Good
Virginia Payload
Module (VPM) – The VPM is not new
news but the fact that the Navy is looking at adding additional missile types
beyond the standard Tomahawk land attack missile is good. An anti-ship Tomahawk is being contemplated
as well as a possible multi-role Tomahawk.
Beyond that, the article describes “electromagnetic warfare kind of
payloads” which, one would hope, might include Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP)
weapons, non-kinetic conductive missiles of the type used in Desert Storm which
can short out electrical grids, and persistent jamming/decoy missiles among
other possibilities.
Harpoon – The
Navy is beginning to take delivery of refurbished sub-launched Harpoon
missiles. While the Harpoon is bordering
on obsolete (slow, non-stealthy, limited maneuverability), it still gives submarines
a longer range anti-ship weapon.
Networking – I
have no idea how one could construct a high bandwidth undersea network but if
the Navy thinks they have a technology that can do it, that’s great. Communications isolation – and the associated
command and control and operational isolation – has always been the weak link
in submarine warfare. If submarines can
be made part of an overall shared tactical picture, that would be a tremendous
accomplishment and significantly enhance submarine effectiveness. Simply having the equivalent of an IFF type
of information to distinguish friend from enemy would be a valuable aid by
itself. However, this is a technology
that I’m going to put in the ‘highly skeptical’ column for the time being. I’m unaware of any foundational technology
that could even begin to approach these kinds of requirements. Still, it’s well worth pursuing as an R&D
effort.
Mk 48 Torpedo –
The article describes an ongoing development of enhanced torpedoes, which is
good, except that the Navy has been talking about this or many years and has
done very little so I’m quite dubious about this.
Good and Bad
SSN(X) – The
Virginia replacement submarine is being described as a revolutionary rather
than evolutionary design.
SSN(X)
will be designed to have improved mobility, speed and stealth; greater magazine
size and payload integration capability; artificial intelligence to increase
warfighter decision space; and improved survivability, so the hull could take a
hit and keep on fighting in a high-end battle.(1)
This is scary because the Navy has turned every attempt at
revolutionary design into major debacles.
On the plus side, designing a hull that can take a hit and keep fighting
is something that ComNavOps has been calling for, for many years.
If the Navy will do this intelligently and build a single
prototype to work out the inevitable problems that accompany any revolutionary
design, this could be a good effort. On
the other hand, if they do as they usually do and commit to a production run of
forty subs before the first one is even designed then we’ll have yet another
debacle to add to the Navy’s growing list of failures and yet more proof that
the Navy is incapable of learning lessons about ship design and procurement.
Honestly, this feels like yet another attempt at leap ahead,
transformative (curse you Donald Rumsfeld) development rather than putting in
the hard work in the research realm that real progress inevitably demands.
Bad
Unmanned Underwater
Vehicles (UUV) – The article describes the Navy’s embrace of large UUVs
that can carry all manner of near-magical payloads to accomplish
reality-defying missions – you know, the usual unmanned blather.
The larger problem with these UUVs is that, even in the best
case, they aren’t geared at accomplishing anything significant in a war
setting. The vague applications that the
Navy floats for these are all small scale, minor effects, even if they
worked. This is yet more evidence of the
Navy’s dismissive attitude towards peer war.
They simply don’t believe a war with China is even possible, let alone
inevitable. Their efforts are directed
towards, low end, peacetime work rather than high end, intense, combat.
A UUV is a minor effects, niche capability. It might be nice, in peacetime, to use a UUV
to plant a small signals sensor near a foreign base, for example, but that
isn’t the kind of capability that’s going to change the outcome of a war. Yes, data collection is always good and helpful
but a single, small sensor isn’t significant.
While there are some potentially good elements to this
submarine warfare path, there are some bad or pointless ones. Worse, too many elements are wishful
thinking, fantasy, or not geared at war.
This mixed assessment leads me to ponder what I’d suggest for a
submarine warfare path and it would contain these elements:
Torpedo – We desperately
need a significantly enhanced torpedo which is longer ranged, faster, quieter,
and with about a 50% larger warhead.
What we need is the conceptual equivalent of the BrahMos cruise missile: fast, large, and absolutely lethal – a one-hit
killing machine.
SSGN – It is
folly to abandon the Ohio class SSGN with its 150+ cruise missiles. That’s significant firepower! While the Virginia Payload Module somewhat
helps mitigate the lack of firepower there’s no getting around the fact that it
requires four Virginias to equal a single SSGN.
Numbers – We are
facing a submarine shortfall that has been recognized for many years and yet
the Navy has done nothing about it. As
much or more than any technological development, we simply need greater numbers
– much greater.
Mine Laying – The
Navy has almost totally ignored submarine mine laying despite that fact that it
offers an immensely potent and stealthy means of laying mines very deep in
enemy waters. We need to greatly enhance
and begin training for submarine mine laying.
Sensors – This is
a purely research effort but we need to develop sensors other than
acoustic. There have been research
efforts to develop chemical, electromagnetic, nuclear, turbulence, and other
methods of detecting and tracking enemy subs and we should be sponsoring much
more research along those lines. The
submarine that gains the first detection likely wins the encounter.
My path is heavy on practical firepower applicable to high
end, peer war. Along with the things we
should be working on, there are some things that are distractions and should be
dropped. These include unmanned
vehicles, widespread special forces support, networking, gender integrated
crews, and the Columbia class (it should be redesigned as a smaller, more
focused sub).
(1)USNI News website, “Navy Undersea Warfare Priorities:
Strategic Deterrence, Lethality and Networked Systems”, Megan Eckstein,
8-Nov-2019,
https://news.usni.org/2019/11/08/navy-undersea-warfare-priorities-strategic-deterrence-lethality-and-networked-systems
Assuming you get 12 tubes per the standard SSN design, the 28 extra takes 22 ships to make up the 4 SSGN gap. I think what they have realized is that distributing that firepower really just makes more platforms have to give up their stealth to fire off the missiles. My guess is we will see the payload module go away by the next batch of SSNs so they can focus on SSN numbers and SSBN completion. Personally, I wonder about a shortened Columbia as an attack sub. Just leave one 4 tube module and now you are buying the quietest sub with a 40 year reactor life. It would start to look cost competitive with a VPM Virginia.
ReplyDeleteFor torpedoes, the holy trinity of speed, range, and payload applies and I'd pick range with signature reduction before the warhead. Then there is whether its time to commit to a larger tube. That might be for the best. Also, more tubes might be much more relevant now if we start talking about multiple, stealthy, long range engagements.
I know you hate the UUVs, but the War Zone has a pretty good article last week on what they are doing for electronic deception tools and possibly plugging them into unmanned platforms including UUVs.
" the 28 extra takes 22 ships to make up the 4 SSGN gap."
DeleteJust a slight correction … It's not the 28 EXTRA tubes that are relevant but the 40 tubes per enhanced Virginia. Thus, at 40 missiles per sub, it takes 15 Virginias to equal the missile capacity of 4 SSGNs.
"distributing that firepower really just makes more platforms have to give up their stealth to fire off the missiles."
Correct, at least to an extent. With a thousand mile missile, presumably, you're going to be launching from well away from any enemy ASW assets so that's not a huge drawback. Of more concern to me is that it requires coordinating the actions and schedules of 4 subs to equal 1 SSGN and, in war, that kind of coordination is always difficult to achieve. Further, it pulls 4 subs off of more pressing submarine missions to conduct mundane missile launches. Finally, if it requires 4 subs to conduct a single SSGN mission, that's 4 times the chance of a sub being found and the mission disrupted. In crowded, confined waters like the E/S China Sea, with extensive SOSUS-like arrays planted, that's a potential problem.
" whether its time to commit to a larger tube."
Yes!
"electronic deception tools"
I'm all for electronic warfare! I'm not for large unmanned vehicles. If you want to hang an EW gizmo of some type on a Scan Eagle, go ahead! To build a large diameter UUV like the Navy is doing to conduct minor, small impact actions is wasteful and distracts from high end combat preparations. It's just the lure of technology with no real CONOPS backing it up. Now, if someone can lay out a valid CONOPS for high end, peer war combat use of UUVs then I'll fully support it. That hasn't happened, as yet.
"Finally, if it requires 4 subs to conduct a single SSGN mission, that's 4 times the chance of a sub being found and the mission disrupted."
DeleteIn any war with China, we're bound to have multiple submarines operating in Chinese waters at any given time. And, in a protracted war, we're bound to lose some of them.
In this scenario, losing one submarine seems to be a risk that has to be taken. But, given the Tomahawk's range, the 4 submarines could operate hundreds of miles from each other and hundreds of miles from any coastline. And, as you wrote earlier, presumably the missiles would be launched "well away from any enemy ASW assets" which would minimized the probability of detection.
However, in the past, large cruise missile strike have been conducted using a combination of surface ships (the Burkes seem to carry 24 or Tomahawks) or bombers.
"presumably the missiles would be launched "well away from any enemy ASW assets"
DeleteYes, this is a double edged sword. Four subs instead of one increase the chance of detection although, properly used, the overall risk of detection is reasonably low.
"large cruise missile strike have been conducted using a combination of surface ships (the Burkes seem to carry 24 or Tomahawks) or bombers. "
That can still apply to some extent in a war with China but to strike inland targets the ships/bombers will have to expose themselves to significant risk. Subs are ideally suited for this mission due to their inherent stealth. The fewer number of subs we can expose (meaning, use SSGNs), the less chance of detection. If we have to put 4-12 subs into the South China Sea instead of 1-4, we're likely to have some detected just due to random odds (and Chinese SOSUS arrays!).
There is the problem of putting all of your eggs in one basket. And, for a variety of reasons, an SSGN might not be available and therefore other platforms must be used. In any war, we're going to use any and all means to launch a cruise missile strike.
Delete"There is the problem of putting all of your eggs in one basket."
DeleteThat is a risk, no doubt, but a single sub is far less likely to be detected than 4 subs. That also suggests that we should have more than 4 SSGNs!
We need to start development of a better cruise missile too. Faster, smarter, and longer-ranged. We need to the SSGNs so we can have all those things without squeezing them into an undersized package.
ReplyDeleteVLSes have been revolutionary, but have also been limiting. We keep trying to fit more missile into the same size tube instead of building a bigger tube.
The current weapons are all as big,smart, and capable as the launch tubes or gun tubes will allow them to be.
" better cruise missile too"
DeleteWell, we are fielding the NSM and LRASM which will be the cruise missile of the near future. Did you have something additional in mind?
"We keep trying to fit more missile into the same size tube instead of building a bigger tube."
We have the Mk57 VLS which is larger than the Mk41 and we have not yet developed a larger missile for it nor do we have any larger missile in development that I'm aware of. Did you have some specific missile in mind that requires a larger VLS cell?
The XLUUV project has tremendous potential for peer warfare. It's designed to be completely autonomous with a range of 6500 nm and a cost of only $10 million a hull. These things don't need to be super smart to lay mines or shoot off strike missiles, just enter coordinates and designate payload delivery time. Plus even if they could only hold the equivalent of one VLS, then the 150 tubes still would cost less than a third of a single hull of the new Columbia class.
ReplyDeleteIts tough to do an apples to apples on this. I like comparing the echo Voyager to the Advanced Seal Team Delivery System and its meager replacement. Way cheaper and more payload area. Hoping they see this and build a module to move the seals ashore easier.
Delete$10 mill per hull?
Delete"The US Navy has awarded Boeing contracts worth a total of $274.4m to produce five Orca Extra Large Unmanned Undersea Vehicles (XLUUVs)."
Im reading it as 'hull, propulsion and navigation system' only . Weapons and sensors are extra plus the costs of integration.
Reference for above
Deletehttps://www.naval-technology.com/features/boeing-orca-xluuv-unmanned-submarine/
"cost of only $10 million a hull."
Delete???? You might want to double check that price. From the navaltechnology website,
"The US Navy has awarded Boeing contracts worth a total of $274.4m to produce five Orca Extra Large Unmanned Undersea Vehicles (XLUUVs)."
That's around $55M each.
I see I duplicated the content of Ztev's comment. My apologies, Ztev.
Delete"Hoping they see this and build a module to move the seals ashore easier."
DeleteThis is not an especially useful or effective peer war capability. SEALs are a peacetime instrument. As Gen. Schwarzkopf said in Desert Storm, Special Ops are more trouble then they're worth in combat.
Nonetheless, 55mil leaves lots of room to come in under the 125mil estimated for the advanced seal delivery system in 2001. And that was going to exceed that number thus the cancellation. Move pancakes, whatever, it's still cheaper.
DeleteNext time the big one breaks out I'll be sure to drive down the Silver Strand with a loud speaker declaring the vacation day. ;) In the end, did either Schwarzkopf net a long term result that put us in a better spot today? Clearly, both fixed a problem at the time, but look where its taken us since.
"As Gen. Schwarzkopf said in Desert Storm, Special Ops are more trouble then they're worth in combat."
DeleteOne man's view though.
Many, many would disagree.
D-Day could not have happened without the support of the precursors of the Navy SEALs and SBS for example.
The SAS did sterling service in North Africa.
In my opinion, Schwarzkopf didn't know what to do with the special forces, and so he wasted them on excursions into the desert searching for SCUD launchers.
Their primary role is recon, and always has been.
$10 million price came from this article:
Deletehttps://news.usni.org/2019/02/13/41119
Based on payload dimensions of the Orca provided from naval-technology.com article, there should be room for 8-10 Tomahawk size missiles. This evens the costs back out and lets us get back to the core point - these vehicles are highly useful in peer warfare.
"precursors of the Navy SEALs"
DeleteThere's a huge difference between the single function, direct combat support, UDT men and the attention-loving SEALs who want to do everything.
As far as knowing what to do with special forces, S understood that we had plenty of surveillance resources and didn't need special forces. They forced their way into his plans and consumed time, effort, and resources that didn't need to be.
Now, if SEALs, for example, would return to their roots (and their limited numbers) then perhaps they could be marginally useful in combat.
"$10 million price came from this article:"
DeleteThe article notes that the cost is a modification to a previously issued contract for an unknown amount. I think the forty million is a partial cost. The various articles note that the Orcas are being developed and purchased in phases. It does not appear that the forty million is the total construction cost.
That aside, I don't think an Orca could launch even a single Tomahawk. It can't do it vertically because of dimension limitations. There is no mechanism for a horizontal launch.
The Tomahawk, with a booster, weighs 3500 lb and with a cannister or some sort would weight around 4000 lbs (2 tons). The Orca payload is around 7 tons, if I recall correctly, so you're looking at a max of 3 launch 'cells', at most. Toss in power supply, some kind of exhaust routing system, cooling, etc. and I highly doubt you could launch even one missile.
For a useful comparison, look at the size, weight, volume, power, exhaust handling, electronic support computers and cabinets, and utility requirements of a simple 8-cell Mk41 VLS. There's no way to fit all that in the Orca.
Well it's one thing to say that special forces are more trouble then they're worth, and another to say that they need to be used in specific ways.
DeleteI'd agree with the second.
Take a theoretical Pacific war with China - it's going to be very hard to utilise drones, satellites, even recon aircraft without losing them. That's the hole special forces has most successfully filled in modern warfare. HUMINT. Used correctly, SEALs could fill a very important role.
Inserted via sub to preform recon.
Supplementarily they could be useful as raiding forces on remote Chinese outposts and as precursor forces inserted in advance of an amphibious operation.
But their role has always been primarily about recon work when it comes to full scale, peer warfare.
That's not been their only role in the war on terror of course. But in a peer war that would be their main value.
Let's just say that even at $55 million each it is only capable of launching a single missile. That still turns out to be cost equivalent to the new Columbia class. $8 billion / 144 tubes = $55.5 million.
DeleteAll this specifics about the Orca set aside, the XLUUV concept does provide a peer war capable platform for delivering mines and missiles. Theses missions basically involve just navigating to a preset coordinate and then deploying the payload. If a manned submarine is appropriate for these missions then why not an unmanned one?
"useful as raiding forces on remote Chinese outposts"
DeleteOnce upon a time that would have been valid. Today, a few Tomahawks accomplish the mission better.
"recon"
In certain situations that MIGHT be a valid use although, again, the amount resources devoted to inserting, supporting, rescue, and exfil are immense so unless the recon is absolutely vital and there's no other way to get it, it isn't worth it. Small, expendable UAVs can do the mission better.
In short, technology has pretty much eliminated the need for special forces in war. Peacetime work is another issue and there is a need there.
I'd cut the SEALs numbers, for example, by a factor of 10 and get them back to their roots. I'd eliminate land warfare as one of their missions since we already have Rangers, Delta, Green Berets, etc. that can do that. I'd get the SEALs back to strictly water missions.
" why not an unmanned one?"
DeleteI don't believe an unmanned sub is capable of that mission. If someone wants to prove it by sending one on a transoceanic voyage and laying some dummy mines in a specific spot then I'll believe it. Until then, it's just more manufacturer's claims that probably aren't true.
I see dozens or hundreds of these things flitting around the ocean just getting in the way of real subs conducting real missions. If our sub detects on of these things, it has to treat it like an enemy and destroy it (wasting torpedoes, wasting UUVs, and revealing their location) or evade (possibly disrupting the subs mission). Similarly, surface groups are going to be diverting to deal with these 'unknowns'.
We would have to create an entire support system to operate these things just to duplicate abilities we already have.
UUVs would be subject to capture and compromise of technology and whatever else they carry.
I see no benefit that makes up for the drawbacks.
We could really get into the weeds on this, but I'll just say one last thing.
DeleteI don't think we should underestimate the value of intelligence in a major war, or the continuing value of HUMINT.
Human recon has advantages. A quality special forces squad can provide long term surveillance in a way that is unsustainable through the use of UAVs and the like. They provide more detailed, long term data.
In terms of the expenditure of resources required - intelligence is so vital, the potential loss of some special forces squads is going to be acceptable. In major warfare special forces units are going to be expended. They are going to be sent on the most dangerous missions and they are going to take heavy casualties. It's always been that way.
And are they really that much more expensive then launching new satellites and building new UAVs as you lose them?
Some - to a limited extent. Once upon a time, human surveillance was highly beneficial but the advent of various other types of surveillance, like UAVs, has greatly reduced the benefits.
DeleteWhat is the one enduring characteristic of human surveillance throughout history? It's that it's always inaccurate. Cargo ships are reported as carriers, numbers are badly misestimated, and so on. A UAV, by comparison, simply transmits images, 100% accurate.
Another major drawback is the very limited range of human surveillance. The range is from a hundred feet (in woods or jungles) to, at best, the horizon which, barring sitting atop a mountain, is ten miles or so. A UAV, by comparison, can cover much, much larger areas.
Humans can, under the right circumstances, remain hidden (stealthy) during surveillance, however, the more stealthy (hidden) they are, the more limited their field of view, generally speaking.
Finally, there's the inevitable rescue attempts. Humans tend to get spotted and then, in the US way of things, we mount massive rescue operations and often lose multiple aircraft, helos, and personnel trying to execute the rescue. We don't just write them off. It's the American way. By comparison, a UAV can be casually written off.
All this is not to say that there is zero use for human surveillance but it does say that the applicable scenarios are quite limited.
UAVs aren't going to last long in the recon role.
DeleteYou can't jam a Navy SEAL.
And the US attitude to casualties will change as a peer war escalates. It's always thus.
Once thousands are dying in a full scale, losing a handful of Navy SEALs in an important intelligence gathering mission is not going to cause them same reaction.
Which isn't to say they won't have exfil options, but no Admiral is going to commit squadrons of aircraft in a hopeless rescue mission in the midst of a large scale naval war.
Anyway, we can agree to disagree on the worth of HUMINT. Personally I think people are going to very quickly have to relearn some lessons about the realities of reconnaissance once a war starts and all the relevant satellites are down and UAVs are getting jammed or shot down.
"UAVs aren't going to last long in the recon role. "
DeleteNo, they're not! Which is why I've consistently called for very large numbers of very cheap UAVs so we can keep throwing them at the surveillance mission. Enough will survive long enough to gather the information.
This requires a wholesale rethinking of how we go about conducting surveillance.
The networking aspect can use buoyant trailing wire antennas talking to LEO satellites. You can get a pretty decent data rate with that kind of system and antenna orientation and polarization doesn't matter much. Think a more advanced version of Iridium.
ReplyDeleteIts also somewhat stealthy using very high frequencies and low power levels, disadvantages are depth and speed limitations to let the antenna rise to the surface.
I doubt the satellites would survive much past the first day in a peer war though.
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/sub-comm.htm
" buoyant trailing wire antennas"
DeleteA few problems with this:
1. No sub wants to sail around trailing surface wires.
2. Any information will be dated unless the sub continuously sails around trailing a wire.
3. As you note, satellites aren't going to last long in war.
4. The transmissions are still detectable. The message itself may not be interceptable but the electromagnetic emissions likely are. The Russian EW efforts in Ukraine kind of paint a decent picture of the vulnerability of communications. The messages may be secure but one doesn't need to intercept the message to localize the source, which is what Russia had great success doing.
1. Its probably the only way to make it work. Yeah, a PITA. But its a very skinny cable for a very low-power signal. I have several ideas on how to do it over fiber optic too now that battery technology has advanced so much recently.
Delete2. Yup, if you're trying to operate as a wolf-pack you need the antenna.
3. Probably the biggest downside.
4. You aren't going to be saying much aside from some few-millisecond highly compressed, frequency agile bursts with your position data. You can listen with little risk of detection though. We aren't talking about a drone-flying remote data link which I believe to be completely impractical too.
Yup, the Russians are damn good at this and we aren't, yet.
Just a caution about low power transmissions - they aren't undetectable. The Russians had great success detecting cell phone transmissions in Ukraine and a phone would seem to be pretty low power. Admittedly, a phone is a completely different beast than a military transmitting unit but the detectability of the source power, no matter how low, seems quite doable. I'm not a comms expert so my knowledge is quite limited but I'm a big fan of the Ukraine lessons and they're screaming at us that our comms our nowhere near as secure and undetectable as we like to think.
DeleteOne of the problems with Cell networks is the phone has to ping the tower fairly frequently even when idle so the network knows which tower to use to contact the phone.
DeleteIf the phone also has Internet there is a near constant, low volume data stream that makes it fairly easy to find a phone.
Cell phone power outputs are anywhere from 150mW to 2 Watts depending on how far you are from the cell tower. They automatically reduce power as much as possible so they don't interfere with other users and towers.
With a decently long antenna you could probably transmit at 1/4 watt or so in bursts of 2 or 3 milliseconds. Very hard to detect if you were also hopping frequencies rapidly at the same time. The antenna is also flush with the water so line of sight to anyone looking for it is relatively short.
I agree its risky, but I guess the question is "is it worth it"? Maybe?
"the question is "is it worth it"?"
DeleteYou ask exactly the right question. If we could obtain continuous, real time data then, yes, it would be worth it. Failing that, and only being able to collect occasional, dated data, I suspect it's not worth it but now you're in a realm where an actual submarine operator would have to make the assessment. It's probably a case of, if it cost nothing and interfered with nothing then, sure, why not, but if it adds significant cost or displaces some other piece of equipment then probably not.
So, your answer of "maybe" seems about right!
What are your thoughts on the potential for the US to commission a class of diesel electric subs, with some form of optional air independent propulsion?
ReplyDeleteThey would need to be based forward of course, in Japan, Guam, Australia etc.
But they would be cheaper and therefore could be more numerous.
Additionally, with AIP, they would actually be potentially quieter and more effective than nuclear boats.
You don't need to sell me on the potential usefulness! As far as the potential for the US to actually build a class of SSK, if we haven't done it by now, I don't see it happening. For unknown reasons, the US Navy seems utterly dead set against it and I've never heard any reason why.
DeleteAnother technology that could be useful for non-nuclear submarines is the Aluminum Fuel cell. The corrosion of aluminum in seawater creates electricity. No noise and no liquid oxygen to worry about. Refueling is not as easy since it is a solid but that is a design issue that has already been solved for Zinc-Air fuel cells and could be applied to the aluminum seawater fuel cell.
Deletehttps://www.llnl.gov/file-download/download/public/20441
http://news.mit.edu/2017/batteries-drink-seawater-long-range-autonomous-underwater-vehicles-0615
Yes, that's one of several forms of AIP.
DeleteClosed-cycle steam turbines, Stirling engines, various kinds of fuel cells, all are currently viable forms of AIP.
As AIP becomes the norm in diesel electric design the US Navy is going to have a potentially serious problem.
Subs utilising AIP are the quietest boats in the ocean right now. Not sure a nuke boat could ever get that quiet.
Wondering if it's not time to go back to having more "specialized" torpedoes than just counting on the updated but old MK48? Do we even still have helicopter and ship launched torpedoes? Was a thing still in the 80s but with end of Cold War, do we still have those? I think I would like a light weight, super fast, cheaper, close in range torpedo for helicopters, ASW ships and maybe a few onboard SSN for close in work and a expensive, heavy, long range torpedo for the majority load-out of a SSN.
ReplyDeleteYes, we still have lightweight helo/ship torpedoes. They're the Mk54. According to DOT&E, they suffer from some significant problems. Wiki has a brief background and the DOT&E reports have more information.
DeleteMk54, did the old S-3 carry that, Skip? Sounds familiar, but I wasn't an Ordie. I was AME, I went out to North Island for FRAMP school as a young AME in 1977, wound up in VS-24 out of Cecil Field, then to Nimitz, CAG-8. Inside of a year, they transferred a guy or two from each specialty (AME, ADJ, a couple of AEs for an example) to an A-6 squadron, VA-35 and VF-84, a Tomcat squadron in CAG8. A couple of the electronics sorts would up in VAQ, too. Of course, back to FRAMP for the A-6E, but it was a skate compared to the command ejection system of the four-seat S3. See, I believe they were were unmanning the S-3s from the very start, my humble opinion. Sure enough, it became a COD and they tinkered with re-fueling, too. But the gutting of S-3 shops started very early.
DeleteYour opinion, Skip, was the S-3 just an expensive exercise in Fake It Til You Make It that didn't, well, make it? Seems to have been the beginning of the trend YOU notice and remark on regularly, going to revolutionary Fake It design, instead of the common horse sense of evolution. My God, I look at their processes today and I wonder we get anything out of the yards and for twenty years, nothing good has come out, everything compromised. Ohio, Los Angeles class subs and Nimitz-Class were tried and true, WHY must we re-invent the wheel with every class? It stinks, if you ask me. Nimitz, Los Angeles and Ohio classes were excellent hulls, dependable and able to be upgraded to whatever goodies came along in electronics, planes and even big-ass drones. These hulls are excellent platforms, tearing them all down was a big mistake especially when you had a multi-generational, brain trust to build them already in place. So Why?
I know you hate when I say it, Skip, but the dollars involved, it's HARD not to follow the money. And I'm a naturally suspicious prick having worked in the Mil-Industrial sector in the DC region for thirty years. I despise them their ways these days when it comes to the ships we're to put our boys and girls on. Has a really bad feel if you've been there in the Great Navy Days and now look where they're taking it. Or am I just fll of it?
Oh, not that it matters much, I've been gone for a bit with family stuff. Hi All! And Happy Thanksgiving, One And All, from a curmudgeon. I'm ugly, but I do mean well and I worry a little over this stuff!
Delete"it's HARD not to follow the money."
DeleteI don't hate money talk. It's ALWAYS about the money! Follow the money and you'll find the problem.
The 'transformation', which is the phenomenon you're talking about, was started as a budget grab, using the promise of revolutionary tech to persuade Congress to hand over large funds.
This approach is stupidity on a platter, as we've documented repeatedly, but it is what we've become today. How to break out of that paradigm is the question/challenge. I do what I can with this blog.
ComNavOps, commenting on your submarine observations:
ReplyDeleteGood
Virginia Payload Module (VPM) – Agree.
Harpoon – Agree.
Networking – Agree.
Mk 48 Torpedo – Agree.
Good and Bad (I’d call this Bad)
SSN(X) – We need to go evolutionary, not revolutionary. For one thing, this almost precludes our ever getting sufficient numbers, to refer to another of your points.
Bad (I’d call this Ugly)
Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV) – The whole philosophy seems to be go ever more complex and expensive with major units, so we can build fewer and fewer, and somehow make unmanned units fill in the gaps. Like you, I just don’t see that working.
As far as what you’d suggest for a submarine warfare path:
Torpedo – Agree, and like your BrahMos analogy. Come to think, that’s kind of what we need with a missile too.
SSGN – There are only 4 Ohio-class SSGN’s, so the whole fleet carries 600 missiles. They’re old and not getting any younger, and to replace them would probably run $8-9B apiece. I don’t really have a problem replacing them with VPM boats. It would take 15 VPM boats to get the same 600 missiles. At about $3.2B each, that would be $48B for the VPM boats, versus about $36B for 4 Ohio replacements. To get more numbers and additional flexibility and capability, I don’t think that’s a terrible tradeoff. I do think we keep the Ohio SSGNs as long as we can, at least until we have a comparable number of launchers on the VPM boats.
Numbers – Given the shipyard capacities and the cost constraints, the only ways I see to get more numbers are 1) to design and build a smaller, cheaper SSG, along the lines of the French Barracuda or the DARPA Tango Bravo project, and 2) to build some AIP conventional SSs. I know an AIP SS is not the equivalent of an SSN in all respects. But there are missions it can perform and take some pressure off the SSN fleet. In particular, I think an AIP SS may be more suited to many missions in the littorals than an SSN might be. And it’s less of a loss if we lose one.
Mine Laying – The Navy has almost totally ignored all aspects of mine warfare. We need submarine minelaying capability, better mine countermeasures, and frankly better mines, too.
Sensors – Agree totally with you. From what I’ve read, we seem to be way behind the Russians in the area of wake detection, and that is another that should be pursued. The Royal Navy appears to have made some progress in this area, and maybe we can leverage off them.
As for your summary paragraph, I agree with heavy on practical firepower applicable to high end, peer war, but I think we need to recognize the need for a number of less than peer war missions. I agree with dropping of de-emphasizing unmanned vehicles and gender integrated crews. I see some need for widespread special forces support, and networking seems great, but a technology-intensive matter for the long run. I’m not sure how much the Columbia class can be down-sized, but to the extent it can, good idea. And as note above, I think we do need down-sized alternatives to the Virginia, both nuke and AIP, if we are to regain numbers.
"if we are to regain numbers."
DeleteNumbers matter ONLY IF THEY ARE THE RIGHT KIND OF NUMBERS. We build a thousand ship fleet if we build canoes but those aren't the right kind of numbers. Simply building lots of SSK might get us numbers but are they the right kind of numbers? Can the US Navy make effective operational use of SSKs?
I'm sure there are some peripheral duties that a US SSK could perform but, by definition, peripheral duties aren't going to win wars. So, while some SSKs might be a convenience and might even free up an odd SSN or two, will that really win us a war? Or, do we need the numbers to be nuclear subs (SSNs)? I don't know. I know enough to frame the discussion and ask the right questions but I don't know enough to answer the questions. You'd need submarine officers to answer the questions and they tend not to discuss such matters publicly.
AIP SSKs have several advantages over nukes, as well as the obvious disadvantages. They are quieter, because even running silent the nukes need pumps running with cooling water for the reactors, and they are smaller, making them harder to detect. In exercises, several of them have embarrassed our ASW forces with their stealth. They can sit on the bottom and go completely quiet. They are lower value, meaning they can perform more dangerous missions with lower risk. These things taken together mean that they are probably better in the littorals, and so much of the focus seems to be sifting there.
DeleteIn that peer war with China, they might be the only assets we would be willing to risk inside the first island chain.
And like it or not, worst case is that they are far better than nothing, which is what the alternative may be if we keep getting more complex and more expensive with our nuke boats.
SSKs would be great to base in Japan, Singapore or even the Philippines or Vietnam (if relations improve). Given sufficient numbers, they could deter China from invading Taiwan by themselves.
DeleteAt this point, I wouldn't bother with AIP. The Japanese are ditching their Sterling engines for a larger, Li-ion battery stack.
I'm not a huge fan of the VPM module. Yes it adds missiles, but it costs between $3-500 million more per boat. Better to have another two to three boats, in my opinion. All of those extra missiles, combined, are just a pinprick to China.
Also not a huge fan of BrahMos. It's a gigantic (2.5-3t), relatively short range missile with a relatively small warhead for its size. Are there really that many enemy ships out there that require supersonic speed to defeat? Just fire lots of simpler, lighter, cheaper weapons. Eventually some will get through.
Submarine- or UUV-based mining is a bit player in a major war. It takes ridiculously long to create minefields this way, especially with small numbers of nuke boats that have better things to do.
"SSKs have several advantages over nukes"
DeleteOne aspect of SSKs that we need to keep firmly in mind when discussing them in US service is range/endurance. The US would be operating them from Pearl Harbor, presumably. That's a very long trip from PH to the South China Sea. The Japanese Soryu class is claimed to have a range of 6000 nm or so but at a very low 6kt speed. It would take forever to reach the operating area! At higher speeds, the range drops drastically.
Most of the countries that operate SSKs use them strictly in and around home waters where range/endurance isn't a factor. For the US, it's an enormous factor. All the silence and capability in the world is useless if you can't get to the operating area and stay there for a useful amount of time.
Also, speed is vital in submarine combat. While not used often due to the noise, when you need speed to outlast a torpedo or extricate from a bad situation, the ability to dial up 30 kts or so is life and death. Again, the Soryu, as an example, has a top speed of 20 kts and can only maintain that for brief periods and doing so will hugely reduce range/endurance.
It's not all about silence!
"SSKs would be great to base in Japan, Singapore or even the Philippines or Vietnam"
DeleteDuring peacetime, that's fine. During war, none of those locations are likely to be available.
"Submarine- or UUV-based mining is a bit player in a major war. It takes ridiculously long to create minefields this way"
Excellent, excellent reminder! We forget that the minefields used in WWII generally consisted of several thousand mines each. My view of sub laid mines is that they can be useful in the very specific scenario of mining a harbor approach channel or other navigational chokepoint but that they are not effective for wide are mining, as you point out. Great reminder! Thanks.
"During peacetime, that's fine. During war, none of those locations are likely to be available."
DeleteThose locations won't immediately be lost on day 1. Any subs at sea at the initial phase of a major conflict can still get their licks in before leaving. The Chinese will have to account for the threat of multiple SSKs lurking around before and during the initial stages.
They can still be useful operating from the Marianas or other forward bases, even Australia.
CDR Chip wrote, 'It would take 15 VPM boats to get the same 600 missiles. At about $3.2B each, that would be $48B for the VPM boats, versus about $36B for 4 Ohio replacements."
DeleteThe planned Columbia-class have 16 tubes (8 less than the Ohio's) and assuming 2 tubes to support special operation forces, a Columbia based SSGN would carry 98 Tomahawks. Therefore, 6 Columbia SSGNs would be needed to replace the capacity of the 4 Ohio SSGNs. Assuming a procurement cost of $8 billion each, it would cost $48 billion for 6 dedicated SSGNs. The same cost as procuring 15 Virginia VPM subs.
If strategic deterrence wasn't an issue, the Navy could convert the 4 youngest Ohio subs into SSGNs. The 4 youngest Ohio's are 22 to 25 years old. Assuming a 2-year conversion period and a 42-year life, each could serve another 15 or more years.
"the Navy could convert the 4 youngest Ohio subs into SSGNs."
DeleteTo add to your thought, if we didn't routinely deploy the converted Ohio SSGNs, they would last longer. In other words, consider them a wartime asset and put them into a semi-idle state with just an occasional, brief exercise sailing.
"Those locations won't immediately be lost on day 1."
DeleteThey most likely will, either through political isolation (Singapore, Vietnam, Philippines, for example, are likely to remain neutral in a China war which means we would be forbidden from using the bases) or immediate attack/destruction. Guam would certainly be subjected to a Minute-1 overwhelming ballistic missile attack. At the moment, we have no significant defensive capability for the base. Bases in Japan would, presumably, also be hit on Day-1, if Japan enters the war. However, there are enough targets in Japan that some bases might remain functional to some degree - iffy proposition.
So, we would likely lose most or all of our forward bases on Day-1, one way or another.
How much longer would a nuclear submarine last in a semi-idle state? And, what does that mean? Is the reactor shut done or run in some idle mode?
DeleteAt the same time, its also a hugely expensive piece of equipment to sit idle only to be deployed in case of a war.
"How much longer would a nuclear submarine last in a semi-idle state? "
DeleteThat's a good question and don't have a definitive answer. What I understand is that a large part of a sub's life is determined by the number of dive cycles. In other words, a sub only has a certain number of dives in it before it reaches a hull-stress end-of-life point. So, it stands to reason that if the sub is left pier side and not routinely diving, that the life span would be extended.
As far as the reactor, I assume it can be put into a minimal operating state but now I'm way outside my area of knowledge!
Yes, it is an expensive piece to sit idle, waiting for war. However, that's also true of B-2 bombers although they do occasionally fly actual missions. Lots of 'pieces' of our military sit idle. It's just the price of being prepared for war.
This also suggests that a class of non-nuclear SSGs might be appropriate. They would be basic missile barges with conventional power and would be left idle until needed in war or one of our all too frequent Tomahawk missile attacks during peacetime.
The Ohio's were built for a 30-year life which the Navy hopes to extend to 42 years. The longest serving submarine, USS Kamehameha (SSBN-642), retired in 2002 after 36 and a half years of service. So, the Navy is attempting to do what hasn't been done before.
DeleteA conventional SSG has some merit, but I'm not sure how many missiles one could carry. I would guess 30 to 40 as an upper limit. But, each would cost far less than an SSGN.
Although not as stealthy as a submarine, a small surface ship, possibly autonomous, could carry 100+ cruise missiles.
I'm uncomfortable with equating build costs only for the various possible combinations of hulls.
DeleteMore hulls means more crew costs and most likely more maintenance and required support infrastructure.
I like the idea of converting the newer Ohios and leaving them mostly idle.
I also agree that planning for losing all forward bases as far back as Pearl, and also losing all space-based assets on day 1 is smart planning. If it doesn't happen like that we win, but at least we prepared.
"...To add to your thought, if we didn't routinely deploy the converted Ohio SSGNs, they would last longer. In other words, consider them a wartime asset and put them into a semi-idle state with just an occasional, brief exercise sailing."
DeleteWish we could hear from a nuke sub engineer or other wise person in the know, why we can't do that? My thought was to take last 4 Ohio's, modify them and keep them in a semi retired state for war reserve. Is it possible or just too expensive? We would remove all the Tridents and just keep them as SSGN but mainly just have them go to sea once a year?
Never heard a real good explanation....
"They most likely will, either through political isolation (Singapore, Vietnam, Philippines, for example, are likely to remain neutral in a China war which means we would be forbidden from using the bases) or immediate attack/destruction."
DeleteSome of those places may opt for neutrality, but any submarines based there can leave, conduct their combat missions and then return to a friendly port.
"So, we would likely lose most or all of our forward bases on Day-1, one way or another."
There are a lot of ports in Japan that could be used. Even the Chinese don't have enough missiles to destroy all of them.
They would hit Anderson on Guam, for sure, but will they actually cause lasting damage or just temporary?
Ports and airfields air fairly hardy, and can be repaired. We fired some 50 Tomahawks at an airfield in Syria and the Syrians were flying from it again within hours. The Chinese don't have enough ballistic missiles to knock either out permanently (short of nukes).
Plus there's Saipan and Tinian nearby. Given a few submarine tenders, we could turn many protected harbors into forward operating bases.
Also, there are lots of non-US islands in the theater that could be co-opted as forward bases in times of war.
"Although not as stealthy as a submarine, a small surface ship, possibly autonomous, could carry 100+ cruise missiles."
DeleteThis is the arsenal ship concept. It has two, related, drawbacks: 1., it's not stealthy, as you noted and, 2., it concentrates a lot of inventory in one platform given that it's not stealthy.
It has advantages, as well, of course.
ComNavOps,
DeleteUnderstand all your concerns. All I am saying is that there are counter-advantages. Being able to utilize those advantages would require some changes of thinking about strategy and tactics. I think we could base them as far west as Guam, and could defend Guam fairly effectively against any conventional weapon. Maybe they could be used in peacetime for a lot of surveillance activities, thus saving wear and tear on SSN hulls. That seems to be part of your war/peace division of labor.
"We fired some 50 Tomahawks at an airfield in Syria and the Syrians were flying from it again within hours."
DeleteBe very cautious about using that as an example. We made no attempt to render it unusable. The attack was carefully 'calibrated' to destroy some facilities but not cause any permanent degradation. The attack was a message, not a combat exercise to destroy a base.
Also, be sure to think operationally. The way to permanently 'destroy' an air base is to destroy its fuel storage - no fuel, no air ops. Trying to destroy runways is pointless. The same applies to a sub base. Destroy the one critical support infrastructure (fuel? munitions storage?) and the rest of the base can be left alone because the subs can't operate.
Dispersed tenders might be an option, as you suggest. I don't know how practical that would be. A tender 'operator' would have to enlighten us.
"could defend Guam fairly effectively against any conventional weapon."
DeleteReally? I don't see it at all, at least, not at the moment. To the best of my knowledge, we have very little in the way of defensive capability at Guam.
What do you see that we have or, alternatively, what do you think we need to effectively defend Guam from rains of ballistic missiles and hundreds of cruise missiles? Guam will, certainly, be a Day-1 maximum effort by the Chinese to remove it as a functional base.
"All I am saying is that there are counter-advantages. Being able to utilize those advantages would require some changes of thinking about strategy and tactics."
DeleteOh absolutely. SSKs have definite advantages. As you astutely point out, benefiting from SSKs depends on having doctrine and tactics that utilize their advantages. This sounds a lot like needing a CONOPS, doesn't it?!
Most people who talk about SSKs (or anything else, for that matter) do so only in non-specific, generalized terms. The question is not whether there are any generic benefits but, rather, whether those generic benefits will be useful for the specific scenario, doctrine, and tactics we want to use them in.
I'm thinking that someone needs to write up a SSK mini-CONOPS post to explore SSKs in specific US Navy scenarios.
"This is the arsenal ship concept. It has two, related, drawbacks: 1., it's not stealthy, as you noted and, 2., it concentrates a lot of inventory in one platform given that it's not stealthy."
DeleteI wouldn't call it an arsenal ship in the traditional sense. But, something smaller in the 5,000 to 6,000 ton range with simpler electronics, a 128 VLS cells, and a few SeaRAM/Phalanx for self-defense might work might work. The superstructure could be shaped much like that of the Zumwalt to minimize detection.
And, though stealthy, an SSGN with 154 missiles concentrates a lot of inventory in one platform.
"The same applies to a sub base. Destroy the one critical support infrastructure (fuel? munitions storage?) and the rest of the base can be left alone because the subs can't operate."
DeleteFuel and munitions can be replaced. Only the submarines and their crews are truly difficult to replace.
"The attack was a message, not a combat exercise to destroy a base."
DeleteIf it took 50 missiles to just "send a message", imagine how many it would take to actually knock a base out for any length of time.
"Fuel and munitions can be replaced."
DeleteNo, they can't. Not on the scale required to operate an air or sub base. Those require massive amounts of fuel. This is the Pearl Harbor lesson. Had the Japanese destroyed the fuel tanks, the Navy would have been unable to operate.
" imagine how many it would take to actually knock a base out for any length of time."
DeleteExecuted properly, potentially only a relative few. This is the Pearl Harbor lesson. Had the Japanese destroyed the fuel tanks, the Navy would have been unable to operate even though rest of the facilities were left untouched.
"Any subs at sea at the initial phase of a major conflict can still get their licks in before leaving."
DeleteThis sounds amazingly similar to the WWII Asiatic Fleet episode. Check out this old post,
"Asiatic Fleet Lessons"
In particular, note the portions about the Asiatic submarine force. I offer this not as an argument but simply as a piece of history that you might find interesting and enlightening. Let me know what you think.
According to this,
Deletehttps://russianmilitaryanalysis.wordpress.com/2017/04/10/u-s-cruise-missile-strikes-in-syria-brief-analysis/
We hit fuel, munitions bunkers, aircraft shelters, air defenses and other targets. Sure looks like we tried to knock the airfield out.
Of course as others have said, we should harden our bases, and set up additional bases in the region. But it may require a lot more weapons than you’d expect to keep a base knocked out.
The Chinese only have a handful of non-precision DF-26s that can hit Guam directly, which is a far cry from what they’d need to knock out either the air or naval bases. they could use air or sea launched cruise missiles, but those a pre easier to counter,
"In particular, note the portions about the Asiatic submarine force. I offer this not as an argument but simply as a piece of history that you might find interesting and enlightening. Let me know what you think."
DeleteIt is an interesting case, with some parallels to today.
It's certainly an object lesson for things that could go wrong. (e.g. poorly tested weapons, untrained crews, ISR resilience, and so on.)
One can only wonder how events might have changed if their torpedoes had worked, and their crews and captains had better, more realistic, training.
On the other hand, today's Mk48 series is probably the most tested torpedo in history. Doesn't mean it will always work, or won't have flaws but it certainly isn't an early Mk13. Harpoon and Tomahawk are well tested in their respective roles too.
Training of SSK crews is obviously non-existent because US SSKs are non-existent. SSN training is probably best in the world, but still may not be good enough for wartime.
ISR network resilience is an issue, but it's an issue for the entire fleet, not just submarines. However simply having more manned "ears in the water" in the region could help significantly, assuming those ears can still communicate.
(Don McCollor)...With mines, would a hybrid mine/torpedo be viable in shallow waters? Able to lay quiet and not necessarily react to the first target, but be able to become a small torpedo with a mile or two range (same as detection range). The idea would not necessarily be outright sinkings, but area denial because of the threat of sinking or damage (a ship in drydock is almost as good as one sunk)...
ReplyDeleteWe already have that. It's the Submarine Launched Mobile Mine (SLMM).
Delete(Don McCollor)...my apologies if I am wrong, but the SLMM can move around, but does not actively rapidly attack a target like a torpedo.
DeleteYes, I think you're correct. The SLMM self-propels to the designated 'laying' point and then the propulsion is disconnected and it acts like an immobile mine after that.
DeleteIMO, if USN going for new attack sub, I wish they wouldn't jam so many missions on it. I would see most of the land attack/SF insertion mission go to a modified Colombia SSBN. Have a modified Colombia come off the production line after the 12 boomers. SSNX should be high focus on anti-sub and little else.
ReplyDeleteAre you suggesting a Columbia class SSGN or are you suggesting dropping the Tomahawk mission from subs?
DeleteI would move most of land attack mission to a Colombia SSGN.
DeleteAssuming you would also build more than 4, I agree.
DeleteIll second that!! The imminent loss of the SSGNs should have a follow-on plan. I was just looking at the ages of the remaining ICBM Ohios, and trying to figure out if some more conversions would be plausible to replace their brethren. But the Columbia timeline doesnt support it, unless some Ohio service lives are extended. Even then, the conversion cost vs amount of life left in the hulls, and what the "acceptable" lower number of deterrent boats is, may make it a non-starter. However we do it though, I believe that the SSGN is somthing that shouldnt disappear from the toolbox.....
Delete"The imminent loss of the SSGNs should have a follow-on plan."
DeleteThe VPM equipped Virginia submarines is the follow-on plan. And, the Ohio's were originally built for a 30-year life which is being extended to 42 years. The longest serving submarine is the USS Kamehameha (SSBN-642), which was retired in 2002 after 36 and a half years of service. Ohio is the same age as when Kamehameha was retired. So, the Navy is entering some uncharted territory, which on the brightside, might provide some lessons learned for the Columbia class.
"The VPM equipped Virginia submarines is the follow-on plan."
DeleteSure, but its not 600+ missles in dedicated platforms either... The sheer punch weight of each SSGN is somthing we should replace on a two or three to one basis. Any upcoming fight could hinge on having, or lacking, that kind of volume of firepower...
@Nico ideally, we could slip in an SSGN into the Columbia line... Maybe every third one?? Would be nice to start putting new ones in the water before the old ones are all gone....
Delete"Any upcoming fight could hinge on having, or lacking, that kind of volume of firepower."
DeleteHistorically, large cruise missile strikes have been launched by a combination of ships and aircraft. For example, nine ships fired 122 cruise missiles at the start of Desert Storm.
As for other platforms, the B-52 can launch 20 cruise missiles. For a special mission, a Burke could offload a number of Standard Missiles and carry a larger number of cruise missiles. Plus, there have been plans to convert the 747 into a cruise missile carry capable of launching 72 Tomahawks.
We could also build a number of small "arsenal" ships each carrying 96 to 128 cruise missiles. By small, I mean something in the 5,000 to 6,000 ton range with a few self-defense weapons. If a carrier group is difficult to locate in the open ocean, a single small ship should be even harder to find.
"For example, nine ships fired 122 cruise missiles at the start of Desert Storm."
DeleteBut...a single SSGN could do that. Plus it could it from the enemy's doorstep, somthing not likely for 8 B-52s to manage. AAW being a Burkes main mission means a mostly TLAM loadout isnt ideal. And we could have an "arsenal" type ship, but thats a huge investment of offensive power in somthing thats still nowhere near as hard to find and counter as a submarine....
"But...a single SSGN could do that."
DeleteThat's the key point. Yes, a combination of multiple ships and aircraft could equal a single SSGN but why subject ourselves to the challenge of coordinating such an expansive effort when we could accomplish the task with a single sub? Also, that coordination becomes infinitely more difficult in wartime.
Finally, there is an opportunity cost, and a severe one, associated with using, say, 9 ships to what a single sub could have done. That's 9 ships that aren't doing some other mission. In peacetime, it's no big deal because those ships didn't have anything worthwhile to do, anyway. However, in war, those 9 ships will be desperately needed somewhere else!
Really good comment.
Thanks. Ive been a closet SSGN advocate for a long time. I feel they are a very valuable tool, in fact maybe top'o the list when looking at a Westpac/China Sea confrontation. Their massive capability to saturate target(s),deep into an enemy area from relative safety, makes them an incredible day one/two asset that we should be building many more of...
Delete@Jjabatie. Not sure it's possible to put an SSGN ever third SSBN. My understanding is USN and manufacturer is on a super tight timeline, so not sure you can move around the SSBMs production.
DeleteReally only options:Figure out a way to save wear and tear on the old Ohio SSGN, convert a few more to SSGN (not sure where and by whom!!!) and again put them in some sort of storage to save on wear and tear OR build a few SSGN after the SSBM run. The problem with that is you go a least a decade with no more SSGNs.
"But...a single SSGN could do that. Plus it could it from the enemy's doorstep, somthing not likely for 8 B-52s to manage."
DeleteWhat do we do an hour later or the next day when we want to launch a follow-on attack or a new attack somewhere else? It could take days or weeks for an SSGN to return to port, reload, and then return to patrol. And, it's not like we have a lot of them either.
And, the B-52s wouldn't be alone in an attack, they would have fighters and EW aircraft in support. And, their defensive electronics as good as they've ever been.
SSGNs aren't wonder weapons and the Chinese aren't 10 foot tall giants either.
"SSGNs aren't wonder weapons..."
DeleteI get that... But on day two of a major conflict with China for instance, where are the B-52s coming from? Did they get hit preemptively? Do they have a field to launch from, or return to? Do we have the 150 Tomahawks on hand there to put on them? And if we use them, how long til another stockpile appears for them to use? Airfields for them will become targets, and resupply wont be easy, so the logistics of other platforms to send HUNDREDS of missles downrange is a much more fragile situation. Of course the bombers will have support, but you think the Chinese arent going to have a say in all this?? B-52s on Guam are, im sure, in their day one strike plans. The two west coast SSGNs have 300+ missles at the ready. At least one, but hopefully both, are in theatre within the first few days of a brawl kickoff, and short of the intel community being completely oblivious, Id like to think the other two would already be on their way when things start. Chances will be awful good that those boats can penetrate well inside the Chinese perimeter, whereas the Chinese defensive depth makes anything other than those subs success questionable. So while not wonder weapons...theyre certainly the heavy offensive tool for breaking down the gate for follow-on forces, including those bombers...
"SSGN to return to port, reload, and then return to patrol. And, it's not like we have a lot of them either."
DeleteThat's why you build more than one! That's why we need half a dozen, at least.
"And, the B-52s wouldn't be alone in an attack, they would have fighters and EW aircraft in support."
That could work. What an enormous effort, though! And, in an opposed attack, there would be losses. All that can be avoided by using an SSGN. It's not that other methods of missile delivery can't work, it's just that an SSGN solves all the associated problems.
@Nico
Delete"The problem with that is you go a least a decade with no more SSGNs."
Exactly!! And while Id like to be wrong...it really seems like "that decade" is the one where we will actually be needing/using them....
"To the best of my knowledge, we have very little in the way of defensive capability at Guam."
ReplyDeleteI said that we could, not that we have the capability now. I actually saw somewhere (wish I could remember where, so I could link it) a layout for a pretty extensive self-defense capability for Guam. I don't believe any of it has been done. It will not be cheap, but if we plan to use Guam as a major base, it needs to be done. Same for Pearl, and of course Sasebo and Yokosuka to the extent the Japanese permit.
"I'm thinking that someone needs to write up a SSK mini-CONOPS post to explore SSKs in specific US Navy scenarios."
I agree, but I don't wear dolphins so anything from me would be speculative. I almost think SSKs fit well into your war/peace concept. Let the SSKs do a lot of the routine peacetime surveillance stuff, so we can save wear and tear on SSNs. Plus, if somebody has to go sit on the bottom outside Murmansk or Vladivostok, an SSK is harder to detect and less critical a loss if the bad guys detect it and play nasty.
"so anything from me would be speculative."
DeleteThat doesn't stop me! :)
Seriously, our so-called professional sailor/warriors have pretty well botched up the Navy so why not some speculation informed by nothing more than common sense? Couldn't do any worse and, likely, a whole lot better!