WWII saw the birth of the Landing Vehicle Tracked (LVT) amphibious assault vehicle, known variously as the "amtrak", "amtrac", "alligator", or "buffalo", among other nicknames. The vehicle was the answer to the Marine’s need for a protected transport capable of traversing surf and coral. The development of an armored version with a 75 mm howitzer provided anti-infantry and anti-fortification firepower available in the initial assault wave. Later, a flamethrower capability was added.
The personnel carrying LVT was the forerunner to today’s standard Assault Amphibious Vehicle (AAV). Indeed, the AAV was initially designated the Landing Vehicle, Tracked, Personnel-7 (LVTP-7).
We see, then, that during WWII, the LVT variants included transport, flamethrower, and armored “tank” versions. These developments were critical to the Pacific war island assaults and were impressive enough in their own right. However, after the Korean War, the LVT underwent yet another round of development resulting in an entire family of functional variants.
The base vehicle for the subsequent LVT family was the 35 ton LVTP-5. The variants, designed by Borg-Warner Corp., included (1),
LVTP-5 – personnel carrier rated for up to 35 troops (though not in practice)
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| LVTP-5 |
LVTH-6 – armored amphibian with fully stabilized armored turret housing a 105 mm howitzer with storage for 151 rounds plus an additional 150 rounds in the cargo hold, a 0.30 cal co-axial machine gun, and a 0.50 cal anti-aircraft machine gun
LVTH-6
LVTC-5 – command vehicle with extensive communications suite for battalion or regimental command; could send and receive on 7 channels and monitor 4; space for seating and map boards
LVTAA-1 – anti-aircraft vehicle fitted with the M42 Duster turret housing twin 40 mm Bofors; Note: It appears that the LVTAA-1 never entered production after prototype testing.
LVTR-1 – recovery vehicle with two winches, each capable of pulling 45,000 pounds, a welding rig, crane and other maintenance equipment (2)
LVTR-1
LVTE-1 – combat engineer and breaching vehicle with an angled blade plow for mine clearing that could clear a 12 ft wide lane to a depth of 16 inches; also included a top mounted, rocket-propelled demolition line charge launcher for mine and obstacle clearance
LVTE-1
The really noteworthy aspect of this bit of amphibious vehicle history is that we still need the same functions today! The absolutely astounding aspect of this bit of amphibious vehicle history is that most of the required functions are still unmet, today!
AAV
It is also interesting to note how little the base vehicle has changed. If we could simply, magically, transport these vehicles to our time, we’d find them quite welcome and useful. That illustrates how little improvement has occurred in amphibious assault – arguably, we have regressed since we now lack any kind of amphibious heavy firepower which we commonly had in WWII !
The AAV/ACV (ACV – Amphibious Combat Vehicle) that is currently being produced has barely changed, functionally, from its historical predecessors and lacks the various variants that are required for a fully functional amphibious capability. The Marines have discussed adding ACV command and 30 mm gun variants but nothing has happened as yet and budget constraints suggest that few, if any, variants will be produced.
This raises the larger question, are the Marines actually serious about amphibious assault? The statements, doctrine, acquisitions, and budget allocation present a very mixed bag of answers.
Statements by various Marine leadership claim that amphibious assault remains a core capability, that a line of AAVs assaulting the beach will never be seen again, that traditional assaults are a thing of the past, and that the AAV/ACV is vital for the Marine mission. An astounding bit of mixed messaging, for sure!
Doctrinally, the Marines/Navy call for a standoff distance of 25-50+ miles for an opposed assault. This suggests that the Marines are not serious about amphibious assault since they have no landing craft capable of conducting effective 25-50+ mile transits.
Marine acquisitions and budgets are heavily focused on the aviation – and now missile – side of things. The lack of importance attached to assault is evidenced by the decades spent meandering around the AAV replacement issue (recall the failed EFV?). Even now, with new ACVs being procured, the utter lack of amphibious firepower and anti-air capability is startling and sends the message that amphibious assault is not a priority and may not even be feasible (if so, why are the Marines even procuring ACVs?).
One final bit of evidence about the degree of likelihood and seriousness with which the Marines view amphibious assault is that the Marines have never conducted an exercise using their own doctrine of assaulting from 25-50+ miles – because they know it can’t be done with the capabilities they currently have. Further, there is no serious investigation of 25-50+ mile connectors being conducted. Recall any photo you’ve ever seen of Marine amphibious exercises. The AAVs are pictured coming ashore in neat rows with a giant amphibious ship parked just offshore so that the AAVs had a very short ride to the beach (barely getting wet in the process!). Great photo op but worthless training.
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| Amphibious Assault Exercise - note the proximity of the host ship |
If the Marines are serious about amphibious assault – and that’s a huge ‘if’ – they desperately need a complete family of vehicles identical in function to the post-WWII LVT family. If the Marines are not serious about amphibious assault, as the preponderance of evidence suggests, then they need to stop wasting money on ACVs which will never be used.
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(1)”Marines Under Armor”, Kenneth W. Estes, Naval Institute Press, 2000
(2)http://www.benning.army.mil/armor/eARMOR/content/issues/1993/MAR_APR/ArmorMarchApril1993web.pdf , p. 13
They really need a basic anti-aircraft gun to deal with drones and UAVs. The 30mm it has is not designed for that. Five years ago, I wrote about the need for two new simple AAV variants, a mortar carrier and SPAAG.
ReplyDeletehttps://www.g2mil.com/AAV-Variants.htm
A pity the AAV is no longer produced in the US, and being retired. The variants you propose will make sense for the ACV, but the USMC needs to recognize the need and make the necessary investments.
DeleteI'm tempted to suggest a US Army-Marine Corps joint project to manufacture turrets compatible with both the Stryker and the ACV, so both services will have the necessary air defense and self-propelled artillery (120mm mortar, 105mm direct fire, whatever is needed) variants; but I'm morbidly certain the Marines will sabotage the project due to their desire for "variants tailored to [their] unique operational requirements," wasting billions before the project is inevitably cancelled.
"the need for two new simple AAV variants, a mortar carrier and SPAAG."
DeleteA mortar carrier, without question although I'd prefer an armor-enclosed mortar carrier vehicle. I understand that your article was focused on quickly achievable, inexpensive options and there is nothing wrong with that and a whole lot right!
Regarding SPAAG capability. The prevalence of small UAVs and quadcopters has changed the anti-air requirement somewhat in that large caliber guns (25-40 mm) are vast overkill and may not be efficient/effective against much smaller targets as opposed to larger helos and large UAVs. I wonder if a different weapons mix is needed today or, alternatively, if a separate, dedicated anti-quadcopter/small UAV vehicle/weapon is needed. I just don't know enough about land combat to say. Any thoughts?
Big Army appears to be looking at a microwave DEW variant of the Stryker for the CUAS mission. The rationale seems to be that you can sweep microwave beams into the air and fry small UAVs, while the larger UAVs are serviced by IM-SHORAD Stryker with its 30mm autocannon firing VT-fuse HE-Frag and Stinger missiles.
Delete"A mortar carrier, without question although I'd prefer an armor-enclosed mortar carrier vehicle."
DeleteFor an AMPHIBIOUS vehicle, the mortar definitely needs to be a turret-mounted, breech-loading weapon. Firing it from a rooftop hatch, the way ARMY vehicles do so, is just begging for water to get in through the hatch and sink the vehicle.
The idea of shooting mortars while floating ashore creates such inaccuracy that it is a non-starter. The concept would be to shoot once the vehicle is ashore. The benefit of mounting the mortar on an ACV is float ashore the same time as the supported infantry and have sufficient mobility to keep up with the infantry in the personnel variants instead of arriving after the battle is won like artillery currently does so that you have to rely on Air and Naval Gunfire for a shorter period of time.
DeleteThe idea of putting a 120mm mortar on a ACV like the 81mm on a LAV has great merit and must be done if we are serious about providing fire support to grunts. Even better would be a short barreled 105mm howitzer like the Hawkeye if it can be made to work.
We can't get the money back spent on ACV and the earlier replacement, but we can look at how to address the issue in the future. Many places won't only be wet at the beach like Camp Pendleton. The vehicles should be able to handle river and other wetlands. Take the beach out of it and work on a cheaper, more numerous fast, long range connector. With the M-1 out of the picture, MSV(L) customised to Marine Corps needs might be a start.
ReplyDeleteI'm not disagreeing but you/we need to consider what it is the Marines actually need given their greatly reduced mission set. They've dropped armor (tanks) so they're not viable for the high end fight. They've dropped much of their artillery and mortars. They lack mortar carriers and any effective means of anti-air so they're not even viable for the middle weight fight. That only leaves the very low end, light infantry missions. How many of those are there in a high end war?
DeleteThe point is, before we begin spec'ing assets for the Marines, we need to clearly understand what missions they capable of performing and what capabilities/assets are required for those missions.
The reality is that there's not a lot of use for light infantry in peer war. Of course, if the Marines have devolved to just quasi-peacetime patrol work, one has to question why they even exist and certainly not at the manning and equipment levels they're at.
"They've dropped armor (tanks) so they're not viable for the high end fight. They've dropped much of their artillery and mortars. They lack mortar carriers and any effective means of anti-air so they're not even viable for the middle weight fight."
DeleteAll of which I think are mistakes. The Marines seem to be intent on ensuring their own irrelevancy, leading seemingly to their ultimate extinction or incorporation into the Army.
" China's type 05 amphibious armored vehicle also achieved this high speed on water "
ReplyDeleteThis statement is incorrect. Comment deleted. The Type 05 has a water speed of around 15 kts. The EFV was designed to have a water speed of around 25 kts.
(A historical note from WW2 during the landings at Algiers) Probably the longest run-in attempted was the LCVPs of the Thomas Stone when she was torpedoed and adrift. As the convoy steamed away, she began launching her 24 landing craft a day early and 160 miles at sea. They made sixty miles before multiple engine failures and sinkings made the 700 troops make the rest of the journey aboard their escorting British corvette
ReplyDeleteThere are other amphibious missions besides assault. Raids, demonstrations, withdrawals, and "support of other operations" are all part of amphibious doctrine. The ACV is valuable there too.
ReplyDeleteThere are also assaults that aren't against cruise missile armed opponents (e.g. Grenada).
"Raids, demonstrations, withdrawals, and "support of other operations" are all part of amphibious doctrine. The ACV is valuable there too."
DeleteThat's theoretically true, however, those instances are vanishingly rare in semi-modern history. The larger point from this is that those kind of small, low end actions do not justify a 180,000 man Marine Corps with its own air force. It also does not justify an inventory of hundreds/thousands (depending on which projection you read) of new ACVs.
The Marines need to decide who/what they are and if they are a missile-shooting, recon/counter-recon force then their size and assets can be cut by 75% ... or simply disbanded and the missions can be turned over to the Army.
In aggregate, these other types of amphibious operations are far more prevalent than assaults.
Deletehttps://www.mccdc.marines.mil/Portals/172/Docs/MCCDC/Command%20Briefs/Why%20Do%20We%20Need%20Amphibious%20Forces.pdf#page=14
1990-2011,
Number of Amphibious Operations
34 HA/DR
13 Peace Operations/Nation Assist
40 Other (No Fly/Show of Force, Ect)
20 NEO/Embassy Spt
22 Asslt, Raid, Strike & Demo
8 Other
Total 137 Missions
I agree that this doesn't justify 180k Marines. In general, I'm not in favor of penny packeting airpower, but the flexibility of MAGTFs having their own mini-air force is valuable in these missions.
The current ACV program calls for 682 vehicles.
I'm personally in favor of the Marines taking the forward deployed, battalion and smaller missions, and handing off the large scale missions (i.e. assaults, large EBOs) to the Army.
This would imply a smaller USMC.
"Number of Amphibious Operations"
DeleteTo the best of my recollection, not one of those operations involved amphibious assault and the use of AAVs in the amphibious role which argues against the acquisition of more ACVs.
However, those are all in the past. Given the Marine's new missions and apparent abandonment of old missions, there is even less need for amphibious AAV/ACVs.
As an aside, that list is mostly fiction being used to try to justify the Marines. For example, HA/DR is not even a military mission. Handing out meals is not a military or amphibious assault mission and the military has no business doing it. The rest, as I recall, barely technically qualify as legitimate missions. There are a few embassy protection missions which are legitimate but those typically involved a dozen personnel or so - technically a mission but hardly justification for the existence of the Marine Corps. That list is a public relations attempt at justification wherein every activity that involved a Marine was counted as a 'mission'. Almost none were legitimate combat related or combat relevant missions. For example, to the best of my recollection, the Marines have never been involved in the enforcement of no-fly zones.
The Marines appear to be hanging on to the old MAGTF with one hand (while eliminating tanks and artillery!) to justify their continued budget share while simultaneously redefining themselves to a very light infantry, missile-shooting, recon group which does not require amphibious assault capability (and, hence, new ACVs) nor any great amount of manning or aviation.
The Marines, themselves, have publicly stated that they are out of the assault business. With no amphibious plans, that leaves the MAGTF as dumbed down version of the army without the armor and artillery to actually be an army.
"The larger point from this is that those kind of small, low end actions do not justify a 180,000 man Marine Corps with its own air force."
DeleteI think that's the problem with Marine leadership. In an environment where winning budget battles is more important than winning war battles, their focus is on maintaining the 180,000 number, and they are scrambling madly to find ways of doing that, even ways that make no sense. It appears that the only way to sustain that number, and in fact the only reason that number exists in the first place, is to play baby army for the Army (with a baby air force to boot). But if that's the reason for that number, why not just merge with the Army? The Marine leadership is fascinated with trying to justify a force size that makes no sense and are coming up with dumber and stupider ideas of how to do it, ultimately leading themselves into oblivion.
Instead of maintaining force size, why not come up with a unique mission or missions and focus on them? When the Royal Marines were facing similar budgetary extinction after WWII, they reinvented themselves as an amphibious/commando organization. The RMs took over the Brit equivalent of SOCOM and every combat RM today is commando trained and qualified.
I think that is where the USMC needs to go. Merge SOCOM and the Marines and give the Marines primary responsibility for asymmetric and counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare. Let the Army focus on large force strategy and tactics, and the Marines on small unit operations. Even in peer warfare there are plenty of them. SOCOM is roughly 30,000, and let the other branches keep about 10,000 each in SEALs, Green Berets, and AFSOC, and use them the way the Brits use SAS and SBS to supplement the RMs. Every Marine E-5 and above would be commando trained and qualified.
For amphibious warfare, assume 30,000 Fleet Marines deployed/deployable and maintain the Marines' current 3:1 rotation. That’s a potential headcount of 90,000, including Marine air. Amphib ops would focus on assaults to defend or retake parts of the first island chain, or similarly in the eastern Med or Baltic or Persian/Arabian Gulf, port seizure against the Chinese string of pearls ports, and other amphibious missions including disaster relief (important to building alliances in Asia/Pacific).
Marine air would focus on ship-shore movement and close air support (CAS) of Marines ashore, giving up the air superiority mission to the Navy. In return, perhaps give the air strike mission to Marine air, so that Navy air focuses on air superiority. Carriers would carry a full load of VF aircraft and swap out for a squadron or two of VMA when the mission required.
USN would have to make some considerable changes to support this concept:
- Revise the amphib fleet to support the amphib mission. This requires some combination amphib ships that can be risked closer in and ship-shore connectors that can be effective from further out, until connector range equals or exceeds the standoff distance. Connectors must include a complete family of vehicles to address all needs, including an amphibious tank like the Chinese ZDT-05. And no LAWs.
- Bring back big guns on cruisers and/or battlewagons, plus more 5-inch guns on destroyers and at least 3-inch guns on frigates, instead of the current 57mm popguns.
- Provide realistic training to perfect strategy and tactics.
You would end up with a Corps size of 30,000 commandos, 90,000 amphibious forces, and maybe 10,000 additional admin, for a total of 130,000 active Marines. The 50,000 decrease in actives could be offset by a 50,000 increase (roughly doubling) in reserves to provide the same end strength. I doubt the current Marine leadership would go for this, because their budget would clearly get smaller. But their force would be more focused and unique, and those things are probably needed for survival. And some of the budget savings could go to the Navy to help pay for those things it needs to do to support the amphibious mission.
The 30,000 deployed/deployable amphibious force is based on the Marines' historic 2 MEB requirement.
Delete"However, those are all in the past. Given the Marine's new missions and apparent abandonment of old missions, there is even less need for amphibious AAV/ACVs."
DeleteThey haven't abandoned any missions other than large-scale, opposed amphibious assault. Minor assaults against less defended opponents are on the table, AFAIK. As are the other stated Marine missions.
"For example, HA/DR is not even a military mission."
As far as the US military and government is concerned, it is.
But that doesn't matter as much in the ACV/AAV discussion. They aren't often used in HA/DR, unless there's a need to traverse difficult terrain or there are security concerns.
IMHO, the MAGTF construct still works for these forward-deployed missions. They have to be a self-contained unit, with mission enablers. The wide variety of potential tasks Marines and the Navy can be called upon to perform caters to a flexible force design. Whether it needs to be as big and extensive as the current MEU/ESG is another question. Maybe we could build a MAGTF that has fewer Marines and doesn't require three $2-4B amphibious ships and all their Guicci kit (V-22s, F-35s).
IMHO, ACVs are still valuable for this type of Swiss Army knife organization. They aren't THAT much more expensive than Strykers (around $1M more each), and they can actually fit a full Marine squad (unlike a Stryker). And they are far more valuable on land than the old AAVs.
"They haven't abandoned any missions other than large-scale, opposed amphibious assault."
DeleteThey most certainly have! By dropping armor (tanks) and greatly reducing artillery and mortars, they've eliminated any mission involving more than handgun/rifle firepower. They may not have publicly listed the abandoned missions but they most certainly have eliminated themselves from all but the lowest level of missions.
"the MAGTF construct still works for these forward-deployed missions. They have to be a self-contained unit, with mission enablers."
Lacking armor (tanks), a true infantry fighting vehicle, and with greatly reduced artillery and mortars, MAGTF is no longer a self-contained, complete combat unit. They now have only a very limited subset of missions that they can accomplish with only very light infantry. Worse, the Commandant has indicated that F-35s and MV-22s are now being reconsidered which obviously means an eye towards reduction in numbers. They Marines are likely to go even lighter which means even fewer uses for them beyond embassy protection which is not an amphibious mission and does not justify AAV/ACVs.
The Marines, in the past, stated that the MEU was the smallest force capable of self-contained combat operations. Having removed tanks, artillery, and heavy mortars, the MEU is no longer capable of self-contained combat operations.
The Marines are, quite literally, eliminating themselves from combat relevancy for US military operations.
"By dropping armor (tanks) and greatly reducing artillery and mortars, they've eliminated any mission involving more than handgun/rifle firepower. "
DeleteThe Marines still have or are planning to buy,
- 7 artillery batteries
- 21 missile and HIMARS batteries
- LAV-25s / ARVs
- 30mm-armed ACVs
- fighters
- attack helos
- loitering munitions
- armed UAVs
- mortars
- ATGMs
I would've preferred they keep the tanks, but they do still have a fair amount of firepower available to them.
They are heavier than the 13 Army IBCTs (41% of the active force).
"I think that is where the USMC needs to go. Merge SOCOM and the Marines and give the Marines primary responsibility for asymmetric and counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare."
DeleteThis is an interesting idea, but I think ultimately it doesn't work. SOCOM is special because of how selective it is. It gets to pick the top x% of each service. OTOH, anyone can be a Marine. That's not to say the Marines aren't well trained and capable, but they just aren't as selective.
If I was emperor for a day, I'd merge the Marines in with the Army, where they should have been all along. One land service, with a Marine branch. The Army then becomes the land forces provider for amphibious missions just like it is for airborne, air assault, and so on.
Then there's no tension of having a separate Marine service that is sized based on arbitrary Title 10 requirements written into law. "shall be so organized as to include not less than three combat divisions and three air wings"? Why not 4 divisions and 5 air wings? 1 and 3? 6 and 10? These are just arbitrary numbers not reflective of any need.
It also eliminates the need for the USMC to constantly fight for relevance and budget at the expense of other services. Many navalists today look to the Army budget when they feel more money is needed for the Navy, but they should be looking to the USMC first, IMHO. We need a 170,000 Marine second land army far less.
"This is an interesting idea, but I think ultimately it doesn't work. SOCOM is special because of how selective it is. It gets to pick the top x% of each service. OTOH, anyone can be a Marine. That's not to say the Marines aren't well trained and capable, but they just aren't as selective."
DeleteThe Royal Marines make it work, but granted they are probably more selective than the USMC. The USMC is probably the most selective USA branch (the few, the proud), and with a reduction in size could become more selective. And not every Marine would be a commando under the approach outlined. Commando training would occur at the E-5 level, meaning most would have completed one enlistment and been evaluated. Marine officers and senior NCOs would be commando qualified, meaning tat leadership would reflect commando training that could be useful in almost any type of small unit ops.
As far as merging the Marines into the Army, Marines have historically been a sea service, and as such share some commonality with the Navy that can come in handy wen planning operations. If sufficient separation of missions can be maintained, a separate service can be justified. The problem is that as long as the Marines are trying to be a baby army with a baby air force, that separation cannot be maintained. To Marine leadership, the problem is that a focused Corps cannot justify 180,000 personnel, and they are more about winning budget battles than war battles.
Lose the baby army and baby air force pieces. Focus Marines on unique missions, and Marine air on supporting those missions, and live with whatever sized Corps tat justifies.
"The Marines still have or are planning to buy,"
DeleteAccording to the Marine's 2030 plan, the artillery batteries will be reduced to 5. The remaining batteries are towed artillery which is considered to be not survivable on the modern battlefield.
The Marines have no 30 mm ACVs. Plans mean nothing.
Do I need to list all the plans that have never come to fruition?
Heavy 120 mm mortars have been eliminated.
Bridging units are being eliminated.
MV-22 squadrons will be cut to 14.
Attack helo squadrons will be cut to 5.
Heavy lift helo squadrons will be cut to 5.
The Army can and should have a good planning relationship with the Navy. There's no reason why an Army marine branch couldn't have this. Forcing the two services to work together on a day-to-day basis would be a significant win, on par with the USAF/Army having to sort out their CAS issues over the years.
DeleteThe problem with USMC vs SOCOM "selectivity" is not just the standards set, but the pool you start from. SOCOM starts from the pool of existing service members. OTOH, the USMC is recruiting from the general US population. So SOCOM is already starting with a more selective pool.
As far as Marine air, their mission set requires airpower, especially rotary. Having a penny packet of fixed wing air is useful too, but organizing it with the Marines means they don't look at the problem from the overall force perspective. They're siloed to think about just their mission set.
"The remaining batteries are towed artillery which is considered to be not survivable on the modern battlefield."
DeleteThe batteries have always been towed, so there's no change there. M777s have been surprisingly survivable in Ukraine, but this is probably due to Russian weakness rather than intrinsic towed arty survivability. Given the Marine mission set, focusing on towed artillery that can be airlifted by CH-53K makes sense. Non-amphibious SPGs stuck on an amphib waiting for connectors is just wasted space and weight. I'd like to see a 105mm SPG based on the ACV, but it seems like a fairly low priority. A new, long-range, lightweight, towed 105mm would also be valuable both for the Marines and Army. The South African G7 is a good model of what's possible. But this too seems like a lower priority.
The Marines don't need bridging units for contingency and EABO operations, so eliminating them makes sense.
The other reductions seem reasonable, and significant capability still remains.
USMC is just in search of relevancy and a mission. When was the last they actually stormed a shore under fire against committed defenders? Korea.
ReplyDelete"When was the last they actually stormed a shore under fire against committed defenders?"
DeleteThat question can be asked of almost every element of the US military. When was the last time a US submarine launched a torpedo in anger? When was the last time a US bomber dropped a nuclear bomb? When was the last time US airborne troops parachuted into combat? And so on.
Most military functions are maintained on a 'just in case' basis. That does not, by itself, render the function unnecessary. It is perfectly legitimate to question whether a function is needed but not having been used in some time is not, by itself, a relevant issue or rationale for elimination of the function.