Saturday, January 29, 2022

Ford Reliability

The nearly worthless DOT&E annual report has been released and one of the very few sets of actual data is for the Ford EMALS, AAG, and elevator systems.  Let’s take a look at the data.

 

Note: Reference is made in the quotes to ‘ISE’ which is an abbreviation for Independent Steaming Event which is part of a series of at sea, post-delivery tests and trials.  It’s basically one of a sequence of test periods at sea.  The number indicates which test/event it is in the sequence.  So, for example, ISE 12 would be the twelfth at sea test period.

 

 

EMALS

 

DOT&E reports this data for the Ford EMALS,

 

During the 8,157 catapult launches conducted through ISE 18, EMALS achieved a reliability of 272 mean cycles between operational mission failures (MCBOMF), where a cycle is the launch of one aircraft.  This reliability is well below the requirement of 4,166 MCBOMF. [1, p.144]

 

Compare this to the preceding year’s report,

 

During the 3,975 catapult launches conducted post PSA through ISE 11, EMALS demonstrated an achieved reliability of 181 mean cycles between operational mission failure (MCBOMF), where a cycle is the launch of one [2, p.137]

 

What is not clear is whether the phrase ‘through ISE 18’ refers to the total since the beginning of the program up through ISE 18 or whether it refers to the incremental change since the last DOT&E report (2020) which was ISE 11.  If it refers to the cumulative lifetime total then the results are skewed by the initial higher failure rate.  If it refers to the incremental number since the previous report then we can get a good feel for the current performance.

 

My interpretation is that the numbers are cumulative.  This means we can, therefore, take the difference between the current (2021) figure of 8,157 launches and the 2020 figure of 3,975 launches, do some simple arithmetic and get the performance for the last year (ISE 13 through ISE 18) which, presumably, should show substantial improvement over the initial performance and give us a good look at the current status.

 

Simple arithmetic gives us the actual number of failures and allows us to assemble the following table of data.[3]  Calculated data is indicated as such.  Remaining data is from the DOT&E report.

 

 

Launches

Failures

Actual MCBOMF

Required MCBOMF

8,157 (through ISE 18)

30 (calculated)

272

4,166

3,975 (through ISE 11)

22 (calculated)

181

4,166

4,182 (calculated - 2021)

8 (calculated)

522 (calculated)

4,166

 

 

We see, then, that the performance for last year (2021) showed substantial improvement from the initial failure rate of 181 to 522, however, it is still woefully short of the required 4,166.

 

Okay, it’s still very bad but if it keeps getting better we’ll be okay, right?

 

Unfortunately, no.  As with any developmental effort, progress and improvement is rapid in the initial stages and then slows quickly as the easy improvements are made and progress becomes increasingly more difficult.  Even if progress were to continue in a linear fashion at the current rate – say, improving from 181 to 522 each year – it would take just over 12 years to get from a failure rate of 522 to 4,166 … but, as I just explained,  that’s not how it works.  Barring a developmental breakthrough, I just don’t see EMALS ever being able to meet the failure rate (MCBOMF) or even come close.

 

 

Advanced Arresting Gear

 

For the AAG system, the current DOT&E report gives,

 

During 8,157 recoveries, AAG achieved a reliability of 41 MCBOMF, where a cycle is the recovery of a single aircraft. This reliability estimate falls well below the requirement of 16,500 MCBOMF. [1, p.144]

 

And, from the previous year’s DOT&E report,

 

Through the first 3,975 recoveries, AAG demonstrated an achieved reliability of 48 MCBOMF, where a cycle is the recovery of a single aircraft. This reliability estimate falls

well below the requirement of 16,500 MCBOMF. [2, p.137]

 

Treating the data as was done for EMALS,

 

 

Traps

Failures

Actual MCBOMF

Required MCBOMF

8,157 (through ISE 18)

199 (calculated)

41

16,500

3,975 (through ISE 11)

83 (calculated)

48

16,500

4,182 (calculated - 2021)

116 (calculated)

36 (calculated)

16,500

 

 

The data shows that we can only recover around 40 aircraft before experiencing an operational failure.  So, if we were to launch a full air wing strike, only half the aircraft could recover!

 

There are two things that are absolutely stunning about this data:

 

1.     The failure rate has barely changed from the initial data.  For practical purposes, there has been no improvement from the start until now!  In fact, the previous year’s failure rate is actually slightly worse than the initial rates!

2.     The difference between the actual MCBOMF of around 40 and the requirement of 16,500 is staggering.  No amount of further development is going to eliminate that gap and, as with EMALS, the easy improvements have already taken place and progress from now on will be slower.  Yikes!

 

 

Elevators

 

For the Advanced Weapons Elevators (AWE), we have only one set of data.  From the DOT&E report,

 

Therefore, only preliminary reliability estimates are available to compare to the requirement of 932 hours between operational mission failure. Through the first 14,842 elevator cycles, 68 operational mission failures were reported. [1, p.145]

 

Again, simple arithmetic gives us the following:

 

cycles = 14,842

failures = 68

failure rate = 218 versus that target of 932

 

While this tells us that the performance is still well short of the requirement, it is at least numerically conceivable that the gap can be closed with further development.  On the other hand, with the amount of effort and man-hours that have already gone into this, it is hard to imagine that there is much more improvement left to be had.

 

 

Summary/Conclusion

 

The basic function of a carrier is to arm planes (weapon elevators), launch planes (EMALS), and recover planes (AAG).  The Ford is currently unable to perform those basic functions at anywhere near the required level of reliability which means the Ford is unable to perform its basic function.

 

How do we get from where we are to the requirement?  Disturbingly, for the reasons discussed, it likely can’t be done.  We’re well into the diminishing returns portion of the development curve.  In other words, we’re entering the flatter portion of the development curve and improvements will be fewer and less impactful. 

 

So, what’s the alternative?  What can be done?  Well, we could rip out the systems and install something proven like the Nimitz systems but that’s almost prohibitively expensive and difficult since the Fords are not designed for those systems.  Instead, I’m going to predict that the Navy will do what they always do when they can’t meet a specification … change the requirement!  I predict the Navy will accept the current performance and simply change the specification.  And just like that, they’ve met the spec!

 

As bad as all this is, the really scary part is that we’re in the process of building three more identical carriers with, presumably, the same problems.  We are building an entire class of carriers that can’t perform their basic function.

 

The only slight hope is that the engineers have learned from the Ford and significantly modified the equipment for the subsequent carriers so that they will be able to perform their basic function.  Unfortunately, this is yet another example of concurrent construction.  We’re building multiple ships before the first one is complete and working properly so the EMALS, AAG, and AWE for the subsequent carriers were ordered long ago, before there was time for the development feedback loop to function and, therefore, the equipment is almost certainly identical, for all practical purposes.  Same equipment … same problems.

 

Of course, given DOT&E’s new practice of concealing almost all data, it’s likely that we’ll never see any data for the other carriers so we’ll have only the Navy’s official statements to inform us … and those will be glowing, without a doubt, as the Navy’s official pronouncements about the Ford have been.  In fact, I’m quite surprised that DOT&E exposed even this data.

 

On the plus side, China has committed to EMALS for their carriers so they’ll likely have the same problems!


 

 

_________________________________

 

[1]Director, Operational Test & Evaluation, 2021 Annual Report, Jan 2022

 

[2]Director, Operational Test & Evaluation, 2020 Annual Report, Jan 2021

 

[3] Launches / failure rate = number of failures

8,157 / 272  = 30 fails

3,975 / 181  = 22 fails

 

Taking the difference between those two data sets

4,182 / 522  = 8 fails


64 comments:

  1. Any idea how many of the EMALS failures are the kind that allow you to shut down one catapult and keep using the other 3, as opposed to having to shut down all 4?

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. No. The impression I get is that there aren't any such problems. A fail on one means shutting them all down. I suppose there could be some sort of non-electrical failure that might be repaired without a total shutdown but the system is an electrical system so I've got to believe that the vast (near all?) majority of problems are electrical in one way or another.

      Delete
    2. I remember when the previous President toured the ship, he asked/demanded of the Navy brass to know how long it would take to rip those catapults out and put steam ones in.

      He was kind of ridiculed for that, but it seems like it is still a legitimate question.

      Lutefisk

      Delete
    3. My two cents? If EMALS is still not EMCON-compatible, go back to steam.

      Delete
    4. "If EMALS is still not EMCON-compatible"

      Targeting beacon.

      Lutefisk

      Delete
  2. And the Navy keeps on paying for and accepting this kind of crappy design solutions. Where were the experts when the PDR, CDR, etc., were being held. Oh that's right I have been at those meetings and when the PMO says we have to stay on schedule and make payments, no one says a thing anymore.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. The most criminal event occurred in 2019 when it was obvious there were serious problems with the Ford design that may be unfixable. The Admirals pressed Congress to fund two more Fords earlier than planned, as though they wanted to get them under construction before Congress and media learned about problems.

      https://news.usni.org/2019/01/31/navy-awards-2-carrier-contract-newport-news-shipbuilding

      Delete
    2. And who was in charge of the Navy's Sea System Command during this criminal activity that awarded a massive contract worth billions of dollars to the prime carrier contractor, Huntington Ingalls?

      Vice Admiral Tom Moore was in charge. Where is he now? A year ago, Huntington Ingalls Industries appointed him as new Vice President of Nuclear Operations for Nuclear and Environmental Services just five months after he retired from the Navy.

      https://newsroom.huntingtoningalls.com/releases/photo-release-huntington-ingalls-industries-appoints-thomas-moore-as-new-vice-president-of-nuclear-operations-for-nuclear-and-environmental-services

      Which notes: "Moore previously served five years as the program executive officer of aircraft carriers where he led the Navy’s largest acquisition program and served as the life-cycle manager for the Navy’s in-service aircraft carrier fleet."

      One big advantage China and Russia have over the US military is that they don't tolerate such corruption. They would lock this guy up. Knowing about all the Ford's problems you'd think he would avoid open kickbacks via this job, but no, he don't care because this is part of our Navy's corrupt culture, also shown by the ongoing Fat Leonard scandal.

      Delete
    3. I think it would solve some issues if you could prevent retired military personnel of O-6 or above for working for defense contractors after retirement.

      Lutefisk

      Delete
  3. You've mentioned that the LCS was designed and built by companies with no experience building warships, and we've seen the results.

    Interestingly, both the EMALS and the "Advanced Arresting Gear" were designed and built by General Atomics, a company with no experience building either catapults or arresting gear. Maybe a lesson for the future?

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. We've got be fair, here. In the case of the LCS manufacturers, there were plenty of companies with shipbuilding experience we could have chosen from. That was not the case with EMALS, AAG, and AWE. No one had ever built those systems before so whoever was chosen would be a 'rookie'. In fact, General Atomics has experience with maglev trains and railguns, both of which use electromagnetic propulsion technology similar to that used in EMALS, AAG, and AWE so the choice of General Atomics was justified since they had relevant experience.

      The real lesson is the need to prototype PRIOR TO PRODUCTION. We could, and should, have set up both land based prototypes and prototypes on a converted cargo ship to examine the sea effects like flexing, water infiltration, sea water corrosion, etc.

      Delete
  4. Maybe the best bet is to let Ford replace the Kitty Hawk at Bremerton, and let the new JFK replace the old one. We will have to re-RCOH the Nimitz, maybe one more while the Nimitz restart gets rolling.
    When/if they can get things figured out, great, pull them out of reserve ...

    ReplyDelete
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    1. Its beyond irresponsible that USN wants to stop with RCOH on Truman? when we have crap like FORD that seriously raises doubts on how ready it is to deploy. No way we should retire any Nimitz class until we know FOR SURE FORD has been deployed and operates correctly.

      Delete
    2. "No way we should retire any Nimitz class until we know FOR SURE FORD has been deployed and operates correctly."

      But that means we will never retire the Nimitzes.

      Here's my thought. Surely there are some things we ave learned from the Fords that could be used to improve the Nimitzes. So 1) build new Nimitzes (or maybe RAND CVN-LXs) incorporating lessons learned from the Fords, 2) retrofit the improvements onto existing Nimitzes during overhauls, 3) design and build a new class of conventional CVs, maybe something between a Midway and a Kitty Hawk (~$6B each) with the savings from building Nimitzes/CVN-LXs (~$9B) instead of Fords (~$15B), and 4) until the new CVs hit the fleet (10-15 years) convert LHAs/LHDs that are worthless as amphibs to interim Lightning Carriers with maybe 40 aircraft each including 24 F35Bs and operate them with CVNs as two-carrier battle groups (CVBGs) in order to learn how best to utilize two (and four) carriers together.

      Delete
    3. "Surely there are some things we ave learned from the Fords that could be used to improve the Nimitzes."

      Barring technological breakthroughs, the EMALS, AAG, elevators, and dual band radar are all failures. So, seriously, what have we learned that we would apply to a Nimitz?

      Delete
  5. Not asking for the answer because not sure anyone other than the Navy really knows but what is a failure and its level? I mean, is it a simple software reboot, turn it on and off, wait 5 minutes or we have to take everything offline and wait a few hours? Is their a risk of losing a jet at launch or not? The numbers for EMALS are bad but how bad really? What does it mean in terms of operations? Slows it down by minutes or hours? There's different levels of bad....its beyond terrible to spend $$$ billions and have to operate like this but thats what was delivered so we have to make the best of it.

    ReplyDelete
  6. Say there's a war tomorrow.
    What does the Ford do?

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Load a bunch of F35Bs and operate in STOVL mode without catapults or arresting gear. If pilots know how to operate in STOVL mode off a Ford. And if we can find some way other than the weapons lifts to get ordnance up to the flight deck.

      Delete
    2. "without catapults or arresting gear."

      Or tankers or Hawkeyes or Growlers. That's an awfully marginal capability.

      I also doubt a B model could operate off an unmodified carrier deck. You'll recall that the amphibs had to have their decks modified to handle the downward exhaust.

      Delete
    3. In a war, you do what you can with what you have. But a great point. Fly a couple of sorties and burn a hole in the flight deck, and then where are you. Just one more testament to the worthlessness of the Fords.

      Delete
    4. "amphibs had to have their decks modified"

      I'm not certain this would be true of Ford. Remember that on the amphibs, the F35B lands vertically, which means it hovers over a single spot on the deck for a period of time. But suppose it just did a rolling landing, in STOL mode. I believe the British are even practicing this, since it also allows the plane to land with a heavier load. In that mode, there wouldn't be nearly as much heat applied to any given spot on the deck, since the heat source would be moving. And there's probably room on the Ford for a rolling landing.

      Delete
    5. Yeah.......keep on dreamin'! https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/28367/navys-f-35c-stealth-fighters-wont-fly-from-troubled-new-ford-class-carriers-for-years

      Delete
    6. "Yeah.......keep on dreamin'!"

      The proposition in this thread is that the carrier could operate the B model of the F-35. The article you reference describes problems that affect the F-35C operations. The F-35B does not require cats or arresting gear and the elevators are now working … sort of. So, in theory, the F-35B might be able to operate if the deck can handle the exhaust.

      Of course, there are other issues such as data handling, underlying compartments, communications, etc. which the amphibs have had to upgrade in order to operate F-35Bs.

      Delete
    7. I followed Jack's link and found another article of interest.

      https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/44067/the-f-35cs-radar-absorbent-skin-is-looking-pretty-rough-after-months-at-sea

      During its first deployment, the F-35s radar absorbent skin quickly wore away.

      Delete
    8. "....During its first deployment, the F-35s radar absorbent skin quickly wore away."

      Thats not what the article says.

      Delete
  7. Look China's 003 carrier which is to launch this year. Within two years after launch, it should start testing. We shall then see if type 003's EMALS works or not.

    If 003's EMALS works, then, no excuse, USS Ford's design and manufacturing tech leaders should be punished. If its also doesn't work, then, we will know EMALS is not suitable for carriers.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Serious question:

      Why is it so important to have EMALS catapults?

      Lutefisk

      Delete
    2. EMALS benefits:

      Higher launch rate than steam ejections.

      Adjustable launch force thus can also launch drones which are not as heavy as fighters.

      Compact thus save space.

      Delete
    3. "Higher launch rate than steam ejections."

      No. The launch rate is determined by the aircraft movement and handling, safety checks, hookup, engine run up, etc. not any inherent speed of the catapult operation.

      "Adjustable launch force"

      No. Steam cats have launched as heavy as the A-3 Skywarrior (up to 80,000 lb) and as light as the A-4 Skyhawk (20,000 lb or so) and X-47B drone (18,000 lb or so).

      "Compact thus save space."

      I've never heard that claim. Any equipment volume savings from removing steam handling equipment would be offset by the required electrical handling and capacitance/flywheel equipment requirements.

      Delete
    4. "Why is it so important to have EMALS catapults?"

      It isn't. This was part of the Navy's general push for new technology regardless of whether it makes sense. Beyond that, it's probably part of the Navy's desire to convert to 'all electrical' ships and eliminate or greatly reduce a major utility (steam). That's a valid desire BUT ONLY IF IT WORKS. In other words, if it worked, EMALS is a 'nice to have' but not a requirement.

      There are no operational benefits to EMALS. We've debunked the claims the Navy has put forth about 'gentler' launches leading to longer aircraft lives and the ability to launch lighter loads.

      Delete
    5. Why then does China use this technology in their new type 003 carrier?

      Delete
    6. "Why then does China use this technology in their new type 003 carrier?"

      Im taking a bit of a guess, but I'd say that since they dont have any steam cat experience to start with, and since they probably have access to a good amount of the Ford designs (and seemingly having advanced further in electromagnetics than we have ie; railgun), its just as easy to do so. Any operational advantages really dont exist.

      Delete
    7. We'll probably never know for sure if China's EMALS is a failure or not.

      Delete
    8. The PLAN stole the EMALs plans before they understood EMAL only sort of works. Maybe the PLAN EMALs will work better ?. The CIA can steal the PLANs plans, and fix the Ford ? Only half kidding.

      Delete
    9. Well I bet that we will know if the Chinese have gotten it to work much quicker. I doubt their carrier will be "finished" for a decade before it joins their fleet functionally...

      Delete
  8. As I understand it, one big problem with EMALS is that normal moving around at sea can cause the rails (is that correct terminology?) to become misaligned and that makes the system kaput. It would seem that no amount of testing on land could reveal that, so no matter how much land testing they did, it's irrelevant. The inability to work on one without shutting the other three down seems like a frankly incredible design screw-up, and somebody should hang (figuratively) for that.

    Bottom line, kill the Fords, finish out those in the pipeline as improved Nimitzes with traditional cats, traps, and lifts, and send the original Ford off somewhere to sort it out until everything works.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. I agree to redo the remaining 3 Fords as steam cats and arresting gear. That being said, I just wonder how much additional work it would take to do so. I know it would require building 4 steam accumulation tanks, with associated piping, the catapults themselves.

      I don't know if the current reactor / steam generators are capable of the additional steam required. If not, there is a hell of a lot of redesign, rework, testing etc.

      Yes, kill the Ford class for now, use the current one as a test bed, until the Navy can get the emals and all up and running.



      Delete
    2. "EMALS benefits:
      Higher launch rate than steam ejections."

      As ComNavOps has pointed out, this is not a huge consideration. Yes, it is a consideration, but not as important as having cats that work reliably.

      "Adjustable launch force thus can also launch drones which are not as heavy as fighters."

      I think this is the real reason. We are so hell bent on going to drones that anything and everything must be sacrificed to facilitate that transition.

      "Compact thus save space."

      I am not aware that we are particularly space constrained on the Nimitzes, or even predecessor conventional carriers, particularly considering the reduction of current and anticipated air wings,

      "I just wonder how much additional work it would take to do so. I know it would require building 4 steam accumulation tanks, with associated piping, the catapults themselves.
      I don't know if the current reactor / steam generators are capable of the additional steam required. If not, there is a hell of a lot of redesign, rework, testing etc."

      There ain't no free lunch, and steam cats are not without problems of their own. It may be next to impossible to redesign any ship that has gone very far beyond laying the keel, so redoing any of the Fords may be hugely cost-prohibitive. On the other hand, spending $14B on a useless ship means that a lot of useful ships cannot and will not get built. Letting the others go forward when it is known that the original doesn't work is fiscal waste, fraud, and abuse of the highest order.

      From a damage control standpoint, the steam piping and accumulation tanks are major problems. A hit on them could send steam over a large part of the ship and render those areas unusable, at least in the short run. Then again, they are located such that for a hit to reach them, it would probably have already rendered a large part of the ship unusable.

      Delete
  9. Whether the 003's EMALS work or not, the Chinese are not obligated in anyway to tell us. And given that US intelligence is basically " They they are strong but we can still beat them if we are serious" sugar talk, I don't trust without reservation whatever the CIA or intelligence reports say about it.

    ReplyDelete
  10. "On the plus side, China has committed to EMALS for their carriers so they’ll likely have the same problems!"
    Funny, when I heard about the race in the South China sea to get the f-35, I thought "if China get it first, will China start to get into concurrent development and over focusing one one plane?"

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  11. This comment has been removed by the author.

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  12. One consideration that was not a concern for the USN, but might be for some navies, is that to have steam catapults you have to have a steam source. If, for example, the UK decided to convert its new carriers to cats and traps, it would have to go the EMALS route, because its gas turbine/electric propulsion does not generate steam.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Would they not be able fit a steam donkey?

      Delete
    2. Probably could, and probably do in fact, but a donkey boiler is unlikely to produce enough steam for cats.

      Delete
    3. My goodness, there is a LOT more equipment associated with a steam catapult than just a steam generator!!!!

      Take a look at this schematic of a steam cat system: Steam Cat

      Delete
    4. This talk of swapping out catapult systems is pure fantasy. If the carrier is not designed for it from the start, it's not going to happen. I shudder to think what the cost would be … a couple billion dollars??

      Delete
    5. The question I would have is how far along the construction of the remaining Fords is. The second in the class, and maybe the third, would almost certainly be too far along to change out the cats without costing a lot more than $2B. On the other hand, if the difference is between having working cats and not having working cats, on a ship where we are already spending $15B, then $2B seems a relatively small price to pay if it could get done for that. Prediction--EMALS will never work correctly in a seagoing environment, and the question is therefore how many $15B white elephants can we afford.

      Delete
    6. If we actually wanted to revert to steam cats then most/all of the justification for the Ford (questionable to begin with) disappears and it would make far more sense to revert to Nimitz construction and we'd save $8B or so on every ship.

      There's a time to try and make do and there's a time to cut your losses. Trying to put steam in a Ford is the time to cut your losses.

      Delete
    7. As I understand the EMALS problem, it works fine on land but not at sea because normal ship movements cause the rails to become misaligned. If that's accurate, I don't see how it can be solved. Maybe some kind of complete re-engineering might work, but maybe not. Again if that's accurate, whoever made the decision to go forward without testing at sea needs to be fried (figuratively, of course). The old British tradition of cutting his buttons off would seem appropriate.

      Delete
    8. Some time ago I read about a British company that were working in a Internal Combustion launch system for QA class.

      I have only found this in a quick search https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/systems/iccals.htm, but the article states that it was being build (a prototype, I suppose) when was replaced for EMALS. In the same article is also stated that would easily replace EMALS without major changes, but I don't know if that is true.

      JM

      Delete
    9. Obviously this ICCAL system is mainly useful for conventional carriers, but if could really replace EMALS in Ford class it would solve one of the BIG problems of the ship.

      Anyway this systems somehow seems like a taboo for US Navy. I don't know why.

      JM

      Delete
    10. "Anyway this systems somehow seems like a taboo for US Navy. I don't know why."

      The referenced article pretty clearly indicates why the Navy lost interest in this system. It was unable to deliver consistent, predictable end speeds which is absolutely vital to successful catapult launches. The article also mentions reliability issues but offers no details.

      That aside, the system essentially uses explosive gases to launch the aircraft. I'd be leery of any system that routinely produces large explosions. That's a disaster waiting to happen!

      Finally, the article claims that the ICCAL could be a replacement for Nimitz steam cats. It makes no claim about replacing Ford EMALS cats.

      Of course, as it turned out, EMALS was not ready or reliable, either but the Navy appeared to have gotten caught up in the allure of the all-electric ship and determined that they would press on with EMALS regardless of how bad it was.

      Delete
    11. "If we actually wanted to revert to steam cats then most/all of the justification for the Ford (questionable to begin with) disappears and it would make far more sense to revert to Nimitz construction and we'd save $8B or so on every ship."

      Which would be the far superior choice in any case.

      Delete
  13. If there is truly no fixing the Ford carriers, then we've wasted 10's of billions of dollars.

    People literally need to go to prison if that's the case.

    Lutefisk

    ReplyDelete
  14. The other concern I have about EMALS, even if it eventually works, is what kind of electromagnetic signature it has. I've heard everything from no problem, it is almost completely shielded, to yes problem, it can be picked up for miles. Does anybody actually know?

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. The most authoritative source I've heard is CNO Greenert who stated publicly that EMALS is unshielded, is not EMCON-capable, and is a major electromagnetic emission source. He made the statement while discussing the Navy's need to return to EMCON capability, in general. He was specifically, addressing the need to reinstate EMCON capability as a purchasing specification for all equipment.

      Delete
    2. In his video presentation at Annapolis, CAPT Tal Manvel said it wasn't a problem, but I thought a lot of that talk was just puffing salesmanship. And at that point they had only tested it on land.

      Delete
  15. 5 years in and these numbers are not even remotely close to the standards. And that's before even considering the EMCON disaster that is looming. This simply is never going to work. It's time to acknowledge that and make alternate plans.

    ReplyDelete
  16. Most PMOs (especially the PMs/DPMs) have no clue how to do reliability prediction and feed that back into the design to meet reliability requirements. One Defense Contractor didn't even get failure rate data from its suppliers, which make predictions impossible. Furthermore, most have no idea how much operational time is required to measure reliability accurately.

    ReplyDelete
  17. Plans to deploy the USS Ford overseas this fall have been altered. It was just announced that it will remain under control of the 2nd Fleet (a training command) and cruise only the Atlantic with a smaller air wing.

    https://www.yahoo.com/news/us-navy-carrier-ford-unusual-180919069.html

    They hope for a regular deployment in 2024. The Navy's goal is to keep unfixable problems hidden until the other three carriers are complete, lest Congress stop funding them.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. "They hope for a regular deployment in 2024. The Navy's goal is to keep unfixable problems hidden until the other three carriers are complete, lest Congress stop funding them."

      Fireable and criminal offense. Do like the Brits used to do. Line them up in front of the Pentagon and cut their buttons off, then haul them into court.

      Delete
  18. Seems like a great opportunity to build EMALS and the Arrestor system at a shore installation and test the heck out of it until you get the reliability you need," said some random Huntington Ingalls engineer. CVN-78 got initial funding in 2001.

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    1. As I understand it, shore testing won't really address one of the major problems. Apparently, on a ship at sea, normal ship motions can cause the rails to come out of alignment, and then the cats don't work. So without sea tests, they really can't resolve it.

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  19. They built a EMALS test facility at Lakehurst, but didn't begin tests until after construction of the Ford began. The tests ashore failed for years. The solution, stop shore testing! It sounds crazy but that's what they did. They will follow the LCS game plan. Hide problems until all four carriers are completed, then don't deploy them except for a few coastal exercises. Then announce early retirements to save money.

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