Just a quick thing to think about for all you naval observers who are eager for the Navy to increase its fleet size beyond the current 296 ships (196 actual combat vessels). We’re hearing rumors from the various Navy force design studies and from SecDef Esper’s office that the Navy is going to shortly be proposing an increase to 350 – 500+ ships depending on which rumor you hear and whether you count unmanned canoes or not. The fact that there is no funding for that level of shipbuilding is glossed over. Setting that minor point aside, consider the following simple questions:
1. Where will the shipyard building capacity come from?
2. How will the Navy maintain all those extra ships?
Maintenance is the more important question. Currently ships are sitting pierside, idle, for months or years (yes, years! – the USS Boise, SSN-764, has been sitting pierside for 5 years waiting its turn at overhaul and has long since lost its basic dive certification) at a time waiting for their turn at maintenance. If we can’t maintain a 296 ship fleet, how will we maintain a 350-500+ ship fleet? Until you can answer that, wishing for a larger fleet is pointless.
I have so many questions, some that may not strictly apply to this topic, so I apologize in advance. Please refer me to old articles as necessary:
ReplyDelete1. If you were named King of the Navy and given control over the budget, what would your Navy look like in five years?
2. Are marine mammals an actual option for mine warfare, or just a Navy hobby? If it is an actual option, do you think converting a commercial tanker into a deployable aquarium be a good idea?
3. If ships are made to last only 20 years, would you still suggest armor/armored transverse bulkheads? (I think I know your answer to that one).
4. Do you think maintenance can actually be upgraded to what is needed, while building up the fleet, in a peacetime Navy?
5. Do you think adding a "trimaran hull," like an oversize Sea Hunter-style, would help an armored ship with a 10:1 ratio be a more stable for ship-borne helicopters?
DeleteI know these questions seem all over the place. I'm asking for a group of us.
Delete1. See the Fleet Structure page of the blog.
Delete2. Just a gimmick.
3. If they'll see combat then yes.
4. Certainly, although it would require a complete revamping of Navy philosophy.
5. I don't know but there's no problem with landing helos on conventional ships. We have RAST and other landing assists and can land helos on surprisingly high sea states.
By the way, if you have friends who are interested in these topics, have them participate and then they can enter into more detailed discussions plus gain the immense wealth of knowledge of the blog! They'll be more highly respected and will be invited to more popular parties!
Apparently, one has been a long time "Anonymous," which may be the loophole to avoid getting invited to party with the cool kids. The others are newbies, scanning past articles and otherwise being lurkers.
Delete1. I have developed my own idea for a fleet structure that has a fair amount of similarity to ComNavOps's, but a different approach to amphibs.
Delete2. Just a gimmick.
3. My problem with building ships with a 20-year life rather than a 40-year life is that it takes twice as many ships to build a fleet over 40 years and maintain it after that. With 40 year lives, it takes 10 ships a year to maintain a 400 ship fleet. With 20 year lives, it takes 20 ships a year to maintain the same fleet size. The problem I have with the Navy is that they state a 40 year life and then don't maintain their ships, so they start to fall apart after 20-30. What I advocate is building ships for 40 year lives and maintaining them properly, including a major (2-year) maintenance and overhaul period at the 20-year mark, so that ships could and would easily fulfill the 40-year life with upgraded and modernized systems.
4. As stated above, I think upgraded maintenance is the key to building the fleet we need, and particularly to keeping it going once built. I agree with ComNavOps that the Navy needs a complete philosophical change regarding maintenance.
5. Agree with ComNavOps. We have plenty of ways to land helos in all but the absolute worst sea conditions. Improving stability might help, but is not really necessary.
For the record, I am really interested in the Fleet Structure topic and would welcome an opportunity to discuss concepts with others on here.
"[...] USS Boise, SSN-764, has been sitting pierside for 5 years waiting its turn at overhaul and has long since lost its basic dive certification"
ReplyDeleteAnd of course nobody paid for that, right?
China must be laughing so hard.
While admittedly my grasp of the actual issues, legalities, etc is slight, Ive heard much about subsidizing shipbuilding. In the face of peer competition, there needs to be a recognition of ship building and repair as a national security priority. Theres a difference in yards that build vs repair. There are still a large amount of repair yards in this country. We need to push maintenance forward, and go to the smaller yards and incentvize them to take on Navy repairs/maintenance. Actively search out smaller yards not currently doing Navy work and ask "Can you? If not, why, and how can we help so that you can?" Tax breaks, deregulation, lightening of environmental restrictions, zoning changes that help keep waterfront condos from being the more lucrative option etc... If the govt can spend billions on corporate bailouts, they can certainly bailout and reinvigorate shipbuilding and maintenance yards. I imagine its been a long time since anyone said "i want to start a shipyard", but that can change. Shipyards are quite literally a national security asset, but without a concerted effort to restart the industry it will only continue the downward spiral.
ReplyDeleteWell said.
DeleteI have said this before on this blog and it bears repeating anytime someone brings up this subject. You can have all the shipyards you want, you have to have the skilled labor to make it work. Right now, in Hampton Roads Virginia, if you are a welder, pipe fitter, any skilled trade, you have a job. I worked at the large repair facilities and smaller ones. We hired the same guy 2,3,4 times because that is what there is. People today do not want these jobs because "They are hot" or "They are dirty". I know welders that make well into 6 figures a year. The jobs pay well, but people have been brainwashed to believe they have to have a college degree to succeed.
DeleteWhile only a couple yards can servive SSNs and CVNs, we need more smaller yards that can take on the more conventional work. As that pool grows, we take all the conventional work from the big yards so they can focus on the big jobs that are so bottlenecked and behind. Having premium combatants like SSNs waiting their turn for YEARS... Thats insane and unacceptable...
ReplyDeleteReal Clear Defense published a copy of the Hudson Institute Report. It's plan costs less than the current 355 plan and uses assumption like must use current manning etc. The plan cuts 2 CVN and 6 SSN so the pressure on the navy yards decreases. Most(all?) of their new builds can be maintained at other yards.
ReplyDeleteIs that cutting future builds, or looking for an 8-9 CVN total force?? Cant really get behind that, and certainly cant support cuts to SSNs, which are arguably the most important platforms. While to a point the monetary cost is relevant, force size and structure can NOT be dictated by cost. A total rethink of priorities and expenditures, aling with a rigorous campaign to cut waste and fraud is necessary. With $700B yearly, there's enough to get the job done if managed intelligently. We have to figure it out, because the Terrible 20s are here, and we cant expect much in the way of budget increases for this decade. Certain political events which shall remain unspoken give a bit of hope, or none at all. But we should assume the budget will be flat, and take huge steps to make.it work.
DeleteIn the author's interview over on Cimsec they point out pulling the carrier build interval back in a year is one of the easier things to fix should the budget scenario improve. It doesn't get down to 9 carriers until the out years, similar to the current plan landing on 10 rather than the 12 called for.
Delete"pulling the carrier build interval back in a year is one of the easier things to fix"
DeleteI haven't read the cited article (too many things to read!) but I would note that reducing the carrier fleet from 10 (with a 50 year life span which results in one new carrier every five years) to 9 increases the build interval by over half a year. What that does is add another half of year's worth of shipyard overhead to every carrier. In other words, the longer we stretch out the builds, the more each one costs. The more each one costs, the fewer we can afford to buy. The fewer we buy, the more each costs. The more each costs, the fewer we buy … … … … That's a death spiral.
They discuss that in detail.
DeleteIt still seems to me that one solution to the carrier problem is to build a mix of nuke and conventional carriers instead of all nukes. As ComNavOps has discussed previously, when all factors are considered, the differential between nukes and conventional is not that great, and in fact you can make a credible case for either side.
DeleteLet's say a Ford costs $13.5B. The last 3 Nimitzes averaged $8.5B (although I'm not sure how much we can trust the Navy's accounting). RAND says we can build a CVN for $9.3B and a CV-LX (basically a Lightning Carrier) for $4.2, or the same total price as one Ford. Don't like the Lightning Carrier concept? CSBA says we can build a CVL (basically a 1960s-70s HMS Ark Royal, with cats and traps) for probably $6B for the first and less, maybe $5B, for future ones. UK built the QEs for around US$4B, add $1B for cats and traps. A modernized Kitty Hawk could probably be built for $6B, based on cost reductions for smaller size, conventional power instead of nukes, and only two waist catapults, leaving the bow free for aircraft storage or a possible ski jump. That's a whole lot of alternatives to Fords.
I've read the Hudson Institute report, and I question whether 1) 9 carriers could ever be enough, or 2) we can even afford 9 Fords. So if 9 carriers are not enough, and we can't afford 9 Fords and still build the fleet we need (both of which I think are very real possibilities), then we need to quit building Fords.
If I had my druthers, I'd like 12 Nimitzes and 12 conventional carriers, organized into 12 2-carrier CVBGs. If we go the. Kitty Hawk conventional route, that's probably about $20B more than 12 Fords. Plus we still have to buy airplanes for them. But if we don't insist on making everything and F-35, and buy 3 separate and more reasonably-priced aircraft--an interceptor/fighter, a long-range carrier based attack aircraft, and a "Marine A-10" that works of carriers--we might be able to get the numbers and even make up that $20B.
The bigger issue for me is still maintenance. I don't see anyway to keep up with current shipyard capacity. And I don't see how anybody but the HII's of the world can commit to adding capacity given the Navy's fickle budget process.
Eliminating fuel oil would reduce many thousands of pounds of weight.
DeleteThis could happen with "Small Modular Nuclear Reactors." Steam is an old fashioned, basic and very reliable system. Nuclear Reactor systems are currently being designed that could replace boilers. This would mean nearly unlimited range and a lot of power, in a tiny space relative to 1960's style reactors.
https://www.nextbigfuture.com/2020/04/us-dod-funds-three-mobile-nuclear-microreactors-designs.html
Thus, the steam systems could be used, with generators being spun instead of propellers. Perhaps replacing propellers with a number of electric-powered water jets, each running on separate but redundant power lines.
https://www.marinelink.com/news/waterjets-warships312784
Ps. Ditto on the "Marine A-10." ComNavOps has me well convinced. That plane makes more sense for the Marines than for the Air Force any day.
Delete"If I had my druthers, I'd like 12 Nimitzes..."
DeletePerhaps we need more "Nimitzes" than razor blades. The Navy should focus upon more maintenance and less selling old steel.
The original justification for Nuke Carriers was when they were envisioned as part of the nuclear triad during the 50's and 60's. Back then, the CVN's would be carrying nuclear-armed, long range bombers. Just as with nuclear subs, the nuclear fuel would allow the platform to move or stay on station throughout the next World War. Carriers no longer have a large place in the nuclear triad, so fueling them with oil is perfectly acceptable. After all, as CNOps has pointed out, they still need to replenish their aviation fuel, food, etc....
Delete200 Robot ships that sit in climate controlled ordinary.
ReplyDeleteNo crews, no training, a bit of maintenance.
The perfect Ferengi Navy, all acquisition.
It just seems to me that no one in the Pentagon actually thinks we will be fighting a near peer war ever. How else can you explain the bazaar ramblings that regularly erupt from the bowels of that building. The mind boggles. But still, Marines sinking submarines is still my favorite.
ReplyDeleteAny Marine Sniper worth his salt should be able to take out any satellites attempting to violate their spacespace!
DeleteEsper evidently announced the new plan today over on USNI. Profoundly disappointed, but maybe when a real document comes out it will make more sense.
ReplyDelete"1. Where will the shipyard building capacity come from?"
ReplyDeleteI think we can get them built. It's a challenge, but I think it can be done. Over a 40-year build process, 500 ships is 12.5 per year, with seems doable. Assuming an average life of 40 years, that's also the build rate to maintain once we get there. To do it in 30 years would be 16.7 per year, and that could be problematic. But I think it can be done.
That's one problem I have with building for a 20-year left. Maybe you save on individual ship costs, but to get the same fleet size, you have to build twice as many ships. Of course, getting them to last 40 years requires substantial maintenance, which brings us to:
"2. How will the Navy maintain all those extra ships?"
This strikes me as the real problem. I don't have a clue how this can be done, and I don't think the Navy does either. I haven't seen anything indicating that they're even addressing this issue. Situations like the Boise issue show that they don't have a clue for now, and adding a bunch of ships won't make it easier.
It's probably doable with proper planning and incentives, but when ave we seen that?
Someone's wish list and reality not always conform. Not just maintenance, training also cost a lot. Soviet Union went bankrupt as it expanded its armed force far beyond it can afford.
ReplyDeleteAfter lost civilian ship building industry, today's US ship building is equivalent to military ship building. Results are high cost and inefficiency in comparison with China which has largest civilian ship building industry. It can leverage what have learned from civilian side (efficiency, technology, ...etc.) in navy ship building.
Among US allies, S. Korea and Japan are only two still have significant civilian ship building industry (no. 2 and no. 3 in the world). The largest destroyer in the world is a Korean one.
One way to leverage is to invite S. Korea and Japan to bid US navy ships. If they can undercut union laden US ship yards such as Newport News, so be it.
Of course, this is politically unbearable not just because Unions in US defence industry are powerful but also many politicians treat Pentagon as their ATMs to legally bite many times from whatever defence contracts.
Hopeless.
"One way to leverage is to invite S. Korea and Japan to bid US navy ships. If they can undercut union laden US ship yards such as Newport News, so be it.
ReplyDeleteOf course, this is politically unbearable not just because Unions in US defence industry are powerful but also many politicians treat Pentagon as their ATMs to legally bite many times from whatever defence contracts."
Would it be possible to encourage Japanese and Korean shipbuilders to take over US yards and bring some of their expertise to play here? You look at how Toyota and other carmakers have built US plants in right-to-work states, and how foreign yards have built relationships with East Coast yards (Fincantieri with Marinette, Navantia with Bath, Austal). Could that happen in shipbuilding, and if so how could we encourage it? The obvious place would be for them to revitalize some west coast yards, but could/would they do that with the union situation out there?
I think thats a viable idea. But again, it would take serious govt intervention. For instance here locally in the Portland OR area, most of the waterfront that was the source for hundreds of Liberty and Victory ships, along with escort carriers, is long gone. But there is still enough yard space and heavy infrastructure to support an FFG builder for instance. But with the political and environmental climate here, large incentives beyond the actual contracts would be needed to get things going again. The influx of jobs and capital alone wouldnt be enough to overcome the challenges and opposition...
Delete" bring some of their expertise to play here? ... and how foreign yards have built relationships with East Coast yards (Fincantieri with Marinette, Navantia with Bath, Austal)."
DeleteI would point out that Austal's partnership produced a horrible LCS product that had huge price, schedule and quality issues so simply bringing in a foreign builder didn't help anything and, arguably, made for a worse product. Similarly, Marinette Marine also produced an LCS with major cost, schedule, and quality problems.
'Importing' quality is not an impossible concept and has been demonstrated in the auto industry but the shipbuilding industry has thus far failed when it was attempted, as far as I know. Why it failed is a question I can't answer.
To be clear, I was suggesting getting Japanese and Korean yards involved. The experience with Austal and Marinette with the LCSs would not really be relevant.
DeleteIt may be because I'm American, but I want the ships built in the U.S.A. For some reason, maintenance done on our ships done in Japan would not feel so bad. I do wonder about foreigners looking over our most important assets, though.
Delete"The experience with Austal and Marinette with the LCSs would not really be relevant."
DeleteWithout knowing why the Austal shipbuilding 'import' failed while the auto industry 'import' succeeded and simply ignoring the failures while assuming future success is wishful thinking taken to the extreme, as the military does so often. If we can identify some characteristic of the foreign auto companies that allowed them to succeed we might look for that characteristic in foreign shipbuilders. If they have it, they might succeed. If they do not, they may fail. Without knowing what 'it' is, there is no compelling reason to believe success is inevitable. In fact, our most direct evidence suggests failure.
I would certainly support an examination of the issue but I would leave the blind faith behind.
There is also the issue of classified information that such an arrangement would allow to be transferred to foreign countries. Unless they simply build an empty hull and nothing else (in which case, there won't be any savings or much quality improvement), we'll have to provide a great deal of classified info about our ships to foreign governments and that greatly increases the chance of compromise. We can't safeguard our own information and disseminating it to other countries just makes a bad situation worse. I don't want Chinese agents (or hacking) in Japan or Korea collecting detailed information on our warships. Not that it would matter much but we have little or no legal recourse for dealing with companies in Japan or Korea or anywhere else.
"Without knowing why the Austal shipbuilding 'import' failed while the auto industry 'import' succeeded and simply ignoring the failures while assuming future success is wishful thinking taken to the extreme, as the military does so often. If we can identify some characteristic of the foreign auto companies that allowed them to succeed we might look for that characteristic in foreign shipbuilders. If they have it, they might succeed. If they do not, they may fail. Without knowing what 'it' is, there is no compelling reason to believe success is inevitable. In fact, our most direct evidence suggests failure."
DeleteI thought that a big problem with LCSs is that they are basically crap designs. The automakers were basically building quality designs.
What our shipbuilding industry needs is an injection of capital. I don't know if anybody domestically is in position to do that.
"I thought that a big problem with LCSs is that they are basically crap designs."
DeleteThe design would have determined the ultimate naval usefulness of the ship, good or bad, but it had nothing to do with the 'goodness' of the construction process. Both LCSes were over cost, over schedule, delivered with very poor quality, delivered with substantial incomplete compartments, etc. Even with a bad design, the ships should have been produced on time, on cost, and complete on delivery. Clearly, the Austal process did not produce a quality construction process.
From what I have seen it seems that Korea doesn't list GFE costs in their ship price figures and Japan does. The cost difference isn't that different, nor construction times. Numbers bought per year seem to be the biggest factor asa we use so few ships being built to finance entire shipyards.
ReplyDeleteI think the idea of buying a larger number of smaller ships would be one way to help revitalize the industry. When there is only one yard that can build nuke carriers, and two that can build nuke subs, then building nuke carriers and subs isn't going to revitalize anything. By my reckoning, we need 80 or so ASW frigates and (if we want to take littoral combat seriously) maybe half that number of corvettes. Those are big enough numbers to keep a bunch of smaller yards going.
ReplyDeleteInteresting rumours from a pretty good source : https://www.portaledifesa.it/index~phppag,3_id,3817.html?fbclid=IwAR3hfsrpLXn80QnKnUgVLUfKwalJhVRAEq_TOhaqCVGIGn7KCAmvP8dFhK4
ReplyDeleteI have no problem with posting links but I would greatly prefer that you add some value such as your opinion or take on the rumor or some particularly noteworthy aspect that you wish to bring to our attention - especially when the link is not in English! Thanks.
DeleteModly October 2019 gave a talk at the Military Reporters and Editors annual conference amongst other thoughts noted that "the carrier strike group has always been a large expense for the Navy but that today it constitutes a much larger percentage of the bill. In the 1980s, the carrier strike group cost about 14 percent of the total Navy operating cost. Today it’s 31 percent."
ReplyDeleteMy view, which CNO disagrees with :), is its nuclear CVN's and the horrendous manning numbers, maintenance and time costs that nuclear entails and with only the one shipyard in US that has the very specialized and expensive nuclear facilities to build. Need to return to conventionally powered CV's, that can be built and maintained in standard shipyards and let the public nuclear capable shipyards maintain the nuclear subs eg USS Boise.
Another Modly comment “Going back to the ‘80s, when we had the 600-ship Navy, the average cost of our ship in that fleet was a billion dollars, that was the average cost of all those ships. Today, our current fleet of 290, the average cost is $2 billion. And that’s in real dollars, inflation-adjusted real dollars,” // “So what that suggests is we’re piling a lot more capability and a lot more expense on a smaller number of platforms.
I'm looking at the Ticos and Burkes, Burkes original design dates back to the '80's platform pre-historic by todays standards with relatively short range GT propulsion, dense and expensive to maintain and operate, even the bloated Zumwalts need only a crew of ~180+ whereas with the latest Burke USS Delbert Black DDG 119 quoting an unbelievable 380.
Retired CNO Adm Roughhead speaking at Congressional committee with Clark Hudson Institute and O'Rourke CRS on future of Navy said they planned operations based on only one in five ships available (from memory, it might have been one in six, video taken down).
Modly comment "we’re piling a lot more capability and a lot more expense on a smaller number of platforms" resonates with CNO thinking building single mission ships, easier to maintain and operate plus crew can train specifically to master the necessary skills required to make a success of the mission.
" nuclear CVN's and the horrendous manning numbers, maintenance and time costs that nuclear entails"
DeleteAs I have repeatedly stated, I am militantly ambivalent on the nuclear issue. HOWEVER, I do insist on adherence to the facts, when available and discernible. For example, we've proven that nuclear manning is no greater than conventional and may even be less. It is absolutely not a factor in the cost of nuclear carriers.
I've done posts demonstrating that stretched out production time frames have a huge impact on cost, likely far more than any nuclear issues.
I've also demonstrated that, yes, there is an upfront cost increase to incorporate a nuclear power system but the magnitude of the increase does NOT explain the overall cost increases we see. For example, the Ford class costs around twice that of the last Nimitz and yet both are nuclear powered and the Ford's nuclear power, being newer, likely costs LESS. So, the doubling of cost cannot be laid at the feet of nuclear power.
One can legitimately argue for conventional power and, in fact, I lean ever so minutely in that direction but the argument MUST be based on facts. From everything I've seen, the most likely explanation for the carrier cost increase is the extended build time, greatly enhanced crew comforts, increased regulatory burdens, decreased competition in the supplier industry, over-spec'ing of ancillary equipment and systems, and programmatic instability.
Program instability is an issue that intrigues me. Defense contractors are faced with demands to deliver cheap goods but are hit with highly unstable commitments from the military procurement organization. For example, Bath Iron Works was looking at a 'commitment' from the military for 32 Zumwalts and shaped their price offerings accordingly. The Navy then slashed the buy to 3 ships. I doubt Bath made any profit. I suspect that many companies have taken to vastly inflating their prices to compensate for the inevitable program cuts. I have little sympathy for defense companies but to ask them to provide firm, low prices while offering them demonstrated program instability is lunacy. I can't blame them for price gouging and profit inflation when they can get it. They've learned the hard way that the government's 'commitment' to a program means nothing.
"even the bloated Zumwalts need only a crew of ~180"
This completely misses the manning issue. We have the technology to operate a ship today with no crew. The problem is that it wouldn't survive in combat. At the moment, there is no technology that can provide human interpretation of situations, damage control, manual labor when automation fails in combat, and so on. The Zumwalt is not bloated with crew, it is undermanned for combat. A Burke with 300+ crew is likely barely manned. A Fletcher class destroyer of WWII was a fraction of the size of a Burke and yet had the same crew size. Why? To handle all the demands of combat. The story of the Stark is a story of damage control that should be required reading for everyone. They barely managed to keep the ship afloat and the assessment was that the only thing that kept them afloat was bodies for damage control and that they actually needed more bodies.
"This completely misses the manning issue. We have the technology to operate a ship today with no crew. The problem is that it wouldn't survive in combat."
DeleteBingo.
Commercial ships have tiny crews because they're not supposed to get into a fight.
Warships are an entirely different story.
(This is also a BIG problem with USVs.)
CNO thx for reply, take note of your thoughts on CVN manning, did come across a statement that carrier manning required over 40% of total sailors in fleet, so begs the question if appropriate numbers for the firepower carriers bring or is it out of proportion?
DeleteModly "In the 1980s, the carrier strike group cost about 14 percent of the total Navy operating cost. Today it’s 31 percent". So we are not talking about the very high up front nuclear carrier build costs, but the operating costs of CSG, my interpretation was the Ford would have had very minimal impact on operating cost figures for FY2018? Modly was referring to. The operational costs of the CSG would have been driven by the Nimitz nuclear carriers plus Ticos and Burkes, the other big unknown is the cost growth in the air wings. Navy funds manpower costs separately from operating and maintenance budget, so whether manning included in Modly's operating cost figures not known, as always limited info supplied to draw conclusions, especially with nuclear.
Totally take your point on needing more bodies for DC, you have to make a trade off/risk assessment of how much you dedicate to ship cost of survivability vs higher losses with more ships "quantity has a quality of its own". If the Navy sticks to its survivability standard levels 1, 2 or 3 should be met by designing/building survivability into ships with modern day tech with hardened tech for DC (Fincantieri added 300t of steel to FREMM for the FFG(X) which does not look expensive), single mission ships will also reduce crew to allow funding to build and operate more ships. My understanding the big change from WWII is the relative cost of crews, as discussed previously, limited info on crew costs available but back in 2012 Mabus said “Every sailor costs the Navy roughly $300,000 a year" and annual pay since have been higher than in the private sector, why its conflicting with large crews as controlling crew numbers so important if funding to be found for a larger fleet.
“From everything I've seen, the most likely explanation for the carrier cost increase is the extended build time, greatly enhanced crew comforts, increased regulatory burdens, decreased competition in the supplier industry, over-spec'ing of ancillary equipment and systems, and programmatic instability.”
DeleteThe video with CAPT Talbot Manvel discussing the design history of the Ford class (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kIjvNCFXCjs) is very instructive about what I see as a related problem—the lack of consideration of opportunity costs. Manvel and his team pretty clearly received guidance to compare competing design concepts—design A versus design B—on a one-to-one basis, without considering that if design A costs twice as much as design B, so you could build twice as many of design B for the same price, maybe the comparison should be one of design A versus two of design B.
Let’s assume for the sake of argument that the Fords have some advantages over the Nimitzes (although at this point those advantages seem more theoretical than real). Does it have $5B worth of advantages? Would I rather spend $14B on a Ford or $9B on a Nimitz and have $5B to spend on things like airplanes and escorts?
To be fair, I think part of that thinking results from the budget process. Is it easier to sell congress on a $14B Ford, or on the $5B of extra stuff you can get if you build a Nimitz instead?
“Program instability is an issue that intrigues me. Defense contractors are faced with demands to deliver cheap goods but are hit with highly unstable commitments from the military procurement organization.”
DeleteThis is how we end up with the proverbial $1,000 hammer. That hammer actually costs the supplier $995 to make—$5 for the hammer and $990 to comply with the administrative burdens of the military procurement process, to retool production lines because the perfectly good and useful hammer that the company makes ordinarily does not fit the exact specifications that the Navy has, to restructure the supply chain to buy one component from a supplier in the district of a congressperson whose vote is needed to get funding to buy the hammer, to change and retool the production line three times because the Navy decided to change the specs, to buy and then dispose of the titanium that you needed when on spec change one the Navy decided that the hammer had to be titanium but on spec change three reverted to steel, and finally to account for the fact that the Navy originally ordered 1,000 hammers but then reduced the order to one. It takes a very special management approach to be a defense contractor and deal with all these things that you don’t have to worry about when making hammers to sell at WalMart.
I remember my 3/c Mid cruise on Ranger long ago. I was assigned to the FT shop for a day. I noticed one of the CRTs on the fire control radar panel had very clearly displayed the word “SONY.” Since we were in the middle of a big “buy American” push at the time, I asked about it. “Oh, the tube went out while we were on Yankee Station. We didn’t really like not being able to use the gun up there. The part was $1,000 in the supply system and there were none available. We had an R&R visit to Kaohsiung and a couple of us went over to the SONY store and found a tube that exactly the same electronically for $100. So we took some money out of Welfare & Rec, bought it, and it works fine.”
Later, when I was on a mine force staff, a different part of the staff did an inspection of a reserve sweep in Fall River, where there was no base establishment. They wrote the ship up for buying its groceries from Market Basket rather that driving down to Newport to get them on base. I asked if they were spending too much? “No, they are well under budget.” Is the food okay? “Best meals I ever ate on a sweep.” Hmm, maybe we should all be buying our food at Market Basket.
The military procurement system is a disaster.
“We have the technology to operate a ship today with no crew. The problem is that it wouldn't survive in combat. At the moment, there is no technology that can provide human interpretation of situations, damage control, manual labor when automation fails in combat, and so on.“
DeleteOperating a ship and fighting a ship are two different matters. Damage control has to be a primary concern any time you are building a warship, and I don’t think it is for the US Navy. I have seen numerous references to automated damage control. Exactly what is that and how does it work? How does automated damage control patch a hole? And what if what gets damaged is the automated stuff?
What wins battles is not how neat my gadgets work, but how well I can keep my gadgets working when I start to take hits.
"in 2012 Mabus said “Every sailor costs the Navy roughly $300,000 a year"
DeleteThere is an old axiom that you can say anything with statistics and this is a prime example. For example, if you were to take the total Navy budget and divide by the number of Navy employees (civilian, sailors, and anyone else), you'd get a 'cost per employee'. That's a technically true and arithmetically true number. It is not, however, a realistic or meaningful number as it relates to the cost of an individual. The meaningful cost of an individual is his salary plus benefits. A salary for a non-officer might be around, say, $50,000 per year. His benefits (medical, dental, insurance, whatever) might total another $50,000 - $100,000 for a grand total of $100,000 - $150,000 per year per individual. Commercial industry, with generally much higher salaries, uses figures like $125,000 - $175,000 per year per individual. Thus, a figure like $300,000, especially back in 2012, is ludicrous and is likely the former calculation of the entire cost of the Navy divided by the number of employees.
We've got to learn to stop accepting statements from the Navy without running them through our own 'is that believable filter?'. As I've repeatedly demonstrated, the Navy will say and do anything to accomplish their goal of the moment.
"controlling crew numbers so important if funding to be found for a larger fleet."
DeleteNO! Crew size is nearly irrelevant. What needs to be controlled is the immense and ever-growing land component of the Navy. Eliminate a hundred thousand of those people and we can crew any number of ships we want - AS WE DID IN THE 600-SHIP FLEET OF THE 1980s!!!!
We managed to fully crew 600 ships and yet, today, the Navy claims we can't crew (reduced crews with more automation) 280 or so ships. What's wrong with this picture?
"And what if what gets damaged is the automated stuff?"
DeleteCommercial industry has as much or more automated 'damage control' (fire protection, hazmat protection, etc.) than the Navy and yet they've learned that in every catastrophic incident, the automated protection systems were damaged right along with everything else and failed to perform. That's not exactly surprising, is it? Why would we think a fire suppression system would not be blown to bits when everything else exploded?
In my industry experience, the only protective systems that every worked were the non-electrical and non-mechanical ones such as containment dikes or gravity quenches - and that assumes that they weren't outright destroyed in whatever triggered the incident.
I think we arw missing a great opportunity with new FFX program, it should have been a requirement to bring on board 1 or 2 "little guy" yards to do some of metal work and/or modules. We need our yards to remember how to crawl first, then walk, then run. I favor more the bottom up approach than the top down, I just don't think we could just order a new conventional CV and hope yards would coming running for the work. We need to seed first small yards....
ReplyDeleteFincantieri is using the Sturgeon yard and ACE(?) in addition to MMC to build FFGX. Also DDG-1000 has had the crew upped to 217.
Delete"Also DDG-1000 has had the crew upped to 217."
DeleteI missed that. Do you have a reference?
https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/Selected_Acquisition_Reports/FY_2019_SARS/20-F-0568_DOC_26_DDG_1000_SAR_Dec_2019_Full.pdf
DeleteThanks for the link. Nice catch. I've seen no other reference to this anywhere and no explanation.
DeleteThere was an article in USNI Proceedings a few months back with the most sensible recommendation I have seen for the Zumwalts. Send one to the Med and one to WestPac as flagships for 6th and 7th Fleets, and send the third to San Diego as a test platform.
Delete500 ship Navy? Where does this number really come from?
ReplyDeleteDerived from thoughtful analysis & war gamed attritional CONOPs? Where we've determined that's precisely the requirement needed to contain or defeat the Chinese navy?
Or is this figure just to fulfill the "Theater Engagement Strategy" wish list of every COCOM. Each of whom clamors for ever more "presence", FONOPs, or PR driven Joint/Combined Exercises?
Or (as I suspect), did they merely pull that "500" figure out of a hat? It's a nice round number that rolls off the tongue nicely when plying Congress for funding. It makes for a nice rallying cry visual on Power Point slides or in trade journal articles. But what does it actually mean in terms of power projection and survivable attrition against a peer naval opponent?
Why not 476? Or 513? "500 Ship Navy" smells like concocted marketing BS to me. Not grounded in analytical wartime need, but political budget process instead.
What is it exactly (CONOPs) that we expect our carriers to accomplish when they don't have particularly long ranged organic means for delivery of warheads to PLAN foreheads?
Yes, nuke carriers have more internal volume for aviation fuel and munitions stores. But so what? As ComNavOps has noted repeatedly, they aren't going to stay out in harms way indefinitely, but retreat to a safe zone for refit/replenishment between battles or shorter campaigns. Along with their non-nuke escorts. Especially so after taking losses to their fairly small air wings.
We could weld hulls, fix bomb damage, and replace Wildcats & Avengers during the early and desperate months of WWII in the Pacific.
Next time around... probably not so much. It's gonna be a come as you are party. Once we send a mission-killed nuke carrier out of the fight to be repaired... the war is going to be decided before it ever comes back from the yards. Or ever gets equipped with new planes.
Exceptionally deep nuke carrier magazines are useful for a 7-month stand-off cruise, plinking Afghani tribesmen... but not the decisive factor during blue water fleet engagements with the PLAN. The fleet engagement issue is likely decisively put to rest long before strike magazines run dry.
Kerplunk, One Side is Sunk (or in complete retreat) after just a few critical sorties (or long distance missile salvos). I'm in the camp of more conventionally powered carriers for the wartime regeneration/new replacement win. Battle of Midway vs. a more protracted Battle of the Atlantic.
To ComNavOps short list of critical questions...
1. Where will the shipyard building capacity come from?
2. How will the Navy maintain all those extra ships?
I'll add a third...
3. Where is the trained manning for this increase going to come from (both crews & shipbuilding industry), including paying for it in a time of economic uncertainty? Cause that's a whole 'nother budgetary quandary. One that far surpasses the mere cost of floating hulls. Personnel costs are the biggest chunk of any organizational budget. Even if we implement a Draft (wartime conscription).
"Personnel costs are the biggest chunk of any organizational budget."
DeleteYes and no. The Navy has a personnel cost issue only because it has an incredibly bloated, non-deployed land force. It should not be that way and does not need to be that way. See, The Manning Myth
Everyone forgets that we fully manned a 600 ship fleet in the 1980's without significant automation and without busting budgets.
Don't worry, after hawks who think that they are patriotic bankrupt the nation, the nation will be like Russia.
DeleteWe could solve a lot of manning issues by reorganizing. In addition to the officer creep referenced by ComNavOps, we have a hugely bloated administrative structure.
DeleteCBO's force structure primer (https://www.cbo.gov/publication/51535) showed the active duty Navy and Marine Corps (CBO didn't differentiate) with 210,000 combat personnel, 93,000 combat support personnel, and 202,000 administrative/overhead personnel. Cut the administrative/overhead in half and that frees up 101,000 people to send to combat or combat support, or simply reduce headcount. Say we put 34,000 (1/3) to combat, 17,000 (1/6) to combat support, and reduced total headcount by 50,000 to save money. Allocating between Navy and Marines on a pro rata basis, that would free up about. 22,000 Naval officers and sailors, which solves a lot of headcount issues.
Looking at it from a budget standpoint, consulting firm McKinsey studied defense spending for the OECD (developed) nations (https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/dotcom/client_service/Public%20Sector/PDFS/McK%20on%20Govt/Defense/MoG_benchmarking_v9.ashx). They determined that the average OECD defense budget went 26% to combat, 11% to combat support, and 63% to administration/overhead. The USA was much worse--14% combat, 9% combat support, and 77% administration/overhead. Out of a $700B defense budget, that's roughly $100B combat, $60B combat support, and $540B administration/overhead. Put another way, if we could increase combat and combat support by 25% and reduce administration/overhead by 25%, we would reduce total defense spending by about $100B ($25B + $15B - $135B).
That's how bloated our non-deployed and non-deployable people and assets are.
USNI news October 7, Sec of the Navy Kenneth Braithwaite asked how his results compared to what Acting Secretary Thomas Modly had tried to do this spring, announcing a drive to find $40 billion across the next five fiscal years to redirect towards shipbuilding, Braithwaite said, “I got way beyond that.”
DeleteMaybe thinking along similar lines?
"Braithwaite said, “I got way beyond that.”
DeleteI posted on that and I, too, got way beyond $40B with absolutely no effort. See, "Navy Needs $40B Savings"
In terms of maintenance it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the Navy, and Congress (and presumably OSD/DOD), don't take this seriously as a functional requirement for successfully operating a navy.
ReplyDeleteIf nothing else the "plan" to restore the Navy's "Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Plan" is difficult to take seriously ($21 billion over 20 years). The proposed spend is less than 5% of the proposed spend on shipbuilding over the same period. Having a 20 year plan to address infrastructure problem might be reasonable if your infrastructure was in good condition at the starting point of that plan. But . . .
“In 2018, most naval shipyard capital equipment was assessed as beyond effective service life, obsolete, unsupported by original equipment manufacturers, and at operational risk. This aged equipment increases submarine and aircraft carrier depot maintenance costs, schedules and reduced NSY capacity. Modernizing naval shipyard capital equipment is therefore essential to meeting future capacity and capability requirements, and maximizing fleet readiness,”
And the cynic in me asks do we really think that funds for shipyard improvements (restoration apparently at this point) won't be raided to fix funding gaps for construction or urgent ship repairs?
And naturally, as ever, the Navy's plans appear to be predicated upon the expectation that demand will maintain the usual peacetime cadence. As ConNavOps notes, this infrastructure can't currently support the fleet we have, how it is ever going to support a larger fleet, let alone a fleet engaged in actual combat operations, completely escapes me.
Could this be a scheme to get more funding? Consider this, we have seen before about how the Navy faked early retiring an aircraft carrier where they claim budget issues, and the result was Congress bump funding into the Navy. What if, this time, the Navy claimed that we couldn't dealt with current and future threats unless immediate emergency funding is approved for extra ships acquisition. Such funding then will be used to fix unreported repairs and below-acceptable maintenance or funding the Navy's pet projects. When the money are used up, the Navy then could claim cost overruns on current ship building projects and such money were routed as emergency fire putting out. That's my speculation, what do you think? I know that it sound like a conspiracy theory but one year ago, i didn't think the Navy would scoop low enough to early retire an aircraft carrier for funding their magical ships.
ReplyDeleteIt's all about schemes to get more funding. That's the way they think at the top, unfortunately. I'm not sure that it's quite the elaborate scheme that you outline. But I wouldn't put it past them.
DeleteOur Navy leadership isn't about fighting China, or Russia. It's about fighting the Army, the Air Force, and ultimately the taxpayers for funding.
The people at the Pentagon, and the whole DC establishment, are good bureaucrats, and like all good bureaucrats, they have three priorities, in order:
Delete1) My career
2) My agency, its reputation and how I can get more budget and headcount
3) Doing the job we are supposed to do
People like ComNavOps think about what job should the Navy be doing and what is the best way to do it. That kind of stuff is the number 3 priority of the people in charge.
It's weird to think about it, isn't usually the idea that most benefit the entity you are working for would benefit you the most? If I was a commander and I propose the idea that increases combat capabilities, would that ultimately benefit me as it would lead to promotion? And if I am doing good, would the second point easier to achieve? Would congress more acceptable of my judgment if I proved to be capable?
DeleteI hope my "conspiracy theory" isn't true by any means cause I will get 5 bucks and Congress will get some lousy explanations about how the Navy just lost billions of taxpayer dollars.
"If I was a commander and I propose the idea that increases combat capabilities, would that ultimately benefit me as it would lead to promotion?"
DeleteNo, you would not get promotions because today's Navy does not value combat capability. They value other things and I've repeatedly listed what those are. So, no, your concept falls apart because combat is not valued.
When war starts, combat will once again be valued and you would promoted. This is exactly what happened at the start of WWII when so many peacetime commanders were fired and replaced.
"When war starts, combat will once again be valued and you would promoted. This is exactly what happened at the start of WWII when so many peacetime commanders were fired and replaced."
DeleteThe problem is that will there be time once war starts to do this before we are hopelessly behind the 8-ball?
"The problem is that will there be time once war starts to do this before we are hopelessly behind the 8-ball?"
DeleteWe'll have as much time as China will. We only see our own problems and we think things are hopeless but China has as many or more problems as us. We, at least, have some degree of experience in naval operations. China has none. China's ship captains and admirals are likely worse than ours. Realistically, both sides will be operated incompetently until better leaders are identified and placed in command. The US has such people. It's just a matter of finding them. Does China even have aggressive, independent thinking, creative, daring people who could assume command? And would China's high command even allow such people to command? I suspect that Communist, dictatorial China does not produce such people and, if that's the case, they'll have no one to find.
"We only see our own problems and we think things are hopeless but China has as many or more problems as us."
DeleteChina has huge problems, and in their society it will be harder for leaders and warriors to step forward. But China also has one huge home court advantage for any contest in or around the South China Sea. Their margin for error may be greater. Of course we could negate that with planning and training and realistic exercising. But that might get Seaman Jones injured, so we can't ave that. Of course, Seaman Jones is just the cover. The real reason we don't do that is that we would quickly discover that probably half our flag officers have nary a clue how to fight their ways out of a paper bag.
" We, at least, have some degree of experience in naval operations. China has none. China's ship captains and admirals are likely worse than ours. Realistically, both sides will be operated incompetently until better leaders are identified and placed in command. The US has such people. It's just a matter of finding them. "
DeleteDo you think that there's a possible case where the incompetent leader lie their way out of getting fired? I am reminded of the case by whoever promised to fix the Ford or he will get fired. Well the Ford didn't get fixed and he's still here!
The idea of recruiting is interesting however. How did we get combat capable leaders in WW2? Were they mostly inside the Navy or outside the Navy? And if they were outside, how advanced our training were compared to pre-war tactics? Is there a conceivable case where pre-war units losses are so significant that a military has to basically to reinvent itself and win the war?
"Do you think that there's a possible case where the incompetent leader lie their way out of getting fired?"
DeleteIn peacetime, absolutely yes. We salute them and call them admiral. In war, no. War is the leveler where only results matter.
"Were they mostly inside the Navy or outside the Navy?"
Both. They were inside the Navy at lower ranks and outside the Navy in the form of common people being drafted in.
"Is there a conceivable case where pre-war units losses are so significant that a military has to basically to reinvent itself and win the war?"
Of course. That's exactly what happened in WWII. We had one division and needed 100 so, regardless of any losses, or none at all, we wound up with a brand new military made up of 95% new draftees. The new people neither knew nor cared about existing doctrine. They made up whatever tactics and doctrine they needed to survive. The military we ended the war with bore little resemblance to the one we started the war with.
It will all happen again. The tragic part is that it doesn't have to be that way. We can clearly see the lessons from history but we seem determined to ignore them. I guess that's the way of humans.
That compels me to ask, what is the purpose of a large peacetime military then? I am aware that the answer would be power projection and 'respond to global maritime threats". But in a real war, wouldn't that just create more cannon folders for the enemy?
DeleteI am reminded of the example of pre-1980s Navy where they are much better equipped and more capable against high-end threats (and it was their goal back then). After the 80s-90s, the Navy transited to the global peacekeeping force that we know today both aims and equipment. What do you think started this change? And why did we do so well back then? Were it because the newness of the lessons in WW2 and the push-back from veterans?
It seems to me that maintenance standards began to go down at about the same time that the Navy began building for minimal manning. As maintenance responsibility began to be moved from on-board to shore two things began to happen: 1) shipboard crews lost interest in maintenance, and 2) maintenance got bundled up in the name of "efficiency" into large availabilities instead of being done in small increments. As a result small issues were/are left to fester until the next availability instead of being dealt with on board while they were still small.
ReplyDeleteHere is one think tank's take on the issue:
ReplyDeletehttps://csbaonline.org/research/publications/strengthening-the-u.s-defense-maritime-industrial-base-a-plan-to-improve-maritime-industrys-contribution-to-national-security
There are no magic bullets there, but it does seem a reasonable overall strategy.