ComNavOps has long criticized
the Navy’s plan to use helicopters as off-board sensor platforms in
combat. Helos also appear to be the Navy’s
main distributed lethality sensor asset.
As we’ve discussed, the problem with helos is that they are extremely
slow and decidedly non-stealthy. Add to
that the need to operate an active radar and the helo has zero chance of
remaining undetected and zero chance of surviving the resultant enemy attack. Unfortunately, the use of active radar
ensures that the enemy will see the helo long before it sees the enemy.
Making the situation worse is
the fact that each warship will only carry one or two helos which ensures that
coverage will be sporadic and sparse and that combat attrition will quickly
reduce the host ship to its own organic sensors. In other words, in combat, helos will be
prove to be only a very tiny step above useless and then, only for a very brief
period before they are destroyed.
So, what’s the solution?
The ideal solution is to use
lots of small, cheap, limited range UAVs and accept the inevitable attrition
while depending on numbers to provide the necessary sensor coverage (see, “TheNext Cruiser and Mini-Hawks” and “UAVs – Numbers Matter” and “SensorAttrition”).
While the concept of small,
cheap, numerous UAVs makes eminent sense, the Navy almost always prefers much
more expensive and complex solutions.
So, …
Alternatively, a stealth helo
might enable the helo to carry out the Navy’s desired off board sensor
function. Is there such a thing as a
stealth helo considering those large, radar reflecting rotary blades? Well, the Army seems to think so and pursued
the Boeing/Sikorsky
RAH-66 Comanche as a stealth
reconnaissance helicopter in the late ‘90s and early ‘00s before the project
was cancelled due to cost overruns and technical issues. Other examples include the HAL Light Combat Helicopter and Eurocopter Tiger. Let’s briefly review these examples.
RAH-66 Comanche – This was intended to be a reconnaissance and light attack helo. Regarding its stealth, Wiki states,
As intended, it would have functioned as a stealth helicopter, incorporating a number of different techniques and
technologies in order to reduce its radar cross-section (RCS) along with other areas of visibility and
detectability. The exterior surfaces of the RAH-66 were faceted and covered with both radar-absorbent material (RAM) coatings and infrared-suppressant
paint; as a result of these combined measures, the Comanche's RCS was stated to
be 360 times smaller than that of the AH-64 Apache. The acoustic signature of the helicopter was also reported to be noticeably
lower than comparative helicopters; this reduction had been partially achieved
through the adoption of an all-composite five-blade main rotor
and pioneering canted tail rotor assembly. (3)
 |
| RAH-66 Comanche |
HAL Light Combat Helicopter
– This is an Indian produced, attack helo featuring very light weight and very
high altitude. According to a Wikipedia
article, it is claimed to have stealth profiling, armor protection, a digital camouflage system, infrared (IR) suppression, and
an exterior covered by canted flat panels to minimize its radar cross-section.(1)
 |
| HAL Light Combat Helicopter |
Eurocopter Tiger – This is a stealthy multi-role attack helo that uses advanced
composites which reduce its radar cross section and features reduced visual,
IR, and acoustic signatures.
 |
| Eurocopter Tiger |
Russia - Wikipedia
reports the existence of a stealthy Kamov helicopter with a reduced radar cross section (RCS),
IR suppression, and an internal weapons bays.(2)
 |
| Ka-58 Stealth Helicopter? |
A naval stealth helo
combining the state of the art stealth features from the preceding examples
might allow the Navy to achieve the manned, off-board helo surveillance asset
that they’ve been chasing for many years and which is the pre-requisite
foundation for a viable distributed lethality concept. Of course, the question is how stealthy can a
helo be? The only hint we have is the
Comanche claim of an RCS 360 times smaller than an Apache but without knowing
what kind of radar signature an Apache has, that’s not really helpful. However, it does suggest that a sufficiently
stealthy naval helo might be possible.
At the very least, it would be worth some developmental effort along the
lines of calculations and small scale testing.
Hand in hand with any
physical stealth design is a stealthy Concept of Operations. How would a stealth helo operate? Would it radiate, thereby pinpointing its own
location? Can it radiate, obtain a
useful picture of the area, and move sufficiently far away to survive the
resultant aircraft or surface-to-air missile attack? Can passive sensors be used to obtain a
useful situational awareness or to supplement active radar to a useful
degree? How many helos are needed to
provide sufficient coverage? And so on …
One of the problems the Navy
has is its insistence on using only the SH-60 Seahawk family. These are large, ungainly, helos – decidedly non-stealthy. If the Navy were to consider the use of smaller,
specialized reconnaissance helos, they might be able to operate more of them
and attain better coverage and be better able to deal with mechanical and
combat attrition. The RAH-66 Comanche,
for example, was 47 ft long, 11 ft high, and a bit over 6 ft wide as compared
to the Seahawk which is 64 ft long and 17 ft high. An LCS, for example, might be able to operate
3-4 small, stealth helos instead of the single Seahawk family helo they can
now. A smaller, lighter, stealth helo
would also be more compatible with the structural strength constraints of the
LCS flight decks which are the limiting factor in their helo ops. A Burke might be able to operate 3-4 stealth
helos as opposed to 1-2 Seahawk types.
All of this is conjecture, of
course, but it offers a possible path for the Navy’s desired distributed
lethality concept. Of course, there’s
still the fact that distributed lethality is just plain stupid but the Navy’s
going to do stupid anyway so this, at least, offers a possibility of doing it
slightly less stupidly.
_______________________________
(1)Wikipedia, “HAL Light Combat Helicopter”, Retrieved
21-Aug-2020,
(2)Wikipedia, “Stealth
Helicopter”, Retrieved 18-Aug-2020,
(3)Wikipedia, “Boeing–Sikorsky
RAH-66 Comanche”, Retrieved 24-Aug-2020,
I have always thought that your ideas are missing something and I think I found out why. Your ideas make a lot of sense to readers here but to actually effective change, the "leadership" of the Navy needs something to save face or to explain why their ideas, if left on the original course, would destroy the military. Of course, this isn't as perfect as it could be (isn't it the beauty of life?) but you need a compromise to sell the idea otherwise you risks getting discredited. Hopefully there are more of these hybrid articles of your suggestions and the Navy's (idiotic) concept.
ReplyDeleteAre there any answers to why the Navy (of other nations as well) single-handedly use choopers as their main method of anti-submarine warfare nowadays? And are there actually any advantages to using the same airframe as the Army and other branches? I felt like with the extra requirements accompanied with sea operations, we should have designed a sea-skimming stealthy helicopter for least likelihood to be detected.
Following the spirit of your blog, I would like to recommend a proposed CONOPS for the helicopter. I see 2 variants of the helicopter that could be used: one could be the airbone portable radar where they either could be extension of the on board sensor on the ships. My guess that it would work similar to current AEWC aircraft but with much more limited endurance and highly questionable ability to counter electronics attack. They could always become a dedicated passive sensor if they are capable of handling themselves in rough sea (I am of course proposing them to land in the seas and utilize their passive sensor as mobile buoys).
The other idea is they could be replace with sea-borne aircraft (seacraft?!?) like the sea variant of the C-130 that G2-Mil proposed before. It's probably at most 2 aircraft that could fit inside the hangar but it does provide a much higher endurance option with stronger sensor package.
"but you need a compromise to sell the idea otherwise you risks getting discredited."
DeleteI somewhat agree with you, to a limited extent. I have offered posts of alternate uses for the LCS and Zumwalt, for example. The problem with trying to fit solutions into the Navy's efforts is that the Navy's efforts are so misguided that it's very difficult to offer a solution that makes any sense and I run the risk of being discredited by offering idiotic solutions.
You also need to recognize that I write on multiple levels. I write about conditions as they are. I write about things as they ideally should be. I occasionally write about partial improvements that still fit the Navy's misguided efforts such as this post.
I'm also inspired by the examples of Rickover, Mitchell, and so many others that didn't try to fit into a misguide effort but, instead, forged a new path and dragged the Navy along, crying and protesting all the way. I would hope this blog serves as an ideal for the Navy to work towards and, if I can offer an occasional 'fit in', as you suggest, then all the better.
"Hopefully there are more of these hybrid articles of your suggestions and the Navy's (idiotic) concept."
Feel free to jump in and offer a hybrid solution to any post problem! I'm often inspired by reader comments to expand their ideas into full posts.
"one could be the airbone portable radar"
DeleteThe problem with any airborne, active radar is that it gives away its own position and that of the host ship. If you've got an entire air and ship escort for hundreds of miles around (a carrier battle group), that will work. If you're a lone ship, you've pinpointed your location for the enemy and now you're all alone and you won't survive and attack. I strongly lean towards passive sensor platforms for that reason.
Originally I believe that these active radar destroyers are only operating in a fleet or a convoy and it would be an acceptable risk to radiate your signature for early-warning detection. But I have mistakenly believe that you must fight all enemies you came across to win wars and you also risked become a concentrated elimination effort in the case of a fleet. One must ask if the all-seeing nature of the Navy approach would lead to their own destruction?
DeleteThe floating buoys idea originally came from the movie "Battleship" where the Navy captain use the tsunami early warning system to accurately predicts where were the alien ship is moving. It's an idea that i find fascinated with since it is a very cheap and expendable option which I believed can be further enhanced with a radar. However, further examination proved that the idea isn't feasible, shipborne radar required a huge amount of energy to operate and if we resort to using small on-board sensor, the effectiveness would be marginal on the ship's combat capabilities. Not to mention the questionable ability to survive in bad weather and rough seas and it's more than likely that it would be intensely jammed or worse, destroyed.
Putting all that aside, I have recently stumbled upon the MK 59 decoy launching system (https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/26899/us-navy-destroyers-and-royal-navy-ships-use-these-big-blow-up-anti-ship-missile-decoys) where it's designed to emulate ship signature when launched (or more specifically the radar system). It would be fascinating to see if we could deploy these decoys through helicopters where they could be deployed far away to serve as a diversion effort or in ship's cases, we could absolutely towed one in the back to make out a larger numbers than we actually are!
" I have recently stumbled upon the MK 59 decoy launching system"
DeleteThe Navy has multiple decoy systems ranging from electronic decoy signals to radar/IR decoys to radar reflectors (Mk59) to Nulka to … All are well worth the effort but it is necessary to keep firmly in mind that attacking missiles are being made smarter all the time, too, to avoid being seduced by decoys. For example, many/most missiles use multiple terminal sensors and imaging of some sort. The days when a simple, large radar reflection was good enough to decoy a missile are pretty much gone. Now, missiles look for specific signatures and EO/IR/Radar images. You're aware, I assume, that modern radar generates an actual 'picture' of the target. A floating reflector isn't going to present a ship image.
This doesn't mean that decoys can't be useful in the right circumstances but it does mean that they aren't going to fool anyone or any missile for too long - but, maybe, just long enough!
"The floating buoys idea originally came from the movie "Battleship""
DeleteWhile an entertaining movie, I assume you know that there was not a single realistic naval element in that entire movie?
I never thought of how advanced missiles really are, shame that other fields development pale in comparison.
DeleteI know that movie is a glorified Navy propaganda piece (at least in the movie they actually assumed total communications cutdown) and I just thought the idea is worth it to have a look at. Well it didn't stand up to the real world test!
All in all, really good conversation! Thank you!
"I know that movie is a glorified Navy propaganda piece"
DeleteActually, what I found more interesting and thought provoking was some of the alien technology. There were a few kernels of good ideas there. For example, the 'spinning' things that tore through the destroyer and just kept going is an interesting concept as compared to the traditional one-time explosion of conventional shells and missiles. What about a weapon that applies a persistent, on-going damage mechanism. There are some metals that react violently in air and/or water and could provide some of that persistent damage mechanism. Or, maybe some kind of physical/mechanical destruction (boring through decks/bulkheads?). Something for researchers to think about.
I think part of the challenge is that the MH-60 has an 8km range limit with Hellfire. Equip it with NSM like India is doing. Only high level assets will have air coverage out that far. Also, try and get Spike NLOS available for the MH-60 and MQ-8C now that Apache's will use them. Move the weapon from the ship to the recon platform. Add heavier gear to the ship like LRASM and maritime Tomahawk. Absolutely keep improving class 3 UAVs for BLOS and targeting data so we can use them for targeting 24/7 at a more affordable price. RQ-21 almost gets it there. They have talked about a vertical take off Shadow UAV which might be enough.
ReplyDelete"Equip it with NSM"
DeleteThat's fine but the problem is still targeting. A million mile missile is useless if you have ten mile sensors. The helo has a hard time finding targets without radiating and if it radiates, it'll be dead lone before it finds a target.
Why can't it get the targeting data from elsewhere via Link-16? Plus my understanding is the EO/IR turret can get tracks out to 30km now. Guessing that's true on the Apache also enabling the Spike NLOS with a 25km range.
Delete"Why can't it get the targeting data from elsewhere via Link-16?"
DeleteIt can but you have some other targeting asset with target data then you don't need the helo!
"EO/IR turret can get tracks out to 30km now."
If a helo is within 30 km of a hostile ship, it's probably already dead.
I need the H-60 if its target data coming from an MQ-4 or that class 3 BLOS UAV with link 16 I just invented. Plenty of ships don't have self defense to 25km. Every USN ship under 8000 tons for one. All Chinese missile boats and corvettes. Most Russian missile boats and corvettes. All of Iran and North Korea.
DeleteSmall boat hunting is a completely different mission set and any asset will work for that. However, to find Chinese small boats, you'd have to be inside the first island chain which is filled with ships, aircraft, and missiles. A non-stealthy helo would have a very short life span there!
DeleteOn a related note, as we've thoroughly demonstrated, there won't be any surviving UAVs in a combat zone or inside the first island chain.
I would argue that NSM on helicopters are more in the nice to have category that doesn't really add much beyond the NSMs on the ship itself. Small expendable U-Vs such as the MQ-8 or smaller take less fuel and have similar targeting ability as the MH-60R, for far less of a weight cost.
DeleteSeveral hundred additional shooters that can take off from anywhere or deploy on a few hundred different ships. Doesn't reveal the ship's location. Covers more ground faster than anything like a missile / modern PT type boat. I'm not clear on how you can distribute lethality much further.
DeleteAgain, nice to have. But in the tradeoffs involved I'd generally take a very small expendable UAV passing targetting information back to the ship, which will always have more natural capacity for a bigger magazine of shots.
DeleteTake an example like the LCS. For the helo+fuel weight, the LCS could carry four or five UAVs+fuel with enough margin left over to add dozens of NSMs.
Delete"dozens of NSMs"
DeleteDon't get carried away, there! The LCS, both versions, are pretty well maxed out in weight margins, stability (for the Freedom variant), and deck space for launchers. Remember, the NSM, in US service, is a containerized, rack stored and launched weapon. There are no reloads at sea, as far as I know. Deck space for dozens of NSM is in very short supply. The current configuration has the NSM crammed in just forward of the superstructure.
That was more of a way to articulate the better utility of letting the ships be a shooter with a small, light drone as the spotter
DeleteOn the LCS itself deck space is obviously an issue.
Weight is much less of an issue considering we're talking about subtracting the replacing 7 tons of helicopter and 75 tons of aviation fuel with 4 tons of UAVs and less than 10 tons of aviation fuel, and the ships as is have a SLA of 67/31 tons.
That's all hypothetical. We all know the Navy is more than content to spend $20B on building those ships (and use their shortcomings to justify $20B in DDG-lites) but will balk at the $1-2B it'd take to make them real warships (Full complement of boats, UAVs that function properly, missiles with punch in quantity).
Delete"the ships as is have a SLA of 67/31 tons. "
DeleteThey had an SLA but it's pretty used up already. Remember, they've added around 30-40 extra crew which means more people, more food, more … well, everything that goes with a larger crew. They've added some permanent equipment that was not part of the original outfit. For example, the Independence variant has had its fuel capacity reduced in order to accommodate current equipment weight requirements. There is no allowance for future growth.
Not exactly, the core crew was increased by 10, and the mission crew was assigned to specific ships as opposed to floating from ship to ship. The actual # of bodies increase was 10. Moving away from a manned helicopter would likely decrease the aviation detachment by about that many.
DeleteThe permanent equipment you're alluding to is I assume the NSMs/Harpoons, which is exactly the topic we're debating here.
And this is all kind of missing the point. Putting small, light expendable UAVs forward would dramatically reduce the weight of the aviation detachment, through loss of the 7 ton -60 and the 75 tons of consumables. So I stand by my "we have plenty of weight margin" comment.
Regarding crew size, the core crew has been increased officially by 10 but on deployment by around 10 along with a dozen or so permanent contractors for specialized equipment maintenance. One of the problematic issues is that contractors have been integrated into watch standing on deployed ships! Actual manning on deployment is somewhere around 80-90 which requires more stores, water, food, berthing, etc. Supposedly, modular berthing containers have had to be used.
DeleteAs the Navy has moved away from the idea of module swapping, they have designated more and more equipment as 'baseline'. Discussions have proposed SEWIP, Nulka, 30 mm guns, LWT/MFTA, Hellfire, NSM, MH-60R/S, TRS-4D, and added combat system consoles/computers as permanent baseline equipment. The Navy is constantly changing their minds about the LCS so how many of these actually wind up being permanent baseline items remains to be seen.
As I noted, the Independence variant had to have their fuel loads reduced to accommodate additional equipment which demonstrates that they have no SLA left. The Freedom class is not much better off. The ASW module has had to be reworked because it exceeded available weight margins. There is no SLA left to work with!
UAVs may require an increase in manning. Multiple pilots are needed to operate the UAVs for extended periods. UAVs still require maintenance, spares, fuel, munitions/payloads, etc. Ironically, the Air Force has found that UAVs require an overall increase in manning. It is likely that the manning will stay the same or increase. Weights may drop slightly but not significantly.
All that said, a single manned helo is just about useless and multiple, small UAVs would be much more useful. No argument there! The challenge is to balance the weights of the various additions.
"Actual manning on deployment is somewhere around 80-90"
DeleteThe 2006 model for manning was 74, so actual manning is between 6-16 more than was planned in 2006.
Per GAO, the LCS-2 Independence more than exceeded the range requirement (I've read by over 2000 nm but was far too heavy). Reducing fuel by 100 tons was a logical step for LCS-6 and beyond, and as GAO notes LCS-6 will likely maintain excess range over the requirements.
UAVs are unlikely to require an increase in manning, as the manned aircraft alone soaks up at least four crew plus significantly more complex/greater maintenance. USAF UAVs are a bad analogy, USA UAVs are far more comparable in role, size, complexity, and problems. A TUAS platoon is 27 personnel, but is required to be able to self-drive and self-secure, which accounts for a good portion of that bill.
And fundamentally, the big weight tax you're losing is the fuel required to keep your 7 ton high performance helicopter up. That's upwards of 75 tons (more likely around 50 tons) of weight that UAVs don't need.
Sorry it was 2010 and the manning model was 76. https://www.dote.osd.mil/Portals/97/pub/reports/FY2010/navy/2010lcs.pdf?ver=2019-08-22-112820-177.
DeleteGAO reference. https://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665114.pdf
" Alternatively, LCS 2 can only sprint at
39.5 knots under full loads, but is predicted to exceed the endurance
requirement by over 800 nautical miles, albeit at potential risk to its naval
architectural limit, as discussed above"
in other words, the gas tanks they put in LCS-2 were obscenely large and unnecessary and they've fixed the problem in later variants.
From a 24-Sep-2013 USNI News article,
Delete"The plans for LCS — as of early 2011 — called for a core crew of 40 sailors with 19 attached to one of the ships’ planned mission packages and 23 sailors as part of the aviation detachment for a total of 89 sailors."
Of course, the core was increased to 50 and then, depending on the definition of 'core', increased again to 70+.
Yeah, besides the arithmetic error in the quote, I think the clear takeaway is that the all-inclusive crew requirements shifted up by around 10. The mission crew was always accounted for and planned for, whether they're core or not isn't germane to ships weight issues.
DeleteYou'll find this interesting … From a 2010 LCS article about a demonstration trial,
Delete"Many of the extra riders were housed in two large “berthing modules” — 12-person, 40-foot shipping containers outfitted with steel-frame bunk beds — stored in the commodious mission bay"
An empty 40 foot container is 8,250 lbs. Fitted out for berthing, perhaps 10,000 lbs or so? The LCS design allows for a max berthing capacity of 75, if I recall correctly. Thus, berthing above that requires the use of a 'modular' berthing container. Just an example of one of the many ways the LCS original SLA was used up!
One of the more interesting (meaning hard to understand) weight additions was the decision to standardize on one combat software system. That's not the interesting part - that should have been done on day one. The interesting part is that the new combat system will likely require new computers and consoles IN ADDITION TO THE EXISTING ONES. Apparently, it will be too expensive to remove and gut the original system and is cheaper to just add the new system 'on top' of the old, so to speak. Again, the weights just keep adding up! I would think space would be at a premium, too.
Per the 2014 GAO report, permanent berthing modifications for the new larger crew weighed approximately 10 tons. That was written pre-2016 crew change but concurrent with the 40+10 in actual conops then being used.
DeleteAgain, 67-10+75= a large enough SLA for at a minimum the 8 NSMs we've seen these ships actually carry and likely more. Deck space obviously remains an issue.
This is an interesting first hand accounting of the LCS failures by the navigator of the USS Coronado and his hope that the new Frigates have a different fate.
Deletehttps://warontherocks.com/2020/09/lessons-for-the-navys-new-frigate-from-the-littoral-combat-ship/
The article points out the dangers of inadequate staffing of the ships.
"navigator of the USS Coronado"
DeleteThanks for the link. The article is interesting but not really informative. The author offers almost no specifics and only generic comments that the LCS failed - duh!
He's got some good points, and some generic platitudes as well.
DeleteRE: the crew. I'd argue this quote says a lot "Conversely, the littoral combat ship pioneered an exemplary training system for surface warfare officers, whose reputation as mariners has suffered in the wake of the Fitzgerald and John S. McCain collisions." Effective training is a force multiplier.
As you have noted ComNavOps, in his opinion the Navy is significantly underestimating the cost of the FFG (X). I'm in violent agreement with that, which is why I've advocating fixing the Flight Is and producing a Flight II with enhanced weight margins.
"pioneered an exemplary training system for surface warfare officers"
DeleteUnfortunately, he offers no specifics about the program beyond that fact that it uses simulators - not exactly a stunning revelation! He could have offered details that would have been hugely informative without giving away classified information.
"I've advocating fixing the Flight Is and producing a Flight II with enhanced weight margins."
Well, that's a fascinating concept. Setting aside that the Flt Is can't really be fixed, what would these Flt IIs do? What would be their mission? How would you deal with the many inherent design weaknesses and limitations?
For example, you blithely say that you would produce Flt IIs with enhanced weight margins but unless you produce a completely different ship, the weight margins are pretty well baked into the design. Short of stripping out equipment, there's not much that can be done to alter the weight margins of an existing ship design. History is full of ships that were overweight/unstable and couldn't be corrected. Similarly, flight deck structural weakness, structural member weakness, limited range, limited deck space, limited endurance, ASW-prohibitive self-noise, and so on are all designed-in flaws. Certainly, we could completely redesign the ship to mitigate or eliminate the flaws and weaknesses but then it's not a Flt II, it's a brand new ship that has only the name in common and we're already building a brand new ship: the FFG(X).
So, what's your thinking?
The biggest limitation is their weight margin.
DeleteOn the Flight Is: Replacing the 7 ton manned helicopter and its 75 tons of fuel with 30 tons of cheap, light UAVs and their fuel would require no redesign and would get this ship a long way towards improved warfighting capacity.
On the Flight IIs: Replacing the helicopter and moving the hangar below decks in the capacious mission bay would enable a significant reduction in superstructure weight in a Flight II, at little development cost (redesigned elevators, superstructure). At more development cost but still very reasonable would be a hull plug, like the US did with the Gearings/Allen M. Sumners or like the Brits did within the various Batches of the Type 22s and Type 42s. Replacing the manned helicopter with UAVs, moving the hangar belowdecks, and a hull plug would together generate potentially multiple hundreds of tons of available weight, all at well below the cost of a single FFG(X).
Missions: Same as LCS. MCM, ASuW,
Inherent Missions (no particular module): Maritime Interdiction, SOF Support, ISR, Theater Security Cooperation.
Potential Other Variants: Naval Gunfire Support (probably a Flight III with a massively enlarged deck gun).
Electronics: Same as LCS as is.
Propulsion: Same as LCS 5/6 onwards
Weaponry: 16 cell Mk. 41 to replace the forward weapons bay.
Small Craft: 4-6 MQ-8B sized UAVs, 4-6 11 meter RHIBs or ideally the CUSV
Concept of Operations: Operate as a SAG with other task organized LCS with C2, logistics, intermediate maintenance, and manned aviation support provided by an Expeditionary Staging Base. Use the complementary capabilities of the two ships to overcome the inherent weaknesses of each.
Answering your question more philosophically, I think this Julian Corbett quote applies.
Delete"On cruisers depends our exercise of control; on the battle-fleet depends the security of control.”
The LCS is our cruiser. It should be forward, executing "exercise of control" missions in peacetime and scouting functions in wartime. The DDGs, CGs, and air wings are our battlefleet. They're the hammer, and should be poised at a moment's notice to lay decisive effects.
As a nation, we've been misemploying DDGs, CGs, and CVNs as Corbettian cruisers, to the degradation of the battle-fleet. In my perfect world, the Western Pacific, Persian Gulf, and Med would be crawling with LCSs doing the mundane and boring tasks our leaders demand in peacetime. Our CSGs would be off California doing nothing but training to kill enemy fleets with no-notice.
How do one do stealth helicopters?
ReplyDeleteThe rotor should be impossible to stealth, since its spinning it can be found by the radar. In aircraft design, allot of effort is going spent to hide the turbine blade with curved inlets to not give away the movement.
Also, with any active system, radar for example there is no need for stealth, as soon as the radar in online, everyone knows where you are.
That would result in that the sensor would need to be passive, Sound, IR, Video or EM. How good will that work in a combat environment close to the sea?
As stated in the post, we don't know how effective stealth would be in a helo but the fact that the US Army pursued it and other countries are, too, suggests that a worthwhile degree of stealth is possible.
DeleteAs I've stated repeatedly, contrary to Navy doctrine, passive sensors are the preferred approach. Passive sensing is quite effective when properly used.
"How do one do stealth helicopters?
DeleteThe rotor should be impossible to stealth, since its spinning it can be found by the radar. In aircraft design, allot of effort is going spent to hide the turbine blade with curved inlets to not give away the movement."
It's probably possible, just not in a way that's cheap enough or fit for mass production.
"It's probably possible, just not in a way that's cheap enough or fit for mass production."
DeleteWell, I cited three real world examples so it would appear possible. The question is, how stealthy? Unfortunately, we have no direct answer for that. Indirectly, we thought the Comanche would be stealthy enough so that would seem to indicate it's possible. The HAL and Eurocopter Tiger would seem to have some degree of stealth though, again, how much is the question.
My bet would be to use good sensors on the Ships and not depend on anything that would have the attrition rate of a helicopter or ucav/uav. It can work in peacetime but during a peer enemy war they will be lost during or before the first battle.
DeleteEven "low cost" small things will be expensive if they are to have a good sensor system, and the space onboard and training to keep them operational and mission useful would be better spent on the actual ship.
"My bet would be to use good sensors on the Ships"
DeleteThe problem with that is that ships have 100+ mile anti-ship weapons but 15-20 mile sensors. The ship's radar is limited to the radar horizon which is around 15-20 miles. Passive sensors, depending on the type, may sense further but don't, generally, provide targeting quality data. There's no point having long range weapons and short range sensors. Hence, the desire to have some kind of off-board sensor that can extend the ship's sensing range.
Using ship's sensors alone is tantamount to operating blind.
Hmm, then i guess that it needs to be an escort carrier or a carrier group that can provide long range radar coverage. With for example the E-2 or a new version of it. Fighter cover needs to be close by.
DeleteAt sea, if the RADAR sees anything that moves it may be targeted because there are few false responses, if one try to extend sensor coverage by flying higher.
One problem is that when you start transmitting the sensor you inform the enemy to your position, or a circle that is half the range of the senor.
SIG-INT aircraft would i think work well with the E-2 or if its the same aircraf.
"then i guess that it needs to be an escort carrier or a carrier group"
DeleteYou're losing track of the topic! Carrier groups have multiple methods of long range sensing. They aren't the problem. The topic - and the problem - is the Navy's intent to conduct distributed lethality operations where a single ship is sent into enemy waters with no sensor support other than what it can carry or the Navy's fantasy of some sort of region-wide total networked sensor coverage - which is complete fantasy. So, the question is how to provide some kind of extended range sensing that matches the ship's weapons range - hence, the topic of the post!
Yeah, sorry, I forgot that someone would think that something that stupid would work. Then i would say that the Navy should go for more subs.
DeleteA single ship will be found and killed, like the German raiders during ww2.
As for sensors, one could outfit a cruse-missile with IR/RADAR/etc. Fire the missile in one direction and see if you are lucky. It would probably last as long as a UAV.
maybe if you deployed flouting senors but then why not use mines instead.
I'm must admit I cant think of anything, however if i get the $ that LM or NG gets i can probably dream of something.
"As for sensors, one could outfit a cruse-missile with IR/RADAR/etc."
DeleteThe concept is valid but it has two glaring problems:
1. The cost. At $2M-$4M per missile, that's a lot of money for a one time 'get lucky' hope.
2. The sensor field of view for cruise missile sized/power sensors is very small. It's akin to looking through a straw. You would need dozens/hundreds to cover any sizable area and then you're right back to point 1. Plus, where are all these sensor missiles going to be stored and launched from? You don't want to use up valuable VLS cells with sensor missiles. If the sensor missile is small enough to launch from some kind of small box launcher then it's going to be even more limited in range and sensor field of view.
The off-board sensor problem is not one with an easy solution! I've suggested small UAVs and lots of them. The stealthy helo is another possibility.
"Then i would say that the Navy should go for more subs. "
Subs are an excellent choice although they have their limitations. Subs have an even more limited sensor field of view other than passive sonar which can be very long range but is also very imprecise. Further, the sub's 'magazine' is limited in size and type. Also, at $3B per sub, we can't build unlimited numbers. We're struggling to keep a fleet of 48 subs or so in operation. In a war, most of those will be assigned much higher priority missions than distributed lethality.
I would say, as you mentioned earlier, this is a no-go and waste of time. Only way a single ship is able to kill anything and live to tell about it would be a surprise attack. Like an ambush on ground. No active sensor can be used to detect the enemy for that.
DeleteI would go for lower cost subs. maybe not nuclear.
But I would just say the mission a failure and go for another strategy. One that could work.
"But I would just say the mission a failure and go for another strategy. One that could work."
DeleteAnd that's the real solution!
"One of the problems the Navy has is its insistence on using only the SH-60 Seahawk family. These are large, ungainly, helos – decidedly non-stealthy."
ReplyDeleteYet, the raid to kill bin Laden reportedly used a stealthy version of the Blackhawk. Whether that was the first use of such a helicopter is unknown. Tyler Rogoway has a neat article on the origins of the stealth Blackhawks over at The Drive which dates back decades before the bin Laden raid.
If a stealthy naval Blackhawk derivative ever becomes available (or even acknowledged to exist!) the Navy would be wise to look into it. However, it's strongly suggestive that given the Navy's need for stealthy surveillance and targeting, there is absolutely no development effort aimed at a stealthy Seahawk derivative. This suggests that an AFFORDABLE stealthy Seahawk is not possible.
DeleteIn general, purchase quantity affects affordability (i.e., unit price). But, how many stealthy helicopters would the Navy need, especially considering they also need helicopters for ASW and ASuW? Say two smaller helicopters can replace a Seahawk, that leaves the ship with one ASW platform. Which at times would be like having none at all.
DeleteAnother option to consider might be the MQ-8C. Its not a clean sheet design, but a few mold line changes, more use of composites, and few other changes might make it stealthier. At least its available to experiment with. The Marines developed the Cobra from the Huey. Same idea.
"and few other changes might make it stealthier."
DeleteAnd that's a very reasonable avenue to explore. I don't know why the Navy hasn't looked at that. A stealthy UAV becomes at least somewhat survivable and makes the Navy's vision of a regional data and sensor network somewhat conceivable - at least the sensor portion.
Conceptually, I think your mini-, semi-expendable drones idea has more merit. It distributes the sensor networks, could be relatively cheap, and requires little complexity. The MQ-8B is a good baseline but a cheaper version is I'm sure also possible. Optionally manned RHIBs could no doubt be done very cheaply. To me, the LCS should have gone the route of mini-,semi-expendable drones to capitalize on the space they have, which would generate huge weight savings for putting real missiles on the ship. Instead, almost all of the combat power is that single 7.5t plus 75 tons of fuel Romeo every other Navy ship has.
ReplyDeleteSomeone I know well worked on a part of the RAH-66 Comanche project. He said it was like trying to invent Star Wars with present day technology.
ReplyDeleteDo not be fooled by promotional advertisement of "stealthy" helicopter. ~80% of a stealthy fighter (F-22, F-35, J-20) comes from its shape. Base on helicopter's structure, it is impossible to achieve same results as F-22, period. A little bit improvement on radar footprint doesn't matter.
ReplyDeleteAnother key issue is, today, it is not practical for a single US destroyer to combat the other top tier navy - China PLA Navy. This is why LCS and DDG-1000 are stopped after fast rising of China Navy. US navy have to move in a fleet thus multiple helicopters from several ships work together.
One idea could be interesting is a mainly drone based carrier. Looks like China's new 076 is moving toward this direction base on its bidding document. Let's see how China will build it and it won't be long as China usually spends less than half time than US to build one. If it is good, US can also build one. 076 calls two electromagnetic eject systems on it.
Drones have a critical problem - electronic signal attenuate with distance. Once it is deep in enemy's territory, keep communications from jamming is always a key issue. Even Iran captured US' RQ170! MQ-9 can only attack forces without acceptable air defense system.
"Do not be fooled by promotional advertisement of "stealthy" helicopter."
DeleteNo one is being fooled by manufacturer claims. From the post:
"Of course, the question is how stealthy can a helo be? The only hint we have … that’s not really helpful."
"A little bit improvement on radar footprint doesn't matter."
Every little bit of improvement helps by decreasing the range at which the helo can be detected by the enemy. Whether small improvements are worth the money is a debatable question.
"today, it is not practical for a single US destroyer to combat the other top tier navy - China PLA Navy."
When, in history, has it ever been practical for a single ship to combat an entire opposing navy?????
"This is why LCS and DDG-1000 are stopped after fast rising of China Navy."
No, you're applying some after the fact rationalizing. The LCS program was truncated after it was realized that they had no combat capability because their modules were non-existent. The Zumwalt class was truncated for unknown reasons, most likely related purely to cost.
"US navy have to move in a fleet thus multiple helicopters from several ships work together."
The reason the post was written was because the Navy is moving towards distributed, single ship operations which is operationally and tactically foolish but it is, nevertheless, the direction the Navy is headed. Now, if you're calling for fleet operations over distributed lethality operations then that's completely valid and I happen to agree but it is important to recognize the direction the Navy is actually going.
"One idea could be interesting is a mainly drone based carrier."
Absolutely and we've covered this in many comments and posts!
DDG-1000 is a strategic blunder. After USSR dissolved, US navy found it had no capable counter party. I believe that you are familiar with navy's strategic announcements.
DeleteDDG-1000 was developed to against regional powers which don't have powerful fleets. DDG-1000 was planned to act alone. It is stealthy thus enemies won't find it until it is too late.
On the other hand, if a DDG-1000 is part of an air carrier group, it is not even as good as an Arleigh Burke(carrying less missiles). Its stealthy is useless in a large group in which other ships are not stealthy.
Worse, DDG-1000 also failed to reach several tech targets which I believe that you are well familiar with.
US navy is changing its strategic as Chinese navy's sudden rise. Its modernization is too fast for Pentagon to comprehend thus navy strategy is changing but not yet finalized. Not only China builds an advanced ship uses ~1/3 cost and ~1/2 time than an equivalent US one, many new technologies which US doesn't have implemented.
Arleigh Burke III is a stop gap measure while navy is studying next generation of destroyer.
The truncation of the Zumwalt class had little or nothing to do with the rise of China. From the Wiki entry on the Zumwalt class:
Delete"On 31 July 2008, U.S. Navy acquisition officials told Congress that the service ... no longer needed the next-generation DDG-1000 class, ... The Navy concluded from fifteen classified intelligence reports that the DDG-1000s would be vulnerable to forms of missile attacks.[27] Many Congressional subcommittee members questioned that the Navy completed such a sweeping re-evaluation of the world threat picture in just a few weeks, after spending some 13 years and $10 billion on the development of the surface ship program known as DD-21, then DD(X), and finally DDG-1000.[26] Subsequently, Chief of Naval Operations Gary Roughead cited the need to provide area air defense and specific new threats such as ballistic missiles and the possession of anti-ship missiles by groups such as Hezbollah."
"DDG-1000 was planned to act alone."
No, not really. It was planned to provide fire support to ground combat elements by standing close inshore - hence, the need for stealth. The fire support would, presumably be supplied as part of amphibious force operations.
Zumwalt was developed as part of the DD-21/SC-21 programs where it was envisioned as providing land attack capability to replace the retired Iowa class battleship fire support capabilities. Zumwalt was to be one of a family of ship types which would have included arsenal ships, a cruiser, and possible others.
"US navy is changing its strategic as Chinese navy's sudden rise. Its modernization is too fast for Pentagon to comprehend thus navy strategy is changing but not yet finalized. Not only China builds an advanced ship uses ~1/3 cost and ~1/2 time than an equivalent US one, many new technologies which US doesn't have implemented."
ReplyDeleteReally on China because of the so open system they work, are durable, are proven in testss?
China can build lots of crap but its notable they seem to have pulled back their grand CV pronouncements.
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Not sure I think stealth helicopters are worth trying. I assume there was a reason the Comanche got canceled.
I rather think the best way of providing distributed lethality is a ton of disposable drones launched of catapults of some sort.
I assume in some peer war everyone is doing their best to degrade, or destroy or jam or hack everything and pulling out all the tools and to do so. So you really need to have a ship to just get a some few minutes of OTH spotting to launch something even if all the drones get knocked down unless you want a knife fight (I assume we are talking exclusion zone war so you are banking on just needing sorta there kind of information).
Stealth Helicopters would only seem to make sense coming from some dedicated platform. Big enough to have spare parts and pilots to I dunno loiter around and observe but not to actual risk detection.
Fixed wing aircraft have such massive performance advantages that I would never use a rotary wing aircraft unless I had no other choice due to a need to hover or land/takeoff vertically.
Delete"I would never use a rotary wing aircraft unless I had no other choice due to a need to hover or land/takeoff vertically."
DeleteThat's exactly what this post is about - the need for a sensing aircraft that can operate from a surface vessel!
Don't always agree with you but I do enjoy your writing.
ReplyDeleteThe Bell 360 Invictus is one of the two entrees into the Army FARA program and has a good chance of winning. It would seem to incorporate a number of items you suggested in addition to being low cost while easily fitting in the hanger of most naval vessels (it seems). It would still need more stealthy treatments to bring it up to Comanche levels, although this is just a guess. The Bell's dual loitering/drone recon armaments could further increase its performance as an recon asset.
No idea the range or how difficult it would be to navalize such a helicopter.
https://www.bellflight.com/products/bell-360
"Don't always agree with you but I do enjoy your writing."
DeleteThanks! Feel free to offer possible post topics.
I don't follow Army developments all that closely but this looks like a possible useful naval variant. Do you know the dimensions? I couldn't find any at a very quick glance.
Navalizing a non-naval aircraft is always a challenge but it can be done.