I suspect that a lot of people believe that nothing can
match the weight of ordnance (“throw weight”) that an aircraft carrier
(meaning, its air wing) can deliver.
It’s significant, without a doubt.
Just for fun, I wonder how a battleship compares to a carrier in “throw
weight”?
Just so we’re clear, the general definition of ‘throw weight’ is the total weight of shells a ship could deliver in a broadside. Obviously, carriers don’t have a broadside and that’s not really a useful way to compare a carrier and a battleship so we’ll modify the definition to suit our purposes. A carrier’s equivalent to a broadside is a maximum effort air strike which, depending on the distance to the target, takes place over several hours. Thus, a carrier can fire a broadside (strike) once every several hours as opposed to a battleship which can fire its guns continuously. For our purposes, the comparison, then, should be the weight of ordnance delivery over some time period with the obvious time period being the duration of a carrier strike mission. Unfortunately, a carrier mission time period is highly variable so, just for the sake of convenience, let’s pick an arbitrary time period of one hour instead of a more realistic several hour period and we’ll assume the carrier’s weapons delivery occurs within that one hour. The time period doesn’t really matter and won’t change the subsequent conclusions.
With that settled, let’s take a look at carrier and battleship throw weights over a one hour period.
We need to start with a few assumptions and stipulations.
With those assumptions in hand, we can derive the following table which shows the one hour throw weights for a carrier and a battleship. The battleship is shown with the alternate cases of high explosive and armor piercing shells. For our purposes, it’s one or the other but not both.
Just so we’re clear, the general definition of ‘throw weight’ is the total weight of shells a ship could deliver in a broadside. Obviously, carriers don’t have a broadside and that’s not really a useful way to compare a carrier and a battleship so we’ll modify the definition to suit our purposes. A carrier’s equivalent to a broadside is a maximum effort air strike which, depending on the distance to the target, takes place over several hours. Thus, a carrier can fire a broadside (strike) once every several hours as opposed to a battleship which can fire its guns continuously. For our purposes, the comparison, then, should be the weight of ordnance delivery over some time period with the obvious time period being the duration of a carrier strike mission. Unfortunately, a carrier mission time period is highly variable so, just for the sake of convenience, let’s pick an arbitrary time period of one hour instead of a more realistic several hour period and we’ll assume the carrier’s weapons delivery occurs within that one hour. The time period doesn’t really matter and won’t change the subsequent conclusions.
With that settled, let’s take a look at carrier and battleship throw weights over a one hour period.
We need to start with a few assumptions and stipulations.
- The carrier’s ‘broadside’ is assumed to be 40x FA-18-E/F
aircraft. Each aircraft has six bomb
hard points capable of carrying a 2,000 lb Mk84 bomb for a total load of 12,000
pounds per aircraft and a total of 480,000 pounds for all 40 aircraft. This is
the theoretical maximum full sortie capability. Two sorties of the entire wing
is the single day maximum.[1]
- A battleship is assumed to be able to maintain a firing rate
of 1 shell per gun per minute which is 60 shells per gun per hour. A battleship has 9 guns in three triple
mounts.
- The battleship magazine is 1220x 16” shells (per NavWeaps website).
With those assumptions in hand, we can derive the following table which shows the one hour throw weights for a carrier and a battleship. The battleship is shown with the alternate cases of high explosive and armor piercing shells. For our purposes, it’s one or the other but not both.
So, what do we learn from the table?
Now, before we take these observations and run with them, let’s note some ‘reality’ considerations that impact our table observations.
A carrier’s theoretical maximum throw weight can never be achieved due to the necessity to keep a significant portion of the air wing reserved for strike-related, concurrent tasks such as carrier defense, tanking, protection of high value targets (HVU) such as E-2 Hawkeyes and Growlers, target combat air patrol (TarCAP), barrier combat air patrol (BarCAP), etc. as well as the inevitable ‘maintenance-down’ aircraft. Thus, our maximum strike does not consist of 40 aircraft but, instead, some significant number less. Thus, the use of ‘40’ as the air wing size is utterly unrealistic. A more realistic maximum strike package might be 10-20 which reduces the carrier throw weight to 120,000 – 240,000 lb.
In addition, an F-18 would rarely (never?) carry six 2000 lb bombs. The weight would drastically cut into the aircraft’s range, speed, and maneuverability. A far more realistic scenario would see a Hornet with just 2-4 bombs with two being the most likely. Thus, the carrier throw weight is further reduced to 40,000 - 160,000 lb.
Magazine capacity is an issue. We know exactly what a battleship’s magazine composition and capacity is. I have no information on what a carrier’s magazine composition and capacity is. It could be that a carrier doesn’t even carry 240x 2000 lb bombs. Or, perhaps it has several times that. I just don’t know.
Related to magazine capacity is ‘emptying’ time. A battleship, firing all guns at a rate of 1 rd/minute can empty its magazines in 135 minutes. That would be a staggering total of over 2.5M lbs of munitions delivered in a short period. A carrier, cannot deliver such large pulses of firepower but because of that limitation can – and must – spread out its delivery. Of course, a battleship can spread out its delivery period, too, if desired.
Discussion
The above should not be interpreted as saying that a battleship is overall superior to a carrier. For example, a carrier has a distinct advantage in delivery range. Both types have strengths and weaknesses and the purpose of this post is not to debate one over the other. The purpose is to point out the shocking firepower a battleship can deliver under the right circumstances which can only lead one to wonder why we ever retired the battleships?
An examination of throw weights tells us that battleships can effectively relieve carriers of some missions and, for some missions, would be vastly superior. One of the major problems crippling the fleet is the deteriorating physical state of our carriers due to overuse and the resulting deferred/skipped maintenance. Common sense says that if we would use battleships to take on some of the carrier’s missions, the fleet would benefit enormously.
With all due respect (none) to Navy leadership, it is, was, and always will be firepower that wins wars (yes, and logistics and manufacturing and …), not networks and data. In the final analysis, you have to be able to kill and destroy and, under the right circumstances, nothing does that like the firepower of a battleship.
____________________________
- The table shows that a battleship has 2-3 times the throw
weight of a carrier in a one hour period.
- If we extend the time period to, say, two hours, the
battleship’s delivery is doubled while the carrier’s delivery remains unchanged
as the aircraft are unable to deliver any more ordnance.
- We also clearly see the folly of trying to use a carrier to provide ground support. It just can’t deliver the required firepower effectively.
Now, before we take these observations and run with them, let’s note some ‘reality’ considerations that impact our table observations.
A carrier’s theoretical maximum throw weight can never be achieved due to the necessity to keep a significant portion of the air wing reserved for strike-related, concurrent tasks such as carrier defense, tanking, protection of high value targets (HVU) such as E-2 Hawkeyes and Growlers, target combat air patrol (TarCAP), barrier combat air patrol (BarCAP), etc. as well as the inevitable ‘maintenance-down’ aircraft. Thus, our maximum strike does not consist of 40 aircraft but, instead, some significant number less. Thus, the use of ‘40’ as the air wing size is utterly unrealistic. A more realistic maximum strike package might be 10-20 which reduces the carrier throw weight to 120,000 – 240,000 lb.
In addition, an F-18 would rarely (never?) carry six 2000 lb bombs. The weight would drastically cut into the aircraft’s range, speed, and maneuverability. A far more realistic scenario would see a Hornet with just 2-4 bombs with two being the most likely. Thus, the carrier throw weight is further reduced to 40,000 - 160,000 lb.
Magazine capacity is an issue. We know exactly what a battleship’s magazine composition and capacity is. I have no information on what a carrier’s magazine composition and capacity is. It could be that a carrier doesn’t even carry 240x 2000 lb bombs. Or, perhaps it has several times that. I just don’t know.
Related to magazine capacity is ‘emptying’ time. A battleship, firing all guns at a rate of 1 rd/minute can empty its magazines in 135 minutes. That would be a staggering total of over 2.5M lbs of munitions delivered in a short period. A carrier, cannot deliver such large pulses of firepower but because of that limitation can – and must – spread out its delivery. Of course, a battleship can spread out its delivery period, too, if desired.
Discussion
The above should not be interpreted as saying that a battleship is overall superior to a carrier. For example, a carrier has a distinct advantage in delivery range. Both types have strengths and weaknesses and the purpose of this post is not to debate one over the other. The purpose is to point out the shocking firepower a battleship can deliver under the right circumstances which can only lead one to wonder why we ever retired the battleships?
An examination of throw weights tells us that battleships can effectively relieve carriers of some missions and, for some missions, would be vastly superior. One of the major problems crippling the fleet is the deteriorating physical state of our carriers due to overuse and the resulting deferred/skipped maintenance. Common sense says that if we would use battleships to take on some of the carrier’s missions, the fleet would benefit enormously.
With all due respect (none) to Navy leadership, it is, was, and always will be firepower that wins wars (yes, and logistics and manufacturing and …), not networks and data. In the final analysis, you have to be able to kill and destroy and, under the right circumstances, nothing does that like the firepower of a battleship.
[1]“Joint and Interdependent Requirements: A Case Study in Solving the Naval Surface Fire Support Capabilities Gap”, Joint Forces Staff College, Joint Advanced Warfighting School, Shawn Welch, Colonel, Army Corps of Engineers, 17-May-2007, p.81-83
You just showed range and accuracy were and are more important. What was the throw weight per ton of a rocket ship? I bet the cost was also favorable. Its not just one thing that makes a given platform obsolete.
ReplyDelete"range and accuracy were and are more important."
DeleteNo, it depends on the task. Area bombardment in support of ground combat doesn't require any great degree of accuracy or, generally, range.
" Its not just one thing that makes a given platform obsolete."
Of course not! Many factors make a ship useful - or not. Firepower (throw weight) is one [very important] factor as is survivability, speed, endurance, etc.
"I bet the cost was also favorable"
DeleteCost is only a secondary issue. Combat effectiveness is the primary issue. Rockets, as used on the LSM(R), were intended to provide a single pulse of suppressive fire just ahead of the troop landing. As such, they were very effective. For actual destruction they were marginal.
It seems like range is where carriers have the biggest 'strike' advantage. Accuracy should be parity as we can make precision gun rounds if we want to. I think the refurbished Iowas even had a laser guided ammunition option?
ReplyDeleteAnd a carrier's range isn't always needed. 40% of the world's population (a proxy for targets) is within 60 miles of a coastline. There's plenty of targets that would provide naval gunfire with meaningful work.
Longer ranged guns and ships that have the armor / defensive systems to close the distance to the coast would be helpful, making more of those targets accessible. Battleships were way ahead of Burkes in this area, even if they didn't have the same air defense capability.
"Battleships were way ahead of Burkes in this area, even if they didn't have the same air defense capability."
DeleteBattleships have the exact same air defense capabilities as Burkes. They're called escorts and they ARE Burkes!
Also, there's nothing that says a modern BB couldn't have advanced air defense capabilities. In WWII, the BB was the most advanced and powerful anti-air defense ship there was. Why not today, too?
Back in WW2 times ship 5 inch guns had anti-air shells with Mark 53 proximity fuze. They were no worse than modern active radar guidance which has been using in anti-air missiles. Too cheap technology for thousands of shells per battleship.
DeleteI thought the recoil of the 16" guns was too strong for fire control radars? That's the reason I was given for why the Iowas never got SAMs, according to the museum docent (I had that chance to tour Iowa a while ago).
Delete" recoil of the 16" guns was too strong for fire control radars?"
DeleteIt's the overpressure from firing rather than the recoil that is the issue and that overpressure wave has been known to damage nearby objects.
A 16" gun with a 22 mile range doesn't absolutely need a fire control radar. They worked just fine with optical rangefinders. Adding a radar would simply require siting it where it's protected from the overpressure wave, presumably high up on the superstructure (which is where you'd want it, anyway!). I'm guessing that a flat panel array would be more resistant to overpressure than an old mechanical, rotating radar but that's just speculation on my part.
There is no reason a radar can't be added to a battleship is properly protected and sited.
"I thought the recoil of the 16" guns was too strong for fire control radars?"
DeleteIt is my understanding that the battleships did not get the Sea Sparrow in the 1980s because the octuple launchers of the day could not withstand the overpressure from the guns. Because the ESSM can be launched from a Mk 41 VLS, this should not be an issue now.
"the octuple launchers of the day could not withstand the overpressure from the guns."
DeleteAnd yet, oddly, the WWII 20 mm, 40 mm, 5" guns and all the exposed deck equipment were able to withstand the blasts. This illustrates how weakly we build things today as opposed to how we built WARships in the past.
I looked up when the Mk 29 octuple launcher was introduced: 1973, fifty years ago! Time surely flies.
DeleteIn fairness to the Mk 29 and the Mk 25 BPDMS, these launchers were developed without the expectation of having to deal with the overpressure blast wave of 16" guns. The Armored Box Launchers for Tomahawk missiles and the Harpoon launchers reportedly had no issues dealing with the overpressure wave, although to be fair these are sturdier, mechanically hardier systems than the matchbox launchers, which were intended to be "good enough" interim solutions - they just ran into a case where they weren't the right choice. I can use a bullet as a good enough punch and as a good enough flathead screwdriver for a while, but there will be some jobs where I need a proper screwdriver.
CNO, I don't know if you have a Twitter account, but you might find this interesting. The USS Aaron Ward (DM-34) remained afloat after mortifying punishment. Quote: "#OTD in 1945, USS Aaron Ward (DM-34) was pummeled by six kamikaze strikes near Okinawa. The crew battled against raging fires and exploding ammunition to keep the ship afloat. A kamikaze propeller can be seen lodged in her superstructure, just forward of the 5"/38 guns." https://twitter.com/NavalInstitute/status/1653894810594340864/photo/1
Delete"USS Aaron Ward (DM-34)"
DeleteEven better, I have the book, "Brave Ship, Brave Men", by Arnold Lott, which tells the story of that horrific incident. It's stunning reading especially when compared against the weakly built ships of today, made worse by minimal manning.
The book graphically slams home the various lessons I preach on this blog about armor, strong structure, weapons density, redundancy, damage control, adequate manning, etc.
When you read the book and compare those ships to what we have today, you realize how far we've fallen.
"Two sorties of the entire wing is the single day maximum.[1]"
ReplyDeleteSince your example suggests a sortie of the entire air wing is 40 aircraft, this implies a total sortie generation per day of 80. Add in a few for auxiliary aircraft (e-2's, growlers, tankers), and it's probably well less than the existing capacity of the Nimitz class carriers (which I believe is 120 sustained). So why did we spend billions of extra dollars on the Ford class, to increase the sortie generation capacity?
"Ford class, to increase the sortie generation capacity?"
DeleteFirst, we didn't increase the sortie generation rate. That was a calculated sortie rate based on utterly unrealistic conditions which the DOT&E reports debunked.
Second, sortie rate has never been a limiting factor in carrier combat. That's just not how carrier flight ops are conducted. Carriers operate in pulses (cycles), not sustained sortie rates.
"So why did we spend billions of extra dollars on the Ford class, to increase the sortie generation capacity?"
DeleteBecause we (whoever is the we who made those decisions) are idiots?
I've seen stats where a 16" barrel wears out after 500 rounds. Were they constantly changing them in WW2? Accepting less accuracy? Or were the smaller, more numerous guns doing a lot of work during fire missions?
ReplyDelete500 rounds per barrel at 2 rounds per barrel is over 4 hours of continuous fire. That is a whole lot of fighting.
DeleteRight, but battleships were integral for bombardments for landings, some which went on for days. Did they limit 16" gunfire? Rotate out ships? etc.
DeleteIt looks that 16 inch guns that had the most use were the 8 16 inch guns on the 3 Colorado class battleships for shore bombardment and the Surigao Strait massacre. It looks like the guns were probably replaced several times during overhauls on the West coast.
DeleteHow much did the newer NC, SD, & Iowa classes use their later generations guns? Was it enough to need replacements?
ps According to wiki the 16/45's on the NC & SD classes had a life of 395 and the Iowa's 16/50 were 290.
Delete"500 rounds per barrel at 2 rounds per barrel is over 4 hours of continuous fire. That is a whole lot of fighting."
DeleteI'm not sure exactly what you're trying to say but the Iowa class had a magazine of around 135 shells per gun (135 x 9 = approx 1220).
The rate of fire is 1 rd/45 sec. A leisurely firing rate is 1 rd/minute.
A battleship would, therefore, empty its magazine twice over before needing any barrel/liner replacement.
"Rotate out ships?"
DeleteYes. That was part of the pre-invasion planning.
I'm just genuinely curious about the logistics of the bombardments, it is hard to find answers on Google and I thought people here would know or have better sources. Could they change the barrels at forward sea bases or where they going all the way back to Hawaii or San Diego? Did they use 5" barrels for most fire missions then use 16" when really needed? How fast could they change out barrels? How long would a ship be on station before rotation, was it full bore for a few hours or did they fire slowly over a few days? I'm curious about stuff like that.
DeleteIt looks like the BB's went back to the West Coast yards for barrel replacement. Not sure about Pearl but not anything west of their. You need big cranes and specialized equipment.
DeleteThe 5/38's could be replaced alongside a tender according to https://maritime.org/doc/gunbarrel/index.php which has the actual directions.
It would be interesting to add seaborne offensive missile throw weights into the comparison.
ReplyDeleteI thought about doing that but I couldn't come up with any reasonable way to do it. For example, what is the offensive missiles on, say, a Burke? Is a Standard an offensive missile since it has an anti-surface mode but would, presumably, be rarely ever used that way? Same for ESSM? If it's just the 8 Harpoons on Mk141 racks, it's so small that it's not even worth doing the calculation.
DeleteWhat do you think? Do you have an approach that would make sense?
I was thinking about the relative weight (how much warhead weight might end up on target) vs guns or bombs (I am guessing it is fairly small).
DeleteThese metrics are kinda meaningless. The carrier's sorties can reach hundreds of miles. The battleship's guns can only reach 20 miles. Massive difference in utility of fires, not to mention the precision and target finding capability of the aircraft.
ReplyDeleteIf we really wanted an naval area bombardment capability, bring back a cheap, rocket-firing, small vessel like the LSM(R). Build however many we actually need. Fire MLRS rockets. GMLRS-ER will reach four times as far as a battleship's guns.
"The carrier's sorties can reach hundreds of miles."
DeletePerhaps you recall this section from the post:
"The above should not be interpreted as saying that a battleship is overall superior to a carrier. For example, a carrier has a distinct advantage in delivery range."
"target finding capability of the aircraft"
BB's have successfully and routinely operated target detection and identification aircraft in the form of UAVs for many decades. You need to catch up on BB operating technology.
"If we really wanted an naval area bombardment capability, bring back a cheap, rocket-firing, small vessel like the LSM(R)."
I did a post on exactly this.
I'm sure you understand, however, that rockets offer suppressive fire but are not capable of destructive fire against fortifications, large targets, hardened targets, etc. and are not that effective as destructive area weapons. Rockets are very cheap and make cost-effective area weapons. However, as capability is added (guidance, extended range, etc.) their cost quickly skyrockets (no pun intended) and they become unaffordable as area bombardment weapons except in limited circumstances.
"four times as far as a battleship's guns."
That's irrelevant. All of a battleship's targets are within a battleship's range!
If range were the only consideration for a weapon's usefulness, we wouldn't have GMLRS-ER or rifles, or artillery or anything except global bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles.
"These metrics are kinda meaningless."
DeleteNo, they mean exactly what they were intended to demonstrate: that a battleship's firepower far exceeds a carrier's and that under the right circumstances a BB can successfully relieve a carrier of some missions and, in fact, perform some of them much better.
Rockets are certainly able to destroy fortifications and hardened targets. GMLRS has proven utility against common timber and earthen fortifications and buildings. GMLRS-SDB can penetrate a meter or two of concrete. We haven't built rockets with more penetration because it's not needed. The number of near-shore targets that require more than this level of penetration are small and can be handled by airpower.
DeleteShow me where there are any coastal fortifications that can't be handled by GMLRS and that we actually might want to destroy. I don't see any Atlantic Walls anywhere.
The 16" guns on the Iowa class had an estimated accuracy of 2.7% at max range, under test conditions, against a broadside Iowa-sized target at 27km. It'd require 50 shots just to have a 75% chance of hitting an IOWA at that range. Against a much smaller point targets, the battleship could fire its entire magazine and not hit it at max range. Unguided gun rounds just aren't effective at any useful range against point targets. Modern fire control and propellants could help a bit, but accuracy would still be low.
Building expensive rockets is still orders of magnitude cheaper than developing and building an entirely new class of battleship, 16" guns, munitions, AND crewing them. Especially since the need to bombard vast swaths of land close to some future enemy shore seems rather remote.
The Army is currently buying around 5-8,000 GMLRS rockets per year and we've already bought over 56,000. We just need some cheap ships to carry them.
"That's irrelevant. All of a battleship's targets are within a battleship's range!"
And when no targets are within a battleship's range, it's a giant waste of money!
"And when no targets are within a battleship's range, it's a giant waste of money!"
DeleteAnd when no targets are within GMLRS range, it's a giant waste of money. That statement applies to EVERYTHING.
"estimated accuracy of 2.7% at max range"
And at lesser ranges, such as supporting an amphibious assault or ground troops or sinking merchant ships or ... the accuracy increases greatly. You're also ignoring that battleships don't fire a single shot. They fire salvoes that blanket the target area ensuring target destruction. The entire history of the battleship demonstrates the devastating effectiveness of the battleship under actual combat conditions. You're attempting to pick isolated facts to support your flawed argument (probably for its own sake) and ignoring the entire historical reality of the battleship. NVietnam didn't care about our carriers, they cared about the battleship. The Soviets were reputedly concerned far more about our battleships than our carriers. Battleship's appearance halted terrorist activities in Lebanon, not carriers. Iraqi soldiers surrendered to battleships, not carriers. And so on.
"Unguided gun rounds just aren't effective at any useful range against point targets."
Of course they are. That's the entire premise behind the MLRS which is used to blanket an area, thus destroying whatever target is in the area. This is identical to a battleship salvo which erases anything in the target area. You're concocting false statements to try to 'win' an argument. In future comments, I'll appreciate your cooperation in not doing that and, instead, sticking to actual facts.
It should be noted that the area effect of MRLS is achieved from cargo rockets carrying DPICM submunitions, which are released in the air to spread out: that's how you remove a grid square with only six rockets.
DeleteWhich means that instead of just plain AP and HE shells, we should look into making HE-Frag shells for the 16" guns. Reportedly the Japanese Sanshikidan rounds, while less than effective in the intended AA role, were devastating when used for shore bombardment.
I am very late here, and I doubt anybody will read this, but I have to say something about this.
Delete"estimated accuracy of 2.7% at max range"
With all respect (and I mean a lot of respect), this comes from probably the most misrepresented report about US Navy WW2 era equipment of all time and the claim ignores the myriad of patently ridiculous assumptions that the report made about the hypothetical target given exactly what naval targets existed at the time.
To keep it short, their assumed target was a mythical Iowa-class counterpart that was performing rapid evasive maneuvers and somehow NEVER dropped below its assumed maximum speed of 35.4 knots.
I hope it doesn't need to be explained that this was and is physically impossible!
Furthermore, the only Battleships in the world (ever) that were capable of performing such radical evasive maneuvers and maintaining a targeting solution of their own were American; all others would have had to either choose shooting or evading due to their lack of stable verticals; so in real terms the report itself is entirely worthless unless the US Navy was expecting to fight the US Navy.
Against a Yamato acting according to Japanese doctrine, ergo attempting to maximize its own gunfire efficiency, the predicted accuracy for the Americans would be closer to 8% at that range, or over three times higher.
That aside, in the context of shore bombardment this entire argument is disingenuous and built around an obvious categorical error: at the last I checked, most strategic military targets such as bases, ports, airfields, factories, and governmental offices do not in fact move.
So, instead of accuracy assumption against moving targets, it's better to speak of the raw dispersion values of the guns in question.
According to live combat data taken from WW2 and Korea, the Iowa-class Battleships during those periods had range errors of only 0.6% of range, or 254yds at their maximum range of 42,345yds, making them the most accurate battleships to ever be built even then. Deflection error was usually negligible in comparison, as range error is always the larger number.
Of course, that's just the WW2 figures. Just by the 1980s reactivations advancements made to fire control and propellants saw a ~29% decrease in dispersion, again drawn from live combat data. During firing trials, the USS Iowa produced a range error of 0.3% of range (or ~127yds at maximum).
To put this in context, the blast effect of the Mk14 HC shell was significant enough that it was reported to incapacitate infantry within 500yds, defoliate trees within 300yds, kill exposed infantry within 250yds, level trees and light structures within 200yds (also destroy most aircraft), and even destroy MBTs within 100yds. This is roughly comparable to a WW2 era 2000lb bomb (or a modern 1000lb bomb).
Or, in other words, the USS Iowa during the mid-1980s had a greater than 50% chance of destroying a tank at 42,345 yards with a single shell; or if it fired all 9 guns at the same target, greater than a 99.987003826% chance.
By all measures that was absolutely excellent accuracy, even if the guns were not as precise as one may desire.
That's just with 1980s technology.
Today, since you already would have to make all new guns and the ships to carry them, you could utilize developments such as Polygonal Rifling and ETC cannons to not only further increase the accuracy of the guns, but decrease time of flight or drastically increase the effective range of the guns well beyond 50nmi without sacrificing payload; and that's without using science-fiction technology such as railguns. Of course, it goes without saying that Guided 16in Shells would be essentially child's play to develop as well, considering they did it with the 8in MCLWG program to great success in the '80s as well.
But I digress, my point was that the Iowa's guns in their final configurations were accurate enough for all targets they were within range of. They were imprecise, yes, but VERY accurate.
"predicted accuracy for the Americans would be closer to 8%"
DeleteI read your comment!
You threw out a lot of numbers and claims and I have no reason to doubt them, however, they are not common knowledge so do you have a reference or link I can look at? If I can verify it, it would make an excellent post!
"I’m not sure if WW2 or any subsequent conflict has given us any instances at all of the usefulness of heavy gunfire from battleships in support of amphibious assaults."
ReplyDeleteThis comment was deleted as factually incorrect.
I've been given to understand that while battleships provided the heavy punch, the bread and butter shore bombardment work was performed by the 5" guns on the battleships' secondary batteries and by destroyers going close to shore.
DeleteAs I have said before elsewhere (I'm sure you recognise what I'm saying), I feel we should be emulating that. For the same crew as a battleship, we can have multiple destroyers performing shore bombardment. And given that the shore bombardment ships will inevitably be counterbattery'd and attacked, I'd rather lose a destroyer or two than a battleship. As you pointed out, battleships are of devastating effectiveness, which means the enemy will marshall their strength to remove them from our use. Only a fool assumes he will take no losses in a combat action.
"shore bombardment ships will inevitably be counterbattery'd and attacked,"
DeleteYou understand the concept of counter-battery so, presumably, you understand that any ship, destroyer or battleship, that is going to approach land should ALSO have a counter-battery capability, right? A battleship with counter-battery capability would be devastating and ensure that a shore artillery will only get one shot.
"For the same crew as a battleship, we can have multiple destroyers performing shore bombardment."
If you're suggesting that as a supplement to battleships, that's great. If you're suggesting that destroyers can replace a battleship, that's incorrect. A 5" shell is simply not devastating. It's good for soft/small targets but you need the big guns for dealing with large, heavy, hardened, fortified targets and for dealing with targets you can't see. Our WWII fathers understood that most of an enemy's targets wouldn't be visible (caves, bunkers, camouflaged batteries, etc.) and that the battleship's guns were ideally suited for destroying those unseen targets in area bombardments.
"I'd rather lose a destroyer or two than a battleship. "
I'd rather not lose any ship. In terms of survivability, a battleship is far better suited for up close work than a destroyer. It would be nearly impossible to sink a battleship with 155 mm size shells fired from shore batteries. Give the BB a counter-battery capability and a battleship eliminates even the possibility of significant damage to itself.
Destroyers are useful when battleships aren't readily available or for very close, pinpoint targets. Even then, battleships had large 5" secondary batteries so ...
The only real reason for destroyers to get involved is when a battleship isn't readily available or when navigational issues preclude a larger ship.
The Air Force's Quicksink concept would allow the Navy's Super Hornet to deploy those 6 2,000 pound bombs like a torpedo and detonate under the hull of an enemy ship.
ReplyDeleteYou read this blog so use the lessons learned, here, to analyze that ridiculous claim and test.
DeleteWhat's rediculous about detonating a 2,000 pound bomb underneath a ship? This is how most modern torpedoes like the Mk 48 operate. The problem is getting close enough to your target.
Delete"The problem is getting close enough to your target."
DeleteTHAT'S what's ridiculous. To believe that an aircraft could approach a modern warship close enough to drop the bomb is ridiculous.
It's also highly questionable that modern, lightly built ships would be any more affected by an underwater explosion of a 2000 lb bomb than a direct hit where the weapon penetrates the ship and explodes.
It's hard to imagine any realistic scenario in which this would be decidedly beneficial.
"The problem is getting close enough to your target."
DeleteYou realize that the nominal listed max range (31 miles) for a Mk48 torpedo is significantly greater than for a JDAM?
The AFRL said the primary use case for the weapon is an inexpensive way to counter China’s large fleet of cutters that harass allied shipping, fishing boats, etc. without having to use laser guided bombs.
DeleteMaybe in the future it will have more utility if paired with the wings or the 400 km powered JDAM. You’d be better off dropping them from a C-130 with Rapid Dragon than an F-18, though.
"THAT'S what's ridiculous. To believe that an aircraft could approach a modern warship close enough to drop the bomb is ridiculous."
DeleteThere are more than just warships in the sea. There are tankers, cargo ships, tenders, and the like. Ships that are typically armed with short-range air defenses. And, this would be a cheaper way to knock out a warship that can't defend itself.
"use case for the weapon is an inexpensive way to counter China’s large fleet of cutters"
DeleteCome on, now. Don't make me do all the work! Analyze the idiocy of that use case.
"this would be a cheaper way to knock out a warship that can't defend itself."
DeleteA warship that can't defend itself IS ALREADY, BY DEFINITION, KNOCKED OUT!
"There are tankers, cargo ships, tenders, and the like."
Large commercial tankers and the like can't be knocked out by bombs any more than they can be by a mine or a torpedo. It would take many hits of whatever type. Smaller vessels can be sunk by any type of weapon and don't need some gimmicky bomb.
This is getting comical as well as ridiculous.
Think very hard before commenting again. There is a limit to the degree of nonsense I'll allow.
Gentlemen, Quickstrike is a MINE. You don't deploy mines directly against an active maneuvering target, you lay your minefield BEFORE the fighting started.
DeleteThe point of Quickstrike-ER is that it gives the Air Force an easier ability to lay minefields (because it just turns the whole mechanics of aerial minefield laying into a JDAM bombing mission, which is the bread and butter of the USAF bomber force), and lets you lay minefields faster at a further offset vs using a ship to do it, because bombers fly faster than ships sail.
More cynically, it's also a way for the Air Force to get more budget pile and shoehorn itself as a leading participant of the AirSea Battle fight against China.
BUt if the Air Force was REALLY serious about the AirSea fight, it really should be training harder for maritime strike - and yet the United States Air Force is the only air force in the world that does not train for maritime strike, having completely surrendered that mission to its competitor, the US Navy.
DeleteQUICKSINK is different than quickstrike.
DeleteAnalysis: Presumably any vulnerable allied shipping will operate with escorts capable of killing the cutters and the cutter ships will be in port or part of larger battlegroups as scouts or something similar?
During a war any vulnerable allied shipping would have escorts and the Chinese cutters would be in port or attached to larger squadrons of ships?
Delete"Quickstrike is a MINE"
DeleteWe're not talking about Quickstrike. We're talking about Quicksink. It's a completely different weapon. Do some research and get caught up.
China's cutters fall into two categories: the 12,000 ton super large Zhatou class cutters and the 1500 ton Jingdao class cutters, which are basically Type 056 corvettes without missiles. Having a larger weapon than just the 57mm guns of frigates could be helpful.
DeleteOn the other hand these ships are quite lacking in air defenses, so why can't we just drop normal laser guided bombs on them, instead of going through all the trouble to make Quicksink, a homing guided bomb?
"The table shows that a battleship has 2-3 times the throw weight of a carrier in a one hour period."
ReplyDeleteThat only applies to targets within range of a battleship's guns. Whereas, carrier aircraft can strike targets hundreds of miles away.
A rifle can only strike targets within range.
DeleteAn intercontinental ballistic missile can only strike targets within range.
A carrier can only strike targets within range.
Artillery can only strike targets within range.
EVERYTHING HAS A RANGE LIMIT.
What a stupid comment.
"should you not be comparing the “explosive throw weight”
ReplyDeleteI've deleted your comment since you obviously don't understand how explosive effects occur.
Hi CNO, if I've missed it in the archives I apologize, but I'm curious as to how you would address the targeting challenges posed by longer ranged weapons like lrasm or tomahawk. I certainly agree with your frequent observations about the Navy's apparent failure to address, but I 'm very curious about the solutions you would recommend. Would you mind expounding a bit?
ReplyDeleteI've covered targeting in numerous posts so please avail yourself of the archives for more information. That said, I'll offer a very brief summation.
DeleteThere are two types of targets: fixed and mobile. Fixed targets (bases, facilities, industries, ports, headquarters, etc.) don't need targeting, per se, as their locations are known. That leaves mobile targets. By definition, mobile targets (ships, tanks, infantry units, mobile missiles, etc.) are smaller which leads to the question: why do we need to target them at a thousand miles? Generally speaking, they aren't an immediate threat at that range. If we do want to target them, THERE ARE NO THOUSAND MILE SENSORS OR SENSOR PLATFORMS! That's the problem with developing thousand mile missiles that have no corresponding thousand mile sensors.
The 'thousand mile sensor' is, then, an amalgamation of various sensor assets: very long range passive, stealth UAVs of various sizes/ranges, submarines, satellites, stealth passive aircraft, etc.
As you can see, the common two most common sensor asset characteristics are stealth and passive.
The more you learn about the Iowa class, the more you realize the significance of the loss of them truly was. The crew requirements would be the biggest drawback in today's world. The hulls were bought and paid for, and tech updates would have made them all the more effective for minimal costs. Look at the money spent vs the capability of the Zumwalts compared to the ongoing modernization needs/costs of the Iowas and I think I know where the better value proposition is.
ReplyDelete" The crew requirements would be the biggest drawback in today's world."
DeleteNot as much as you think. The WWII crew was 2700 but a significant chunk of that was the labor intensive 20/40 mm guns and 5" guns. By Desert Storm, the crew had been reduced to 1800. With some judicious automation and automated 5" guns, I'd venture a guess of a modern crew size of around 1200?
For comparison, the crew of an America class LHA is 1060 and we don't hesitate to build those. A Nimitz class carrier has a crew of over 3500, not counting the air wing.
This was a fun thought exercise, and I take as an oblique way of arguing that the battleship should still be in service. To flush out the topic I think it would be helpful to note at least briefly why battleships were retired.
ReplyDeleteMy understanding is that the conclusion coming out of WWII was essentially that battleships didn't have a future in surface to surface warfare at sea. In any battleship vs carrier surface to surface engagement, the carrier wins due to range. Assuming roughly equivalent cost to produce (?), no one is going to choose a fleet with a battleship at its core when they can choose a fleet with a carrier at its core.
This leaves naval gunfire support as the sole mission where battleships excel. The Navy is run by people who sail on ships and think about warfare at sea, and this simply wasn't a high enough priority for them and so everyone pretended that there were alternate platform that could adequately execute NGFS.
You're exhibiting several misunderstandings.
Delete1. While someone might suggest bringing back an actual Iowa class battleship as a stopgap measure, a WWII battleship is NOT the answer; a MODERN equivalent is the answer and it would differ significantly from an Iowa. The differences would include a massive SAM component, modified armor arrangement, totally different secondary battery, a large UAV capability, a large cruise missile capability, etc.
2. Battleship missions go far beyond land bombardment. Other missions include anti-surface (when both sides are practicing EMCON, close range surprise encounters are likely), blockade (sinking merchant ships since we have no effective sinking capability), port/base destruction, anti-air, deep strike (cruise missiles), sustained heavy caliber bombardment, fantastic peacetime uses (if we have the will to use them), etc.
3. NO ONE but you has suggested "a fleet with a battleship at its core". A modern battleship is a supplement to overall fleet capabilities.
"This was a fun thought exercise"
DeleteNo, it was a serious examination of the SUSTAINED firepower of a battleship which dwarfs that of a carrier. It's up to us, as naval comanders, to figure out where/how/when that firepower would be useful and how to apply it. Given our constantly shrinking air wings and VLS firepower across the fleet, a battleship is going to look very good in the near future.