, it would feature a bow mounted sonar and a towed array.
The VLS would contain ASROC, quad-packed ESSM, and a couple of ASM’s for self-protection.
The torpedo launcher would be located amidships with the ability to train to port or starboard for launching.
The RBU/hedgehogs would be used against submarines but also as a last-ditch anti-torpedo device as depicted by CNO in his “Shallow Water ASW” post from March of 2018.
Lutefisk
The third configuration of Fletchers that I would create would be as one of CNO’s dedicated EW ships.
DeleteThe hull should be large enough to accommodate the electrical generators and EW equipment required.
There probably wouldn’t be a navy task force that wouldn’t benefit from having one of these ships along.
And the fourth configuration would be as a dedicated drone carrier. These would be CNO’s ‘small’ and ‘inexpensive’ (relatively speaking) situational awareness drones.
Those drones would be passive and fly search patterns, sending information back to the task force via microbursts.
I would configure the drone carrier like a little Fletcher-sized Nimitz. These would have an angled deck for landing the returning drones, and catapults on the bow to launch the drones into the wind.
I understand that having a miniature flight deck sounds silly, but having worked in warehousing and factories, I appreciate efficient work flow.
It seems that the navy has perfected the work flow configuration for flying machines off of ships, and it should translate over to small aircraft as well as it works for the full-sized versions.
Lutefisk
Just a few minor thoughts to help you clarify your concept:
Delete"The 24 VLS cells would need to be divided between the fantail and amidships."
Bear in mind that the Mk41 VLS is designed in groups of 8.
"quad-packed ESSM and ASM"
Think through the weapons split. How many ASM do you need and does that leave you enough ESSM? For example, if you think 20 ASM are needed, that leaves you 16 ESSM. And so on. Just consider the number of each that you want.
"common tactic used would be to drive forward towards the enemy to shorten the range as rapidly as possible."
Why? Common wisdom would be to use your weapon's range advantage (assuming you have one, depending on the threat) and maintain your distance. I know this one is highly dependent on the threat and the circumstances but just think it through.
"I believe that this would be superior to using a drone as the drone would require flight commands to be transmitted from the ship which would produce electronic emissions."
No! A UAV would be given a pre-flight search pattern and/or waypoints. There would be no communication other than the UAV reporting back if it spots anything. A telescoping mast (there's some significant engineering challenges in that!) would only extend the horizon a few to several miles. The UAV extends the horizon a hundred+ miles. A, mast. B, UAV. Take "B"! You want choice "B"! The UAV!
A drone carrier would probably benefit from a new, dedicated design rather than trying to adapt a Fletcher. You need UAV storage space, a hangar of sorts, lots of maintenance spaces, etc.
" a little Fletcher-sized Nimitz"
Not needed. Scan Eagle size UAVs do not require wind and only need a small, portable, 6 foot catapult and are retrieved via a net or hook.
An angled deck was to protect the aircraft parked forward in the event of a bolter. A small UAV wouldn't do any damage to anything so an angled deck is not needed. Again, a simple safety net would provide all the protection needed. Don't make the design more complicated than necessary. K.I.S.S. !
"I just want to point out that you asked for it. ;)"
DeleteI did! And you gave some good thoughts. Well done!
It doesn't matter whether ever single idea would be used or even possible. The important aspect is thinking about this stuff at all levels from individual ship design to overall fleet structure and incorporating some sort of CONOPS. The Navy does far too little of this type of thinking - nearly none, as far as I can tell.
CNO, my apologies.
DeleteI forgot to copy and past my second variation. (It was a late Friday night of putting my ideas 'on paper' at the end of a long workweek).
The second configuration that I would utilize would be as an ASW escort.
The primary ASW ship that I would use would be an updated Perry class, and it would be a Cadillac of ASW. But those would need to be supplemented with numerous (and less expensive) ASW escorts.
The starting point for these would be the Fletcher configuration (the one with five single mount 5” guns).
I would remove all the 5” guns except for the farthest forward. That deck space would then be used for two RBU/hedgehog launchers forward and two more aft.
One five-tube torpedo launcher with Mk 48 torpedoes, 24 VLS cells, one SeaRAM, one Goalkeeper, and two Phalanx.
For ASW work, it would feature a bow mounted sonar and a towed array.
The VLS would contain ASROC, quad-packed ESSM, and a couple of ASM’s for self-protection.
The torpedo launcher would be located amidships with the ability to train to port or starboard for launching.
The RBU/hedgehogs would be used against submarines but also as a last-ditch anti-torpedo device as depicted by CNO in his “Shallow Water ASW” post from March of 2018.
I believe that these would prove to be very useful ASW screening vessels.
Lutefisk
"I forgot to copy and past my second variation."
DeleteI think you may have done it and it may have gone to the spam folder because there was another copy of it there.
"A telescoping mast (there's some significant engineering challenges in that!) would only extend the horizon a few to several miles."
DeleteYeah, that's probably a bridge too far.
"A UAV would be given a pre-flight search pattern and/or waypoints. There would be no communication other than the UAV reporting back if it spots anything."
I wasn't really thinking of a UAV for that role.
What I was thinking of is a way to get the EO/IR optics up high to see the other fellas first. That was the thinking behind the tall mast.
Another way would be a drone that carries the optics up above the ship, but how to control it?
If it's tethered to the ship the control signals and visuals can flow up and down the wire, but that line is going to weigh something. That requires a bigger drone which is going to, at some point, no longer small enough to not be seen.
But if it is free-flying without the tether, then signals need to fly back and forth between the drone and the ship, negating the EMCON.
Lutefisk
"Think through the weapons split. How many ASM do you need and does that leave you enough ESSM? For example, if you think 20 ASM are needed, that leaves you 16 ESSM. And so on. Just consider the number of each that you want."
DeleteI was thinking of 8 ESSM (32 missiles) and 16 ASM.
But honestly, there is no scientific reasoning behind that.
I really just grabbed those numbers out of thin air because I don't know how many ESSM would be needed to defend or how many ASM's would be required to successfully hit an enemy ship.
I'm not sure if the Navy knows those things either though.
Lutefisk
"drone that carries the optics up above the ship, but how to control it?"
DeleteYou may be overthinking this! A drone (with EO/IR sensor) is simply told (pre-flight) to circle the host ship at a fixed distance (say, twenty miles?). Sort of a circling 'follow the leader' flight. No comms necessary. The altitude gives the sensors an added ?40 miles? (I haven't done the height-horizon calc). Couldn't be simpler!
"I don't know how many ESSM would be needed to defend or how many ASM's would be required to successfully hit an enemy ship."
DeleteThis is where CONOPS comes in. Will your destroyer be operating under a Burke's Aegis umbrella? If so, you can reduce the AAW weapons a bit. If not, you need to increase it.
Will the destroyer be operating as a squadron? If so, the ASM load is the ASM load of the squadron, not a single ship.
And so on.
I've pretty well described the engagement sequence and requirements for anti-missile defense so you can 'size' your weapons split accordingly.
"A drone (with EO/IR sensor) is simply told (pre-flight) to circle the host ship at a fixed distance (say, twenty miles?)."
DeleteThat's a good idea.
Would it be possible for it to transmit the signal of what it is seeing directly to the ship via a focused beam?
Lutefisk
"Would it be possible for it to transmit the signal of what it is seeing directly to the ship via a focused beam?"
DeleteCertainly, but why would you want to? Unless it sees something (that's what computer recognition algorithms are for!), there's no need for it to transmit. Remember, it doesn't need to be able to identify the serial number of the ship or aircraft it sees, it just needs to send you a single digit microsecond burst indicating 'object on ocean' or 'object in air'. You can then decide what you want to do about it.
Maybe with better algorithms, it can send 'large ship' or 'small UAV' or whatever; again, just a single digit code so almost no chance of detection.
Again, don't overthink this.
Our current leaders want continuous, holographic, 3D, multi-spectral, full color, subspace imaging but we know the pitfalls of that approach (cost, complexity, detection, enormous bandwidth, long transmission times, etc.), right? All we need to know is, is there something there or not? If there is, we'll figure out what we want to do about it.
K.I.S.S.
"Would it be possible for it to transmit the signal of what it is seeing directly to the ship via a focused beam?"
DeleteRecall the example of the WWII dawn scouting patrols that carriers would launch every morning. The scout planes didn't broadcast back to the carrier a continuous description of what they were seeing (clouds and ocean!). They broadcast only when they had a spotting report. If the carrier didn't hear anything, they could reasonably safely assume there was nothing there. Again, don't make things more complicated than they need to be. Combat wisdom!
CNO, thanks for the discussion.
DeleteYou always give me lots to think about.
Lutefisk
Could be worse! The US Space Force might want to have it's own earthbound army, navy, marine and air force too. [Joke]
ReplyDeleteNot really a joke. When they created a Space Service, I assumed it would absorb Air Force, Navy and Army Space assets. Nope, it got a few Air Force units, but the rest remained separate. Not to miss out, Commandant Berger formed a Marine Corps Space Command MARFORSPACE in 2020 with a Major General in charge!
Deletehttps://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2020/11/17/marine-corps-forces-space-command-is-here/
Sounds way too plausible to be funny!
DeleteFrequently, in private sector, if a department cannot do their jobs well, they want to grab others jobs.
ReplyDelete"We have four ground combat forces (Army, Marines, Navy SEALs/EOD/medical, Air Force Special Warfare)."
ReplyDeleteI would disagree with this part. Air Force Special Warfare doesn't have the numbers to be considered a true ground combat force - AFSOC's trigger pullers are very much specialist augments or enablers to other forces, such as TACP, the special warfare weathermen, pararescue, SERE school, Combat Talon & Pave Hawk... the same goes for the Navy SEALs, who in their totality would be an overstrength infantry battalion at best. (This is also ignoring how using NSW and AFSOC as line infantry is wasteful, as it negates their skillset and what they bring to the table. You shouldn't use a jewelers screwdriver to change out a #3 Phillips head screw.)
Outside of direct action, which is the most fundamental skillset for a SOF unit, the duplication of effort isn't so pronounced in SOCOMs units, because each unit has a specific role and task (albeit with a certain degree of overlap for redundancy)*. A wrench, screwdriver and allen key are all used to screw things in, but that doesn't mean that you should get rid of two and only have one. And even in the one type of screwdriver, you've got different sized heads in your toolbox.
* We can see an example of this in the Tier-1 SMUs: Delta prioritises land operations, but still trains operators for maritime missions; DEVGRU prioritises maritime ops, but still trains for the airplane takedown that's a classic Delta mission. Redundancy always imparts a cost to efficiency.
Which, I suppose, is another question to ask: where does one balance efficiency versus redundancy?
"Air Force Special Warfare doesn't have the numbers to be considered a true ground combat force"
DeleteYou've missed the point. It's not whether the AF can mount a ground offensive to conquer all of Asia, by itself. It's why do they need ANY ground forces when they can call on Delta, Green Beret, Rangers, and other forces that already exist and are tasked with ground combat AS THEIR PRIMARY MISSION? That's duplication and in order to accomplish that duplication, they had to create, maintain, and budget for specialized training pipelines, equipment, uniforms, etc. They created a complete duplication of existing ground force support and logistics so that they could have their own mini ground force.
Another great example is Navy SEALs fighting permanently on land in Iraq and Afghanistan when we already have plenty of Army special forces that could do the job just as well. SEALs are supposed to be water warriors. Well, there's not that much water in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, or wherever.
Duplication and waste.
You're just looking to argue with me and nitpick instead of looking at the overall premise. If, say, AF pararescue was the only duplication in the entire military then it would be no big deal, would it? However, each duplicaton, no matter how small, carries its own penalty in wasted effort and wasted money. All those duplications (many quite large!), across the entire military, add up to enormous waste of resources while, at the same time, basic capabilities (SHORAD, for example, or mobile armored artillery) go lacking.
Why does the Navy need an oversize battalion of ground combat troops when we have an entire Army plus Green Beret, Rangers, Delta, etc.?
Don't nitpick, look at the overall premise.
@CNO: "It's why do they [AFSOC] need ANY ground forces when they can call on Delta, Green Beret, Rangers, and other forces that already exist and are tasked with ground combat AS THEIR PRIMARY MISSION? "
DeleteAir Force special operations Command (AFSOC) is not a ‘ground combat force’, overwhelming most of its ~20,000-man force consist of aircrew, and the comparatively small portion of the force that does operate on the ground (the Special Tactics Squadrons) do so to *enable the use of airpower*, particularly specialized airpower through tactical air control, CSAR, weather observers and other functions. Mostly the AFSOC Combat Controllers, Tactical Air Control Party (TACP), Special Operations Weather Technicians, and Pararescuemen (PJs) operate in support of other SOCOM units.
For example, Combat Controllers are FAA certified air traffic controllers with the mission of penetrating into combat and hostile environments UNDETECTED to establish assault zones or airfields, while simultaneously conducting air traffic control, fire support, command and control, etc.. These guys have some of the most advanced communication training and equipment in the military and it is difficult to envision any significant forced entry operation (vertical envelopment) being conducted without them. Generally, Combat Controllers are the most heavily employed SOF units, and some SOF mission focus around getting one or two combat controllers into a position to do their magic.
https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/104592/combat-controllers/
They are a great example of why all the talk about: ‘disestablishing SOCOM’, or arguing: ‘the USMC could take over SOCOM’ is done to support an extreme partisan position, or by folks who do not understand AFSOC/SOCOM.
For more information on AFSOC:
https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/104592/combat-controllers/
GAB
@ComNavOps:
DeleteYou keep saying you're not a ground combat expert, but then you accuse people of arguing and nitpicking you when you display gaps in your knowledge. And you missed the point I made, which GAB elaborated on, that AFSOC's personnel are not a ground combat force, they are specialist enablers who provide a specialist skillset that is outside the job scope of line infantry. Who truly is the person who is looking to argue here?
"It's why do they need ANY ground forces when they can call on Delta, Green Beret, Rangers, and other forces that already exist and are tasked with ground combat AS THEIR PRIMARY MISSION?"
It's the other way around: AFSOC is called upon to provide specialist skillsets in support of ground combat forces.
As for the SEALs being used in Afghanistan, that was in part political (Delta got Iraq, DEVGRU got Afghanistan), and in part due to the high optempo and demand for SOF commandos. When you have SEALs who can execute direct action missions, does it make sense to keep them unused on maritime missions? Or should they be used where there is a need for them?
(Notably in Iraq, the optempo was so high that everyone had to step up a tier: Green Berets started taking Delta taskings (and standing up CIF company in each Group), Rangers took on Green Beret missions, line battalions started doing Ranger things and night raids of their own.)
By all means we should eliminate duplication of effort and streamline things, but SOCOM is not where you that, because each unit brings a specific skillset to the toolbox, and at the operational level, task forces are run as a SOCOM show, not an Army/Navy/Marine Corps/Air Force show.
DeleteI don't actually disagree with the idea of disbanding the Marine Corps, however, because I too question the need for having a second land army that occasionally deploys from ships. Other nations seem to manage well enough without having a separate marine corps. The Army already has winter warfare and mountain warfare divisions - just make like the Japanese and designate an Army brigade as an amphibious assault brigade and be done with it.
@JMD
DeleteI am not sure this was directed at me, but I am NOT in favor of disbanding the USMC in spite of the criticism I have leveled at the service.
I do favor a more historical role for the service.
GAB
"AFSOC's personnel are not a ground combat force"
DeleteWell, here's the AF position on the subject:
"Earlier in 2018, the service released a memorandum describing the current challenges and explored possible improvement opportunities to become more effective. “Bottom line, a fully leveraged Air Force ground maneuver element eliminates the need to ask another service to do what the Air Force should do ourselves,” the memo states. This conclusion indicates a desire for more independence. The document was signed by the Air Force’s Vice Chief of Staff, Gen. Stephen Wilson."
Here's a Wiki statement:
"Like other special operations units, SR [Special Reconnaissance] units may also carry out direct action (DA) and unconventional warfare (UW), including guerrilla operations."
'Ground maneuver element'? 'Direct action'? 'Unconventional warfare'? 'Guerrilla operations'? That all sounds like ground combat forces to me.
You continue to miss the point of the post which is the duplication of missions. For the sake of discussion, let's say you've totally convinced me that AF personnel are not in any way, shape, or form ground combat personnel. They carry no weapons. They don't fight. They've not been trained for ground combat. They've never even heard of ground combat. If it wasn't for gravity, they wouldn't even know where the ground was. Okay, how does that change the premise of the post? It would mean we only have three ground combat forces instead of four. Hooray! We've only triple duplicated that capability instead of four times! Great!
"When you have SEALs who can execute direct action missions, does it make sense to keep them unused on maritime missions? Or should they be used where there is a need for them?"
Again, you miss the point. It's not whether the SEALs should be used in ground combat just because they are available; it's whether they should even exist AS A GROUND COMBAT FORCE. There's certainly a need for a water-based combat force but that need only requires a very small force, not a division worth of SEALs or whatever they're up to now. When was the last time you heard of a SEAL mission that actually involved water? Admittedly, that's an unfair question because they don't exactly advertise their work although we certainly seem to regularly hear about their land exploits so ...
@GAB
DeleteNo, that wasn't directed at you. It's just something I've thought about a fair bit.
@ComNavOps: You, sir, are arguing to win. As much as you accuse me of missing your point, you are likewise missing my point.
DeleteYou're equating the specialist enablers that AFSOC provides with a full up proper ground combat force - and when you lump in the Green Berets and Delta into that definition, you've oversimplified things so as to remove nuance, which hinders a holistic understanding of the topic at hand.
Again, the point I have been saying is that each unit in SOCOM brings a specific skill to the table - there is very little duplication there. But there are core fundamental skillsets that all units end up having. To use an analogy: a Fletcher-class DD, an Atlanta-class CL, a Portland-class CA - all of these ships have different, specific roles to serve. And all of these classes also fought engagements with other ships, because shooting at enemy ships is a core fundamental skillset that a warship must have.
Your argument is akin to saying that we have have a duplication of effort because we have destroyers, light cruisers, heavy cruisers, battleships and carriers, why should we need carriers when the battleships are the surface warfare force?
"There's certainly a need for a water-based combat force but that need only requires a very small force, not a division worth of SEALs or whatever they're up to now."
By all means, reduce the SEAL Teams if you want: the USN used to get by with just two Teams back in Vietnam - one can argue it probably doesn't need 8 whiteside teams. Keep DEVGRU - it's a Special Missions Unit with a skillset the regular teams don't have, and it serves as a substitute asset for when CAG is fully tasked (the reverse applies, of course; JSOC tasks the SMUs as available).
@CNO: "Well, here's the AF position on the subject:..."
DeleteThe memo cited, is really about overhauling and realigning personnel from ACC to AFSOC as discussed below.
On the confusion about missions: sure, a handful of combat controller’s inserting ahead of an airfield seizure [Forced Entry] by the 75th Ranger Regiment is ‘Direct Action’, but that does not make the USAF/AFSOC a ‘ground maneuver force’ by any realistic definition. Should we also consider tactical air control parties, FACs, and liaison officers to U.S. Army units as ‘ground maneuver forces’? If we realign them to ‘de-duplicate DOD’, who should perform the role that the air force provided as far back as WW2 as the USAAC?
Digging deeper into the memorandum, the USAF times reports: "The revamped structure would seek to move pararescuemen and combat rescue officers, who are now primarily under Air Combat Command, into special tactics squadrons [AFSOC] and better integrate them into that world, alongside combat controllers and special operations weather team members who are already under Air Force Special Operations Command." https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/your-air-force/2018/10/12/air-force-eyes-major-changes-to-fix-dysfunctional-battlefield-airman-structure/
This is about personnel management more than anything else.
With all respect to Stephen W. "Seve" Wilson, General USAF (RET), he was a B-1/B-2 pilot before becoming Vice Chief of Staff for the USAF, so he gets a pass on describing what ‘ground combat’ to the USAF at large.
I also note, that when I was part of SOCSOUTH in Panama, there were never more than three (3) Combat Controllers assigned to the command and its components at one time, and that was because AFSOC assigned a replacement officer two months early.
GAB
"This must stop. We need someone in higher authority to put a stop to this. It’s costing us untold sums of money to duplicate capabilities."
ReplyDeleteAbsolutely. But w hat it's going to take is what we haven't had in quite some time--someone in charge to say, "Army, you do this and not that, Air Force, you do that and not this," and the same all the way through the other branches. But that has to start from some strategic concept of what we are trying to do--and we haven't had that since the Berlin wall fell.
Very good points. Although, in fairness, sometimes there is a value in redundancy. For example, when the Chinese destroy all our communications and GPS satellites on the first day of a major war, it would be really nice to have an alternative way of doing communications and navigation that doesn't depend on satellites. If it's run by the Navy (or Army) instead of the Space Force, I'm not sure that would be so horrible.
ReplyDelete"sometimes there is a value in redundancy."
DeleteThere's always a value in redundancy in combat ... as long as it's carefully considered and planned redundancy. There is no value in useless, pointless duplication.
Redundancy should also be of a dissimilar nature, if possible. I've posted on this (see, "Separation and Redundancy"). For example, if all our deep strike B-2 bombers get shot down (we've only got around 18 flyable ones!) it would be very wise to have an alternate, dissimilar deep strike capability like, say, cruise missiles. That would be an example of redundancy that doesn't wastefully duplicate existing logistics, support, training, etc.
That's an example of a carefully considered redundancy.
At the other, useless end of the spectrum is Marine aviation. It duplicates two other existing capabilities, offers nothing unique and useful, duplicates the entire acquisition, training, maintenance, logistics, and support bureaucracy that the AF and Navy already have and it isn't usefully redundant. If the AF and Navy aviation are totally destroyed, a handful of Marine aircraft won't make any difference.
"Marine aviation"
DeleteDo we have any idea roughly what fraction of the costs are for the various overhead you mentioned? As opposed to actually operating the air wings? Obviously there are a lot of extra fixed costs involved. Although Marine aviation does do useful things, so if it went away, those things would presumably have to be done by Navy aviation. So any idea how much would be saved by eliminating the Marine overhead, taking account of the fact that the Navy overhead would be larger?
Additional thought: Since the Marines are part of the Navy, it seems like there would already be an opportunity for them to share the Navy's bureaucracy. Pilot training, for example, should be almost the same right up to the most advanced level where you are learning the actual combat jets. Do you happen to know if they take advantage of that?
"So any idea how much would be saved by eliminating the Marine overhead,"
DeleteWell, here's one example: If Marine air didn't exist, the LHA/LHD vessels would not exist and those are a MAJOR acquisition and operating cost - many, many billions of dollars! The aircraft, one might assume, would be absorbed into regular Navy carriers which would help get us back up to the 90+ air wing we used to have instead of the 60+ air wings we have now.
Beyond that, I could write a post/book on the ramifications (positive and negative) of eliminating Marine air. Consider the immense costs of Marine air bases, hangars, maintenance, parts, etc., all of which duplicate Navy and Air Force equipment, facilities, and logistics.
"For example, if all our deep strike B-2 bombers get shot down (we've only got around 18 flyable ones!) it would be very wise to have an alternate, dissimilar deep strike capability like, say, cruise missiles."
DeleteAre not the Army's efforts with Long Range Precision Fires a step in this direction? The Air Force's only paradigm for long range attack is to do penetration attack with B-2s or F-35 dropping JDAMs, or to launch subsonic cruise missiles from unstealthy B-52s.
Meanwhile with LRPF, the Army's efforts are on making long-range artillery and SRBMs as another avenue of attack (and it's not as if long range missiles as an Army weapon is a new idea, the Russians have had Scud and Iskandar for decades now, the PLA has 2nd Rocket Artillery and the Army originally intended to field ground launched Tomahawk missiles...)
The air force has shown no inclination to pursue alternative means of deep strike beyond the bomber force, and the ICBM force is the red-headed stepchild of the USAF. Meanwhile, the Army already fields tactical ballistic missiles - LRPF's missile component would be an outgrowth of that existing institutional knowledge.
First things first. The USA really doesn't have--and arguably hasn't had since the Berlin Wall fell--a grand geopolitical strategy. Ross Perot opined in 1992 that, in the post-Cold-War world, economic power would become more important than military power. We didn't seem to grasp that, but China did. While we have spent 20 years chewing up lives and limbs of our brave 20-somethings in a relatively fruitless effort to impose our will militarily on an area that doesn't really want to do things our way, China has badly outflanked us with economic influence, without a single Chinese soldier shedding a drop of blood in the effort.
ReplyDeleteSo we need to refocus from the top down.
Once that is in place (and it really can't happen until that is in place) then we need to determine what our military goals and objectives are, and the non-duplicative ways that each branch contributes to those goals and objectives. Then we need to drill down to the concepts of operations (CONOPS) required to meet those goals and objectives, and the critical success factors (CSFs) that must be attained to meet them. At that point it should start to become obvious who does what, and how to keep each branch in its own sandbox.
I have my own thoughts about what should be the answers to those questions, and I would tend to guess that most of you would agree with some and disagree with some of it.
But if you don't know where you are going, then any (and all) paths will get you there, and that seems to be what is happening. We are kind of floundering around in all ahead neutral, and nobody really seems to know were they are going.
"But if you don't know where you are going, then any (and all) paths will get you there, and that seems to be what is happening."
DeleteI don't think that's it, at all. If that were true, the implication would be that each service, in an effort to provide the best possible support for America, would be trying their patriotic best to safeguard the country. That would laudable, if misguided and misdirected.
Instead, what we're seeing is each service attempting to appropriate missions from the other services in an attempt to safeguard not the country but their own budget slice.
The former is a noble but misdirected effort. The latter is a power-grubbing, despicable effort.
"The former is a noble but misdirected effort. The latter is a power-grubbing, despicable effort."
DeleteAnd the latter is the inevitable result when there is no coherent grand strategy, nor any resulting specific plans to implement such strategy.
They don't have anything to do but protect their budget turf, because there is no strategic plan.
My basic strategic outline consists of three pieces:
1) The Ross Perot idea of winning the economic war by restoring the USA's status as world leader in manufacturing. This requires tax, legal, and regulatory policies to favor returning essential manufacturing to the USA, with the return of non-essential manufacturing at least to NAFTA/USMCA or close allies.
2) The Harry Truman idea of bribing up alliances to stop the spread of hostile regimes.
3) The JFK idea of building a military force capable of meeting the "two-and-one-half-wars" standard--the ability to prosecute simultaneous wars against Russia in the Europe/Atlantic area and China in the Asia/Pacific area, plus a rogue nation or terror group somewhere else (perhaps Iran?).
Can we afford to do this? If we cut out the admin/overhead fat cats in both the civilian and military ends of government, yes. If not, no.
"Every single piece of the key west agreement"
ReplyDeleteComment deleted. If you have something productive and coherent to say, feel free to re-post.