Total Information Dominance … and we killed innocents.
According to Gen. Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr., Head of the United States Central Command,
"We now assess that it is unlikely that the vehicle and those who died were associated with ISIS-K or a direct threat to US forces," McKenzie said of the airstrike at a briefing, following an investigation by the Military.
"This strike was taken in the earnest belief that it would prevent an imminent threat to our forces and the evacuees at the airport, but it was a mistake and I offer my sincere apology," Mckenzie said, adding that he is "fully responsible for this strike and this tragic outcome." (1)
Total information dominance and we can’t identify a legitimate target for a simple drone strike … but we’re basing our entire military future on exactly this kind of unreliable information warfare. This incident encapsulates everything wrong with the path the military is on.
This is the system we want to base our future military on? If we can’t get this right with total information dominance what chance do we have of beating China with ‘information’?
The administration was desperate for a public relations ‘victory’ in the Afghanistan debacle and murdered innocents trying to get it.
If McKenzie truly takes full responsibility, he should resign in disgrace and then be recalled to active duty to face a court-martial. Not because an innocent was killed in a war zone but because he went along with what he had to have known was a PR motivated, unjustified, rush to action.
This is reprehensible and disgusting.
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(1)Fox News website, “General says it is unlikely ISIS-K members killed in August Kabul drone strike: 'A tragic mistake'”, Kyle Morris, 17-Sep-2021,
Information is critical in wars since ancient time. You need to know where your enemies are, their supplies are, ... etc.
ReplyDeleteEven today, ASW is considered one of most difficult task of navies because it is hard to find and locate enemies' submarines. I heard people talking about in a drill, a captain could see a submarine's tip visually but sonar of his ship gave no information of the submarine. Not to mention, water temperature and salinity variations cause further problems.
Apparently, CIA and military intelligence have failed in Afghan.
"Information is critical in wars since ancient time."
DeleteInformation has been wrong in wars since ancient time.
No one, least of all me, is disputing the need for information (intel) in war. The problem is when you base your entire military on the foolish belief that your information will be unerringly correct … and that it can substitute for firepower.
Worse, firepower is no substitute for GOOD JUDGEMENT- something the US military lacks, as multiple "friendly fire" accidents demonstrate.
Delete"GOOD JUDGEMENT- something the US military lacks, as multiple "friendly fire" accidents demonstrate."
DeleteMany friendly fire incidents are just the confusion of combat rather than any lack of good judgement. Desert Storm is a good example of that.
Others are the result of scenario fulfillment - the person sees what the expect to see. The Vincennes incident and the 1994 Blackhawk no-fly shootdown incident were examples of that.
Relatively few friendly fire incidents are bad judgement, per se.
You don't consider seeing what one expects to see, to be examples of poor judgment?
DeleteNo, not at all. Judgement, by definition, means making a choice that is, to some degree, debatable. Scenario fulfillment, by definition, is seeing something that you expect to see and which seems absolutely true even though it is not. Thus, the person acts 'correctly' based on what they believe they see. There is no debate or judgement involved because they don't see any alternative data that suggest another course of action.
DeleteFor example, the Vincennes crew acted perfectly correctly based on what they 'saw'. The fact that what the believed they were seeing was incorrect was not a matter of judgement, it was an altered reality caused by mental stress or conditioning (they expected to see an attack so they 'saw' an attack). Their judgement wasn't wrong, their reality was. For what they believed was real, their judgement was correct and, in fact, was the only choice they could have made - no judgement was involved - just trained response.
In contrast, this drone murder was a classic example of poor judgement. There were multiple courses of action based on data that was highly debatable and clearly seen as such by the decision makers. They knew there were various possibilities that could explain what they were seeing and they made a choice with full knowledge and understanding that they might be right or they might be wrong. They made a considered choice - a judgement.
DeleteWow, first time I heard about this:
ReplyDeletehttps://newlinesmag.com/reportage/the-drone-unit-that-helped-the-taliban-win-the-war/
I think the scary part is how fast and how nimble even "third" or even "fourth" world adversaries can aquire and use quite sophisticated systems. Or make a cheap, unsophisticated copy to use while US spends billions developing a billion dollar all singing dancing version....
Those at the upper tiers of the military payscale are not subject to the same consequences or standards as those they oversee. I had to deny or disapprove of quite a few indirect fire missions (mortars or artillery) because they violated the rules/criteria that were given to us from basically CENTCOM in conjunction with President Karzai (Afghani President in 2009-2010 when I was there) wishes. Even when the M982 Excalibur GPS guided 155MM artillery round was developed and fielded to reduce collateral damage dramatically. When it was initially fielded about a decade or so ago, at max range at the time of 40Km, it had a 10 meter Circular Error Probability (CEP). Basically it would land no further away from the target than 10 meters. This allowed for a much smaller warhead to accomplish a more precise strike.
ReplyDeleteSorry, I went off the main path. At my level E-5/E-6 my ass would be court-martialed and imprisoned for causing collateral damage, specifically for the deaths of civilians whether intentional or not. There were a few Company Commanders and Platoon leaders who left me off their Christmas Card list because I had to disapprove indirect fire missions in the interest of not causing collateral damage to property or civilian casualties. At the time, we could not approve any fire missions that did not meet the minimum 500 meters distance from a civilian area.
These very rules, laws, regulations do not really apply to the extreme higher ups. They get a slap on the wrist where as in my paygrade section of the rank structure, we would get hemmed up in a heartbeat. I know when I had to employ indirect fires, I would hit up our intel folks for the most current intel about the AO (Area of Operations, not the Red Shirts), had the most current imaging, extra and most of all, we always had eyes (Mark I Eyeballs) on the target/object.
PID (Positive Identification) of a target had to be confirmed before any action was taken. In some instances, if a platoon was engaged in a TIC(Troops in Contact) with the enemy, you toss out the rulebook to save friendlies first. In that instance, I would accept the consequences for my actions that saved lives. That does not apply to those in command (at least in the Army((Reason number 1357 why I should have stayed in Navy, another story for another time).
My apologies again for veering way off course but that incident should never have happened if everyone involved did their jobs and did them correctly.
Thank you for sharing your experiences. Have you had the opportunity to direct naval fire support and/or do you have any thoughts about naval fire support you'd care to share?
DeleteSure thing. Naval Gun Fire (NGF) is a thing of the past, sadly. It was never discussed in AIT. I think it got kicked to the side when the Iowa-class BB's were retired for the final time. There was hope of it returning I thought with the development of the AGS for the Zumwalts and well that traveled less then the Spruce Goose. The current 5-inch/62.cal(?) is not going to give the grunts on the ground a warm and fuzzy much like the 57mm Mk110 on the LCS and NSC is going to elevate the confidence of a skipper going at it with PLAN surface combatant.
DeleteAs far as CAS (Close Air Support) missions originating from a CVN, your going to be disappointed. The F-35 Alphabet JSF is no A-4, A-7 or A-6. Somehow I do not think they are really going to use an F-35 to make a gun run in the manner that the Warthog still excels at. F-35 and even the F/A-18 cannot even close to being able to survive in a CAS mission profile.
Getting back to NGF after the brief digression, the USMC ANLICOs(Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company). They are Marine Corps equivalent to the US Army 13F (Forward Observers). I think they might touch on it in their initial training.
As much as I hate to say it, you have to have the old, reliable Mark I eyeballs on target. In a real world conflict, the average life expectancy of a Forward Observer, is roughly 30 seconds which is enough time to send off a basic Polar Fire Mission and then disappear.
During my Afghanistan deployment from 2009-2010, I had the opportunity to utilize both the Predator and Reaper UAVs to conduct operations. They were used to keep eyes on an objective as well as provide overwatch.
Blue on Blue, friendly fire incidents are handled much differently based on the paygrade(s) of those involved. General Milley or whoever authorized it, might get a slap on the wrist. Down at my level (E5-E6) or O1-O3, you will get hemmed up in a most unpleasant manner.
A rule we had and held ourselves to it was having PID (Positive Identification) of your target/objective. The further you are from the situation, the further you are from offering any constructive guidance.
I went off script again.... NGF should be brought back into the tool box of the grunt on the ground, especially with the Marines going back to island hopping.
This brings into question who we droned in the first attack. It was supposed to have been an ISIS-K planner, but no names or details were given.
ReplyDeleteWe had an XO on a sweep who had been a gun boss of a DD doing fire support off Vietnam. One Sunday morning they get a call for fire from a forward observer. He checks his coordinates and it's a church. They call the FO back and say no can do, check your coordinates. The FO replies, no it's a cave and the VC have them pinned down with fire from there and are ripping them to shreds, they need fire support immediately. CO considers everything and orders them to fire. They put two 5 inch 38 rounds into the middle of Sunday mass. The LT was a Mustang with two years left to retire. He requested non-combatant duty and got XO of a sweep. His CO on the sweep was Will Rogers, of Ticonderoga infamy. I have always wondered about the irony of that.
ReplyDelete