Monday, February 10, 2025

MEU/ARG Issues

With the demise of informative DOT&E annual reports, we are left having to scratch around for breadcrumbs of information about the state of our military.  One such crumb is a Breaking Defense website article, undoubtedly intended as a praise-packed, puff piece, about the 2024 deployment of the 15th MEU.  On the face of it, the deployment was a non-stop cascade of puppy dogs and kittens sliding down double rainbows and landing in pots of gold.  However, a careful reading between the lines reveals some surprising systemic problems that degraded the unit’s readiness and combat capability.  Let’s look closer.
 
Starting in January and spanning through most of 2024, the 15th MEU and Amphibious Squadron-5 completed nine major exercises; visited 11 foreign countries; responded to a typhoon that hit the Philippines; and completed 80 operations over the course of 10 months.

As an aside, why are we still doing 10 month deployments?  Does anyone remember the Navy’s Optimized Fleet Response Plan (OFRP - 2014) of several years past that was going to optimize the deployment/training/maintenance cycle to ensure readiness and prevent extended deployments?  Yeah, that lasted about a day (see, “Deployments and OFRP”).
 
The deployment did not get off to a good start, losing one of its three amphibious ships, USS Boxer, almost immediately.
 
Just days after it initially deployed in April, the Boxer (LHD-4) was forced back to San Diego to fix a variety of maintenance issues.[1]

Even later in the deployment when Boxer eventually rejoined the ARG, ship maintenance issues continued.
 
But he [Capt. James Robinson, ARG commodore] did concede there was at least one “OAI” — an acronym short for “operations, activities and investments” — that was missed due to the ship’s maintenance problems.[1]

Ships were not the only equipment failures.  The ACV proved challenging, as well.
 
… MEU deployed with 12 ACVs in tow, and, he said, “it’s almost underwhelming to say that we learned a lot.”
There were challenges in understanding how to maintain the vehicles while deployed and concerns about corrosion prevention.[1]

This suggests that the Marine’s training with the ACV was significantly inadequate despite a decade or more of use and supposed thorough testing.  Corrosion prevention?  Seriously?  Aren’t these things designed to be immersed in salt water and be exposed to a salt-air environment for months on end?  How could corrosion possibly still be a problem and an unexpected problem, at that?
 
ACV - No one thought it would get wet or warm?


Another disturbing note was this,
 
The MEU also had to coordinate sending beach survey teams ahead of the ACVs to check that conditions were safe.[1]

The ACV is supposed to be able to handle less than perfect weather and physical conditions.  If not, if it can only be used in perfect conditions and hospitable locations then we have a nearly useless piece of equipment.  Combine this note with the history of ACV accidents and one can’t help but conclude that the vehicle is far less safe and effective than advertised.
 
At one point, even the water temperatures were cause for a concern. Dynan [Col. Sean Dynan, 15th MEU commanding officer] recalled that the waters in the Philippines were particularly hot, and there were questions about whether the vehicle’s cooling systems would cope.
 
“That was somewhat of a surprise,” he added.[1]

After all this time, water temperature effects were a surprise?  Really?  No one thought to test the vehicle in warm water?  The ACV’s first RFI dates back to 2011 and in the intervening 13 years no one thought to test the vehicle in warm water despite knowing that the Pacific would be a major area of employment?  What kind of geniuses were working on this program?
 
The ACV was not the only piece of equipment to experience challenges.
 
The MEU’s training and deployment also coincided with the Pentagon’s three-month-long grounding of the V-22 Osprey fleet, including the Marine Corps’ MV-22 variant.
 
… restrictions and intermittent V-22 Osprey groundings …
 
Due to where the MEU was operating, Dynan said the restrictions the Pentagon left in place after the Osprey fleets returned to flight didn’t affect operations. But the missed training time did mean that his flight crews had to work fast to regain qualifications and proficiency once the grounding was lifted in April.[1]

The MV-22 continues to be a problematic piece of equipment, useful only in very specific and restricted scenarios.  In any truly objective assessment, the MV-22 would have to be declared a very marginal success or an outright failure.
 
 
Discussion
 
As noted, we have no hard data to work with and must, instead, attempt to read between the lines and look for patterns.  Doing so reveals that the MEU/AGR have serious equipment and maintenance problems and that testing and training has been woefully inadequate.  This is true for both the Navy and Marines.  I suppose it’s good that the Marines have declared themselves out of the amphibious assault business (so why are they floating around on endless deployments?) because they seem to utterly lack the ability to execute a successful assault.
 
 
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[1]Breaking Defense website, “One deployment, three ships and a whole lot of challenges”, Justin Katz, 5-Feb-2025,
https://breakingdefense.com/2025/02/one-deployment-three-ships-and-a-whole-lot-of-challenges/

45 comments:

  1. Some kind of decision needs to be made on the future of the Corps. We don't need two standing armies. Either downsize to something akin to the Royal Marines for special amphib type missions, or give the whole ground component to the Army to use as marine combat teams for amphib ops (including river crossings) and give the air component to the Navy. Repurpose ships in the amphib fleet that you can and place the rest in reserve status. Just way to much money going out for a service that just does not bring much to the table anymore. The coming budget crunch that's coming for the federal govt. as well as the country as a whole will probably trigger some kind of decision on the Corps. path going forward.

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    1. "Either downsize to something akin to the Royal Marines for special amphib type missions"

      It appears we are well on this path already. The Marines are definitely out of the major, contested, assault from-the-sea business. They are more like a niche infantry force with special equipment. But even this role is limited when neither your special equipment nor your transport is reliable.

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    2. Agree... its time to either rebuild and reshape to have a viable waterborne force, or do away with it. It's sad that 30-ish ships make or break the Navy, but that's a lot of hulls to build, maintain, and crew. That money could be better used elsewhere.

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    3. "They are more like a niche infantry force with special equipment."

      What special equipment do they have?

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    4. "The coming budget crunch"

      Without delving into politics too deeply, what budget crunch is coming? I see the current administration attempting to eliminate waste and fraud but that's not a budget crunch. I've heard nothing to indicate that spending on military programs that are actually combat useful will be 'crunched'.

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    5. Military budget may be cut by as much as half. Trump presser this morning (2/14). No matter the final cut figures, it's going to be cut, the country is broke. And maybe its a good thing, we can finally root out all the corruption and wasted money. We may actually get more bang for the lesser buck in the end?

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    6. "Military budget may be cut by as much as half."

      I have seen no details on what would be cut. If the cuts are all from the DEI and other useless things then, yes, they are cuts but not cuts to anything that matters. I'll wait to see some kind of itemized list of cuts.

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  2. "...the MV-22 would have to be declared a very marginal success or an outright failure."

    But it looks so cool and futuristic and stuff...

    Lutefisk

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  3. The MEU cannot be a force in readiness if the ships are not ready and equipment cannot make the journey. F35s issues were not mentioned but probably occurred. Time to turn MEUs into regionally located forward deployed land based battalions like SPMAGTF CR in hotspots such as the Philippines, the Mediterranean and the Bahrain. Use LPDs to shuttle the ACVs around the theater while air is based at an airfield near the GCE basing. This plan does not require any additional amphibs to maintain a crisis response force.

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    1. "Time to turn MEUs into regionally located forward deployed land based battalions"

      Of course, making them land based also restricts them to the exact spot they're on. They can't move even to a nearby location. Can we predict with that kind of accuracy where the next crisis will erupt? History suggests not.

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    2. I'm ok with that concept with the caveat that, yes, you will still need ships of some sort (current amphib types, or otherwise) to move them around regionally. The 31st MEU has been forward deployed to Okinawa forever. Is that the type of thing being suggested here? If so, I'm ok with expanding that concept.

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    3. "will still need ships of some sort (current amphib types, or otherwise) to move them around regionally."

      So, you're still going to maintain a large amphibious fleet but just not have any troops on them? What have you gained?

      Are you aware of the Army/Air Force rapid response forces? They can put troops on the ground anywhere in the world in a day. Seems a much better approach to crisis response.

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    4. To be clear where I might not have been: the amphibs would have the associated troops (MEU) colocated or nearby. Like Sasebo (vessels) and Okinawa (troops); even closer if possible.

      Frankly, I am not aware of the capabilities of the Army/AF RRFs. But, I assume if they can get anywhere in a day, it's via fixed-wing aircraft (C-17?), which require some sort of runway and a secure one at that. An embarked MEU does not need that capability, so potentially allows us to place troops where we otherwise could not - at least until an airfield is available.

      I'm not arguing one is better than another but having some flexibility in terms of how you can get a few thousand troops on the ground somewhere is a concept I completely endorse.

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    5. " the amphibs would have the associated troops (MEU) colocated or nearby."

      Then what's the point of having the troops on land? You have to man and maintain the ships anyway so there's no cost savings. Having to load the troops and equipment when they're needed would just add further delay.

      I'm missing the point of the concept.

      "fixed-wing aircraft (C-17?), which require some sort of runway and a secure one at that."

      Any unimproved stretch of level ground would suffice. They can also jump the troops and air-drop equipment.

      Beyond that, there is almost always a suitable stretch of land somewhere near the operating area.

      Unless an enemy attacks a land based MEU head on, the Army/AF can get anywhere much faster than a MEU/ARG.

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    6. I like the idea of more forward deployed MEUs. We have 7 total, 6 in CONUS (3 on each coast). The 6 in CONUS are not close to anywhere they might be needed. Let's station some around the globe; this will also cut down on needless. lengthy transit time from the US, with the corresponding wear on the ships.

      Where? In addition to Japan, I'd permanently station an MEU and ARG (LHA/LHD + 3 LPDs) in places like:
      - Naples
      - Bahrain
      - Singapore. Alternately, Manila (if they will have us)

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    7. RRFs are very limited and basically only bring infantry to the fight with less than a week of sustainment. MEUs also bring artillery, HIMARS, aircraft and 15 to 30 days of sustainment.
      The reason to have the MEU forward deployed is to have it in the theater it will be used so you don’t take 15 to 30 days to transit to the crisis. Being forward deployed with land based air allows us to cut the LHA / LHD because the two LPDs are able to transport the battalion without its air component.
      Marines need to find a way to be cheap and effective or face elimination as a service.

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    8. "RRFs are very limited and basically only bring infantry to the fight with less than a week of sustainment."

      This is the epitome of a specious argument and it is clear you did not do your homework nor make any attempt to present an objective assessment.

      1. A rapid response force, BY DEFINITION, is just the INITIAL force, meant to provide a quick reaction. It is not, then, left to flounder on its own. Reinforcements and supplies are quickly provided as follow on elements, as needed.

      2. A MEU, barring an enemy attacking them directly, needs several days/weeks to assemble before they can respond. Being in a given region (if we happen to guess lucky) shortens the response time but it is still several days. You'll recall that MEU operating doctrine, today, is to disaggregate upon arrival in theater. It requires days to reaggregate and then proceed to the crisis location. In the meantime, the crisis enemy has had days to wreak whatever havoc its objective is.

      3. You seem to forget that maritime pre-positioning ships exist for the purpose of sustaining forces that have been quickly deployed.

      4. An Army/AF rapid response force, almost by definition, will have an airfield of some sort nearby (even if only an unimproved dirt field) which allows rapid and continual reinforcement and resupply of the INITIAL force.

      5. I have attempted, and thus far failed, to document the composition of current MEUs. I suspect that they no longer deploy with artillery or HIMARS. Perhaps you know of documentation indicating one way or the other?

      6. Depending on the location and requirements, the AF can supply the aviation component for a rapid response force including stealth fighters and bombers, in quantities that dwarf the six or so F-35Bs typically embarked on an LHA.

      7. There was a time when the MEU did, indeed, offer a middleweight force for crisis response. However, those days are gone. The Marines have dropped tanks, much of their artillery, heavy mortars, etc. They are the very light infantry that you decry!

      I trust that you next comment, should you choose to comment, will be much better researched, balanced, objective, and analytical.

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  4. They need to buy type-05 from China

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    1. Do you have any information indicating that the Chinese 05 family actually works, is effective, is reliable, and is easily maintained? It's easy to get caught up in thinking all our equipment has problems and everyone else's equipment is perfect but this is absolutely not the case. I guarantee that China's equipment has problems but we just don't hear about them.

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    2. Type 05 has been using for 20 years and many variants have been developed to meet different marine needs. It is famous on its speed over water. Its weakness, like almost all armored vehicles today - anti tank missiles.

      https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_05_amphibious_fighting_vehicle

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    3. The Type 05 family has a water speed of 12-15 kts which is nice, I suppose, but hardly a game changer. That speed means nothing to rockets, artillery, mortars, and missiles. The US cancelled the EFV which had a claimed speed of around 24 kts so, clearly, speed isn't all that important.

      There is no information that I'm aware of regarding reliability, effectiveness, and maintainability.

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    4. Pentagon cancelled EFV due to R&D failure, not they thought speed was not important. Its high power diesel engine had heaps of problems.

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  5. I know I'm repeating myself (for which I apologise) , but from the outside it looks obvious to me. They need a plan to transform into a port seizure and port defence force. Clive F

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    1. When you say 'port defense', I assume you're referring to forward bases as opposed to defending, say, New York City port?

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    2. Yes, either one the US already uses or a friendly port to stop the Chinese taking it. Or once it has been taken stop it being lost again. Defence and attack have different skills / abilities required. It would also include operating a port in a war zone, anti air, stopping it getting blocked etc.

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    3. It's certainly more viable than what they're trying now. Restructure different divisions or battalions to focus on offense or defense, and reorient around local air defense, expanded (re)construction capabilities, logistics harvesting, traffic control, whatever. Even this is a more legit reason for the Corps' continued existence than EABO...

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    4. "It's certainly more viable than what they're trying now."

      Given the history of WWII port/base/island defense which was almost a 100% failure for both the US and the Japanese (every island we defended, we lost; every island the Japanese defended, they lost), how would you reconcile that with your proposal? What would you do differently that would tip the odds towards success?

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    5. I think the real reason the islands were lost is because their defense wasn't jointly fought. It's not so much the defenders quality or numbers, its whether or not theyre alone in the fight. Generally speaking, every island swap in the Pacific happened after local naval forces were sunk or chased away. So part of, or all of defending an island is winning the Naval battle beforehand, or at least fighting it to a draw. The Marines would have the task of local air/ground defense and the Navy, even AF, would have the job of ensuring an invasion never takes place. Worst case is if the Marines ever have to defend somthing...

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    6. So, I guess my answer would be- give the Marines whatever is needed for a strong, fairly short term island defense, but ensure that the Navy never leaves the Marines to have to do it.
      If we suffer a Naval defeat, they should be able to maintain a defense long enough, hopefully, for the cavalry to come...

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    7. I didn't really address offense because, as you said...defenses always fail. So we'd have to get our doctrine and connectors debacle fixed, but think the Marines would manage the offense decently. It's the defensive role that's iffy.
      .

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    8. "real reason the islands were lost is because their defense wasn't jointly fought."

      Every island was "jointly fought' by both sides and yet every island was lost by both sides. The reason the islands were lost is because the attacker, in every case, was able to mass superior localized forces and choose the time and conditions of attack. It's simply the nature of an island. By definition, it's isolated from land resupply and contested air/sea simply can't resupply in sufficient quantities. Honestly, though, resupply was not that much of an issue. Most islands were lost fairly quickly before resupply could become a major issue.

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    9. "ensure that the Navy never leaves the Marines to have to do it."

      As the US found out (and later, the Japanese), there is not enough Navy to defend every forward base and island.

      "long enough, hopefully, for the cavalry to come..."

      Got a chuckle out of this. If the Navy loses a major battle, what cavalry do you see coming? We have a very small Navy to begin with and we can't produce new ships in any useful time frame or even repair damaged ships. Where's this cavalry?

      You're missing a key concept which is that you don't defend every individual base and island. You establish and defend a forward line of battle defined by just a few bases/islands. The rest are relegated to the 'undefended' rear area. This is how we advanced across the Pacific and this is what the Japanese failed to do.

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    10. "I didn't really address offense because, as you said...defenses always fail. So we'd have to get our doctrine and connectors debacle fixed, but think the Marines would manage the offense decently. It's the defensive role that's iffy."

      I assume you're referring to port seizure / port defense. You're missing a key concept. You don't seize (or defend) a port in isolation. In other words, you don't just sit on a port and see how long you can defend it against unending enemy attacks. A port is means to an end. It's a step along a greater path/objective. For example, we attacked Normandy to seize the associated ports SO THAT WE COULD SUPPLY THE ASSAULT ACROSS EUROPE.

      Any port we seize (or want to defend) has to be a step along a larger path. That being the case, you don't just sit on the defensive, you move along the offensive. Typically, a port would mean large scale resupply in support of further cross-country assault. Thus, the defense of the port is largely accomplished by pushing the offense out and away from the port. The enemy is so occupied with the expanding front that attacking the port becomes a lesser priority. Thus, the best defense is a good offense. I think I did a post on that!

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    11. I hadn't really expanded my thoughts fully enough, but, you're right. I commented, with my thoughts focused similarly to the WWII pacific, and how it happened. So, in a modern WestPac fight, the defense would be first, concerning possibly Guam (and possiblyothers, like in the Marshalls, Phillipines, Tinian, etc), or other islands, looking for those naval victories, and then turning to the offensive, and moving closer to ultimately what I would assume would be a Taiwan support or reclamation(??)

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    12. "I hadn't really expanded my thoughts fully enough"
      "the defense would be first, ... then turning to the offensive"

      Do you see the problem with this view and with the defense of Guam, in particular? In WWII, we lost all our forward bases and began our counter-Pacific march at "zero". As we gained each new island, we moved on to the next and the previous island became a backwater support island that didn't need defending. Each new island WAS the front line, briefly, SEIZED AS PART OF THE OVERALL OFFENSIVE AND WITH OUR ENTIRE FORCE SURROUNDING AND SUPPORTING IT.

      In contrast, Guam is not part of any offensive movement and is, truly, an isolated forward base without the entire might of our forces supporting it. It really is an isolated island that needs to be defended and history suggests that's nearly impossible to do successfully.

      That's the problem/challenge with Guam. It's made worse by the fact that we're doing almost nothing to build any serious defense for it. As things stand currently, the best we can hope is to lose the function of the base but retain possession because the Chinese have other, higher priority tasks. The worst (and more likely) is that we lose the base completely because we're not serious about defending it.

      You can make a very good argument that once war starts, Guam will be the equivalent of Wake and fall quickly.

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  6. AAV's replacement needed to be another tracked vehicle.

    Trump should buy the UK's 2 carriers to help with amphib ship problems.

    Force Design 2030 needs scrapping. The 'traditional' ARG was a real asset. The next war will be fought in the Southern Hemisphere. Lots of austere landing sites and islands.

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    1. " help with amphib ship problems."

      What amphib ship problems do we have? I've often stated that there is no REASONABLY foreseeable need for amphibious assault given the strategic realities and that we should REDUCE our amphib fleet from 30+ to around 6. That being the case, I see no need for UK carriers as amphibs.

      "The next war will be fought in the Southern Hemisphere"

      Where and by whom?

      "Lots of austere landing sites and islands."

      Those wouldn't be opposed assaults; they'd be unopposed, administrative unloadings which do not require large amphibious ships.

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    2. "AAV's replacement needed to be another tracked vehicle."

      I'm not a land combat expert so I can't knowledgably talk about the wheeled versus tracked debate but it sure did seem at the time that the military got caught up in the wheeled excitement not because of any demonstrated superiority by wheeled vehicles but because it was 'new' tech and 'transformational'.

      The wheeled versus tracked debate also depends, as almost everything does, on the Concept of Operations (CONOPS). How you intend to use the vehicle will likely determine the best choice of wheels versus tracked. Unfortunately, the Marines have no AAV/ACV CONOPS. The ACV was built for water landings and yet the Marines say they won't be conducting amphibious assaults. So, what is the purpose/role of the AAV/ACV? It's a certainty that we would have designed a radically different vehicle if we had started with the premise that the AAV/ACV would NOT be required to do water landings. No CONOPS equals a poor design ... every time - just ask the Navy.

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    3. UK's two carriers have heaps of problems. Certainly, it is not wise to buy lemons.

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    4. The benefit of a tracked troop carrier is that it can accompany tabks cross country. Since the Marines have divested themselves of their tanks, and the kinds of beaches we would seize do not have terrain impassible to wheels (andnin many cases will be close to road betworks), wheeled APCs are not that much of an issue.

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    5. American class is far better and much more cost effective than the two British lemons. They cannot even get their power system right so frequently, deployments aborted.

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  7. Have you read 'Lighting the Way: Marines, Missiles, MPF Boats, and the Path through PRC Defenses in the Western Pacific' www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2025/february/lighting-way-marines-missiles-mpf-boats-and-path-through-prc archive.is/B2TRP a USMC lieutenant colonel's proposal to arm speedboats with Javelin antitank missiles, to fight Chinese Navy, Coast Guard, and Maritime Militia ships in the South China Sea? I thought the idea was stupid, as the boats he proposed using are small, and thus, short-ranged and require frequent refueling and resupply; and that the proposal doesn't mention any plans to provide the speedboats with air defense. But you may have ideas to somehow make it work- or better explanations for why it would never work.

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    1. PT boats also had limited range, no air defense, and the need for frequent resupply. We figured it out back in WW2. If we wanted to now, we’ve a model to look at.

      But I have a hard time seeing these little guys as anything more than an irritant, even if we could make this work. We would need to know much better where they fit into our larger OOB and plans against the PRC. Until we do, this wouldn’t seem to be a good use of time or money.

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    2. "Have you read 'Lighting the Way: Marines, Missiles, MPF Boats, and the Path through PRC Defenses in the Western Pacific'"

      I read about half and then gave up. The author is both ignorant and delusional. Worse, he can't seem to decide whether he's discussing peacetime 'gray' confrontations where rules, laws, and politics reign or war where there are no constraints. It's not even worth analyzing further. It's typical of the garbage being vomited forth by our supposed professional warriors today.

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  8. The ACV was a USMC punt, post EFV program. I believe the ACV was originally designed for the MPC program. When the EFV was canceled, the MPC (Rebranded as ACV) became the prime sea mover to replace the legacy AAV. I seem to remember the Marines stating that the ACV 2.0 version will potentially achieve the speed envisioned by the EFV. The USMC needs a highspeed sea connector (which the ACV isn't). Without such a connector the whole amphibious fleet is pointless.

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