If you want to read a sales brochure that raves about the
magnificence of the Navy, check out the latest 30 year shipbuilding plan.
Here are some tidbits from the most recent five year plan
for the years 2027-2031 inclusive.[1]
Battleship (Qty=
3, $14.5B ea) – Setting aside the reality that these will never be built, the
plan is to have three built within the next five years while our high priority,
“must get hulls in the water” frigate will only complete four? There’s some serious delusion at work here.
Burke (Qty= 7, $3.61B
ea) – Sure, these ships are long since obsolete, non-stealthy, overloaded, have
no growth margins, lack close in weapons, and have sub-optimal radars but we’re
going to build seven of them anyway because it’s the only ship we know how to
build. Along those same lines, I’ve read
that the Navy is going to restart the F6F Hellcat production line because it
was successful and we know how to build them.
NSC-FF Frigate
(Qty= 4, $1.76B ea) – This is our most urgent shipbuilding project, according
to the Navy, and we can only get four in five years? Does this give a feel for our ability to
replace sunken ships during a war? Check
out that price! That’s a long ways from
the numbers the Navy was publicly tossing around! Remember when the Navy was claiming they
would build Constellations for around $800M ea?
Now, we’re building slightly upgunned NSC patrol boats for twice that
cost! Yikes!
Virginia SSN
(Qty= 10, $6.3B ea) – Setting aside the fact that we’ve been unable to maintain
a build rate of two subs per year and now we think we’ll build two plus an SSBN
each year, do you remember when the Navy proudly (and fraudulently!) claimed it
was building Virginia’s for $2B apiece?
Well, now the cost is up to $6.3B and, of course, that’s a lowball Navy
estimate.
Landing Ship Medium
LSM (Qty= 23, $298M ea) – I have yet to hear any viable Concept of
Operations for these sitting ducks and yet we’re going to build 23 of
them? I wouldn’t want to be a Marine in
the near future! Shipping on one of
those promises to be a one-way trip and a short one at that.
Unmanned – Paraphrasing
Star Wars, “The delusion is strong in this one.” From the Navy’s shipbuilding plan,
This statement is utterly false. We can easily match China’s shipbuilding but we choose not to for reasons that only an insane person could agree with. This is purely a self-inflicted disadvantage. We’ve discussed the many ways we could easily and hugely increase our shipbuilding so I won’t belabor it here.
The Navy’s solution?
Why, unmanned, of course!
False! The Navy’s unmanned vessels do NOT delivery warfighting capability. They are largely unarmed.
Retirements - What
about retirements? The five year plan
calls for 58 new ships and 46 retirements.
That’s a net gain of 12 ships. Take
that number at face value. It’s a gain of
12 ships over 5 years which is 2 ships per year. Compared to Chinese shipbuilding rates,
that’s embarrassingly pathetic. Still,
it’s an improvement. Or is it? When we start looking at what types of ships
will be added and lost, the picture is not good.
- 10 CG/DDG will be retired and 10 DDG added. That’s a net gain of 0 for our top of
the line surface combatants.
- Counting all combat
ships (carriers, surface ships, attack subs), we’ll gain 22 and lose 25 for a net
loss of 3.
The numerical gains will be in auxiliary ships, not combat
ships. Auxiliaries are vital but they
add no firepower to the fleet.
Summary
Though I’m sure they didn’t intend it as such, the 30 year
plan perfectly documents the Navy’s delusions, fantasies, runaway costs, and
schedule slippages. In that sense, it’s
quite informative and interesting. As far
as reality … well, that’s not included in the document.
____________________________
The United States faces a strategic inflection point where peer adversaries have achieved naval mass that the U.S. cannot match with traditional shipbuilding alone.[1]
This statement is utterly false. We can easily match China’s shipbuilding but we choose not to for reasons that only an insane person could agree with. This is purely a self-inflicted disadvantage. We’ve discussed the many ways we could easily and hugely increase our shipbuilding so I won’t belabor it here.
To counter this and deliver warfighting capability fast, the USV FoS strategy outlines a rapid, competitive path to deliver affordable, scalable, and adaptable unmanned surface capabilities … [1]
False! The Navy’s unmanned vessels do NOT delivery warfighting capability. They are largely unarmed.
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