As we’ve seen, the United States attempted to deter Russia from invading Ukraine. However, despite the combined military might of all of Europe plus the mammoth presence of the US forces based in Europe, Russia went ahead and invaded Ukraine. Obviously, deterrence failed. This failure offers us a chance to analyze the concept of deterrence and how deterrent efforts were applied and why they failed. Let’s examine this case objectively.
Note: This is a discussion of deterrence in the abstract. None of this discussion should be viewed as a judgment or stance on the desirability of supporting Ukraine, or not. That’s a separate issue. The point is that the US made the attempt to deter Russia and it failed. We can learn from that.
What deterrent actions did we attempt?
Deterrent Actions
Forward Presence. Europe is the very definition of forward presence. The number of troops, vehicles, aircraft, and ships surrounding Russia is almost uncountable and yet Russia was undeterred. Why?
Proponents of forward presence – meaning overseas bases and forward deployed ships – claim that our forward presence is a deterrent. This is the proffered justification for the endless, soul-sucking, maintenance-shredding, several month long deployments the Navy conducts. We have forward presence all over the world. In Europe, the US has something on the order of 60,000 troops and a couple of hundred aircraft. In addition, the US has Army divisions based in the continental US that can deploy anywhere in the world in 24 hrs and Air Force aircraft that can strike anywhere in the world in 24 hrs.
It would be difficult to achieve a greater degree of forward presence than that which faces Russia and yet Russia was undeterred. Why?
Clearly, forward presence, alone, is not a deterrent.
Sanctions. The US threatened Russia with sanctions but publicly removed the most significant ones from consideration. The remaining sanction options simply offered no significant pain to Putin. Beyond that, Russia/Putin has never been impressed or influenced by sanctions so there was no reason to believe that watered down sanctions would accomplish anything … and they didn’t. Putin clearly recognized US sanction threats for the hollow threats they were.
Aid. The Russian invasion did not occur instantaneously, with no warning. The military buildup took place over an extended period. The US had the opportunity to supply Ukraine with sufficient weapons to possibly act as a deterrent but, ultimately, opted not to. A RAND blog article cites US military aid to Ukraine in the amount of $2.5B since 2014.[1] That averages out to around $310M/yr. Aid was limited to lightweight arms and supporting equipment such as radios.[1] Thus, the aid provided to Ukraine was insufficient in quantity or impact to provide a deterrent effect.
Information Warfare. The USMC and the Navy, among other military and governmental organizations, have set up information warfare groups.[2,3] The US’ attempt to conduct information warfare (whatever that might mean) was a total failure. We failed to shape the narrative and failed to win the global perception battle. We issued a steady stream of confusing and conflicting statements about ‘minor incursions’ and limited sanctions. Our information warfare efforts (again, whatever that might mean) were an abject failure.
Willpower. ComNavOps has repeatedly stated that presence, without the willingness to use that presence, is useless and this was an object lesson about the validity of that premise. Of all the countries and forces amassed against Russia, none were willing to use their force. That being the case, they may as well have disbanded and saved the cost of maintaining forces. For the US’ part, the Biden administration made it crystal clear that they would not respond in any significant way to a Russian invasion. This unwillingness to respond with forceful action is not just a Biden administration failing. Under previous administrations, the Iranians seized our riverine boats and crews because they knew the US would not respond. The Iranians shot down and seized our UAVs because they knew the US would not respond. The Chinese seized our UUV because they knew the US would not respond. And the list goes on endlessly.
It is likely not a coincidence that Russia chose the Obama administration as the time to annex Crimea and the Biden administration as the time to invade Ukraine rather than the Trump administration. This has nothing to do with Democrat/Republican politics and everything to do with geopolitical willpower regardless of administration.
All the deterrent actions in the world will not work if they are not backed up by the willingness to take forceful action, both militarily and non-kinetically.
Conclusion
A consideration of the above leads to the following inexorable conclusion:
There is no such thing as deterrence as a stand alone entity. To have any hope, whatsoever, of an effective deterrent effect, the deterrent effort must be backed by ironclad willpower and the willingness – even eagerness – to use force.
This, then, leads to the obvious conclusion that the only truly effective deterrent is force and that really means that the enemy (the target of the attempted deterrence) must believe, deep in his psyche, that we will use force and will do so in a very painful manner. That belief can only come from having witnessed or been the subject of such displays of force in the past.
Without the enemy’s absolute belief that we will use force, no other action or threat has the slightest deterrent effect.
Now, not all forceful deterrent effects need to be kinetic military actions - although that is the preferred action and the root of truly effective deterrence. There are other actions that can be ‘forceful’.
Cyber Attacks. We could have conducted massive cyber attacks on Russia during the build up phase. After all, Russia is the source of most of the crippling ransomware attacks on the US so they’re long overdue for retaliation. The Russian government is well aware of, and sanctions, the ransomware attacks. Widespread cyber disruptions would have hindered Russian military actions, caused unrest among the population, and refocused Putin’s attention on domestic emergencies.
Trade Embargo. We could have halted all trade with Russia and strong armed the rest of the West into co-operating. The impact of that, alone, would likely have dissuaded Putin.
Economic War. We could have frozen all Russian banking assets/monies, halted all economic transactions, and conducted a coordinated campaign to devalue the Russian currency.
While these actions would, potentially, be effective to varying degrees, there is still no substitute for punishing, lethal, military action.
Relevance
This is a Navy blog so how does all of this relate to the US Navy?
- Forward deployments clearly provide no deterrent effect and are not only useless but are significantly counter-productive both in terms of trying to stabilize a region and in terms of negatively impacting our own combat readiness by increasing wear and tear on men and ships while deferring required maintenance.
- If we want to have any chance at providing a deterrent effect from forward deployment, we simply must begin applying force. Our philosophy must change from appeasement to forceful confrontation and our rules of engagement must be modified to allow disproportionate, escaltory, pre-emptive and reactive force to be applied so as to instill bone-deep, painful lessons in enemies. We must lose our fear of escalation and embrace it as our standard. If someone shoots down our UAV, we need to destroy an entire airbase of theirs. If someone captures our riverine boat, we need to destroy an entire naval base. If someone points a rifle at us, we need to kill every enemy soldier in sight. The bone-deep lesson is that you don’t screw with the US. That, and that alone, will offer the possibility of effective deterrence in the future.
- We need to design and procure weapons and equipment that can be used in the ‘short of war’ region of the spectrum. See, “Island Showdown”.
Implication
World events don’t happen in isolation. China is taking careful note of what has transpired with the Ukraine situation. Taiwan has to be watching the Ukraine events in sheer terror. The US/West lack of response has given China the go-ahead to invade Taiwan with no fear of any significant response or repercussion. Taiwan is as good as gone.
Note: If you care to comment, be warned: we are not going to discuss partisan politics and I will moderate such with a heavy hand. If you care to comment, do so with data and logic, not emotions.
__________________________________
[1]The RAND Blog, Charap and Boston, 21-Jan-2022,
https://www.rand.org/blog/2022/01/us-military-aid-to-ukraine-a-silver-bullet.html
[3]https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2020/01/wheres-destruction.html
I think the failure in information warfare seems to be the key here. During the current crisis Russia played itself as the victim that is merely reacting to foreign aggression and the West played unknowingly along by trying to not provoke an incident that could be spun into such a narrative. Not realising that this narrative can be made up anyway. Instead they should have acted more aggressively and have used information warfare to suppress the enemy narrative while pushing their own.
ReplyDelete"Instead they should have acted more aggressively and have used information warfare to suppress the enemy narrative while pushing their own."
DeleteDo you think a better narrative would have stopped Russia from invading? Is it as simple as that … a better story?
What, specifically, could we have done with information warfare that would have been effective?
I'll offer one example that answers my own question: the US kept trying to deter an invasion while simultaneously assuring that there would be no invasion. You can't have it both ways. Trying to deter something you claim won't happen just leads to a wishy-washy, unconvincing story that contradicts itself. We came off looking clueless. We needed to pick a narrative and stick with it.
I'll give you another specific example. We could have published polls showing that the majority of Ukrainians were against Russian involvement and did not want independence. The fact that there was no such poll is immaterial. It would have served to change the narrative and counter Russia's claims. Information warfare is not about the truth (although that helps!). It's about establishing a winning narrative. If you have to lie to do it, that's simply a tool in the information warfare tool kit. Russia proved that truth is not a concern.
Now, what about your list of specific actions?
I think that is is a sure bet that S. Korea is very soon to be under "New Management" as well.
ReplyDeleteUnlike the US, the South Korean government isn't under the delusion it can deter aggressors "on the cheap"- it has the draft to ensure its military has the manpower needed to accomplish its tasks, it doesn't waste that manpower by sending military personnel on so-called "peacekeeping missions" that do nothing other than raise a government leader's approval points (and give a clever enemy opportunities to inflict a "defeat in detail" on the military units deployed), and its military leaders remain more focused on "defend Korea against foreign enemies" than "defend Korean minds against the heteronormative, white supremacist patriarchy."
DeleteNorth Korea's constant threats against its southern neighbor- including artillery barrages- keep South Koreans focused on real threats, instead of the imaginary ones occupying too many American minds.
I would also add that your deployed forces have to be ready to fight at very short notice. As you've stated, a MAU that is engaged in various training and force building exercises and is scattered across the map is not a credible deterrent as its obvious going to take it days to reoganize into fighting order.
ReplyDeleteShips have to be reasonably close the proposed theater of action with a full war load of plans and ordanance along with logistics support.
I think the biggest sin of the US military is the huge gap between the size of the force deployed and the combat power that it can provide. We may have 60,000 troops in Europe, but we only have ~8,000 ground combat troops and their heaviest asset are 300 Strykers. Plus 48 AH-64 helos in the aviation regiment and an artillery brigade.
Not exactly going to put the fear of god into the Russians.
I also find it ironic that the forward deployed forces are airborne and Stryker brigades which are very light in exchange for strategic mobility. So, the inference could be that they are not really intended for combat in Europe, but rather to be rapidly deployed from Europe to elsewhere, like Africa.
And of course the Navy basically has no capability to quickly move heavy formations from CONUS to Europe so they have pretty much failed one of their primary missions. Carrier decks really aren't going to be helpful here, nor are cruise missile strikes unless we are planning to sail a task force into the Black Sea. Pretty sure that's not a good idea.
Once again, I am reminded of ComNavOps statement that the US is fundamentally unprepared for serious combat against anything close to a peer level. We have been spending billions of dollars on a military is pretty much useless here.
"I would also add that your deployed forces have to be ready to fight at very short notice."
DeleteThat would be nice, yes, but crises rarely arise overnight. Generally we have time to build up forces. For example, Russia began massing forces on the Ukraine border as far back as Mar 2021. Had we reacted beginning then, we would have had 11 months to build up a force.
A more pertinent aspect to your statement about being ready to fight at short notice is the requirement to be MENTALLY ready to fight at short notice. The riverine boats and crews that Iran seized had several times the numbers and firepower of the Iranians but were mentally completely unprepared to fight regardless of how big an advantage in numbers or firepower we had.
I only slightly jokingly have posed the question, what would we do if an Iranian helo flew up to a carrier of ours, landed, and demanded that we surrender the carrier? I'm not at all confident that we wouldn't surrender. We did exactly that with the riverine incident. The only difference is scale. Would that really matter since we're not mentally ready to fight?
There is a lot that was written here, far too much for me to tackle in one post; so I will concentrate on two arguments of yours.
ReplyDelete1) That forward presence is an ineffective deterrent.
Firstly, the Russia invasion example only proves that forward presence is an insufficient deterrent. But that's no surprise, there is no sufficient deterrent by definition, there are only degrees of deterrence. No matter how strong your deterrence consists of it will always be possible for it to fail. Even if everyone is absolutely convinced that you will start a thermonuclear war over the slightest infraction, that will be of no help if you are facing a madman dictator who has no qualms with getting into a nuclear conflict.
Thus, a real analysis of the deterrent effect of any forward presence must look at its relative impact; your absolute expectations (it failed to stop one conflict) are completely unrealistic).
"To have any hope, whatsoever, of an effective deterrent effect, the deterrent effort must be backed by ironclad willpower and the willingness – even eagerness – to use force.
This, then, leads to the obvious conclusion that the only truly effective deterrent is force "
No that doesn't follow. Just because it's necessarily true that use of force (or the threat of it) is needed for deterrence, it doesn't follow that forward presence can't also have a deterrent effect. In fact, they often complement each other.
2) Your point about escalatory tactics being the most effective deterrent.
"Our philosophy must... must be modified to allow disproportionate, escalatory, pre-emptive and reactive force to be applied so as to instill bone-deep, painful lessons in enemies...If someone shoots down our UAV, we need to destroy and entire airbase of theirs."
Maybe this might be an effective tactic if we were faced with a competitor that posed an asymmetric low-level threat, but clearly this will be a completely bonkers tactic to employ against a peer competitor like China.
Consider the logic, according to you this is the best deterrent strategy, meaning that a rational actor should behave in the manner you prescribed. Therefore, it follows that China should also escalate (in order to try to deter us) when we do something to them (like bombing a UAV base) because they shot down one of our UAV's. This inevitably leads to nuclear war, which of course means we (and China) failed to deter anyone from doing anything.
In fact, we basically failed to the largest extent humanly possible. And yet such an example is not only possible, but is the only logical outcome of your proposed "escalate to deter" policy.
" there are only degrees of deterrence."
DeleteNo, deterrence, like pregnancy, is a binary condition. You are or you are not pregnant. You deterred or you did not.
"it will always be possible for it to fail."
Of course. In fact, failure is the default condition and successful deterrence is vanishingly rare. To be fair, it's also very difficult to prove successful deterrence.
"it doesn't follow that forward presence can't also have a deterrent effect."
It absolutely does follow and you acknowledged it without, apparently, realizing it when you stated,
"Just because it's necessarily true that use of force (or the threat of it) is needed for deterrence"
You acknowledged the absolute link between force and deterrence! Therefore, it absolutely DOES follow that forward presence can't have a deterrent effect, ABSENT THE USE OF FORCE.
"clearly this will be a completely bonkers tactic to employ against a peer competitor like China."
No, it's not clear. Why would this not work? In fact, China has been using exactly this tactic against us and has been totally successful. We fly a recon flight IN INTERNATIONAL AIR SPACE, and they respond by forcing our aircraft down, seizing the crew, stripping the aircraft, and sending the parts to Russia. That's massive escalation relative to the initiating event which was a routine, PERMISSIBLE flight. I can go on with examples but you know the litany as well as I do.
"Therefore, it follows that China should also escalate (in order to try to deter us) when we do something to them (like bombing a UAV base) because they shot down one of our UAV's."
DeleteYou're completing failing to grasp the concept of initiation and response. The response I'm advocating occurs ONLY after an unprovoked, initiating event. If an enemy (China) wishes to avoid an spiraling tit-for-tat series of escalations, they have only to refrain from the initiating event. Simple as that.
You have fallen prey to the common fallacy of believing that only we are required to avoid escalation while our enemies are free to escalate as they wish with no consequences. Why are only we subject to, and responsible for, consequences? This is the rationalization of fear and timidity. Even your own example recognized the existence of an unprovoked, initiating event (the shoot down of our UAV) and yet you allow fear to paralyze you thought process and limit your response options to ?nothing?
If an enemy is willing to escalate from an incident of their own making all the way to all out war then they were determined to initiate a war anyway and if it hadn't been that incident, they would have manufactured another one.
" clearly this will be a completely bonkers tactic to employ against a peer competitor like China. "
Let's turn this around and rewrite it as, " clearly this will be a completely bonkers tactic to employ against a peer competitor like America." If the logic applies in one direction, it must apply in the other, right? So, China would be completely 'bonkers' to escalate against us and yet, as I've pointed out, they do it routinely and without fear of consequences. Far from 'inevitably' leading to nuclear war as you claim … nothing happened.
In fact, one can make a very good argument that China's policy of routine escalation has, indeed, deterred us from operating freely in the South China Sea. We have gone from free operations to very few, very brief, very restricted, very limited, and very useless Freedom of Navigation operations and have backed off all interference with China's many illegal operations.
When China forced down and seized our EP-3, we should have immediately bombed and destroyed the aircraft to prevent it's disassembly and we should have escalated to include bombing the entire base the aircraft was held at. If China wanted to go to war over an illegal act of war on their part, so be it … but they would not any more than we would.
When the bully takes your lunch money, you don't take his in retaliation. You beat him to a pulp so that he'll never consider messing with you again.
Agree with this ⬆⬆ completely CNO, and was exactly what I was trying but failing to express in the previous post!!!
Delete"If someone captures our riverine boat, we need to destroy an entire naval base...disproportionate, escaltory, pre-emptive and reactive..."
Precisely!! Hold a press conference, and announce the new US ROIs. Then take all the blue stuff off the rails and wait for the first examples to step forward. We need to stop being the ones that break the escalation chain!!
ComNavOps,
ReplyDelete"You acknowledged the absolute link between force and deterrence! Therefore, it absolutely DOES follow that forward presence can't have a deterrent effect, ABSENT THE USE OF FORCE."
But that's not what I was disputing, what I was taking issue with was your quote that "Forward deployments clearly provide NO (emphasis mine) deterrent effect and are not only useless but are significantly counter-productive"
It's pretty clear that you weren't just trying to say that forward deployments without the use/threat of force are insufficient but were going a step further and saying that forward deployments (even with force) are either redundant or counterproductive. But that doesn't follow from the belief that use/threat of force is a necessary component of deterrence. Just because something is a necessary component of something, doesn't mean that it's the sole determining factor.
Being an American citizen is a necessary condition of being the president of the United States, but clearly not the only qualifying factor.
"You're completing failing to grasp the concept of initiation and response. The response I'm advocating occurs ONLY after an unprovoked, initiating event"
The problem with this approach is that it fails to account for the relativity of what constitutes a provocation. The United States might think that China started it because they shot down their drone in international waters in the Spratly islands. China might think that the US started the conflict because they flew their drone in their national airspace. Each side is convinced that they are right in their response and that the other started a completely unprovoked action.
"yet you allow fear to paralyze you thought process and limit your response options to? nothing?"
That's not what I'm saying. Of course we should give a response, but it should be (in most circumstances) limited and not intentionally escalatory. Just as you wouldn't pull out your gun and shoot someone (I would hope) if they spat near your shoe but would instead take a more moderate response. Of course, there are exceptions, if you were convinced that they were trying to instigate armed conflict anyway, then it might make sense to pull out your gun and get them to back off. The problem is that you're advocating for extreme escalation as a de facto policy, which doesn't take into account that not everyone is intent on being a super malicious actor. In real life we have to take into account context.
"So, China would be completely 'bonkers' to escalate against us and yet, as I've pointed out, they do it routinely and without fear of consequences."
I completely disagree. You're just coming up with examples of 'provocations', but that's an entirely separate matter from a strategy of escalating to deter, which is not something that China possesses. For example, do you really believe that if we forced down one of their H-6 recon bombers over Guam, that they would respond (in normal times, not pre-war) by escalating and bombing the aircraft and associated areas at Andersen?
Does the PLAN try to ram/sink our ships when we conduct FONOPS through what they regard as their territorial waters?
There's no doubt that we've been deterred in the south China Sea, but that deterrence comes (ironically) from their forward staged presence. It's the presence of Chinese military installations which makes the USN more reluctant to approach or overfly the islands, and not some mythical escalate to deter strategy on the part of China.
That's also why the bully analogy fails because in the bully case it's pretty clear that he/she is determined to escalate from the very beginning, so of course it makes sense to preempt their escalations if you see no other (desirable) way to deconflict. But that's not the case in any of your examples. China did not cause the Hainan incident because they wanted to start an armed conflict with the US, nor did Russia invade Ukraine because they want to win some kind of limited nuclear exchange.
DeleteEscalating to deter would thus force a response that wasn't necessary to begin with. The idea of course is to come up with some kind of smart policy which could avoid any responses that lead to the war situation on the one hand, while also deterring our adversaries from engaging in those provocations to begin with on the other hand.
No policy is perfect of course, which is why our strategy, while it is (for the time being) effective at preventing outright war, fails to deter the provocations/conflicts in question. But your policy goes completely too far in the other direction, it would lead to serious escalatory crises which are far worse than any current provocations (Hainan incident) that we may have endured.
You have to take into account the sum picture, and clearly the world we currently live in is a better world than the world wherein we implement your hypothetical strategy. Yes, we can always (and should) come up with a better and smarter policy, one which achieves better results on both ends of the spectrum. But your policy is not that policy. It solves the problem of the house being on fire by flooding the entire city with a tsunami.
"China might think that the US started the conflict because they flew their drone in their national airspace. Each side is convinced that they are right"
DeleteThis is a ridiculous example. A UAV is either in someone's territorial air space and subject to shooting down or it is not. GPS, radar, etc. all provide absolute proof of the location. Of course, countries often choose to lie about the location on the world stage but that doesn't change the reality which both sides know to be true regardless of what they might claim. Each side knows who was right and who was wrong.
"Of course we should give a response, but it should be (in most circumstances) limited and not intentionally escalatory."
This is your fear talking. If the goal is to be able to deter someone in the future then you have to make the punishment swift and painful. Your example of someone spitting near me - while ridiculous - clearly illustrates your failure to grasp the basic concept. If - I repeat, if - my goal is to deter the person from ever doing that again then, yes, I most certainly will beat the snot out of them. On the other hand, if I've deemed that an insignificant event that does not threaten me and does not need to be deterred in the future then I simply continue on my way with no action.
"In real life we have to take into account context."
Which I have done and which you are ignoring by making up ridiculous examples. I'm not advocating dropping nuclear bombs on a country because an aircraft safely and responsibly joins up with my recon flight in international air space to do their own recon. That requires no response. On the other hand, if an enemy aircraft flies unsafely, bumps my recon aircraft, forces it down, seizes the plane and crew, and strips the aircraft for secrets, then, yes, it warrants destroying the offending air base completely.
The fundamental concept is crystal clear. You may or may not agree with it but there is no ambiguity about it so cease with the ridiculous examples.
"You're just coming up with examples of 'provocations', but that's an entirely separate matter from a strategy of escalating to deter, which is not something that China possesses."
DeleteNow you're either ignorant of reality or choosing to ignore it. How many times do I have to provide examples? When we operated a UUV in international waters, that was the provocation (from China's illegal and incorrect perspective). Their seizure of the UUV was the escalatory act.
When the UNCLOS tribunal ruled against them, that was the provocation (from China's illegal perspective) and their subsequent seizure, construction, and militarization of existing or non-existent islands was the escalatory act.
Feel free to disagree my premise but at least recognize reality.
"Does the PLAN try to ram/sink our ships when we conduct FONOPS through what they regard as their territorial waters?"
Actually, there have been several examples of Chinese ships sailing in aggressive, unsafe manner designed to cause a collision if we didn't instantly turn away and leave the area … which we have thus far done. They have escalated and we have backed down. They are doing exactly what I'm calling for (to a lesser degree) and it's working. We've been deterred by their escalatory actions.
"so of course it makes sense to preempt their escalations if you see no other (desirable) way to deconflict."
DeleteYou really need to study recent history. China has made no secret of their intent to seize the entire E/S China Seas and surrounding territories. That's pretty escalatory! If we want to deter that, we need to apply consequences that are painful in the extreme to them.
China first illegally claimed international waters. They then escalated and began physically occupying existing islands. They then escalated by illegally constructing artificial islands from reefs (prohibited by UNCLOS of which they are a signatory). They then escalated by militarizing those islands. And so on. If you wish to argue, at least recognize actual historical events!
"Escalating to deter would thus force a response"
Escalation does NOT 'force' a response. That's fear talking again. When escalation has been performed against us, we've consistently backed down. China is no more going to war over a minor incident than we are. What will happen is that they'll think twice before initiating the next provocation.
You really need to stop being ruled by fear.
"should) come up with a better and smarter policy,"
DeleteSo feel free to offer one. That would be an informative and worthwhile contribution. I encourage you to do so and look forward to hearing a better solution!
ComNavOps,
Delete“This is a ridiculous example. A UAV is either in someone's territorial air space and subject to shooting down or it is not”
Perhaps I wasn’t clear. I meant a case where China claims the spratly islands as its territorial waters, but this isn’t recognized by the US.
“China first illegally claimed international waters. They then escalated and began physically occupying existing islands.”
None of these are examples of a escalate to deter policy. To demonstrate that, you would have to show that those actions were specifically undertaken in response to some american action which they were trying to deter. You did come up with better incidents, like some ramming attempts which were conducted in some limited instances. But the fact that they don’t occur frequently, meaning every time we try a FONOPS, suggests to me that those which were just some provocations conducted on an ad hoc basis. And not a serious policy of escalate to deter.
Even you acknowledge that “ They are doing exactly what I'm calling for (to a lesser degree)”. So I think it’s clear they don’t really have a full fledged escalate to deter policy, and yes that would be nuts on their part, and yes that absolutely would force a response on our part.
What they really are doing is occasional provocations, that either cause us to back down, or when we respond (e.g. trade sanctions under trump) they either back down themselves or provide a muted response. That is clearly not the escalate to deter policy you had in mind.
Moving on from the China example to the broader picture:
“Escalation does NOT 'force' a response. That's fear talking again“
Yes it does when we are faced with a peer or near peer power. Obviously lower level competitors are a different picture, because they may not be capable of reciprocally escalating.
The problem with your policy is that it doesn’t deter at all, it only gives the appearance of deterrence. It increases the chance of war (because escalation always increases the risk of war) while decreasing the number of small provocations like sinking a UUV. It only looks like you’ve succeeded in deterring because you’ve limited the number of small provocations, but that comes at the expense of a massively increased risk of war.
This is obvious from history, none of your examples work because I’ve shown they aren’t really an example of the policy in question.
They always peter out at some level (the escalating power isn’t willing to go all the way). But take examples from history where the escalating power was willing to go all the way with a peer competitor, what happened? Look at cases like Nazi Germany, where at first it looked like Hitler’s policy was working.
The allied powers bowed before him in appeasement, given only limited ineffectual responses. Hitler kept escalating, and in turn it reached a level that inevitably forced the allies to respond. We can see that Hitler sacrificed deterrence for the sake of appearance of deterrence. It looked like he was getting his way at first and this made him very popular. But the only logical end result of the escalate to deter policy, as I showed, is in our context a nuclear war.
" escalation always increases the risk of war"
DeleteI can offer wisdom but I can't cure irrational fears. You're on your own with that.
"cases like Nazi Germany"
If an enemy is determined to go to war then it doesn't matter whether you escalate or appease; war will still result. The Allies attempted appeasement - the opposite of escalation - and still wound up with war. If the enemy wants war, it will happen no matter what you do or don't do.
"We can see that Hitler sacrificed deterrence for the sake of appearance of deterrence."
Hitler wasn't attempting to deter anything. You need to study your history. He was determined to conquer and the only question was at what point the Allies would finally respond, if at all.
Not only are you wrong but recent events have clearly demonstrated that. We've done the complete opposite of escalation in response to China and they've continually upped the ante. We've achieved the exact opposite of deterrence and you want to do more of the same?!
Your fear rules you and warps your judgement and logic. There's nothing I can do to help you.
"None of these are examples of a escalate to deter policy."
DeleteOf course they are. China is attempting to deter the US from operating in the E/S China Seas (and the entire Pacific on a larger scale and longer time frame) and they escalate their actions each time we do so. That they don't take the escalation as far as I suggest is just a matter of degree not lack of escalation.
They started with mere verbal protests and then escalated to shadowing our ships, then escalated to crowding our ships, then escalated to seizing islands, then escalated to militarizing them, then escalated to seizing our various military assets and fouling our towed arrays. They've escalated to entering other country's territorial waters and air space. They've escalated to made up claims of territory and EEZs. They've escalated to abrogating treaties they are signatory to. They've escalated to building the largest navy in the world!
How you can view all that and not see escalation is beyond me. Perhaps fear is keeping you from acknowledging what is happening?
Interestingly, each one of their escalations has NOT RESULTED IN NUCLEAR WAR so that disproves your contention in that regard!
Similarly, NKorea has continually escalated their actions with pursuit of ballistic missile programs, shooting ballilstic missiles into the territory of Japan, sinking a SKorean ship, landing troops in SKorea, etc. and yet … no nuclear war. Again, your fear is disproven.
Iran continues to escalate. I'm not going to bother listing the examples. You know them. Again, no nuclear war. Your fear is disproven.
There is too much here to adequately respond too. So I am going to limit my points to the main argument chain. Remember that I was arguing that
Delete1. Your arguments against forward presence are erroneous
2. Your escalate to deter policy is deeply mistaken
I noticed we dropped the first argument chain, that's fine with me as there was a lot to talk about, but I just want to point out that you never adequately addressed my objections.
"How you can view all that and not see escalation is beyond me"
Now you are putting words in my mouth, you are also all over the map with examples from foreign powers of what you construe to be escalatory practices. But:
a) As I already pointed out, it's not enough to come up with examples of provocations, you have to show that they were undertaken as a part of a broader deterrent strategy. b) I'm just debating the merits of your so called escalate to deter policy. I never said that foreign countries don't try to escalate or provoke us, and I never claimed that our policy is the right one (though I certainly think it better than yours). I'm just saying that no rational actor would implement your policy prescription.
"Interestingly, each one of their escalations has NOT RESULTED IN NUCLEAR WAR so that disproves your contention in that regard!"
Clearly that's not the case because no state actually implements your policy, and not because the policy works. You just keep coming up with plenty of examples where China, N. Korea attempted to provoke us, or escalated in response to our actions. But that's just confirmation bias, you ignore all the examples where they didn't escalate or in fact backed down.
In real life, policy consists of a careful coordination of intentional escalations on one hand and de-escalations on the other hand. State actors will probe when they think they can get away with it, and back down when they think they can't. Nobody has a "escalate to deter" stance as a blanket policy, because the logical outcome of that is war.
The reason we don't have war in reality is precisely because your policy is fictional; countries do back down in real life. Khrushchev was willing to provoke quite a lot, but he wasn't willing to escalate all the way to nuclear war in the Cuban missile crisis.
Anyways, you never adequately addressed my argument showing that if everyone adopted your policy, it would inevitably lead to war. You just pointed out that such a policy would only kick in if some actor engaged in illegal/unwarranted provocations, and then you claimed that said actor would only commit their escalatory actions if they were inevitably committed to war in the first place. Thus, if war broke out, it wouldn't be the fault of your policy.
But then you go on to contradict yourself and come up with plenty of examples where China and other states have in fact provoked us. Presumably, you don't think that China is serious about starting a nuclear war when engaging in such provocations. Hence it follows that your own objection is debunked.
Moreover, as I already pointed out, states can reasonably disagree over what counts as a provocation; each side can be absolutely convinced that they are in the right.
Furthermore, the point about your policy only applying when another state engages in unprovoked action is irrelevant. It doesn't matter whether we apply our policy in such a circumstance or not, it matters what a rational actor would do. According to you, a rational actor should apply your policy if they are trying to deter another state, and a state that is engaging in deliberate provocation is still going to desire to deter the other nation from responding.
You have no real response to all of the above except to come up with a list of examples which you think proves your point, but it doesn't for the many reasons I already pointed out.
You've clearly made up your mind and nothing I say is going to change that. However, for the benefit of other readers, I'll offer two examples of the US doing exactly what I'm proposing.
DeleteExample 1. Operation Praying Mantis. In 1988, the USS Samuel B. Roberts was damaged but not sunk by a mine laid by Iran. In response, the US wiped out the Iranian navy, sinking half a dozen vessels and killing dozens. In addition, several oil platforms were destroyed. The US' response was a significant escalation approximately in line with what I've called for. No nuclear war resulted. Iran lost its navy and was deterred, at least for a time.
Example 2. In 1986, after a Libyan bombing of an entertainment facility in West Berlin that killed two US servicemen and injured dozens more, the US attacked barracks, command and control centers, Il-76 transport planes, an air base, air defense radars, and Libyan leader Muammar Ghaddafi, among other targets. All were damaged or destroyed and Ghaddafi was severely injured. The US response was an escalation approximately in line with what I've called for. Nuclear war did not result. Ghaddafi went into hiding for several years and Libya reduced, but did not entirely cease, their terrorism support although they did become much more circumspect about it.
Since we are no longer engaged with the main argument chain, this will be my last response.
DeleteTo your above points:
As I already mentioned, the real problem with "escalate to deter" comes into play when dealing with peer/near-peer adversaries like Russia and China, so those examples are arguing against something I never attended to criticize. May I also point out that nuclear war obviously could not break out because Libya and Iran did not possess nuclear weapons.
Plus, see all my other points (e.g. confirmation bias) as to why just coming up with real world examples is insufficient to establish that your policy was actually adopted.
Until next time.
There is a case to be made that the US doesn't mind that much about the war taking place as, unless it is over very quickly, will lead to a significant degradation of Russia's conventional capability & combat reserves, ie Russia will spend itself in Ukraine. If this view is held by major decision makers, then any deterrence would be half hearted.
ReplyDeletehttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7nKvym5jmj8
I have no problem with watching Russia bleed itself. The flip side is that Russia is gaining invaluable practical experience about combat and weapon systems which will only make them stronger!
DeleteThe failure to deter Russia from attacking Ukraine doesn't necessarily prove that deterrence never works. This may even be implied by some things you've said.
ReplyDeleteAccording to Henry Kissinger (I think) deterrence is the product of three things: our capability, our WILL to use the capability, and the adversary's assessment of the first two. Since it's a product (and not a sum), if any of those items is zero, then deterrence is zero and the adversary won't be deterred. Mathematically, zero times anything is zero.
In the case of Ukraine, it's been clear for years (including from repeated statements from Biden) that NATO does not have a consensus to go to war with Russia to protect Ukraine. It isn't a member, for one thing, so there's no treaty obligation, and a war with Russia would be a huge risk. Thus, our WILL is obviously zero. Therefore, the product of the 3 terms is also zero. Since zero times anything is zero.
This doesn't necessarily prove that Russia would be undeterred from attacking a member of NATO (Poland, for example). Because of the NATO treaty, our will would clearly be non-zero in that case. Of course in that case the capability comes into play, and if we have no forces deployed there, then the lack of capability might eliminate the deterrence. Obviously, the deployed (and prepared) forces don't necessarily have to be American, and in the case of Europe, they should probably be European since Europe is now quite wealthy and has more than adequate potential, both in economic strength and in population base, to deter Russia on their own.
"NATO does not have a consensus to go to war with Russia to protect Ukraine."
DeleteNo one has claimed that. Wanting to deter Russia does not require a NATO response. Wanting to prevent an invasion may simply be a logical and pragmatic decision independent of any formal NATO action.
You seem to have jumped straight to war being the only way to deter Russia. Going to war with Russia is NOT the only way they could have been deterred. In the post, I offered other actions that likely would have deterred Russia if they had been applied.
Given the clear lack of will for NATO to intervene in a Russia-Ukraine war, I think the only real deterrent we could have achieved would have been to give a lot more weapons to Ukraine, which would allow them to better defend THEMSELVES against Russia. If the cost of the invasion to Russia could be made high enough, that might deter Putin. Since obviously in the case of an invasion of Ukraine, the will of Ukraine to defend itself would not be in question.
ReplyDeleteWhen it comes to Taiwan, China has spent decades building the capability to prevent the US from intervening in a Taiwan invasion, through the various anti-access/area-denial capabilities that they've built. So sometime soon, we may well not have the capability, even if we did have the will.
ReplyDeleteAt this point, I think the best we can probably do would be to flood Taiwan with a bunch of relatively low-cost, mobile, and dispersed weapons to attack the invasion fleet. That is, truck mounted mobile anti ship missiles. You can buy around 1000 anti ship missiles for the price of a single Burke class destroyer. Add in the trucks, call it 500. If they are mobile and dispersed, that means 500 hard to find targets vs one easier to find target. Seems to me that's more likely to deter.
We probably should have been doing this for several years already. But the rule of trees comes into play. The best time to plant a tree is 20 years ago. The second best time is now.
Again, you seem to have jumped straight to the war method of deterrence. As far as deterring China from invading Taiwan, we could apply the measures listed in the post and they would likely be extremely effective. China needs the world/US far more than the world/US needs China. Total economic isolation and war (devaluing their currency and removing them from the world banking system) would devastate China. The US could pick up the 'slack' from cutting off China and our 'recovery' would be rapid. China produces nothing that we have to have and can't produce for ourselves. They have no hold on us that we don't allow them to have.
DeleteThis is very true. The effects of cutting all trade, freezing/seizing all assets, and cancelling all debt would be enormous. With their domination of a large part of our consumer market, this would create tough times for a while, but we'd be better off...
Delete"but we'd be better off..."
DeleteThink about how much better off we'd be. It's huge! All those China based industries and jobs would come flooding back to the US especially if we eliminated the tax issues that made them move overseas in the first place and, to go a step further, offered a few tax incentives for companies to come back and stay back. The jobs boom would be incredible and that leads to higher wages, lower unemployment, increased investment in US facilities (even more jobs!), demand for more infrastructure (more jobs!), and so on.
"China produces nothing that we have to have and can't produce for ourselves"
DeleteWell, not exactly. They dominate the production of many key pharmaceuticals, for example. Plus there's also the rare earth metals thing, which they completely dominate. What's not quite as well known is that they also dominate the processing of the rare earth minerals, plus production of certain key things made from them -- like the high powered magnets used in many of our weapons systems.
Of course these industries could be rebuilt here in the US. And they should be!! But it can't be done instantly.
"Of course these industries could be rebuilt here in the US."
DeleteThat's exactly what I said!
"China produces nothing that we have to have and can't produce for ourselves"
We can produce anything we need. We just need to allow ourselves to do it. We need to remove some of the environment regulations that are preventing rare earth processing and then we can supply our own needs. And so on with every other thing we need.
"China produces nothing that we have to have and can't produce for ourselves"
DeleteIn the medium/long-term, true.
But it'd take time to rebuild all those factories and the supply chains they are a part of.
In the meanwhile, the economy would be wrecked, industrial production would crater, and the population would get very angry.
Nobody is going to push that button, in a democracy.
" the economy would be wrecked, industrial production would crater, and the population would get very angry."
DeleteCome on, now. Use some common sense and fairness. The economy would not be wrecked. There would be some short term disruption, yes, but we can adapt.
With a tiny bit of common sense, we'd implement this gradually, over a few years or so in order to minimize disruptions. To his credit, Trump was on this path, to a small extent, and it was working smoothly. Jobs were returning and the economy was doing great.
If, for some inexplicable reason, we wanted to do this instantaneously, we'd just have to streamline the process of permitting and get new factories built or old ones refurbished in short order. Consider the example of the vaccine production effort (setting aside any discussion of their effectiveness) which went from zero to max in a very short period which INCLUDED extensive safety testing. We can build a factory in a matter of months. If we'd stop the idiotic mandates, regulations, and unemployment payments we could end the supply chain shortages overnight.
"Come on, now. Use some common sense and fairness. The economy would not be wrecked. There would be some short term disruption, yes, but we can adapt."
DeleteIf you wanted to do this gradually and put someone with a brain in charge of it, sure.
But as a sudden thing, perhaps in response to China invading Taiwan, it would be a nightmare.
It wouldn't be just about building a single product (the vaccine).
America’s trade with China in goods in 2020 was $660 billion, $120 billion of that being exports, making it America’s largest trading partner.
You don't replace that in weeks or even months.
Companies such as Boeing are American but many vital assemblies come from China, as do rare earths and more.
While the USA could produce most of this domestically, it would take years at best.
As an upside, China wouldn't be in a happy place, either.
America’s trade with China in goods in 2020 was $660 billion, $120 billion of that being exports, making it America’s largest trading partner
"America’s trade with China in goods in 2020 was $660 billion"
DeleteThe real question is what percent of that trade (the imports from China, specifically) is vital, required items. For example, clothing is not a vital required item. While it's nice to have a continuous stream of new clothing, it's not required. We have other sources and could quickly find alternate sources. The same applies to almost everything else.
In contrast, things like oil (we used to be oil-independent and could quickly be again) are a must-have. I'm actually kind of hard pressed to come up with many/any must haves that we import from China.
Seriously, what can you think of that we import from China that the loss of would cause a collapse in our standard of living?
While we are mostly talking about military actions here, we certainly can't ignore the strength of economic action. While we generally veiw our status as a consumer/importer nation as a weakness, it's truly a strength if used properly. We have HUGE trade imbalances with China and Russia. Those nations balance their checkbook with the money coming from the US. So the ability to "shut off the tap" exists. If we were serious in our foreign and economic policy, we could do far more than issue some sanctions. A complete halt to all imports, freezing/seizing all assets, cancelling debt, etc could change the landscape rapidly. Yes, there would be upsets in supply, and US based, overseas manufacturing companies would take a hit. Weaning ourselves off of cheaper products would hurt the consumer for a while. But regaining independence from imports would not only improve our economy over time, but would stop the funding of enemy national growth. We look on in awe of the Chinese naval buildup, but yet most fail to understand, we funded it!! It can be tough for the average Jane/Joe American to vote with his wallet, but our paychecks being spent at the Walmarts, Dollar Stores, and Les Schwabs (and a thousand other imported goods retailers) are what have allowed our Navy to reach second place. (Of course inept leadership has helped, but we all know that already)...
DeleteAs we discuss deterrence, I encourage everyone to look at this youtube clip for three country's military recruitment ads.
ReplyDeleteWhich countries do you think are projecting to their potential recruits, their friends in the world and their enemies that they are taking the profession of warfighting seriously?
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kfe6d6MzeLM
Lutefisk
"The US had the opportunity to supply Ukraine with sufficient weapons to possibly act as a deterrent but, ultimately, opted not to."
ReplyDeleteWhat weapons could the US or our allies have supplied to Ukraine to provide some level of deterrence? The Ukrainian Armed Forces total about 250,000 on active duty and a similar number in their reserves. They operate a large number of tanks and armored vehicles, but have less than a 100 fighters and a few warships.
Javelin and Stingers have limited value in an urban environment. Patriot SAMs require highly trained technicians to maintain and operate them. And, how many of those would you need to defend Ukraine? Plus, we would have to weigh the risk of Russia getting their hands on such weapons. In hindsight, some antiship missiles might have been useful but that would not have been a deterrent in and of itself.
Accepting Ukraine into NATO seems to be the main driver here. Maybe if that was put on hold while continuing to support Ukraine, Russia might not have invaded Ukraine.
"What weapons could the US or our allies have supplied to Ukraine to provide some level of deterrence?"
DeleteAre you asking because you don't the American military inventory of weapons, because you don't know which weapons would be effective, or because you're wish to be argumentative?
Here's a very partial list of weapons that could be effective:
land mines
sea mines
scatterable mines
MLRS/GMLRS
self-propelled artillery
counter-battery radar
M18 Claymore mines
UAVs
tanks
IFVs
mortars
Javelin
Stinger
modern rifles/ammo
heavy machine guns
MSHORAD Stryker anti-air vehicles
Hellfire missiles
anti-air Humvees
and the list goes on almost endlessly
"Javelin and Stingers have limited value in an urban environment."
Javelin is of immense value in an urban setting. The urban setting provides unlimited concealment for the operator! Stinger is equally lethal in any setting.
The list of useful equipment the US could have supplied is nearly endless! The only questionable items would be weapon systems too complex to quickly master such as advanced aircraft.
Seriously?
"...and the list goes on almost endlessly..."
DeleteHow about remote detonators?
Wired to an aircraft bomb (like a 500 pounder) on a likely avenue of approach, buried under the street or in a building.
When the second tank drives past it....kaboom.
Very disheartening to the tank crew.
Lutefisk
Having the biggest gun in tbe world is meaningless if you are unwilling to use it and the other guy is caving your head in with a rock.
ReplyDeleteWestern conflict aversion is the issue. West fears WW3 yet Chibese, Iranians and Russians clearly know this do as they please. Norks sunk a South Korean corvette yet no WW3 or Korean War 3.0.
If say US did hit Russian troops in Ukraine via say stealth bomber strikes would the Russians escalate especially as 2/3s of their army is in Ukraine and they clearly don't even have enough troops to take over that blighted country?
Probably not. It actually gives Putin a rationale to withdraw as he is trying to avert WW3.
"If say US did hit Russian troops in Ukraine via say stealth bomber strikes would the Russians escalate "
DeleteThat was a trick question, wasn't it? It's a stealth bomber so the Russians wouldn't even know it had been there! LOL!
But a stealth bomber can be seen by radar, mostly ground based radars, but not the radars used by fighters and missiles. So in general for a stealth bomber to be shot down a fighter would need to be close enough to pick it up via infra red or visually to shoot it with its guns. As this is unlikely a stealth bomber would most likely be able to attack and leave without itself being attacked but the ruskies would know it had been there.
DeleteI was making a small joke … apparently, too small.
DeleteYes, they would know it was there. Just because the lower frequency radars don't get a target grade capture, it doesn't mean no one knows you are there.
DeleteThe only good thing about using the vanishingly small number of B2s is you can't easily hit the bases without starting a thermonuclear war.
Anything else we are talking about, its way easier to hit the aircraft on the ground, not in the air.
If the point of deterrence is to use the threat of retaliation to deter or preclude our adversary from pursuing a course of action contrary to our interests, or to force the adversary to act in accordance with our interests and against their own, then for the threat to be credible we need to threaten retaliatory actions that will hurt our adversary more than they hurt us or our allies, and not leave it open for our adversary to hit us back in return harder than we’ve hit them. Or perhaps convince our adversary that we’re crazy enough not to care about any of that, which wouldn’t be easy.
ReplyDeleteRussia, which is willing even in peaceful times, to send agents into a neighboring state to kill its opponents with nerve gas and radioactive materials, is clearly capable and entirely prepared to respond to any actions that we might take with measures of its own to which we would be unable to respond, without going to places we wouldn’t wish to go, or would be legally precluded from going.
Russia is well aware that we understand all this very clearly, and makes no real attempt to keep its past actions secret, beyond a routine denial; this is part and parcel of their own deterrence strategy, and our knowledge and understanding that Russia is willing to act decisively in its national interests without any sort of moral compass or ethical constraints, serves as a far more effective deterrent to us, than are any of our threats to them.
For example, if we hit Russian banks with a cyber attack, Russia could presumably, if it chose to do so, respond with attacks on our health care system, or perhaps our water treatment infrastructure, potentially killing thousands (all with plausible deniability). Would we do something as egregiously wrong and immoral as that? Of course we wouldn’t.
The other options that you put forward are to me are also less than convincing. We could sanction Russian trade (as we’re now doing), however Russian exports are in short supply and high demand, and as we’ve seen with the oil price (up 50% since we started talking about this stuff), this isn’t hurting them in the slightest.
Supplying lethal weapons? Well they can play that game just as well as we can, and (perhaps especially) supplying e.g. MANPADS is in my view a deeply irresponsible course of action, as there’s no telling where they will ultimately turn up, or against whom they’ll be used, especially the ones that fall into Russian hands.
Funding and supplying an insurgency? Ditto - right back at you!
In fact there are endless ways in which Russia can respond to any of the putative sanction strategies on your list; cut off the supply of wheat to our unstable allies in Algeria or Egypt; disable the gas pipelines in Ukraine; sell S400 systems to Iran; covert support to North Korea’s nuclear program, the list goes on….All these options are credible and believable, far more so that anything we have to put on the table.
Ultimately of course Russia could offer to build China (our real adversary) some of its Yasen or Borei class submarines, and our position and current advantage in the Pacific, where it really matters, would be hugely degraded, to put it mildly.
So my view is that while deterrence might be an effective strategy against the poor and the weak (Serbia comes to mind), a country like Russia can’t be deterred from taking any action it wishes to take, if it considers that its vital national interests, as it sees them, are in the balance, as it has the capacity and the demonstrated willingness to up the ante every time, thereby very effectively deterring us from taking the first steps in a race we can never win.
I mostly agree with what you've written here, however I disagree that a country like Russia cannot be deterred. Clearly whatever the west consider to be a deterrence have failed. Perhaps it is the context that is wrong, leading to the formulation of the wrong deterrence? Russia have claimed that NATO expanding to Eastern Europe (Ukraine was the red line) to be an existential threat, the West have clearly ignored or refuse to believe this. The result is this mess in Ukraine.
DeleteLet's flip this thing around, what if China ignored U.S warnings and flipped Mexico to join her military alliance? I'm sure the U.S will invade Mexico, because having Chinese missiles at the U.S border is an existential threat (Cuban missile crisis). So now what deterrence will the Chinese consider to prevent the U.S from invading Mexico? I think barring any other diplomatic deals (bribery/concessions and the sort) nothing short of attacks on the U.S itself along with a nuclear exchange. Even that might not be enough of a deterrence because if the U.S thinks it an existential threat then it doesn't matter if it escalates to nuclear. We're all dead anyway.
Loc