One of the near-criminal failings of Navy leadership over the last few decades is the looming shortfall of attack subs (SSN) with 30 year shipbuilding forecasts demonstrating a steady drop to around 40 subs in the 2030 or so time range. We touched on this, briefly, back in 2013 (see, “SSN Shortfall”). The Navy’s stated goal for SSN numbers is 66, derived from the Navy’s 2016 Force Structure Assessment.(1, p.8) That’s quite a shortfall from 66 to around 40. Here's a graph showing one of the typical projections that demonstrates the shortfall.
Where are we at, now? The current SSN inventory is 50 subs, broken out as follows:
|
SSN Inventory (3) |
||
|
Class |
Class Name |
Current Active |
|
SSBN-726 |
Ohio |
14 |
|
SSGN- |
Ohio |
4 |
|
SSN-21 |
Seawolf |
3 |
|
SSN-688 |
Los Angeles |
28 |
|
SSN-774 |
Virginia |
19 |
|
|
Total |
68 |
So, what has the Navy been doing to mitigate the coming shortfall? Contrary to what any sane person would expect, they’ve been early retiring Los Angeles class submarines for many years (see, “Los Angeles Class Overhauls And Retirements”)
That is absolute bat-excrement crazy! … but it fits the pattern of incompetent, insane Navy leadership decisions, doesn’t it?
Let’s examine some aspects of the submarine shortfall
Cost – By early retiring Los Angeles class subs, we’re not only exacerbating the submarine shortfall but we’re trading paid for Los Angeles submarines for $3B Virginias. This might – barely – be excusable if we were getting stunningly more capable submarines for the money but there is no indication that is the case. The very sparse information available suggests that the Virginias are marginally more capable, at best. Wait, that can’t be, you say. The Virginias are decades newer. They must be greatly improved. Well, the Ford costs twice the recent Nimitz class, is decades newer and offers absolutely no improvement in combat capability and, quite likely, represents a decrease in some areas. So, yes, it’s quite conceivable that the Virginias are not a significant improvement over the Los Angeles class. To be fair, there is almost no public information on performance of either class on which to base a comparison.
Shipyard Capacity – The Navy is trying build more subs but the current shipyard construction capacity is limited to barely two subs per year. Growth out of the shortfall is simply not possible. Despite this, the Navy has early retired dozens of Los Angeles subs. Shipyard capacity also affects maintenance. Currently, subs are sitting idle pierside for years waiting for their turn at maintenance.
All of this is made worse by the coming Columbia class SSBN construction program. There are only two yards building nuclear subs for the Navy: Electric Boat and Newport News. Electric Boat has been chosen as the prime builder for the new SSBN. This will likely reduce Virginia class construction to one per year, if that. We are not going to build our way out of the submarine shortfall any time soon.
Ironically, Congress has signaled its willingness to add more subs to the Navy’s budget but yard capacity is simply not available. Given that the Navy has known about the coming shortfall for decades, has the Navy been investing in increased yard capacity? No. Well done, Navy.
Budget – The SSBN program is going to have a profound impact on the Navy’s shipbuilding budget. The 2019 GAO annual report cites a SSBNs cost of nearly $9B per sub and history assures us that cost will only increase.
Comparative Numbers – China’s submarine numbers are shown below. Currently, China has more subs than the US (76 vs 68) although their advantage lies in SSKs as opposed to the US emphasis on nuclear powered subs. Given that the Chinese operating area is the South/East China Seas and the first island chain, the SSKs do not represent a disadvantage and may actually be an advantage in the shallower, more confined operating areas.
|
Chinese Submarine Inventory (6) |
|
|
Class |
Current Active |
|
SSBN |
7 |
|
SSN |
12 |
|
SSK |
57 |
|
Total |
76 |
Trend – Far more concerning than the current total numbers of submarines is the trend. China’s submarine fleet is expected to increase to around 76 subs, or so, by 2030, depending on which report you care to believe while, at the same time, improving the quality by retiring older subs and replacing them with new ones. At the same time, as the Navy has indicated, the US submarine fleet will be steadily decreasing as the SSN fleet drops towards 39-40.
Summary
This post is mainly informational. There is no particular point other than the criminal stupidity and mismanagement by the Navy that has allowed this situation to develop. Submarines represent one of the US Navy’s biggest advantages over any other country and Navy leadership is knowingly squandering it.
Unfortunately, lacking the yard capacity, we can’t build our way out this shortfall but what we can do is stop early retiring perfectly capable Los Angeles class subs. We also need to begin the long term process of building more maintenance capacity so that we don’t have submarines sitting idle waiting for their turn at maintenance. Seriously, this is the kind of thing we used to mock the Soviets/Russia for and now we’re doing it: building subs and leaving them sitting idle, unable to operate.
___________________________________
(1)Congressional Budget Office, “An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2019 Shipbuilding Plan”, Oct 2018
(2)Congressional Budget Office, “An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2013 Shipbuilding Plan”, Jul 2012
(3)https://www.nvr.navy.mil/NVRSHIPS/SHIPBATTLEFORCE.HTML
(4)Congressional Research Service, “Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress”, Ronal O’Rourke, 10-Jun-2010, p.7
(5)Congressional Research Service, “Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress”, Ronal O’Rourke, 14-Aug-2006, p.14
(6)https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_active_People%27s_Liberation_Army_Navy_ships
USNI News October 28, reporting on "SECNAV Braithwaite Calls for Light Carrier, ‘Joint Strike Frigate’ ; Sounds Alarm Over Chinese Naval Expansion" while visiting HMS Queen Elizabeth at sea off the coast off Flamborough Head, England, October 1.
ReplyDeletePentagon’s Battle Force 2045 plan for the Navy’s future fleet calls for a fleet of 500 ships that will include building up to 70 to 80 nuclear attack submarines.
FWIW in 25 years to add possible additional 30 SSN to current fleet of 50, assuming 28 Los Angeles class all retired by 2045 need total new build of approx 60 boats, approx 2.5 per year at cost of $3.6 billion each of the new 10,000t Virginia Block V's with the VPM. Ball park ROM figures of $9 billion a year, 25 year program total cost $225 billion.
Wiil funding be there at even at only two and a half SSN pa, any possible alternatives for less costly/smaller SSN or even SSK to increase numbers at faster pace.
I may be misunderstanding your numbers. If 28 subs retire and we build 30 new, that's only a net increase of 2 over the current level.
DeleteIf you mean adding 30 new to the current 50 for a total of 80, we would need 58 new subs.
Yes guesstimated as ~60, should have mentioned also allowed for retirement of the first two Seawolf's as by 2045 will be ~46/47 years old.
DeleteIt seems to me that several steps are obvious:
ReplyDelete1. Keep the Los Angeles class submarines in service longer. A quick analysis suggests that if we keep them for 35 years each, then there would still be 18 in 2025 and 5 in 2030. If we could keep them for 40 years each, then there would still be 28 in 2025, 18 in 2030, and 5 in 2035.
2. To do that we need to upgrade maintenance. In particular, we need to add a major submarine maintenance (and possibly construction) facility on the west coast. That’s expensive up front, but a cost saver in the long run. Looking at new construction, if two shipyards can produce 2 submarines per year, that simply exacerbates the need for a third yard, and it would seem to make sense on the west coast.
3. We currently have 14 Ohio SSBNs and the first of the Columbia SSBNs is supposed to come online in 2031. Assume we add one Columbia per year until the class reached 12 in 2042. If we retire one Ohio every other year, we would be down to 9 by 2029, and continuing that practice would leave us with 9 through 2031 (8 Ohios and 1 Columbia at that point), 10 in 2032 (8 and 2), and we could stay at 10 by adding 1 Columbia and retiring 1 Ohio after that. On that schedule, the last Ohio (presumably Louisiana) would be 42 when retired in 2039. We’d have 10 SSBNs through 2040, 11 in 2041, and back to full strength 12 in 2042. We would build 1 Virginia (or replacement) a year while we are building the Columbias.
4. Once we are through building the Columbias, we can devote that line to a new SSGN, and start building 1 of those per year plus 1 Virginia (or replacement). If we retired the current Ohio SSGNs at age 40, they would all be gone by 2024. As a partial replacement, build the next 20 Virginias as VPM versions, which seems to be the plan, and at 2 a year we would have 20 by 2030. That’s when we start building the Columbias, so reduce the Virginia (or replacement) production to 1 per year, basically to build the number of non-VPM Virginias (or replacements) to 30 by 2039, and then replace older Virginias as they are withdrawn. The new SSGNs would start entering service in 2043, and could be based on an updated Ohio design, assuming that would be cheaper than the Columbia design.
5. That still won’t get us enough numbers, so I have two other proposals. One, build a smaller, cheaper SSN to complement the Virginias. What I have in mind is something like the French Barracuda, that would cost about half as much as a Virginia. It doesn’t carry as many weapons, but it is smaller and thus would presumably be a better fit in shallower or restricted waterways. Two, build some AIP/diesel/electric submarines. These are not the equal of nukes in open oceans, but they can be employed effectively in littoral and restricted waterways. They could work around the first island chain, in the eastern Med, in the Baltic, or in the Persian/Arabian Gulf—all places where the likelihood of future naval involvement is fairly high. Let’s say we did try to establish a new construction/maintenance yard on the west coast. They could ally with the French Naval Group (DCNS/DCN) to build Barracudas, and with the Japanese Mitsubishi or Kawasaki to build some of the Japanese AIP designs. Let’s say it takes 5 years to get the new yard up and running, and let’s say it could produce one of each sub per year.
Doing all these things, the minimum size of the submarine fleet would be 63 in 2024-25 (primarily because of hanging on to more Los Angeles class), and it would grow steadily thereafter. By 2050 we could have a force of 122 subs (30 Virginias/replacements, 20 Virginia VPMs, 12 Columbia SSBNs, 8 Ohio SSGNs, 26 Barracudas, and 26 AIP SSKs). Since a significant part of that force would be considerably cheaper per ship than what the Navy is looking at, the overall cost for a much larger force would probably not exceed the cost of the Navy’s planned force by a significant amount. Getting the new yard (whether east coast or west coast) would be a significant step, but one that would be necessary to accomplish this program.
We know Columbia will be quieter. Should we build more of them cut down to 4 tubes as an interim SSN on the way to the Virginia replacement? I don't think you can get quiet with enough sensor capacity in a Barracuda hull. Suffren being the comparable in production model is still going for 2.1B a pop. Also, where is this 12 SSN Chinese number coming from?
DeleteThe Suffren $2.1B, as lead ship of class, includes a bunch of front end research and design costs. The estimated average cost for the entire class is $1.3-1.5B per sub. Obviously the USN increases the cost of everything it buys, but on the other hand you should get some cost reduction from amortizing research and design costs over a larger production run. In any event, it's substantially less than the $2.5-2.8B cost of a Virginia, and at some point we really do have to look at costs.
DeleteMy understanding is that the real size penalty for the Barracudas is a smaller weapons load. That just may be something we have to live with.
The Columbias are estimated by CBO to run about $7.5B apiece. A Columbia-based SSGN would presumably be in the $7B range. If we could get an updated Ohio for less, say around $5B, that would seem to be a perfectly capable SSGN design and that's money worth saving.
The real killer, money-wise, is the proposed Virginia replacement that CBO is currently pricing at about $5+B per sub. Run the numbers, and that pretty well prices us out of business fairly quickly. I am looking at keeping the Virginia pipeline going, making incremental improvements as we can, and using the Barracudas and AIP SSKs to get numbers. It's the old Zumwalt high/low mix approach, but given the numbers needs and realistic budget expectations, I don't see any other way to go.
I know not everybody is a fan of SSKs but one reason I would agree with CDR is if we can't maintain the SSNs properly or build back up the maintenance base, building a few SSKs and a maintenance depot for them on the West Coast should at least be seriously considered. Not as much a fan of the small SSNs, you're spending close to what you're spending for a big SSN,probably not worth it. You really need the "downgrade " to an SSK to get the better price and open the possibility of bringing in more manufacturers and maintenance yards. After a few years, who knows, maybe USA gets lucky and not only we get some more yards on West Coast but maybe even some competition on those SSNs too! One can dream....
Delete" where is this 12 SSN Chinese number coming from?"
DeleteAs noted in the post, reference 6.
The Barracuda class seems okay but nothing special and likely not well suited to US operations. The reactor requires 10 yr refueling cycles which is a major drawback. The weapons load appears to be 20 weapons which are a mix of torpedoes, missiles, and mines. For a sub that is operating far from its base, as a US sub would when operating in and around the South China Sea, a small weapons load is not desirable. If a sub makes the effort to travel far from base, the trip (meaning weapons) needs to be worth the effort.
DeletePedestrian capabilities combined with high cost seems like an undesirable combination.
Just working off a quick scan of the class specs. Maybe there's something more that makes it more attractive?
Delete"The Barracuda class seems okay but nothing special and likely not well suited to US operations."
The French designed them for use in the Med and other restricted waters. If we are going to fight in the first island chain, the Med, the Baltic, or the Persian/Arabian Gulf, those attributes might come in handy there. Worst case, they are a way to get more hulls in the water for less costs, which was the idea behind high/low. Sometimes, as the Russians say, quantity has a quality all its own.
Anyway, looking at costs, CBO says that the Navy's 2020 version of the 355-ship fleet will spend $395B over 30 years to have 78 subs in the water by 2050 (12 SSBN, 5 SSGN, 28 VPM, 33 Virginia replacement), where the approach I outlined would spend $325B to have 122 subs (12 SSBN, 8 SSGN, 20 VPM, 30 Virginias, 26 Barracudas, and 26 AIP SSKs) in the water by 2050. You can have a preference for one combination or the other, but saving $70B (or $2.3B/year) comes in handy for budget purposes, and I think my approach is better suited for a significant littoral component.
Bottom line: 122 subs can be 44 places that 78 subs can't be. And my 122 subs include 70 that are basically the equal of those subs in the Navy's 78, so the tradeoff is 8 Virginia replacements versus 26 Barracudas and 26 AIP SSKs.
DeletePlus that $70B savings can buy 5 Fords (worst case) or 8 Nimitzes or 12 Kitty Hawks or 700 airplanes or 20 cruisers or 40 Burkes or 60 FFGXs or 120-140 ASW frigates (not that we'd buy that many, but it gives you an idea of what the tradeoffs could be). And building a third yard to build the Barracudas and maintain the Pacific Fleet subs would be a bonus with part of that money, plus there are probably several yards that could build the AIP SSKs.
"they are a way to get more hulls in the water for less costs"
DeleteI'll continue to pound on this because it's vital to understand. The fleet size and composition CANNOT be determined by cost. It has to be determined by operational need. Costs are a factor but only a secondary one and ship cost is the last place to cut costs - personnel, overhead, and other places should be cut to the bone before operationally necessary ship costs are affected. We have gazillions of dollars of savings waiting in those other areas to be controlled and cut before we start looking at operationally necessary ship costs. Note that I keep saying 'operationally necessary ship costs'. I say that because the Ford, Zumwalt, and LCS, among others, are NOT operationally necessary and should never have been expended and should, even now, be terminated.
'More hulls' is NOT a worthwhile goal. More combat effective and useful hulls is. The case for a US Navy SSK has never been effectively elucidated. It may exist but no one has developed it. Everyone is infatuated with the idea of lots of cheap SSK hulls but no one has identified exactly how these cheap hulls would operate and be supported within a US Navy strategic plan. They may well have a useful and effective place but, on the other hand, they may not. They have lots of drawbacks to go with their advantages and the case has not yet been made for them.
I'd love to see someone (it's on my long term to-do post list) make the case and include smaller weapons loads, reduced endurance, lower speed, basing requirements, transit time versus operational time, greater combat risk, multiple training pipelines, multiple maintenance and parts lines, ?shallower dive limits?, etc. balanced against inherent stealth, lower cost, ?reduced manning?, etc. and all of that reconciled against US Navy strategic needs. Even at first glance, the case for a US SSK is nowhere near self-evident.
So, before we all jump on the SSK bandwagon and start building a hundred SSKs, we need to carefully examine the combat and operations case.
"the approach I outlined would spend $325B to have 122 subs (12 SSBN, 8 SSGN, 20 VPM, 30 Virginias, 26 Barracudas, and 26 AIP SSKs) in the water"
DeleteOnly in the most simplistic sense. Your approach would also incur additional costs for multiple training pipelines, multiple spare parts pipelines, multiple maintenance paths, multiple inventory software systems, multiple shore support capabilities and facilities, etc., none of which exist now and none of which you included in your cost analysis. As you well know, the true cost of a sub is not just the construction cost. There are all kinds of operating and support costs. Spreadsheets of ships and construction costs are fun to play with, no doubt, but the true cost impact is much more complex.
There is also the actual operational necessity to consider, as I described in the preceding comment. This is not to say that there is no place for SSKs in the US Navy but the case is far from clear cut and no one has made it, yet.
Quantity has a quality all its own is valid ONLY if that quantity is combat useful. A thousand combat canoes (to use my favorite example) add a lot of quantity but no combat useful quality.
I'm the last person to give the Navy credit for any intelligent thinking but given their extreme desire for more hulls, of any kind, regardless of whether they're useful or not, doesn't it seem odd that the Navy has not turned to SSKs to increase hulls in the water and try to get more funding from Congress? That should tell us something about what value the Navy sees (or does not see) in SSKs. Again, that hardly indicates that the Navy is correct in their thinking but it certainly suggests that SSK supporters aren't seeing the whole picture.
"saving $70B"
Delete"122 subs can be 44 places that 78 subs can't be."
This is extremely simplistic. The Navy is already complaining that it can't man 280 ships. How are we going to man 44 extra subs (and all the other ships you've called for!)? The Navy already says they can't afford to pay for full crews for 280 ships. How will they pay for crews on many dozens of extra ships? The point is that a simplistic construction savings calculation is just that: simplistic. There are lots of additional costs to go along with more ships and more types of ships. The Navy budget is pretty close to a zero-sum game. If you increase the number of crews and their associated costs then you have to subtract funds from somewhere else.
Yes, we can (and I have) pointed out areas of potential large savings but I also recognize that additional ships and ship types carry cost penalties far beyond their construction costs. I'd love to see you incorporate at least an approximation of the impact of the additional costs on your fleet plans!
"This is extremely simplistic. The Navy is already complaining that it can't man 280 ships. How are we going to man 44 extra subs (and all the other ships you've called for!)?"
DeleteGood question. One corollary to high/low is that smaller and cheaper ships require smaller crews. Assuming the Navy's Virginia replacement has the same size crew, assuming the SSGNs have the same size crews as the comparable SSBNs, and assuming that the other types that I am including have the same size crews as they currently carry in other navies, then the total crew for the Navy's 78 submarines would be about 10,870 (139 per sub) and the total crews for my 122 submarines would be 13,100 (107 per sub). That's a difference of roughly 1200, that can be offset elsewhere.
We can also look at one of your (and my) favorite whipping boys, the bloated shore establishment. CBO prepared a military force structure primer in 2017 that combined Navy and Marine Corps personnel. They showed a total of 505,000 (roughly 325,000 Navy and 180,000 Marines), including 210,000 combat, 93,000 combat support, and 202,000 administrative/overhead. Cut admin/overhead in half, add 34,000 to combat, 17,000 to combat support, and 50,000 to reduction in total headcount. Allocating between Navy and Marines on a pro rata basis, that would free up 22,000 for Navy combat and 11,000 for Navy combat support. You could man a bunch of ships with that, including my 1200 extra sub sailors and a lot more. And if the cuts to admin/overhead were too draconian in spots, you could cut back on some of that 50,000 total force reduction. You've pointed out that 280 admirals and staffs is way too many. You could cut 200, still have 80 which should be more than adequate, and at an average staff size of 20, that's 4,000 right there.
So it can be done. It takes a rethink of lots of things, but I think a rethink is in order.
“I'll continue to pound on this because it's vital to understand. The fleet size and composition CANNOT be determined by cost. It has to be determined by operational need.”
DeleteAgreed. And I’m a bit angry at the suggestion that I’m letting cost override operational need. All I’m saying is that at some point cost forces tradeoffs, and within cost constraints we have to look at getting the most bang for the buck. I’m not saying build SSKs because they’re cheaper. I’m saying that if there are jobs where SSKs can be effective and using them for those jobs frees up money that can be used elsewhere, then do it. As you noted in the original post to this thread, “SSKs do not represent a disadvantage and may actually be an advantage in the shallower, more confined operating areas.”
“More hulls is NOT a worthwhile goal. More combat effective and useful hulls is.”
Agreed. I’m not looking at dumping the whole SSN/SSGN/SSBN force for SSKs. I’m looking at places where we may need to operate in a peer war—the first island chain, the eastern Med, the Baltic—or in an action against a rogue nation—the Persian/Arabian Gulf—and I’m seeing lots of shallower, more confined areas. If SSKs are more at an advantage in those areas, then use them there, and free up more SSNs for blue water stuff.
“The case for a US Navy SSK has never been effectively elucidated. It may exist but no one has developed it. Everyone is infatuated with the idea of lots of cheap SSK hulls but no one has identified exactly how these cheap hulls would operate and be supported within a US Navy strategic plan. They may well have a useful and effective place but, on the other hand, they may not. They have lots of drawbacks to go with their advantages and the case has not yet been made for them.”
Part of the problem is that the Navy always looks at it on a 1-to-1 basis, one SSK versus one SSN. The SSK will never win that, but if we can build 4 SSKs for the price of one SSN, or if we can find needed jobs that SSKs can do and use the savings to address other areas of need, then we are ahead of the game.
“So, before we all jump on the SSK bandwagon and start building a hundred SSKs, we need to carefully examine the combat and operations case.”
I’m not talking about building 100, I’m talking about building 25-30. There’s a big difference. Note that excluding the SSKs, my proposed submarine force is 96 SSNs, versus the Navy’s proposed 78, and even dropping the Barracudas (which theoretically have some of the same advantages as the SSKs in littoral areas) I’m still looking at 70 essentially equivalent submarines. I’m asking what force that can beat China’s how to build it within reasonable budget constraints.
“Quantity has a quality all its own is valid ONLY if that quantity is combat useful. A thousand combat canoes (to use my favorite example) add a lot of quantity but no combat useful quality.”
I think Barracudas and AIP SSKs are much more than combat canoes. LCSs and Zumwalts are not and have the additional disadvantage of being very expensive combat canoes. If we had used what we spent on them for other purposes, we would be way ahead of where we are. If SSKs and Barracudas can be effective in shallow or restricted waters, and if there is a good likelihood that we may have to fight there, then build some and use the savings for other needs—ships, airplanes, personnel, training. There’s no shortage of needs.
“I'm the last person to give the Navy credit for any intelligent thinking but given their extreme desire for more hulls, of any kind, regardless of whether they're useful or not, doesn't it seem odd that the Navy has not turned to SSKs to increase hulls in the water and try to get more funding from Congress?”
But the Navy doesn’t want SSKs. They want to replace $3B Virginias with $5B future SSNs, which forces reduced numbers, and make it up with UUVs that are worthless in combat. Given their lack of intelligent thinking, we might argue that their avoidance of SSKs is a compelling argument FOR them.
The Second Columbia is budgeted for over 9.3B. I don't think they will get much cheaper. 7.5B is an old or false number. If you look at Australia's program for a conventional version of Suffren they are coming in at over 3.4B per boat for the program cost.
DeleteWhether the Columbias are $7.5B (CBO estimate) or $9.3B, or any other number, they are the same price for my approach as the Navy's, and we are both building the same number, so there is no impact on the comparison.
DeleteThe Australian Shortfin Dolphin program looks like something that has been pretty badly mismanaged, with a lot of unnecessary political involvement, from several reports I've seen. I've seen several discussions of total life cost, particularly comparing conventional to nuke, and that's what that $3.4B number looks like to me.
Conceptually, it seems that a smaller Virginia should be cheaper, and the French experience suggests about half the cost. Maybe it's not specifically a Barracuda, maybe it's just a downscaled Virginia.
What I find really bizarre is that CBO has estimated the Navy's proposed Virginia replacement at $5.5B. What is that about? That is clearly a ship that we cannot afford in the numbers needed. That's what I'm trying to avoid with my Barracuda concept.
"I’m a bit angry at the suggestion that I’m letting cost override operational need."
DeleteI think that's exactly what you're doing! I don't say that in a mean way. I think you're falling back on generalities rather than specific operational needs when you're making your assessment of the usefulness of an SSK. For example, you say, "I’m seeing lots of shallower, more confined areas". That's a generality, not a specific operational need. Why would we want to operate in shallow, confined areas? The answer to that is the specific operational need - or lack thereof. What, specifically, is in those shallow, confined waters that is important enough to want a sub to operate there?
Maybe there is a valid operational need - and maybe there isn't. I tend to think there isn't. I see nothing in shallow, confined waters that I'd want to risk a sub, conventional or nuclear, for.
I can foresee some uses for an SSK but they involve things like home harbor defense, far flung chokepoint patrol, and the like. Whether those few tasks justify the added expense of additional sub types is a very open and debatable question in my mind.
What you might attempt is to list SPECIFIC sub tasks you have in mind. Not, 'patrol shallow waters' but patrol shallow waters because [fill in the blank] and there is no better way to accomplish [fill in the blank]. I've done that and what I've concluded is that there are very few tasks where an SSK is suitable and the best option. It's a fascinating exercise and I encourage you to try it. I think you'd enjoy it and find it enlightening.
I think you're giving this more thought than the average person and I wholeheartedly praise you for that but I do think you're falling just a bit short of the specific operational needs analysis.
Take this as a conceptual challenge rather than a criticism. Maybe try that one, specific example: what's in shallow confined waters that requires a sub? And no, the answer isn't because a ship might happen by. That's generalities, again. Using that logic, we'd have to cover every ocean with subs every several miles apart because, hey, a ship might happen by. If you think a shallow, confined navigational chokepoint is a good place to sink Chinese oil carriers then, where is that place? Is a sub really the best way to prevent oil shipments from reaching China or is it easier to stop them at their port of departure? Where would you base a SSK for this task and how would you support it? And so on. Specifics!
What is there in the way of operational needs for SSKs? Something, or else why would China have 57 of them (3/4 of their sub force numerically)? If that's too flippant an answer, I apologize. But it's not irrelevant. So maybe the mission of an SSK is to oppose whatever China is doing with its SSKs.
Delete“What you might attempt is to list SPECIFIC sub tasks you have in mind.”
Well, let’s see, for starters:
- Home harbor defense (you mentioned that one)
- Choke point control (and that one)
- Swimmer insertion (better than risking an SSN)
- Intelligence gathering close to shore (again, better than risking an SSN)
As far as cost, I’m not letting costs drive operations. I’m figuring what operational needs we have, and what is the best and most cost effective way to fulfill them. But I am also well aware that we can’t forget costs altogether. We have only a finite number of dollars to allocate, and we need to allocate them effectively or risk getting cut back in the future. Things like the Fords and Zumwalts and LCSs do not represent good allocations of dollars. The Zumwalts and LCSs are basically war canoes (if we can assume the war part) and even if the Fords are marginally better than the Nimitzes (questionable), is a Ford better than a Nimitz plus a Kitty Hawk, because that’s pretty close to the tradeoff? If a $750MM SSK can do a mission instead of a $3B SSN, it makes sense to use the SSK and save the SSNs for the jobs the SSK cannot do.
So figure out how many jobs an SSK can do, and how many you need to do those jobs, and let that be your number of SSKs, and free up that many SSNs for things SSKs cannot do, or cannot do as well. I have estimated 25-30. CAPT Wayne Hughes came up with 16 for green water operations (https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2018/june/build-green-water-fleet), with the rationale that, ”It includes 16 non-nuclear submarines because littoral waters are where they will be most effective.” China has obviously come up with 57. I don’t know the right number, but I’m thinking it is greater than zero.
I have three other thoughts. One, there really doesn’t seem to be much in the way of strategic thinking going on in the Navy these days. Maybe what we really need is a detailed strategy, and tactics to implement that strategy, and then come up with the ships you need to execute those tactics. Two, with a $5.5B replacement for the Virginias, the Navy seems to be pricing itself out of having numbers in the submarine game, and apparently intends to make up the difference with UUVs. For $6B, would you rather have a $5.5B Virginia replacement and five $100MM drones, or a $2.8B Virginia VPM, a $1.5B Barracuda, two $750MM AIP SSKs, and 2 drones? I know which way I would go. Three, given the current state of Navy planning, maybe the failure to include SSKs in future fleet plans is the strongest argument for them.
"or else why would China have 57 of them"
DeleteCome on, now, you know the answer and it has no bearing on US needs, whatsoever.
China has only relatively recently developed the necessary technology to produce and package nuclear reactors into submarines. Before that, they had no choice but to build SSKs. Even now, they're still learning about nuclear sub reactor operations so they aren't committed to a massive build program, yet.
China's operational needs don't require nuclear subs since they're goals are limited, for the time being, to the S/E China Seas where SSKs are ideally suited.
Trying to use China's number of SSKs as 'proof' that we need SSKs is not valid and I know you know this.
"Well, let’s see, for starters:
Delete- Home harbor defense (you mentioned that one)
- Choke point control (and that one)
- Swimmer insertion (better than risking an SSN)
- Intelligence gathering close to shore (again, better than risking an SSN)"
You just proved my point. The tasks you listed are either already covered or fairly rare occurrences, or both.
For example, swimmer insertion is a very rare occurrence and we already have subs specifically configured for that: the Seawolf class and various LA class.
For example, ISR can be conducted by any sub and SSKs don't perform the job any better than a SSN. As far as risk, if the job is too risk to an SSN, it's too risky for an SSK.
As far as harbor defense, for the foreseeable future, no one seriously expects US mainland harbors to be threatened. That leaves places like Guam for which an SSN is perfectly adequate, as is an SSK.
Chokepoint control is a theoretical capability that both SSNs and SSKs can perform. No one has yet specifically identified a chokepoint that would be critical in war. Setting that aside, there is no benefit gained from using an SSK instead of an SSN and an SSN has better endurance and bigger weapons loads along with greater speed and greater underwater endurance.
So, there are a few, infrequent tasks that an SSK CAN perform and none that they are more suited to perform than an SSN. Whether these few optional tasks justify the creation of an entire added training and maintenance programs and extensive shore support staffs and facilities is the question and I think the answer is obvious: no.
If just happened to already have SSKs sitting around then, sure, assign them a few tasks but to create an entire new class and support system for a few, rare tasks that can be done just as well by SSNs is not logical.
When war comes, our allies can supply SSKs for those few tasks. No need for us to create a new class and system.
"If just happened to already have SSKs sitting around then, sure, assign them a few tasks but to create an entire new class and support system for a few, rare tasks that can be done just as well by SSNs is not logical"
DeleteIf the SSKs can perform those tasks efficiently for 1/4 to 1/7 the cost, freeing SSNs for other tasks, is entirely logical. You keep saying that I am driven by cost. No, I'm actually driven by combat requirements, with the proviso that if we can meet those needs more cheaply, that frees up resources to devote to other tasks. To use your favorite example, if a Ford costs $14B and a Nimitz costs $9B, building Nimitzes instead of Fords frees up $5B that can be used for airplanes, or destroyers, or sailors, or training, or maintenance, or any other of a number of things we need. There is a huge opportunity cost to using a more expensive platform than we need, and I think we both agree that in the carrier case that more than offsets any marginal utility that the Fords offer. I'm just applying the same argument here.
If you can do something with a $750MM SSK, the fact that it can be done just as well by a $2.8B (or $5.5B if you look at CBO's projected cost of the Virginia replacement) is no reason to use an SSN to do it. There are jobs that a $2.8B SSN can do 4 or 7 times (or more) as well as an $750MM SSK. Those are the jobs you use SSNs for.
"The tasks you listed are either already covered or fairly rare occurrences, or both."
The fact that they are already covered by a $2.8B SSN is not a reason why it would not be better to cover them with a $750MM SSK and save the SSNs for tasks that SSKs can't do. The fact that they are rare means that we don't need a lot of SSKs. I'm not talking about building 100 SSKs. I'm talking about looking at all the missions we need performed, figuring out which ones make sense for SSKs in the overall scheme of things, and building enough SSKs to cover them. My guess is 25-30, worldwide. My guess is that there are another 25-30 that could be performed by a smaller SSN. Both those numbers would be subject to analysis and verification. But I think both numbers are larger than zero, and probably in the ranges I'm discussing.
The fact that an SSN can perform ISR or swimmer insertion or choke point control as well as a SSK doesn't meant that we should use SSNs for such missions if we have 1) higher and better uses for those SSNs (and we do), and 2) cheaper alternatives that free up the SSNs to do those higher and better uses (which we don't, but SSKs and smaller SSNs could provide).
As far as the allies argument, aren't you the one always arguing against depending on allies who may be unreliable?
"cheaper alternatives"
DeleteSSKs are not cheaper or only marginally so when the cost of the entire additional, new support system is factored in.
If you really want to sell your case, do the analytical cost analysis and include ALL THE COSTS associated with an SSK, not just the construction cost (I've listed several of the other costs and there are many more). If that shows an overwhelming savings then I'm in. If not, I'm not. I strongly suspect the result will be marginal savings, at best.
This is quite similar to the claimed LCS savings which vanished when the bloated shoreside maintenance was factored in.
This is quite similar to the nuclear power debate where the supposed conventional power cost savings vanish when ALL THE COSTS are factored in.
One point to make is that SSK are having a large step up in capability. Japan just built the first lithium SSK. They have many times the storage of lead acid batteries.
DeleteThere are a few types of lithium batteries. See Submarine Matters - http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/ for more.
AIP only really works for coastal defence. It's big and heavy and uses up battery space. Plus subs are very slow when using AIP.
Lithium charges quickly, many times quicker than lead acid. It holds many times the charge of lead acid. The indiscretion ratio is far lower.
PS The Barracuda class main job it to protect France's SSBN from Russian SSNs.
Australia is buying a SSK version of this SSN.
The problem I see is that the Navy never considers opportunity cost. It was obvious from the video of the presentation by CAPT Talbot Manvel at Annapolis on the development of the Fords
Delete(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kIjvNCFXCjs).
They looked at one Ford versus one each of other platforms and concluded that (at least in theory) one Ford is better than, for example, one Nimitz. But is one Ford $5B better than a Nimitz? Or is one Ford better than one Nimitz plus what else that $5B could buy? Or are two Fords better than 1 Nimitz and 1 Kitty Hawk and a surface escort squadron? Those are the questions that didn't get asked and I think should have been.
I'm not letting cost overrule combat requirements, despite your claims that I am. What I'm saying is that, given certain combat requirements, what is the most cost-effective way to meet them, and can money that we save here, be used to make us better prepared there?
I think a big part of the problem is that the Navy hasn't adequately defined its combat requirements. "Oh, look, we have this new Ford aircraft carrier with all these neat do-dads. We need a bunch of those." Do we? Can we fulfill 95% of the mission requirements (and I would guess that percentage is even higher, particularly considering how the Fords have performed so far) for 2/3 the cost, and use the savings to meet other equally important requirements that are currently going begging (like NGFS or ASW or mine warfare)? Overkill on one mission, particularly at the expense of unpreparedness for others, makes no sense.
The Navy wants 66 SSNs/SSGNs. If we can build 12 SSBNs and 60 SSNs/SSGNs, plus 25 smaller, cheaper SSNs and 25 SSKs that can perform a lot of the more routine tasks and free the SSNs/SSGNs up for the more demanding work, and save $50B that can buy 80 ASW frigates and 30 mine countermeasures ships, it seems to me that we come out way ahead.
The real problem I see is the proposed replacement for the Virginias, that CBO currently prices out at $5.5B each. We can maybe afford 10-20 Ohio-type SSGNs at that unit price. But 33 replacement SSNs would be $180B, and that plus 12 Columbias at $90+B, 5 Columbia-type SSGNs at $37B, and 7 more Fords at another $91+B, knocks about a $400B hole in future acquisition budgets. At the current acquisition budget level of around $20B/year, that would be $13+B/year over 30 years, leaving $7B/year for everything else. That would buy a Burke ($1.8B) and a FFGX ($1B each), plus either 1) a LHA/LHD ($4B), or 2) a LPD ($2.2B) plus a couple of AOE/AFS ($700B each). So if we did 10 years of 1) and 20 years of 2), we'd end up with a Navy with 12 Fords, 12 SSBNs, 5 SSGNs, 33 SSNs, 30 Burkes, 30 FFGXs, 10 LHAs/LHDs, 20 LPDs, and 40 AOEs/AFSs. Those 192 ships are not going to put much of a scare in our peers.
Keep building expensive and you run out of numbers.
Cmdr Chip. Our Submarine, Frigate, and OPVs are us buying design and manufacturing capabilities in addition to the ships and boats.
DeleteThey also have to be built slower than optimal so we can continuously build ships.
So the cost is many times higher than the actual platforms.
Also costings are over 50 years lifetime of building, maintaining, and upgrading (and crewing, training etc).
PS Its a Shortfin Barracuda not a Shortfin Dolphin.
Delete"Also costings are over 50 years lifetime of building, maintaining, and upgrading "
Delete????? Are you saying that Australian ships serve 50 years?
Not till now. But that is 50 years till the last one retires, and it enters service in about 20 years time.
DeleteBut the subs are expected to last that long with regular upgrades. Our current subs are about to become almost new with new engines etc.
The problem is it is 14 years till the first one hits the water. In 50 years time we'll have a good sub fleet.
Talk about long term planning.
“SSKs are not cheaper or only marginally so when the cost of the entire additional, new support system is factored in.”
DeleteThe Navy’s biggest single cost is personnel, and the Barracuda and SSK crews are about half the size (or less) of Virginia and SSBN crews, so there should be a significant cost savings there.
As far as the logistics support system, weapons are going to be virtually the same, fuel is going to be an added cost (although generally similar to other ships except for AIP system needs), and spare parts will be different. I realize there has some movement on the part of the Navy to standardize everything to shorten the logistics tail. But I fear that leaves some vulnerability. The example that comes quickest to mind is somewhat unrelated—if every AAW ship relies on AEGIS, and AEGIS develops a widespread glitch, or enemies learn how to evade AEGIS (like the Argentines did with the RN Type 42s in the Falklands) we are in a world of hurt. From a strategic or tactical standpoint, it might be well worth the logistics cost to be able to force an enemy to deal with a small, quiet, and different shallow water submarine threat.
You wrote in 2013, “SSKs are ideal for [homeport defense]. They’re extremely quiet, relatively small, well suited for shallower water operations, and deadly. A small fleet of a dozen or so SSKs would not only provide valuable defense but could serve as realistic opponents in ASW training.”
That’s pretty consistent with my thinking. I particularly like the ASW training aspect, and the training benefit of sending new officers to SSKs to learn about subs before nuke power school. I’ve upped your number, although I am open to the exact count, because they are cheap to build, and as you note could also be useful for choke point control (and there are a number of those in places where we might have to fight peers—including Malacca, Sunda, Skagerrak, Kattegat, Bosporus, and Dardanelles—or rogue nations—including Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb) or swimmer/special forces insertion/withdrawal (where quiet, small, and shallow water all come into play) where an SSN can do the job, but there may be other more pressing needs for the unique capabilities of an SSN.
Bases are a key part of the logistics tail. For homeport defense we could use US bases, while for overseas missions, we would need bases within SSK range of objective areas. If we adopted my strategy of denying China the first island chain, one element of that strategy would be to form alliances with the first island chain nations, plus strengthening ties to Australia and India. That would make available Subic, Sepanggar, Singapore, Fremantle, and Mumbai, from which all those Asian objective areas are reachable, along with existing NATO bases for European operations. And because in many cases we would be basing in countries with their own AIP SSKs, there would presumably be some useful commonality on the logistics side.
I’m not proposing to replace Virginias with SSKs or Barracudas. I’m proposing virtually the same number of Virginias or equivalents as the Navy. I question the wisdom of spending $5.5B each for Virginia replacements (sounds like a Ford sub), instead continuing the Virginia line with marginal improvements as we go. That’s not putting cost ahead of mission, that’s finding the most cost effective way to accomplish the mission and using the savings to accomplish other missions. It’s the same as building $9B Nimitzes instead of $14B Fords and using the $5B savings to build conventional carriers or address ASW, NGFS, and mine warfare. We can build a $2.8B Virginia, a $1.5B Barracuda, and a $750MM SSK for $500M less than one $5.5B Virginia replacement. Build Barracudas and SSKs with the savings, use them for missions that will free the Virginias for the big stuff. I don’t think it’s a great idea to tie up a Virginia putting swimmers ashore or sitting and waiting at a choke point when others could do that, allowing the Virginia’s speed and range to be used for missions which require that.
"Cmdr Chip. Our Submarine, Frigate, and OPVs are us buying design and manufacturing capabilities in addition to the ships and boats.
DeleteThey also have to be built slower than optimal so we can continuously build ships.
So the cost is many times higher than the actual platforms.
Also costings are over 50 years lifetime of building, maintaining, and upgrading (and crewing, training etc)."
That's what I thought. Plus, I get the impression there has been a lot of political wrangling to no good purpose. I saw a video where one MP was berating an admiral, insisting that pump-jet propulsion meant nuclear power.
"PS Its a Shortfin Barracuda not a Shortfin Dolphin."
DeleteThanks, typo or brain cramp.
"The Navy’s biggest single cost is personnel"
DeleteYou may recall that I utterly disproved that. Or, perhaps I should say that I proved that crew costs were not significant. Total Navy manning is, however, although we've also demonstrated that total Navy manning is obscenely out of control.
So, crew size is not a significant cost factor and, if it were, you've already acknowledged that total crew will increase.
" “SSKs are ideal for [homeport defense]."
They are. However, that doesn't mean they're a cost effective method of accomplishing the task. There are many ways of accomplishing harbor defense other than SSKs. Small patrol boats, sea bed arrays, mines, unmanned UUVs/USVs, helos, etc. - all of which already exist and don't require massive new pipelines and infrastructure support.
"Build Barracudas and SSKs with the savings"
You seem to be mixing old and new costs. Wiki lists the Barracuda cost for 6 subs as E9.9B(2013) which is E11.1B(2020) or E1.8B ($2B USD?) each. You also fail to note that the US can't build a sub for that amount because the US can't match French shipbuilding subsidies as the CRS reports shipbuilding reports note.
Just as importantly, I'm not sure why but you refuse to incorporate the added, immense, support costs of a new class of ship(s). For example, the cost of yet another new nuclear reactor support, safety, and training pipeline alone would be quite significant.
I have no idea how to estimate the cost of logistics, support, and infrastructure for each new class of ship/sub but it's quite significant. Utterly wild guess, I'd say it would add 25% to the cost of each ship/sub. So, if you were to add that to the $2B cost of the Barracuda, you now have $2.5B - essentially a Virginia and definitely not a significant cost savings. Similarly, that $750M SSK (I don't know where that cost came from) becomes $937M.
"I’m not proposing to replace Virginias with SSKs or Barracudas."
DeleteThen where are the 'savings' coming from? If you're building the same number of SSNs then any additional SSKs or small SSNs just cost added money. I'm missing something here.
What I'm not doing is building the $5.5B Virginia replacements. They look to me like the submarine version of the Ford class.
DeleteSo instead of 33 of them ($180B), 28 more Virginias ($70B), and 12 Columbia SSBNs ($90B), total 73 subs for $340B, I'm building 12 SSBNs ($90B), 20 Virginia VPMs ($56B), 30 Virginias ($75B), 26 Barracudas ($42B), and 26 SSKs ($20B), total 112 ships for $283B, basically 39 more ships for $57B less. I'm also thinking that instead of 5 Columbia-based SSGNs at $7B each ($35B), we could build 8 Ohio-Based SSGNs for maybe $5.5B each ($44B).
So instead of 12 SSBNs, 5 SSGNs, and 61 SSNs for $375B, I'm proposing 12 SSBNs, 8 SSGNs, 20 VPMs, 30 SSNs, 26 smaller SSNs, and 26 AIP SSKs, total 122 subs for $327B. That $48B savings will buy a lot of spare parts.
Bottom line is that no argument is going to win you over to building SSKs, just as no argument is going to win you over to maintaining a viable standing amphibious capability. So we will just disagree on those points but generally agree about most of what's wrong with the Navy's approach--Fords, LCSs, Zumwalts, no conventional carriers, no NGFS, inadequate ASW, no mine warfare capability.
DeleteDon’t think this will resolve anything, just think we will have to agree to disagree, but wanted to respond to a few of your points.
Delete“I proved that crew costs were not significant. Total Navy manning is, however, although we've also demonstrated that total Navy manning is obscenely out of control.”
And I showed a way to move 22,000 more officers and sailors to combat, and 11,000 to combat support, while reducing total headcount by 50,000.
“There are many ways of accomplishing harbor defense other than SSKs.”
But we aren’t building any of those others, either. And an SSK that can do other things may very well be a more cost effective solution across the board.
“Wiki lists the Barracuda cost for 6 subs as E9.9B(2013) which is E11.1B(2020) or E1.8B ($2B USD?) each. You also fail to note that the US can't build a sub for that amount because the US can't match French shipbuilding subsidies as the CRS reports shipbuilding reports note.”
Remember that the Barracudas are a class of 6 submarines. If we build 25-30, that means that we amortize the R&D costs over a much larger number of subs. The marginal cost per additional sub is going to be much less than the average total cost including R&D. Say they are US$1.5B each, plus US$3B R&D (US$500MM each). That’s your US$2B per ship. Now take that same US$3B R&D and amortize it over 26 ships. Now it’s US$115MM each, for a total ship cost of US$1.615B. Yes, I know US shipbuilding costs will be higher, but 20% higher only gets you to about US$1.93B each. And I’ve used US$2.8B for the VPMs and US$2.5B for plain Virginias, but CBO now puts those costs at about US$3.1B for the VPMs. So the savings are still about US$1B per hull.
“Just as importantly, I'm not sure why but you refuse to incorporate the added, immense, support costs of a new class of ship(s). For example, the cost of yet another new nuclear reactor support, safety, and training pipeline alone would be quite significant.
I have no idea how to estimate the cost of logistics, support, and infrastructure for each new class of ship/sub but it's quite significant. Utterly wild guess, I'd say it would add 25% to the cost of each ship/sub. So, if you were to add that to the $2B cost of the Barracuda, you now have $2.5B - essentially a Virginia and definitely not a significant cost savings. Similarly, that $750M SSK (I don't know where that cost came from) becomes $937M.”
I don’t refuse to incorporate the costs. Like you, I have no way to estimate what those costs are. From the beginning with nukes, we have pretty much always had multiple pipelines, and I would guess we are pretty adept at incorporating them by now. I’m sure the cost is non-zero, but I doubt it rises anywhere near the $1B cost differential per ship that we are working with.
So you’re adding 25% to the cost of each Barracuda and SSK without adding the same 25% to the Virginia, not to mention the $5.5B Virginia replacement. That does not seem apples to apples.
And that brings us to the one thing you haven’t addressed—the $5.5B Virginia replacements. I’m sorry, but that looks like the submarine force’s version of the Fords. Where I get a lot of my savings is basically instead of building 33 of them for $181B, I build 30 more Virginias ($90B), 26 Barracudas (use your cost $52B), and 26 SSKs ($19B), or $161B total. Plus I have to believe we can build a SSGN on an Ohio chassis for a bunch less than $7B for a Columbia SSGN. I’ve used $5.5B as a SWAG.
The $750MM cost for the SSK came from what people are paying for them. For example, from https://combatfleetoftheworld.blogspot.com/p/warships-cost.html:
- Germany/Portugal Type 209 : $550MM
- Germany Type 212 : $525MM
- Germany Type 214 : $500MM
- Germany/Israel Dolphin : $635MM
- France/Spain Scorpene : $825MM
- Japan Soryu $537MM
- Japan Taigei $700MM
- Average $610MM, add $140MM for 23% cushion.
Cmdr Chip (from my three sons?).
DeleteAll of the subs you list are short ranged. That is why they are so cheap. That is why Australia has to buy custom subs (SSN converted to SSK) as our subs need lots of fuel to transit to operational areas. In the cold war the hung outside of Vladivostok, but small subs make that difficult due to storage space.
For the US to find the above subs useful there would need to be many and all forward deployed.
Although as I said above lithium will change all our known comparisons.
But the US needs long range subs or forward deployed SSKs. And SSKs can not escort CVNs, hunt SSN hunting SSBNs, or hunt SSBNs.
PS To use SSNs require the country to have nuclear power plants. Australia doesn't and will never for political reasons.
I'm not at all convinced by this argument, which I think is just the usual RAN BS. No existing submarine can possibly meet all our requirements, all of which are absolutely essential, so we'll just have to get someone to build us something completely unique, regardless of cost....and surprise, surprise....the French are keen to do just that!! Latest estimate $100,000,000 for 12 boats!!
DeleteIn WW2 the USN's fleet boats (Gato class), operating out of Brisbane and Fremantle managed to sink 90% of Japan's merchant fleet, and a good percentage of the IJN too.
Range didn't seem to be much of a problem back then, or if it was, we just managed it.
Sorry...make that $100,000,000,000.
Delete"Cmdr Chip (from my three sons?)."
DeleteNope, sorry, although he was sort of my favorite character on the show for obvious reasons.
"All of the subs you list are short ranged. That is why they are so cheap. That is why Australia has to buy custom subs (SSN converted to SSK) as our subs need lots of fuel to transit to operational areas. In the cold war the hung outside of Vladivostok, but small subs make that difficult due to storage space."
That's why I 1) bumped the cost estimate up 20% and 2) have discussed the need to form alliances with first island chain nations. From Subic, Sepanggar, Singapore, or even Fremantle, patrolling the Malacca and Sunda Straits is doable. From Singapore, go out to the sea buoy, pull the plug, and you're there.
"For the US to find the above subs useful there would need to be many and all forward deployed."
I'm thinking some would be in the port defense mode, and could work o littoral tactics in that role. Some would necessarily deploy forward, and there is a list of locations to choose from.
"Although as I said above lithium will change all our known comparisons."
I have wondered about this concept, although it would require a somewhat larger submarine. Use electric drive powered off a lithium battery that can be recharged either from diesel or AIP powered generators.
"But the US needs long range subs or forward deployed SSKs. And SSKs can not escort CVNs, hunt SSN hunting SSBNs, or hunt SSBNs."
SSNs can also do choke point control, swimmer/special forces insertion, and intel gathering. But if we can use SSKs for those missions (which they can also do) then that frees up more SSNs for the SSN-specific missions.
"PS To use SSNs require the country to have nuclear power plants. Australia doesn't and will never for political reasons."
Fremantle would actually be a good forward base to cover the eastern half of the Indian Ocean. And Mumbai would work to cover the western half, the Arabian/Persian Gulf area, and the approaches to the Red Sea.
"So you’re adding 25% to the cost of each Barracuda and SSK without adding the same 25% to the Virginia,"
DeleteThe support infrastructure for a Virginia already exists so the costs are already included in the cost of a Virginia. In contrast, the support costs for a small nuke and a SSK would be new costs that have to be added.
"The support infrastructure for a Virginia already exists so the costs are already included in the cost of a Virginia. In contrast, the support costs for a small nuke and a SSK would be new costs that have to be added."
DeleteBut you're not going to spend 25% per ship 25 times. You'll establish the infrastructure one time, or maybe one time on each coast. Once the infrastructure is in place, there would be some marginal costs of maintaining additional inventory lines. But I would think that 25% apiece for 25-30 ships is excessive.
Again, the really big problem I have is trying to figure out what the Navy is going to get for the $5.5B that CBO is estimating for the Virginia replacement. That seems a huge increase in cost. If it had something like SSGN capability, that sounds about right. But supposedly it won't even have VPM missile capacity. It's looking like an updated version of the Seawolf class. Since the Navy has always been pretty secretive about the capabilities of that class, I don't really know what we would be getting. Maybe some submariner can fill us in.
DeleteI just worry that it looks too much like the submarine answer to the Fords.
What I'm looking at instead of 33 of those replacements for $181B, building 30 Virginias ($90B), 26 Barracuds ($52B, using your $2B cost) and 26 AIP SSKs ($23B, using your $900MM cost), or $165B total. That savings of $16B can be used to address shortcomings in other areas.
If the replacement has some magic capability that really makes it worth $5.5B per ship, then my position would change. But I haven't seen that.
Also, CBO projects the cost of the new SSGN based on Columbia at $7.4B. I am thinking we could just repeat the current SSGNs based on the Ohio platform for less money. I'm estimating $5.5B, based on not a lot more than a guess, but that seems reasonable and the numbers aren't huge.
ComNavOps, I do note that for your proposed fleet you are taking the same approaches with respect to keeping the Virginias pipeline going and going with an Ohio-based SSGN instead of a Columbia-based one. We would just be doing different things with the savings.
"But you're not going to spend 25% per ship 25 times."
DeleteOf course you are. For example, the manpower to establish a training pipeline is not a one-time cost. It's an ongoing, never-ending cost. Similarly, the manpower cost to provide parts inventory and maintenance support is an on-going cost. Even facilities are on-going costs. Just as your home is an on-going cost (mortgage), Navy facilities, buildings, land, taxes, insurance, and a hundred other things are on-going costs. Even something as simple and straightforward as, say, a drill press for maintenance support is likely paid in one payment but has an on-going, albeit small, cost associated with its yearly inventory and asset control, its own maintenance, electrical usage, etc. The on-going cost of the drill press is small but multiply it times the thousands of pieces of equipment that a new SSK support infrastructure needs and it adds up.
"But I would think that 25% apiece for 25-30 ships is excessive."
I said that I have no idea what the support infrastructure cost for a class of ship is but 25% seems somewhere in the ballpark. Consider how many people the Navy employs to maintain the dozen or so classes of ships they have. A new class is going to generate many more support people. That's why the Navy has been so focused (unwisely) on reducing the number of classes. The class costs ARE enormous.
I get wanting to support your concept but you're relying on almost made up savings when you don't factor in the enormous costs associated with establishing new classes of ships. Consider the huge investment in class support that came with the LCS program: entire new training pipelines, multi-crew rotations, shore side maintenance, extensive repair facilities (really extensive for the LCS because they break down so often!), entire research and development programs trying to produce modules, foreign support facilities, leases, and contractor support, and on and on. I know it's fun and easy to focus solely on construction costs but it's not realistic.
Well, if you're going to build freaking disasters like the LCSs, you are going to have inordinate infrastructure requirements. How many of them had to deploy before one made it home without being towed?
DeleteI'm talking about building reasonably competent ships with pretty much proved technology.
But you don't need two separate support pipelines for USS Swordfish and USS Saberfish. You have to move more stuff through it, but it's one pipeline, not two. The things you are talking about are going to increase every time you add a ship, same class or not. You have fixed facility costs that you pay one time, and variable operation and maintenance costs that you pay on and ongoing basis. The fixed costs should be a one-time thing, and the ongoing O&M are things that you pay for any ship.
I don't see where a Barracuda or a AIP SSK will impose more operating costs than any other similarly sized ship, and and capital costs should tend to be one-time.
This comment has been removed by the author.
Delete
DeleteLet's address my major point.
CBO estimates the cost of the Virginia replacement to be $5.5B. That is roughly $2.5 billion more than the Virginia cost, an increase of over 80%. What is the Navy getting for that kind of increase?
That seems reasonable for an SSGN, but from what I can determine, this sub won't even have VPM missile capacity. It's supposed to be something like a Seawolf, but the Navy has always been so secretive about the Seawolf that it is hard to determine what upgrades that gives us. And do we really need 33 of them?
For another thing, the Navy estimates the cost at only $3.4B each. Why the $2.1B difference between Navy and CBO estimates? I could see paying $3.4B if there are significant upgrades.
But $5.5B for an upgraded Virginia looks a lot like the submarine version of the Fords.
Submarine construction capacity is stupidly low.
ReplyDeleteI do not have the figures, but subs are crucial and aiming to add, say, three yards in thirty years should be doable.
What happens if there's a war, subs are lost and can only be replaced at a rate of 2/year?
After lose civilian ship building industry, US ship building is equivalent to military ship building. Therefore, cost saving measure and efficient is not focus on US shipyards - bottom line, all they need to appease Pentagon and Congress. Result is clear - naval ships build in US are expensive, very expensive.
ReplyDeleteOne picture shows really worrisome sign - a recent satellite picture of China's 3rd aircraft carrier --- NEXT TO IT, in the same photo, is a huge cargo ship under construction.
Too many have treated defense budget as their ATMs. SSN shortfall is only nature outcome.
Thanks for your blog.
ReplyDeleteThe central problem that lies behind (and links) nearly all of your posts is this: Today China is a first-rate shipbuilding nation, and the United States is a third-rate shipbuilding nation. Not only, as you correctly point out, do we not have the shipyards, we also don't have the welders; we don't have the solderers; we don't have the structural fabricators; we don't have the plumbers; we don't have the electricians; we don't have the riggers; we don't have the engineers; we don't have the marine surveyors, and we don't have the supervisors to check the work that these guys are doing.
So, as you would expect, we can't build very many ships, and we can't build them very quickly, and the ships we do build are very expensive and don't work very well.
Also, for some reason, we can no longer even design good warships (presumably because we also don't have the naval architects).
And we can't crew the ships we do have because a naval career is no longer an attractive option for the people we're looking to recruit.
Turning this situation around would take at least twenty years, even if we allocated the resources to it, and had the political will to address it. I don't think we have anything like that amount of time left to us.
"The central problem that lies behind (and links) nearly all of your posts is this: Today China is a first-rate shipbuilding nation, and the United States is a third-rate shipbuilding nation. Not only, as you correctly point out, do we not have the shipyards, we also don't have the welders; we don't have the solderers; we don't have the structural fabricators; we don't have the plumbers; we don't have the electricians; we don't have the riggers; we don't have the engineers; we don't have the marine surveyors, and we don't have the supervisors to check the work that these guys are doing.
ReplyDeleteSo, as you would expect, we can't build very many ships, and we can't build them very quickly, and the ships we do build are very expensive and don't work very well.
Also, for some reason, we can no longer even design good warships (presumably because we also don't have the naval architects).
And we can't crew the ships we do have because a naval career is no longer an attractive option for the people we're looking to recruit.
Turning this situation around would take at least twenty years, even if we allocated the resources to it, and had the political will to address it. I don't think we have anything like that amount of time left to us."
My thoughts:
Blue-collar workers - we need to revamp our secondary education program to emphasize vocational education, and get out of the, "everybody needs to go to university" mindset. Going to university to major in sociology so you can be a barista at Starbucks is a mac worse career decision than going to trade school and learning how to run a CAD/CAM terminal, or any of hundreds of other skills.
Naval architects - a possible in-Navy solution is to adopt the Royal Navy practice of separating engineering and deck/warfare parts of our line officer community. Engineers run the ship and deck/warfare fight the ship. Deck/warfare are eligible for command at sea, and engineering officers command shore bases and repair, maintenance, and construction facilities and serve on design bureaus. The deck/line officers focus on strategy/tactics/rules of the road, and the engineering officers basically get the equivalent of a PhD in marine architecture by the time they make Captain.
Crew - We have to make the Navy an attractive career; one thing that concerns Meis tat we seem to have taken a lot of the fun and zest out of the experience.
We need to get him behind it now, and I think 20 years is about right to fix it. I don't think China will pass us in that time frame, so I think we can be okay, but only if we get moving now.
"We need to get him behind it now, and I think 20 years is about right to fix it. I don't think China will pass us in that time frame, so I think we can be okay, but only if we get moving now."
DeleteWell the USN seems to be working on that assumption, to the extent that they're thinking about these things at all, but I seriously doubt that the Chinese share this benign and optimistic view of the world.
China makes no secret of its plans. They are planning to push us out of the Pacific, undermine our economy and our alliances, and ultimately to supplant us as the world's hegemonic power. And they're planning to ensure that if and when we decide to resist them, they're in a position to defeat us in a conventional naval conflict, and they're building up their navy to exactly that end.
Right now we could probably win such a conflict, but with every year that passes, the outcome becomes less and less certain.
So we don't need a twenty-year plan; we need a plan for now and next year.
Apologies if this is too political, but I think step one is to get out of the Middle East. We are tying up huge resources in what really is a succession of winless wars. And while we are trying to impose our will militarily in the region, China is buying up everything around us. I am not sure exactly what we can accomplish in terms of an exit strategy, but we need to be exploring it. Getting out frees up a significant portion of our military to quit plinking pickup trucks and start focusing on how to get ready for a peer war. It also puts China in a bit of a bind. We don't use Mideast oil any more, thanks to fracking, but China depends on it greatly. Without our presence in the region to do it for them, China has to look at securing its own oil supply line. They have sort of prepared by buying port facilities in the region, but having to do so will strain the current capabilities of PLAN and will force them to look more at a blue water fleet and less at an intimidate your neighbors fleet.
DeleteLet the Chinese waste trillions in that quagmire if they want to.
DeleteAmerica should leave the region ASAP.
"Let the Chinese waste trillions in that quagmire if they want to.
DeleteAmerica should leave the region ASAP."
The difference. China has to. We don't.
"China makes no secret of its plans. … "
DeleteVery nice summation!
Thanks.
DeleteHere are a couple of ideas to address the problems of our inability to quickly build new warships (including submarines), and to efficiently repair and refit older ones: If we can't do this stuff in peacetime, how the heck do we think we're going to manage in times of conflict?
Utilise the shipyard capacities of our trusted 5-eyes allies along with Japan and South Korea (and accept but mitigate the risk of Chinese spying) suspending (by Presidential order) the relevant provisions of US Code Title 10, Subtitle C, Part IV, Chapter 633, 7309. This would allow the US Navy to build warships in overseas yards. For example we could work with the Brits on a common platform for the Ohio and Vanguard SSN replacements, and jointly build 16 of one kind rather than 12 and 4 respectively.
Take a good hard look at our shipyard efficiencies. As we know, the cost of constructing a tanker in the United States is four times the cost of constructing the same ship in an overseas shipyard, and the cost of a container ship is more than five times higher. Is there some reason to assume that the cost differential in building warships is so very different? All the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (the Jones Act) is accomplishing is ensuring that hardly any merchant ships are built here, thereby depleting the US Merchant Marine, and our potential reserve of mariners.
Separately, I've been impressed by the way the Brits are managing their Arrowhead 140 Frigate Project. Modular construction; sourcing major components from the most cost-efficient suppliers; maximizing commonality across the fleet (the same diesel engines are used in the Type 31s, the Type 26s, the QE Class carriers, the Type 45 destroyers, and the Astute class submarines); a newly constructed undercover assembly yard building 2 ships concurrently, and, importantly, a fixed price contract that precludes the Navy from making any changes at all to the agreed design parameters. Some lessons for us here I think.
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ReplyDeleteMy radical solution. Cancel the Columbia program. Build 16 more Virginas with the VPM for many more cruise missiles, and pack them with the new nuclear cruise missile underdevelopment. This would free money to build another 40 Virginas! The Navy then has the flexibility to arm more subs with nukes or fewer in the future. Cruise missiles also thwart efforts to develop ABM defenses.
ReplyDeleteAmong a host of other problems, cruise missiles simply don't have the range to threaten Russian and Chinese interiors like ballistic missiles do.
DeleteNot cancel, but delay Columbia 10 years. I have more faith in our ability to keep the Ohios going for another 10 years than in our ability to improve our sub-building capacity.
DeleteSeparately, there are some tasks today (intelligence, work in the Med, Persian Gulf and North Sea, Seal landings) that could be done by SSK's, reducing the demands of SSN's. That would help too.
And the obvious, stop retiring LA's...
As sonobuoy technologies advanced, submarines' survivability in shallow water become questionable. For 2020, Pentagon purchase plan goes more than 200,000 pieces. They are one time consumable.
ReplyDeleteNot only US, China also has lots of advancement in this area. A few airplane can disperses sonobuoys in large area. Active sonobuoys can make people in submarine almost crazy as the sounds generated are ... you know. It is a torture.
Not only US, China has also leaped forward in this area. In 2018's ZhuHai Air Show, a Chinese company displayed its airbone anti submarine systems for sale. China itself has stopped large scale further development of manned conventional powered submarines for itself but focus on unmanned underwater drone (such as HSU-001) and nuclear submarines.
Nuclear submarines are only suitable for deep water. Nuclear reactor is always on thus hot sea water released from cooling provide a strong signal in shallow water. Problem is that ALL Chinese coasts are shallow water while US west coasts are deep water. Also, in deep water, sonobuoy is not as useful as in shallow water.
A serious problem is that China might sell airbone antisubmarine system to unfriendly nations as long as they have money to buy.
For shallow water, then, small unmanned underwater drones may be key weapons in future. Of course, underwater communication is a serious challenge - sea water is conductive thus electromagnetic wave doesn't work.
@Anonymous: "...sea water is conductive thus electromagnetic wave doesn't work..."
DeleteThis is not true - underwater signals are harder than signals in air, but possible.
GAB
Ultra long wave radio signal can only transmit in sea water ~60 feet, which has very limited usefulness. Acoustic wave (vibration based) is thus used but any use of active acoustic wave is danger to manned devices.
DeleteEven to use ultra long wave communication, nations (only few) built miles long antenna arrays which cost a lots of money.
"Acoustic wave (vibration based) is thus used but any use of active acoustic wave is danger to manned devices."
DeleteI won't go crazy on this, since we discussed it at length on a previous article but due to the SOFAR Layer, sound can be used for thousands of miles. For example, a sound generator in Hawaii could send messages to submarines in the South China Sea. I can imagine ways for submarines to send messages back without putting themselves in danger.
https://oceanexplorer.noaa.gov/explorations/sound01/background/acoustics/media/sofar.html
Here is a study in using granular crystal non-linear acoustic lenses in water.
Deletehttp://www.daraio.caltech.edu/publications/nonlinear_acoustic_lens_Donahue.pdf
Interesting discussion. I am firmly in favor of buying/building SSKs to *supplement* not *replace* SSNs as we are unlikely to be able to build more than 2-3 nuclear boats per year without a massive investment in shipyard capacity. The limit is not $, but shipyard capacity.
ReplyDeleteAIP SSKs are about ¼ of the procurement price of $3.2 B Virginia class SSN with VPM, and as CDR Chip pointed out that SSKs have ½ to one third of the crew requirement of a Virginia. Life cycle costs are harder to calculate, but I note that if we really want them, we could further cut costs by sending them to foreign yards for major repairs and maintenance: Japan and Germany have highly regarded SSKs and shipyards.
The issues of crews and shipbuilding budget are clear, as is the solution: reduce/stop production of amphibs and build submarines! The lunacy of building ~$2 billion dollar amphibs to support ‘constabulary patrols’ when we need warships was never more obvious.
GAB
"I am firmly in favor of buying/building SSKs to *supplement* not *replace* SSNs as we are unlikely to be able to build more than 2-3 nuclear boats per year without a massive investment in shipyard capacity."
DeleteI agree, perhaps building an SSK base in Guam for these to be able to support the first island chain barrier. Of course, SSN's are the best and most preferred. As for SSK manpower requirements, 18-22 officers and 6-10 seamen (per Wikipedia) for something like the Gotland-Class would not be a major drain.
I think shipyard capacity is an individual national security/economic asset that should be separated from military funding; perhaps this should be included in a future Infrastructure Bill. Shipyards could be built and either managed by private companies or used outright by those companies, with costs removed from lease payments.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gotland-class_submarine
Gotlands seem a bit small. The Japanese build the Soryu for a lot less than Virginia and it has better range and more capacity to loiter, and carry more stuff.
DeleteBut I agree as a supplemental class you gain the potential to have more yards than the ones that only build nuclear subs. More yards always a good thing.
But the pentagon don't really care about maintenance or training so you really think they are going to loose a some LCSs for number hulls to build or even maintain yards?
CNO,
ReplyDeleteI have a small suggestion to offset the decrease in numbers slightly.
Use Japanese submarines.
They're retiring them earlier than most navies do, so if they kee longer, they'll naturally increase sub numbers. Either the Japanese can increase their own numbers this way organically, or the US can lease them from Japan.
Just my 2 cents.
Andrew
BAE systems and Rolls-Royce should be approached about starting a submarine yard and nuclear reactor plant in the United States. They could make additional Virginia Class submarines or a US variant of the UK Dreadnought class for the SSGN replacement.
ReplyDeleteIncreasing the number of shipyards that can handle new nuclear builds would seem prudent. The current production rate is too low to keep up with projected needs.
A dedicated nuclear submarine repair/overhaul facility adjacent to the new build shipyard that would service the Los Angeles and Ohio class submarines could take advantage of the nuclear regulatory overhead already in place for the new build shipyard and help keep the current fleet in active status.
I have wondered if the nuclear plant/propeller on the Los Angeles class submarines is not as quiet as the US Navy would like (or deems survivable) and if that is why they are pushing them out of the fleet. If that is the case, a Virginia class power plant and pump jet could be mated to a Los Angeles class submarine that had its power plant removed. The two classes are roughly the same diameter so it might be possible. If BAE and Rolls-Royce could offer a modernization of the Los Angeles class for a reasonable cost and a reasonable timeframe it could address the projected shortfall in SSN's.
"I have wondered if the nuclear plant/propeller on the Los Angeles class submarines is not as quiet as the US Navy would like (or deems survivable) and if that is why they are pushing them out of the fleet."
DeleteNuclear tech in use is generations behind what is in the lab. For example, the Xe-100:
It continually updates the fuel, so the mid-life work would be moot. It does go cold when needed and can be emptied out and checked regularly. When used on land, only a 400 yard exclusion zone is needed, as opposed to 10 miles for the old-school reactors. The modular design allows it to be upgraded in power depending upon what is needed.
Some mentioned points:
“High temperature tolerant graphite core structure” “Designed for a 60-year operational life”
“Flexible application – electricity and/or process heat” “Online refueling (95% plant availability)”
Pull those outdated 60's style reactors out and convert their fuel into pebbles. It's waaaaaay past time to move on to the future of nuclear power.
https://x-energy.com/reactors/xe-100
The Xe-Mobile matched to a mobile platform could be used to power Marines on islands. Design it to be buried for further protection.
Delete“As the US Military prepares for “near peer” adversaries of the future, highly portable power with a high energy density will be a game-changing technology.”
“In response to these multiple potential needs, X-Energy has developed the “Xe-Mobile” – a power generation system that can be delivered to the point of electricity need and quickly begin generating power – no construction or site preparation is required. Features of the Xe-Mobile include:”
“Rail, truck, and US Military transport aircraft compatibility” “All components housed in standard ISO Containers” “ Can Operate at full power for more than 3 years” “Utilizes TRISO fuel, due to high maturity & a strong safety case” “Produces at least 1 MWe of electrical power” “ Multiple voltage outputs available”
https://x-energy.com/reactors/xe-mobile