Among military websites, the headlines are all atwitter
about the US’ use of the one-way, LUCAS, attack drone in the strikes against Iran.
Here’s a Military Times website headline[1]:
US Confirms First Combat Use of LUCAS One-Way Attack Drone in Iran Strikes
This is a simply stunning development and marks a new
chapter in strike warfare. From the
LUCAS performance specs, never before has any country had the ability to
deliver a maximum 40 lb payload to a distance of 500 miles at a cruise speed of
85 mph (74 kts). The closest the US has
come to this in the past is the one-way Tomahawk attack drone (sometimes referred to as a cruise missile) with a 1000 lb
warhead and a range of 1000 miles at a speed of Mach 0.74. (570 mph).
It’s embarrassing the way we’ve made a habit of proudly
trumpeting “new” technologies that have actually existed for many decades. That’s not to say that there isn’t a use for
a small, very slow missile (which is what a one-way drone is) with very low end
lethality but to brag that we’ve accomplished something remarkable is
humiliating and deceptive (or ignorant).
Here’s an example of an embarrassing attempt at praise from
Army Recognition website.
“overwhelm defenses” ? Isn’t that what we’ve done repeatedly when we’ve launched dozens of cruise missiles at targets over the years?
“massed, distributed
effects” ? Isn’t that a contradiction?
“expendable systems”
? Haven’t missiles always been
expendable?
“scalable” ? Haven’t
we always scaled operations as needed?
Well, sure, we’ve done all that for many decades but never
before have assembled all the accolades into a single press release. Now that’s an accomplishment!
Again, at $35,000 per unit, there may be a use for such a
weapon but to believe it is something new is just ignorant and embarrassing.
Warning: As usual, we are not going to discuss the
politics of the US decision to strike Iran, only the military aspects.
U.S. Central Command has moved Task Force Scorpion Strike into an operational posture, giving deployed forces a low-cost one-way attack drone capability designed to multiply strike capacity, absorb attrition, and overwhelm defenses through massed, distributed effects. Beyond adding another munition to the inventory, it effectively creates a new layer of “magazine depth” that can be launched quickly from dispersed sites, complicating enemy targeting and imposing unfavorable cost trades on air defenses. The shift matters less for a single drone’s performance than for what it signals: the U.S. military is now treating expendable systems as a scalable combat arm, not a niche experiment … [2]
“overwhelm defenses” ? Isn’t that what we’ve done repeatedly when we’ve launched dozens of cruise missiles at targets over the years?
https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2026/02/28/us-confirms-first-combat-use-of-lucas-one-way-attack-drone-in-iran-strikes/
https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/aerospace-news/2026/u-s-central-command-deploys-first-operational-lucas-drone-unit-for-potential-iran-strikes#google_vignette
One advantage of a low flying drone flying at 85mph is that most radar is tuned to ignore objects going less than 100mph. Otherwise their screen is cluttered with cars on highways and large birds or flocks of birds.
ReplyDeleteThat used to be true and may still be on older systems but modern systems have pretty wide ranging (or adjustable) speed gates. If you see a large "flock of birds" on radar heading straight at you, you ought to assume they're not birds. Plus, not many flocks of birds fly 85 mph! This is also why we have optical and IR sensors for confirmation.
DeleteTo G2mil on the previous blog posts for:
Delete"G2milFebruary 28, 2026 at 12:21 PM
I will try to load up G2mil at a free hosting website so it stays up forever."
Thank you greatly appreciated! (and to save myself the trouble of having to thank G2mil later so do not take it personally when G2mil is finished and met with silence as I have already thanked you already!😉)
Now to the subject of radar, there are radars like below that, at least claims to be able to detect "even hovering drones" as below says:
The Skyfend Defender anti-drone radar is capable of adequately detecting low, slow, and small drones, and can even identify hovering drones. Skyfend Defender active phased anti-drone radar has a long-range detection range of up to 1KM.
https://www.autelpilot.com/blogs/skyfend/drone-radar-distinguish-birds-or-drones
And below as examples:
The radars ordered from Robin Radar are intended to provide early warning of approaching drones.
They can detect small unmanned aerial vehicles and distinguish them, for example, from birds and other moving objects. The agreement with the Dutch radar manufacturer was signed on November 27.
https://militarnyi.com/en/news/netherlands-to-purchase-100-ukraine-tested-drone-detection-radars/
I read a blog post that Bahrain and Qatar have SeaRAM systems on their small ships that were supposed to deal with drones. Most were too far for the gun to hit and the IR missiles wouldn't lock on to the lawn mower type engines with little heat.
DeleteThe IJN Kamikaze was the original long-range, one-way attack drone, I reckon. It was a solid system but those single-use organic targeting computers required a lot of training data.
Delete@G2mil—Not sure which blog post you were reading but it sounds a little sus. SeaRAM utilizes Phalanx architecture (I forget which block) but there’s no gun. It’s an 11-cell missile launcher that uses its own electro-optical/IR sensors. Unless it’s turned off it’s not real likely a slow-poke drone will sneak by it. 🙂
DeleteA related topic: We've had a naval base at Bahrain since 1948. I've written in the past that its a bad location nowadays. Its certainly not supporting the fleet during this war, and the families are stuck there. The 5th Fleet command and support elements should move to a safer location like Kenya, Perth Australia, or maybe southern Oman.
ReplyDelete"move to a safer location"
DeleteThat's one solution.
Alternatively, we could stay there and build up major defenses. For example, Bahrain. We knew Iran would attempt to strike back. We had all the warning we needed and yet something got through and hit the navy base or close to it. How could our alerted defenses be unable to stop an unsophisticated Iranian weapon? I have no idea what defenses we have there, if any, but they clearly weren't adequate.
Alternatively, we could make a habit of striking potential offensive threats before they become threats. Iran has threatened us for decades. If someone walks up to you, holding a gun, and says they're going to shoot you, is it wise to wait until the do to take action?
I've been told by an expert on that region that our military has discussed moving the 5th Fleet HQ to Duqum Oman for years. I googled that and found this interesting link:
Deletehttps://www.americansecurityproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Ref-0213-US-Military-Bases-and-Facilities-Middle-East.pdf
It is criminal that ground based air defense remains the red headed stepchild that is deemphasised by the US Army and the US Air Force. Only the Navy has really consistently invested into improving its seaborne air defenses.
DeleteUltimately at the end of the day, we're reaping the effects of decisions made decades in the past, particularly the Air Force's lack of effort into defending their airbases.
I don't follow Army/AF matters that closely. I wonder who is tasked with airbase defense? The AF doesn't have ground forces or missile batteries and the Army doesn't care about the AF so ... who's responsibility is it?
DeleteBefore you praise the Navy, I would remind you that the Zumwalt was built with zero close in weapon systems, most Burkes have only a single CIWS, and carriers are woefully lacking anti-air systems so the Navy is not particularly serious about defense.
You might also recall that Guam, our most important forward naval base, is almost undefended for practical purposes.
"I don't follow Army/AF matters that closely. I wonder who is tasked with airbase defense? The AF doesn't have ground forces or missile batteries and the Army doesn't care about the AF so ... who's responsibility is it?"
DeleteEffectively, nobody's. Airbase defense has been consistently neglected by the Air Force. It has SOME security guards. It has almost zero organic troops for defending their airbases against ground attack. I believe this is an outgrowth of the time when Strategic Air Command controlled the Air Force: SAC existed in a time when there was no viable defense against ICBMs, and expected its airbases to be targeted by nuclear ICBMs. (Their mitigation was to have aircraft on standby alert, ready to launch on missile warning, and to have rotating shifts of bombers and tankers constantly in the air, so that some portion of the bomber force would always be in the air and avoid destruction on the ground.)
Air Defense in the US Army is just Patriot and some Avenger: a Humvee carrying short range Stinger missiles. There's the Interim M-SHORAD Stryker, which is a step in the right direction, but that's purely for self defense against enemy helicopters. The Army's HAS historically deployed SOME Patriot batteries to protect airbases, but the Army's priority in using Patriot is to provide area anti air protection for the maneuver force.
Quite frankly, while we could have called for more air defenses to be built up at the bases, the reality is that the Army does not have enough Patriot and THAAD batteries for that.
In contrast to the Army, where we have medium range SAM in Patriot, BMD with THAAD and some SHORAD with Avenger and IM-SHORAD Stryker, a Burke represents a significant improvement in air defense capability over the Army's offerings. We have long range SAMs in SM-2ER and SM-6, BMD and ASAT with SM-3, medium range interceptors with quadpacked ESSM, and we have point defense options with SeaRAM and CIWS. Yes, most burkes only have one CIWS, but more and more ships are adding on RAM, and this is still a greater density of point defense vs the army, where Patriot batteries typically have ZERO point defense guns. CRAM was never procured in large numbers and is typically sited to protect command posts.
Ukraine war showed its value - consume enemies expensive SAM. Ukraine has no problem since US and Europe pay for these SAM but who will pay for Iran? Every SAM used on this kind of drone means a lost opportunity to intercept Tomahawk.
ReplyDeleteBTW, wishful thinking of Russia pays war reparations to Ukraine so Ukraine can use this money to pay US and Europe is a wishful thinking - FOREVER.
"value - consume enemies expensive SAM"
DeleteThis is true only if the defender has no other option. The US and, presumably, China, have and continue to develop multiple, lower cost anti-drone defenses. These include control signal disruption, microwaves, lasers, nets, anti-drone drones, small caliber guns, and various forms of electronic warfare ... and these are just some of the methods that have been publicized. I'm sure we have other, unpublicized defenses.
Thus, any value small drones may have had along the lines you suggest is already gone or fading.
It is worth noting that the size and kinematics of the Banshee target drone in the footage below is pretty much identical to the Shaheed-type drone.
Deletehttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=61YnsQ1v0mw
" size and kinematics of the Banshee target drone"
DeleteHow is this relevant?
Note how easily the target drone was taken down. We can expect similar results when employing these systems against Shaheed type drones.
Delete"Note how easily the target drone was taken down."
DeleteWhat did we actually see in the linked video? Did we see every engagement attempt or only the ones that succeeded? How many engagements actually took place?
Was the target coming straight at the ship at high subsonic or supersonic speeds or was it flying slow? Was the target engaging in terminal maneuvers as all modern missiles do (rapidly jinking to change altitude, speed, and direction) or was it obligingly flying a nice semi-parallel pattern on an utterly predictable path, steady, level, unvarying? Was the engagement in realistic weather conditions or were conditions perfect?
"We can expect similar results"
Yes we can if the attack occurs in daytime with perfect weather and pre-knowledge of the attack and the attacker flies, slow, steady, takes no evasive action, comes one at a time, and never actually comes straight at us but circles until we get a successful shot.
So, what did we really see in that video?
"Note how easily the target drone was taken down."
DeleteWhat I noted was how easily you were sucked into a public relations video without questioning it or understanding what you were really seeing or not seeing.
While it's good to be skeptical, we need to have some measure of perspective here, lest we go too far in the opposite direction. Shaheed-type drones rely on being small and cheap enough that they can be mass produced for saturation attacks. They have limited payloads, they are slow, and their kinematic profile is hardly that of a challenging target. Shaheedoids do not perform terminal evasive maneuvers the way more sophisticated AShMs do.
DeleteWe have, in fact, documented reports of self propelled antiaircraft guns downing Shaheeds - and these are with unguided rounds that are being aimed purely by the SPAAG's radar.
Quite frankly, Shaheedoids are the lowest tier of crude cruise missile. These are hardly what would be called a pacing threat.
That said, the problem that Shaheedoids pose is the pressure they put on the AD assets. You have two ways of using these weapons:
Delete- a massed saturation strike.
- a constant steady stream of targets.
With the former, you're trying to throw up so many targets that the enemy AD can't engage them all; with the latter, you're trying to bait out the enemy AD to engage your bait targets so that you can catch them off guard while they're reloading.
A Shaheed is a simple enough target to destroy; the question then becomes one of magazine depth.
The value in guided rounds for AAW defense is that 76mm rounds have a higher velocity than missiles, and thus shorter Time To Target: 3 inch rounds hit a slant range of 5km in ~6 seconds, vs ~8 for a respectable point defense SAM like 9M331. At 10km slant range, TTT of gun is ~13 seconds, while TTT of 9M331 is ~18 seconds. Additionally, they're better able to deal with saturation attacks than point defense SAMs because most modern naval 76mm guns can do 120 rounds per minute, and trying to bait out the gun isn't going to work because these are autoloaded guns drawing from a magazine full of hundreds of rounds. You have the magazine depth and rate of fire to fill the sky with lead, while giving said lead a better chance to hit the target via guidance.
That said, it needs to be understood that guns are not a substitute for missiles, they are a complement. Even the Italians, the inventors and promoters of DART, run a mix of interceptor SAMs and 76mm Super Rapid. The Chinese have been investing into developing a whole gamut of defenses: 30mm gatlings, guided 76mm guns, point defense SAMs, interceptor SAMs. And of course, both the US and the PRC are developing point defense lasers.
"small and cheap enough that they can be mass produced for saturation attacks."
DeleteLet's also keep in mind that we're discussing naval scenarios as opposed to land attacks. Drones can be useful in land attack scenarios such as attacking a known, fixed base or facility at distance.
A ship at sea, however, is a completely different scenario. It is constantly moving and both the initial targeting and some sort of mid-course/terminal/continuous guidance is required for relatively slow moving drones to be able to acquire the target and it is exceedingly difficult to imagine how an attacker without air supremacy can manage that. Ships are also much more heavily armed and 'sensor'ed' than land bases, for the most part, and are free to engage at distance without worry about collateral damage.
I think the story behind this is funny. A lot of startups have been touting their one way attack drones, typically with worse specifications than LUCAS, except they cost like $200,000 a pop.
ReplyDeleteThe company that produces LUCAS makes target drones for training, so they reverse engineered the Shahed and it had the similar cost of <$40,000. I guess someone had enough brains to buy that instead of the ones that cost 10x more, even if its not a weapon we really need.
And it is definitely a poor man's cruise missile. In an realistic sense it is a V-1 style terror weapon as opposed to something that does real damage to enemy capabilities. The exception that proves the rule might be the Ukrainians and Russians using their high end versions with dynamic targeting to strike targets like ground based air defense units or trains. As far as I can tell the US has enough high end missile inventory for these targets.
But as you point out, possibly nice to have because they are easy to produce on short notice. Maybe good to sell allies we don't want to give our high end capabilities to.
I wonder if the US is using Iran to test new weapons and technologies. Using slow missiles isn't normally a good options unless you want to try something new to confuse the enemy, or test new capabilities. Not just thew weapon itself, but the industrial base- if you use 1000 drones, how quickly can the factory in the US make more?
ReplyDeleteAndrew
If these drones really only cost $35,000 a pop then you get 6 for the price of a single Javelin missile so at least that's some benefit for tank and vehicle plinking.
ReplyDeleteYou get what you pay for. The drone is advertised as an anti-soft-skin weapon as opposed to the Javelin which is anti-tank (tandem shaped charges warhead). Javelin is fire-and-forget while the drone requires control stations and continuous monitoring.
DeleteDifferent weapons for different purposes.
Since LUCAS is literally a reverse-engineered Shahed drone, bragging about this "new capability" is certainly a weird flex.
ReplyDeleteApparently, these are improved. Mainly by having communication nodes in each drone, with some of the drones having starlink communication terminals enabling two way updates to all the other drones via satellite. Thus a mesh communication network, able to overcome some electronic jamming, gps jamming and the like.
Delete"Well, sure, we’ve done all that for many decades but never before have assembled all the accolades into a single press release. Now that’s an accomplishment!"
ReplyDelete;)
Lutefisk
The CENTCOM has publicly revealed the cost of the drone to be $35,000 per unit
ReplyDeleteThe War Zone reports, "To date, TFSS [Task Force Scorpion Strike] has not employed its LUCAS drones in real combat operations, but they have been launched at test targets in the region to demonstrate their capabilities, according to the U.S. official."
ReplyDeleteTesting like this a rather smart move to prove out the tactics, techniques, and procedures to use such a drone. And, this type of testing could be used to correct any design or manufacturing flaws, plus identify areas for improvement.
Military Times website and numerous others as well as CENTCOM have confirmed that the US used LUCAS drones against Iran.
DeleteThey could all be saying the same thing, but coached in different terms.
DeleteBut being a new weapon, is it not possible they are being a little selective in the targets to attack? Like going after softer targets to prove out the system.
From National Interest:
ReplyDelete"LUCAS could provide much-needed capabilities to the LCS program."
I thought this was somewhat comical. Why not? Cruise missile that is terrible, only useful with huge numbers and has a huge physical footprint; let's put that on a small ship with harshly limited deck space.
That said, I'm somewhat more optimistic about development of LUCAS drones than you seem to be. 800km claimed range, carries a Starlink terminal and has enough of a payload for recon equipment. I think it fits the role of "attritable, cheap recon UAV" that you describe better than anything else the US is fielding right now. Reported cost of $10k-$55k each.
Getting them to the zone isn't necessarily easy. 800 km is not the whole Philippine Sea. Maybe it's a good starting point?
" huge physical footprint"
Delete"Huge" is a relative term. The LUCAS is around 10ft x 8ft.
Sure, I can accept that. Not problematic for the right ship and mission profile. But it doesn't pack into a nice, small VLS, and the ratio of footprint to explosive is poor. LCS couldn't fire the hundreds of objects you would need to have an effect on a serious target.
DeleteThe Russians and Ukrainians seem to have the ideal situation for low-quality cruise missiles: land. You need space to hide in. The munition isn't effect-dense like HIMARS, one or two trucks couldn't fire enough to have a meaningful effect. So you need space to disperse dozens of trucks or permanent catapults or whatever you use.
I think if we were serious about winning a Pacific war, we would be all-in on Myanmar, Vietnam, Philippines, anyone else in SEA whose ear we could catch. Because they have a shitload of land to hide shitty or quality cruise missile launch sites.
"ratio of footprint to explosive is poor."
DeleteThat's true!
"LCS couldn't fire the hundreds of objects you would need to have an effect on a serious target."
We all tend to get caught up in the one-vs-the entire enemy discussion. I'm the last one to defend the LCS but in no realistic scenario is a single LCS going to attempt to engage a "serious target". It will do so with the aid of other ships and aircraft. Thus, it only needs to contribute a moderately useful amount to the total force. If it does happen to find itself in a one-vs-serious then, like Taffey 3, it's screwed and the best it can do is make a heroic but futile charge.
"Myanmar, Vietnam, Philippines"
Aside from our decades long utter ineptitude at foreign diplomacy, you can see why the countries in that region would be extremely reluctant to side with the US. They're right in China's backyard and, in a war, would be entirely on their own as the US would be far too busy with other tasks to devote any defensive efforts toward those countries.
"Aside from our decades long utter ineptitude at foreign diplomacy, you can see why the countries in that region would be extremely reluctant to side with the US. They're right in China's backyard and, in a war, would be entirely on their own as the US would be far too busy with other tasks to devote any defensive efforts toward those countries."
DeleteI certainly agree with that. I think there are two worthwhile considerations:
One, Myanmar is in a good spot to be exploited and coerced. If we could play kingmaker in the civil war, we could possibly extract some very serious concessions.
Two, we need to be ready to exploit opportunities. China has not, historically, played nice with neighbors. They already went to war with Vietnam, and there is friction with the Philippines. SEA isn't ready for a NATO-like structure, but we should have a relationship and responsive assets in case something happens. That positions us better to engage in aggressive diplomacy of the sort you've advocated, like demolishing Chinese artificial islands, and portray ourselves as guardians rather than aggressors. And if it even remotely reduces the odds of these areas falling into the enemy camp, it is worth it--a Taiwan crisis would be vastly worse if the Philippines or Vietnam offered basing to the enemy.
The best we can realistically hope for - and should be shooting for - is to persuade countries to remain neutral in the event of war - and that's even a stretch but well worth the effort!
DeleteAs far as obtaining trade or resource arrangements during peacetime ... yes, of course! We should have been doing that for decades. That's what the State Department should have been doing. I applaud Marco Rubio for beginning to do some of this during his tenure. Hopefully, he'll continue to make strides.
One of the things I've been thinking about recently is the drone problem, especially the Shahed/Geran and the MAGAURA. Now, to be clear, I'm an amateur (outside of Roman/Byzantine Naval Warfare), but I was curious as to your thoughts on the problem of drones as you seem to have discussed it significantly, and whether or not armor is really a viable solution to it?
ReplyDeleteE.g. the most recent generation of Shahed-136/Geran II or Shahed-238 carries a 90kg warhead (about twice that of a Hellfire, which allegedly can penetrate 850+ mm of armor), but I can't find much information on its armor penetrating ability. Smaller FPV/Fiberoptic drones deployed by the Russians and Ukrainians now seem to be designed to penetrate up to 2.5in of modern armor plate.
But my thought isn't so much the ability of armor to defeat a drone's warhead, as its ability to force drones to carry larger, more expensive munitions, driving up the cost and size of drones, which makes them both easier to hit and closer in cost to being worth the shot-for-shot tradeoff? I mean if we can drive up a drone's cost to ~$200,000 (the same as a MAGAURA) in exchange for a RIM-116 (~$1 million) that seems significantly better than the current $20K-$50K price range for a Shahed/Geran.
"whether or not armor is really a viable solution to it?"
DeleteArmor is a partial solution to everything! That said, the way to deal with drones is not to work on absorbing their hits but to prevent their hits through better surveillance and better anti-drone weapons, both kinetic and electronic. Of course, the best way to deal with drones is prevent them from being built and launched!
"cost"
The way to view the cost equation is not the cost of the drone versus the cost of the anti-drone missile but, rather, the cost of the ship that the anti-drone missile saves. Spending a million dollars to save a multi-billion dollar ship is money well spent. That doesn't mean we shouldn't look for cheaper anti-drone weapons; we most certainly should and we are.
Thanks. Yeah it baffles me why the Navy doesn't move to the Melara (our Mk. 75) and its VULCANO projectile. I know we're developing the HVP for the Mk. 45 Mod 4 but the higher rate of fire for essentially the same range (120km vs 150km for the HVP) seems worth the tradeoff in the context of drone defense.
Delete"why the Navy doesn't move to the Melara"
DeleteEveryone has their own favorite weapon but, as far as I can tell, they're all basically the same in actual performance. Are you aware of any realistic test of the Melara/Vulcano system as opposed to a scripted, staged marketing exercise? I'd love to read about it, if there is any. Manufacturer's claims read like miracles. Reality ALWAYS reveals a fraction of the claimed performance.
Has anyone ever sent a swarm of drones at a Melara/Vulcano system in less than perfect weather with significant sea state with the defending ship maneuvering at high speed, pitching and rolling? THAT'S the test results I'll believe.