Taiwan is attempting to build 8 new indigenously designed SSKs. Reuters has a good article summarizing the effort.[1]
Shipbuilder CSBC began construction last year and is aiming to deliver the first of the planned eight vessels by 2025, according to government statements. The value of the project is estimated at up to $16 billion, according to the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies. [1]
Taiwan’s current submarine fleet consists of two Sea Dragon SSKs built in the Netherlands and delivered in 1987. Typical of SSKs, they have six 533 mm bow tubes and 28 torpedoes.
The central rationale for acquiring new submarines appears to be the following,
The eight new submarines, plus the Sea Dragons, would pose a deadly threat to an invasion fleet, say veteran Western, Japanese and Taiwanese submariners. Armed with powerful torpedoes and anti-ship missiles, these vessels could attack the convoys of troop transports and warships that China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), would need for any landing on Taiwan. [1]
This smacks of the kind of everything-we-do-will-work-and-the-enemy-won’t-try-to-stop-us thinking that the US military routinely engages in. Can a handful of SSKs really present a significant threat to what would be a massive invasion fleet? Let’s analyze that premise.
Despite anyone’s desperate wishes, the Chinese are not going to launch an invasion fleet with no anti-submarine (ASW) protection. Chinese ASW efforts will be extensive and will greatly diminish the effectiveness of defending SSKs unless the SSKs are determined to perform a suicidal attack that would only result in a couple of sinkings per submarine.
Even without considering Chinese ASW efforts, ten SSKs have a limited capacity. With a total of 60 torpedo tubes across ten submarines and using an initial salvo of six torpedoes per sub, two per target, this would only result in 30 targets being hit (sunk or mission kill). This is ridiculously optimistic and assumes that every sub is available, every sub finds targets, every sub launches unhindered, and every torpedo hits but it defines the absolute upper edge of expectations. So, the upper end of expectations is 30 hits. The invasion fleet would consist of two or three hundred ships so this amounts to 10-15% of the invading fleet being stopped (sunk or mission killed). That’s not insignificant but it’s hardly an invasion stopper, either. The Chinese would gladly pay that price to seize Taiwan. To assume further success by the submarines would be compounding the ridiculousness by assuming that, having given away their positions by firing, the Chinese would stand back, do nothing, and allow the subs to continue firing until all their torpedoes were exhausted. Of course this won’t happen. It is highly unlikely that any submarine would get a second attack opportunity before the defending ASW forces made a second attack impossible.
Now, let’s inject just a small degree of realism into the scenario. For starters, not all ten submarines would be available and in the right location to attack an invasion fleet, not all the available submarines would achieve a firing situation due to enemy ASW activity, and not all torpedoes fired would hit their intended targets. So, a slightly more realistic estimate would be that five subs would achieve a firing situation and half the torpedoes fired would hit a target thus giving around 7 targets hit (sunk or mission kill). There would be no follow up attacks as the submarines would be too busy evading and dying.
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| This is what a serious invasion fleet would look like. |
Not only would a few submarines always be unavailable due to maintenance, the submarines might well have other duties that prevent them from being used against an invasion fleet. For example,
The two people in Taiwan with direct knowledge of the sub program said the vessels would also be deployed in the deeper waters east of the island. That would help keep open ports along Taiwan’s eastern coastline, which is furthest from China, for resupplies in a conflict. [1]
Thus, some number of subs would be deployed on the opposite side of Taiwan from an invasion fleet and would be unavailable to attack the fleet.
So, our more realistic assessment is that a fleet of ten SSKs could achieve 7 hits from an invasion fleet of two or three hundred ships. Is this level of result sufficient to justify a $16B program? The best way to answer this question is to pose another question: could the money be better spent on small, mobile, land based anti-ship missile launchers? For example, the Norwegians have demonstrated that small anti-ship missiles like the Kongsberg Naval Strike Missile (NSM) can be launched from mobile, land based launch vehicles. Taiwan could acquire thousands of such systems for what they plan to spend on 8 submarines. Which would do more damage … thirty or so torpedoes or many thousands of anti-ship missiles?
Let’s ask some more questions:
Which would be more survivable?
Which would be easier to acquire?
Which would be easier to man?
Which would cost less to operate?
Which would be easier to deploy on short notice?
Unless Taiwan chooses to start a war, they are going to unavoidably take the first hit in an invasion. That means they need widely scattered, numerous, hard to find, hard to hit weapons that will survive to strike back. China will commence an invasion by finding and striking at the submarines and employing sufficient ASW resources as to prevent the subs from achieving viable firing situations. In contrast, thousands of small, mobile anti-ship launchers present a capability that cannot be eliminated or even significantly reduced prior to an assault. The SSK program represents time, resources, and money that could be much better spent on other alternatives.
Even if Taiwan is determined to go through with the SSK program, there are many obstacles that make project success less than a given. Aside from the fact that this is a brand new, never before done effort from a non-existent indigenous submarine building industry (recall how the US LCS turned out when we contracted two companies that had never built a warship before?), the various technologies that make up a modern submarine must largely come from foreign companies and many of those companies and their parent countries are very reluctant to upset China. Again, the odds of success for a small anti-ship weapon system are much greater than an indigenous SSK program.
Ten SSKs are an annoyance to China, not an invasion stopper.
________________________________
[1]Reuters website, “T-Day: The Battle For Taiwan”, Saito et. al., 29-Nov-2021,
https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/taiwan-china-submarines/
Of course, as I believe you've mentioned in other contexts, the mobile land based antiship missiles need to also be coupled with survivable reconnaissance capabilities to fire beyond the radar horizon. Is anything like this in the cards?
ReplyDeleteI have no idea what Taiwan's surveillance capabilities are, however, I would note a few factors that impact that in a positive way:
Delete1. Taiwan has some extensive mountains that, thanks to their height, offer the ability to greatly extend the radar horizon.
2. The Taiwan strait is only 80-100 miles wide so the required search distance isn't very far.
3. A Chinese invasion fleet would be coming directly at Taiwan as opposed to passing by so detection and targeting would get easier by the minute.
4. An invasion fleet of hundreds of ships would be the ideal situation for blind firing into an area. It would be nearly certain that a missile would find a target.
In addition to more shore-based anti-ship missiles on mobile batteries, IMHO Taiwan could spend the money for submarines better by building more (simple and cheap) units like these:
ReplyDeletehttp://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/naval-news/naval-news-archive/2021/december/11132-taiwan-navy-launches-third-and-fourth-indigenous-mine-laying-ship.html
PS
After all, mines remain one of the most effective A2/AD weapons!
The problem with mines is that unless they're willing to mine the strait BEFORE hostilities, they would have no chance to do so after hostilities commence. China would sink any mine laying ships instantly.
DeleteThe very short distance across the strait - and hence, very short reaction time - almost renders minelaying non-viable.
Command detonated mines might be an option but, again, laying such mines during peacetime would generate a lot of bad international publicity.
"Command detonated mines might be an option but, again, laying such mines during peacetime would generate a lot of bad international publicity."
DeleteStill beats being invaded, if they have the political will to do so.
In theory, subs could be used to close Chinese harbors with mines, but they probably won't have time to do so.
"but they probably won't have time to do so."
DeleteQuite right! For Taiwan, it all comes down to time:
-time to respond
-time to hold out pending US involvement
-time to recover from the initial hit that they have to absorb
With a 80-100 mile strait, time is not on Taiwan's side.
And that is where the sub will come in handy. By forcing the chinese to sweep the strait thoroughly before sending in their amphibs or risk losing whole battalions of troops and armor, or thousands of tons of fuel, food and ammunition, the subs buy time as much as they inflict casualties.
Delete"By forcing the chinese to sweep the strait thoroughly before sending in their amphibs"
DeleteThat's not how escort operations work. Convoys don't sweep thoroughly before the merchant ships sail; they sail together with the escorts surrounding the merchants. The same would apply to an invasion fleet. The ASW escorts would sail with the fleet, surrounding it, and clearing as they go. The possible presence of a few subs won't buy any time, at all. Worst case, China won't even blink at losing a handful of ships during the course of an invasion. In their reckoning, it's just part of the cost to achieve their objective. The US did the same thing in WWII. Invasions/assaults come with a certain level of losses. It's understood and factored into the attackers planning.
You might find the study of WWII invasions/assaults helpful in understanding the Taiwan situation.
I wonder if a better use of the submarines might be as a more survivable mine laying platform? Since China will rapidly gain air supremacy over the strait and destroy any surface ships?
ReplyDeleteYou're on the right track, however, the problem is that submarine minelaying is a slow operation and given the narrow width of the strait, that would allow only a few hours of minelaying before the invasion fleet was landing. Relatively very few mines could be laid in that time. Granted, every little bit helps but the money spent on minelaying subs could probably be better spent on other options.
DeleteUnlike the US, I don't think the Chinese will be thwarted by a few ships hitting mines. They'll press right through and ignore a few mine losses.
My thought was that the Taiwanese probably assume quick Chinese air superiority and are looking at more (relatively) survivable platforms. But your analysis of their effectiveness makes a great point. Along with the mountain-based mobile launchers, maybe they should be looking more towards hundreds of midget subs? Or even better, just a huge amount of moored torpedo mines (CAPTOR??). Or, what about some kind of containerized VLS-esque, underwater torpedo magazine system?? Since an invasion fleet must come to the beaches/ports, and those locations are limited/predictable, they could be wire controlled/guided rather than autonomous, in relatively shallow water, and deployed now rather than hurriedly in the days when an invasion becomes obviously imminent. Im just daydreaming outside the box here, but for the expense of an SSK program, it seems as if some kind of more-surviveable, remote launched torpedo defenses in large numbers might be a better plan(?) Visions of an old forts' effectiveness, and the sinking of the Blucher come to mind...
DeleteEven if you turned a US defense contractor loose on it(insane $ costs, guesstimate $8m each), and CAPTOR-ized Mk48s, that $16B would probably still get you multiple torps for every ship the Chinese could send...
Delete"this is a brand new, never before done effort from a non-existent indigenous submarine building industry"
ReplyDeleteThat's not correct, though.
See: "Taiwan had, in the last seven years, managed to quietly enlist the help from seven foreign countries, including Britain and the United States, to quietly recruit foreign submarine design and construction experts. This enabled Taiwan to design their own diesel-electric submarine and quietly obtain the components, including major systems, from foreign suppliers. The secrecy was critical because since the 1980s China has threatened economic retaliation against any foreign country that supplied Taiwan with new subs or the components and expertise to build their own."
More at https://strategypage.com/htmw/htsub/articles/20211218.aspx
Recruiting bits and pieces of expertise is great but that does not equate to having actually built submarines on a routine, industrial basis. Again, look at the problems we encountered with LCS construction despite both companies having hired experts and having some degree of in-house industrial manufacturing expertise.
DeleteCNO, I like the mobile ASM idea for Taiwan.
ReplyDeleteFor the money, I would think that could be complemented by a host of MLRS launchers.
Hide them in underground bunkers and they can drive out and launch, then pull back in for reload/repositioning.
Of course you'd probably need a bulldozer to lead the way to clear the rubble, even for the initial launch.
But I'd think MLRS could really put a hurt on an invasion force.
Lutefisk
I think mining and their mere presence eats up resources devoted to suppressing the threat. For the assymetric advantage I might be inclined to develop a submarine that fits in a bit like a stealth missile boat. Easy to resupply from anywhere. No torpedo room, just 8-10 slanted tubes to be reloaded directly at a simple dock. I'm thinking German type 207 size. Something under 50m and a smaller draft. Worry less about diving depth. Keep good endurance with relatively small crew. Their boats don't need to do everything the surrounding navies subs need to do in order to accomplish their mission.
ReplyDeleteHere's a wacky thought about mines. We've already got aircraft delivered mines. There are even wing kits being developed to allow them to glide. How about adding a booster rocket and possibly motor, so they could be kept in a bunker during the initial missile salvo, then launched by rocket into the strait?
ReplyDeleteObviously more expensive than ordinary mines, but a lot cheaper than $16 billion for a handful of submarines.
"Mass—numbers of vessels—appears adequate unto Taipei’s purposes. The inventory will presumably stabilize at eight boats once new craft are built and decrepit ones retire. Factor in training, upkeep, and deep maintenance, and three or four should be underway or ready to put to sea for combat duty at any given moment. These are strategic assets. Naval commanders should keep boats on patrol at all times, honing crews’ tactical proficiency while guarding against a preemptive strike on the sub force at its moorings.
ReplyDeleteBeyond that, how can the Taiwan Navy maximize its potential for sea denial? Sea denial is strategically defensive in outlook, but that doesn’t rule out offensive tactics. In fact, offense is the beating heart of strategic defense according to the masters of maritime strategy. Sure, ROCN subs could take a passive stance, in effect standing sentry duty off seaports such as Kaohsiung or beaches likely to be targeted during a cross-strait amphibious assault. They could await attack and strike back hard. This would be valuable service.
Better yet, skippers could take an offensively minded, enterprising stance. Taiwan Navy boats could lurk off mainland seaports to raid shipping as it enters or leaves harbor. Or they could loiter in or around straits that pierce the first island chain. Barring the Luzon Strait—PLA Navy boats’ favorite passageway between the Western Pacific and South China Sea—would constitute an immense contribution. The wide Miyako Strait, to Taiwan’s north, could offer rich hunting grounds as well.
Corralling Chinese quarry within the island chain would help Taipei safeguard the island’s east coast. And it would let the Taiwanese armed forces shore up the central segment of the “Great Wall in reverse” the U.S. armed forces seem intent on erecting along the island chain, in concert with allies, to constrain PLA maritime movement."
From https://www.19fortyfive.com/2021/12/why-taiwan-needs-new-submarines-to-make-china-pay-in-a-war/
And I agree with this. Subs put surface ships in a tizz.
And the landing party will need lots of supplies and follow on forces. If China gets a foothold Taiwan only needs to retreat to the mountains and hold the eastern ports for US reinforcements.
"Better yet, skippers could take an offensively minded, enterprising stance. Taiwan Navy boats could lurk off mainland seaports to raid shipping as it enters or leaves harbor. Or they could loiter in or around straits that pierce the first island chain. Barring the Luzon Strait—PLA Navy boats’ favorite passageway between the Western Pacific and South China Sea—would constitute an immense contribution. The wide Miyako Strait, to Taiwan’s north, could offer rich hunting grounds as well."
DeleteThat would be nice and all, but Taiwan won't have resources to spare for that, they'll be 100% focused on trying to stop an invasion that would lead to their complete defeat.
Long-range sea denial just isn't a priority when the enemy is launching an amphibious assault on your core territory.
I don't think an invasion of Taiwan is as much of a slam dunk as some people seem to worry about. Taiwan is hardly defenseless, and amphibious assaults are not that easy to do.
ReplyDeleteAt the same time, I am not sure that Taiwan does not provide a very useful service to China in its current status. Taiwanese investment on the mainland is huge, and a large number of Taiwanese companies have operations there. Taiwan can be--and apparently is being--the capitalist enclave and window to the western economies that Hong Kong was supposed to be--until the HK natives got too uppity for Beijing's tastes. And the mainland is more insulated from events on Taiwan than it was with HK, because there are not thousands of Chinese commuting to Taiwan for work every day. And Taiwan is not really a threat to the mainland.
The places that threaten the mainland are to the south--Indonesia and Malaysia, which even now could shut down the Sunda and Malacca Straits, effectively cutting off China's essential oil imports and seaborne exports. I could see the focus of China's amphibious and naval capability pointing south, probably starting with the Philippines. Once they secure their southern flank, then they can apply a lot more pressure on Taiwan.
Merry Christmas CNO, and everyone else as well!!🎄
ReplyDeleteAnd to you and yours!
DeleteThis is a prestige badge, not well thought out spending. Sometimes I think Tawain just doesn't take it's defense very seriously. Whether it's hopelessness or a very strong belief that the US will bail them out.
ReplyDeleteIf they are actually serious about defense, they would not have shorten the mandatory conscription service to a measly 4 months.
DeleteAs much as people like to hate on NK, they at least put their money where their mouth is.
Odd choice for the subs as i agree, they would do little to stop an invasion, they may all be better used in keeping ports open on the far side.
ReplyDeleteIn any case a serious invasion would be preceded by air attacks and these could go either way.
Too much preparation and China gives the game away but a surprise attack may not succeed.
Here are some interesting simulations of an air attack (there are 4 parts)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8MN05AEA3MA&list=PL3kOAM2N1YJfr4Se4pdZHratFpDGjdyxq
If you want a boxing day chuckle I came across this by accident a US vs China simulation https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vJXWJ-Px5tU
ReplyDeleteTaiwan is already buying 100 land-based, mobile, Harpoon launchers and 400 missiles from the US. So they will have a sizeable land-based anti-ship missile component. They're also working on indigenous mines and minelayers and small missile combatants, but those might not last very long.
ReplyDeleteI think the subs are a worthwhile addition. The Chinese have options other than invasion. They could blockade Taiwan, hoping internal unrest forces political capitulation. In that case, they could keep their naval forces out of range of land-based missiles. However, the subs could still cause havoc with the blockade force, or attack Chinese shipping elsewhere.
"They could blockade Taiwan"
DeleteIn theory, yes.
In practice, not really. It would backfire massively.
We do not live in the 1300s anymore, for better or worse.
"options other than invasion … blockade … subs could still cause havoc with the blockade force, or attack Chinese shipping elsewhere."
DeleteIf the US opts not to get involved in a non-invasion shooting war between China and Taiwan, Taiwan is lost and nothing they do and no units they acquire can change that. Chinese ASW forces would fairly quickly eliminate Taiwan submarines one way or another (at sea, in a confined operating area, or in port during reload/resupply). The only thing that having a handful of subs would change is the time frame in which Taiwan would be conquered.
On the other hand, if the US opts to get involved then Taiwan doesn't need subs. The US would be far better equipped with their own sub and air forces to deal with a Chinese blockade and attack Chinese shipping elsewhere.
In fact, having Taiwan subs roaming around would only make things more difficult for the US by introducing additional friendly fire uncertainty and hesitation in submarine warfare is usually fatal for the side that hesitates.
"Taiwan is already buying 100 land-based, mobile, Harpoon launchers and 400 missiles"
DeleteWhich is immensely insufficient. We're talking about attacking the equivalent of Aegis ships. Only saturation attacks will be effective. After the initial strikes, Taiwan would be lucky if half their missiles were still functional and available. Taiwan needs thousands of missiles, not hundreds. That's the problem with the sub program - it's siphoning off the equivalent of thousands of anti-ship missiles from Taiwan's defense.
Realistically, half of Taiwan's subs would be lost in the initial strike and the remainder would be lucky to get in a few hits before also being destroyed. That's a very poor combat-return on investment. Thousands of anti-ship missiles, on the other hand, guarantee that a substantial number will survive an opening strike and present a significant threat.
All of this is really untested in live combat. I doubt subs are easy to hunt down and Aegis ships will get knocked out too easily. Not against Aegis, but we need a different way to skin the cat. More ships, networked for starters.
Delete"I doubt subs are easy to hunt down"
DeleteThey are not! They are incredibly difficult to fix and kill. HOWEVER, they are relatively easy to mission kill especially when the target is known and the subs have to come to the defender, as in this scenario. Taiwan subs have to enter a physically restricted body of water to reach their targets which confers significant advantages to the defender who simply has to wait for the subs to come to them.
Further, it is only necessary for Chinese ASW assets to suppress, not destroy, the subs. A sub that is busy running, hiding, maneuvering, and evading is a sub that is not launching torpedoes. Large numbers of ASW assets in a restricted body of water ensures that the subs will be pretty much occupied just trying to survive … that's a mission kill.
"Aegis ships will get knocked out too easily."
We're talking about Chinese Aegis ships defending against anti-ship missiles. Aegis is designed to handle saturation attacks so in order to be successful, the attacker needs really large saturation attacks! Of course, as you say, that has never been tested so maybe China's Aegis will work and maybe it won't. It would be unwise, however, to assume it won't work. Taiwan would, literally, be betting their survival as a nation on an assumption.
"The Chinese have options other than invasion. They could blockade Taiwan,..."
DeleteTrue, they could. On the other hand, I can't think of any historical cases where a blockade alone (without an invasion) was sufficient to cause a country to capitulate and give up its sovereignty and accept subjugation, occupation, and control by another country. Admittedly, I'm not a professional historian so there may be a case, but I can't think of any.
There are examples of failure, however. For example, consider the South during the Civil War, or Germany during World War I. Or North Korea and Iran today. Admittedly we aren't imposing total blockade against North Korea or Iran (although the economic restrictions are still fairly severe). On the other hand, we're not asking them to capitulate and give up their sovereignty -- only to stop the aggression against their neighbors. And they won't even do THAT.
@CNO, "Which is immensely insufficient. We're talking about attacking the equivalent of Aegis ships. Only saturation attacks will be effective."
DeleteThe 400 Harpoons is in addition to the 800-odd HF-2s and HF-3s they already have (unclear the breakdown between air- sea- and land-launched).
The Chinese destroyers have to contend with the same issues ours would when they get close to shore during an invasion, namely clutter and reduced detection ranges.
Also, land-based missiles are just one component. The combination of up to a thousand land-based missiles, subs, mines, airpower (for as long as it lasts), and missile boats (ditto), would be a nightmare scenario for any amphibious planner. And that doesn't even factor in US involvement.
"400 Harpoons"
DeleteAs you know, Harpoons are beyond obsolete. They're slow, non-stealthy, non-maneuverable, and have no terminal evasion capability (some have a rudimentary popup maneuver). That's the description of a very low end target practice drone. The success rate of such a missile will be very low.
If not launched in a coordinated fashion to achieve simultaneous time-on-target, they will be almost completely destroyed by modern naval air defense systems.
All the existing Taiwan Harpoons are the original Block I, as far as I know. The announced purchase will be for Block II, according to press releases but I don't know what capabilities will be included in that. Export weapon systems are often dumbed down.
Hey, I'm all for acquiring any anti-ship missiles for Taiwan but to think that 400-500 missiles - half of which will be destroyed in the initial strike that Taiwan must absorb - will be sufficient to stop an invasion fleet is pure fantasy. It's a start but not the final answer by a long shot. The $16b that they're going to spend on new subs (and it will be much more than that, as it is for any naval construction program!) could be much better spent on more missile systems that are mobile and survivable.
They do have some supersonic HF-3s on truck mounts.
DeleteShooting down dozens to hundreds of even subsonic, non-stealthy missiles close to shore, where the engagement range shrinks, and their radars and missiles have a hard time picking missiles out of the clutter is no cakewalk even for our ships. Expect a LOT of leakers. Successful engagements may even be in the minority.
Have the Chinese even tested their systems against saturation attacks? Near shore?
They certainly shouldn't underestimate the Chinese, but they also shouldn't assume the Chinese are 10 feet tall.
How many Type 52s and 55s are the Chinese even willing to risk in this mine-infested, shooting gallery, when they also have to worry about the USN?
"are the Chinese even willing to risk in this mine-infested, shooting gallery, when they also have to worry about the USN?"
DeleteAs has been discussed in the comments, there is no reason to believe that mines can be successfully deployed in significant, effective quantities.
The Chinese will get a free, initial strike since Taiwan will not initiate the war. That means that half of Taiwan's weapons and platforms will be destroyed first thing. The Chinese will employ continuous suppressive bombardment (shells, missiles, aircraft, etc.) during the actual assault which will further reduce the number and effectiveness of any defense. Harpoons will make the Chinese job easier since they are little more than target drones. Some will get through, yes, but hardly enough to defeat an invasion force.
The USN will be no threat, whatsoever, during an assault. We are simply not placed close enough to do anything. It is also highly debatable that the US will even choose to respond.
So, to sum up, the Chinese invasion fleet will encounter no mines of any significance, the Taiwan defenses will be heavily attrited and suppressed, and the USN will be a non-factor. Taiwan can bleed the Chinese but they cannot stop them with the defenses they currently have.
To remind you, the issue is not the combat effectiveness of Harpoons but the wisdom of spending $16B on a handful of subs that will be only marginally effective, if that.
"They do have some supersonic HF-3s on truck mounts."
DeleteI have no idea how effective those missiles are but, in theory, I would much rather see $16B spent on thousands of supersonic anti-ship missiles then a handful of ineffective subs.
How about EMP weapons for defense?
ReplyDeleteAre Chinese ships even EMP hardened, or did they go the dumb route?
Taiwan's arm procurement is a political decision (i.e. big ticket items on fighter planes, surface and subsurface ships, etc.) rather than a military-only requirement one (i.e. folding Taiwan's role into an US-centric strategy)
ReplyDeleteFrom our pov, in a China fight we would like Taiwan to absorb, consume, and extend PLA's effort to make it as costly as possible. That means land based anti-ship, anti-air, and anti-land efforts (like WW2's Japanese island defense on Iwo or Okinawa). However, from Taiwan's pov, it doesn't want a war to end up like Iwo or Okinawa. Therefore, out of necessity, it has to move 'Taiwan scenario' towards a 'strategic vulnerability' to 'dissuade' both China and the US from a Taiwan induced conflict.
To dissuade China, 1st, Taiwan knows China doesn't want a war which will kill its rise & thereafter. 2nd, Taiwan's expensive-but-vulnerable fighter & ship procurement would lessen China's worry on any inadequacy of PLA's war plan (hence, not to induce China into more substantial invasion armada preparation).
To dissuade the US, Taiwan, by making itself strategic vulnerable (with expensive-but-fewer buys instead of more dispersed mines/stingers/javelins etc.), we would hesitate war on China fight with such limpwrist ally.
Above is the only explanation I can give on Taiwan's military disposition. Taiwan and China are both Chinese-in-thinking. One wants to win-without-war, the other wants to survive-without-war.
It is a political buy as vritually all Taiwan's purchases are including donestic upgrades of 1960s and 1970s systems like M48 tanks and MIM-73 Chappral SAMs or obsolete US supplied warships .
ReplyDeleteThe sub buy also ignores a major probem - since abolition of conscription Taiwan's military recruiting ability jas collapsed with many units being 20-40% under strength.
So how do you crew 8 subs when you struggle to recuit to an alreqdy shrunken military?
I am surprised that no one has commented on the obvious (at least to me) use for these submarines. Everyone talks about sinking an invasion fleet, but is that really what 8 or so subs would do well?
ReplyDeleteHow many tankers and freighters transporting critical imports would these subs need to sink to shut down China's economy virtually overnight?
But if China took control of Taiwan, how long would the subs hold out for, sinking ships? Would they surrender, Once Taiwan is taken, China can send its subs and navy after them, and planes, which could now take off from Taiwan. The subs would just delay a few shipments, nothing more, unless assisted in some way by other world powers.
Delete"How many tankers and freighters transporting critical imports would these subs need to sink to shut down China's economy virtually overnight?"
DeleteAs of 1-Jan-2020, China had 4569 Chinese flagged, registered merchant vessels (the US has around 180). Sinking a handful of ships wouldn't make even a slight dent in China's shipping.
In addition, China has thousands of other ships from commercially aligned countries.
Further, China would be providing anti-air and ASW escort for their merchant shipping. The few Taiwan subs that would survive the initial attack would constitute no more than a minor pinprick of annoyance to China and even that would be quickly eliminated as Taiwan's ports would come under attack, preventing the surviving subs from reloading and resupplying. Submarines can operate forward but cannot be based forward and Taiwan would be the very definition of forward basing - basing which would be eliminated within hours of the first strike.
No the submarines will not stop an invasion fleet, but the larger political point is that the Taiwanese are putting skin in the game. I would prefer if they reinstated conscription and incorporated it into their mobilization plan.
ReplyDeleteWhy is skin in the game important? I for could never continence sending U.S. troops to fight to support a nation that refused to make a determined effort to defend itself. It is an old-school political marker, but a people can and should do something.
The Poles got breach loaded in WW2, but at least they fought valiantly and even counter-invaded Germany. The same goes for the British. I do not believe that FDR would have helped the British had he judged them as unwilling to fight.
GAB
Few standard diesel electric submarines alone are not enough to stop a simultaneous seaborne invasion. That is why it's important for Taiwan to also reinforce its submarine force with several inexpensive midget submarines. Simply the simplicity and affordability of of midget subs will allow Taiwan to produce them in large numbers. And I bet a single heavyweight torpedo armed 200-ton midget sub can sink a destroyer size surface combatant or any military transport ship operating in the surrounding shallow waters of Taiwan.
ReplyDelete