This keeps coming up in comments so I guess I have to address it.
I’m sure that everyone has heard, by now, the near-legendary story about the Swedish diesel-electric submarine HSwMS Gotland that ‘sank’ the US carrier Ronald Reagan in an exercise, thereby conclusively and unequivocally proving that submarines are invincible and that carriers are just marking time until they will by 100% sunk within ten minutes of the start of a war – at least, that’s the conclusion that many have drawn based on one widely disseminated story. Is that really the correct conclusion? Let’s look just a bit beyond the sensationalistic story and see what the reality is.
As we know, the US Navy has no SSKs of its own and leased the services of the Swedish SSK Gotland from 2005-2007 for the purpose of study and exercises. As far as the actual exercise in question, we have almost no information so almost everything that follows is speculation and reasoned logic.
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| HSwMS Gotland, SSK |
Wikipedia states that the exercise in question involved Carrier Strike Group 7 (CSG 7) during the 2005 December pre-deployment Joint Task Force Exercise 06-2 (JTFEX 06-2) in the Pacific Ocean (probably in the California Operating Areas).(2) As such, the exercise would have included all areas of the group’s mission capabilities with ASW being one check box on the list. Note that the supporting citation in the Wiki article is irretrievable and unverifiable.
According to a Wikipedia article about CSG 7, the group consisted of the Reagan, a Ticonderoga, and 3 Burkes.(3) This isn’t even remotely representative of a wartime carrier group so it follows that any exercise would not be representative of a wartime scenario. That aside …
All right, that’s the end of what we actually know. Now, let’s move into reasoned speculation.
The Navy’s purpose was to find out how stealthy the sub was and to study ways to detect and counter the sub. Sinking it in an exercise was not the primary purpose. Think about it … if you want to see how effective the sub is, you’d likely start it at different points, nearer and farther, to observe its characteristics. In fact, you might intentionally refrain from ‘sinking’ it and allow it to approach as closely as possible to study the acoustic patterns as they vary with distance.
So, just as Top Gun aircraft instructors allow the students to shoot them down in order to learn, the Navy may have allowed the sub to sink the carrier to learn how it would be done.
Now, let’s consider what an ASW exercise is.
The number one attribute of an exercise is that it’s not realistic right from the start. Out in the wild, it would be exceedingly unlikely for a sub to ever get within detection range of a carrier group. The ocean is an incredibly vast place and the odds that a sub and a carrier would randomly cross paths is very low. In an exercise, do we want to wait for months while a slow, limited sensor range sub searches for an ocean-roaming carrier? Of course not! So, we artificially constrain the exercise by confining the sub and carrier in close proximity to begin the exercise. Thus, the sub has already, artificially, achieved detection and ‘maneuvered’ into weapons range. The only remaining uncertainty is whether the defenders will detect the sub in the short time period before the sub achieves final firing position and that is probably unlikely.
Consider the history of WWII submarine-carrier encounters. For all the millions of miles of carrier group travel, both Japanese and American, and all the millions of miles of submarine travel, how many encounters between carrier and submarine actually occurred? I’m aware of a single Japanese sub encounter with an American carrier, the Wasp. Another Japanese sub fired on the Yorktown but the Yorktown was already badly damaged and adrift, at that point, at the end of a battle. On the other side, there were one or two encounters between American subs and Japanese carriers: the Shinano was sunk by a US sub. So, out of many dozens of carriers and many hundreds of subs criss-crossing many millions of miles of the Pacific ocean, only half a dozen or so sub-carrier encounters occurred. That pretty conclusively demonstrates how unlikely SSK-carrier encounters would be in war. Further reducing the likelihood of encounter is the fact that SSKs are littoral assets and stay relatively close to land while carriers seek out the deepest and most remote waters they can find. The two are extremely unlikely to meet just due to their different preferred operating areas in addition to the simple statistical unlikelihood of a random meeting in the open ocean.
It is instructive to note that Gotland arrived at the start of the lease and returned to Sweden at the end of the lease via mobile dry dock (Norwegian semi-submersible heavy-lift ship, MV Eide Transporter,) rather than sailing under its own power.(1) Modern SSKs are not generally open ocean assets.
The next noteworthy aspect of an ASW exercise is repetition. If you’ve gone to the trouble and [staggering!] expense of assembling a sub and a carrier group for an ASW exercise, do you want to run one quick iteration and call it a day? No! You want to get your money’s worth. You want to run and rerun the exercise to allow as many people and assets as possible to participate and learn. In the course of numerous iterations, you would expect that the sub would ‘win’ some and the carrier would ‘win’ some. Without a detailed listing of every iteration, the conditions, and the results, we can’t draw any conclusions. Instead, what we get is a sensationalistic story about an invincible sub. What we don’t hear about are the other twenty times that the sub lost because that’s not a sensationalistic story.
The Navy’s Top Gun school has used A-4 Skyhawks, T-38 Talons, F-16N (briefly), and F-5’s, among other types, as its adversary aircraft. They have routinely ‘shot down’ student pilots. Does this mean that those aircraft are superior to the front line US Navy aircraft? Of course not. It means that the adversary aircraft are used in such a way as to teach lessons to the students. Similarly, the Gotland SSK was used to practice against and that may well have meant ‘losing’ for the US Navy participants so that they could learn.
In an actual combat situation, the carrier is going to be escorted by dozens of ships extending out for 20-50 miles in rings around the carrier (see, “Escorts”). In addition, the group’s ASW helos will be scouring the sea 24/7. The sub will have to penetrate fifty miles or so through dozens of escorts and constant helos to achieve a firing position. In an exercise, as we noted, that entire phase is skipped and the sub is artificially placed inside the defensive layers. We don’t even know whether any escorts or helos were used in the exercise in question. It would seem reasonable that they were but perhaps they had other pre-deployment tasks to accomplish?
In combat, the escorts will also be firing on any semi-possible contact just to be safe. This will influence the sub’s behavior, knowing that either random chance or a momentary contact might result in a torpedo close enough to be a threat to the sub. The sub will be more cautious and move less aggressively knowing that the alternative is death rather than a reset of the exercise. In an exercise, the sub can take chances it wouldn’t take in real combat.
Carrier groups, historically, have had submarine escorts that, presumably, range far ahead of the group and ‘sanitize’ its path. In an exercise, there is no far distant submarine escort that the attacking sub had to defeat/evade just to reach the surface escorts/helos and then then, ultimately, the carrier. Again, another unrealistic aspect of the exercise.
In combat, the number one defensive tactic is to flee. At the first hint of a sub threat the carrier would likely turn and run at 35 kts thus denying the sub firing position. In an exercise, this is not an option. As we noted, the sub and carrier are constrained to a fixed location. The carrier is forced to allow the sub to approach.
So, what are we left with in the way of reasonable conclusions?
- ASW exercises are utterly unrealistic
- Every ASW exercise has both sides winning some and losing some
- An ASW exercise is an artificially constrained tracking exercise rather than an ASW exercise
- SSKs present a very unlikely threat to a carrier
Finally, let’s consider what an actual combat engagement between an SSK and a carrier would look like.
For starters, there would be no engagement. The odds on an SSK intercepting a carrier group is infinitesimal. SSKs are not deep ocean going subs, as a general statement, whereas carriers are only deep ocean platforms in a war. The two would never meet.
Setting that aside, let’s assume that an SSK was cruising the open ocean. Barring the million to one random chance encounter where a carrier group literally sails straight over top the submarine, an SSK could never detect and maneuver into a viable torpedo firing position. The carrier group travels at 20+ kts with maximum speeds of 30+ kts. By comparison, the SSK’s maximum, short duration speed is just 5-20kts, depending on power source. The submarine does not have the speed to maneuver into an intercept position without giving away its own position. SSKs depend on the prey coming to them, not the other way around.
None of the preceding should be taken to assert that submarines are not a threat. They most certainly are! The purpose of the post is to demonstrate just how unrealistic a pre-deployment ASW exercise conducted for a small carrier group is. This should also demonstrate that the single sensationalistic story is just that – a single example from, likely, dozens/hundreds of exercises. By itself, it proves nothing. The SSK may well be, and likely is, a very difficult opponent to defeat but we’ve just demonstrated that the very notion of an SSK-carrier encounter is almost absurdly unlikely.
Side note: Oct 2014, Sweden spent several days looking for a supposed Russian sub and found nothing. Of course, there may not have been anything there to find but it suggests that the Swedish subs are not the all-seeing, all-knowing, invincible killers of the sea that popular media has portrayed them to be.
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(1)https://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/sweden-has-a-sub-thats-so-deadly-the-us-navy-hired-it-t-1649695984
(2)Wikipedia, “HSwMS Gotland (Gtd)”, retrieved 26-Sep-2020,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HSwMS_Gotland_(Gtd)#cite_note-15
(3)Wikipedia, “Carrier Strike Group Seven 2004–06 operations”, retrieved 27-Sep-2020,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carrier_Strike_Group_Seven_2004–06_operations
Given how frequently submarines appear on television, I'm surprised by how much fuss the Jalopnik article has attracted. For example, British TV had a broadcast from the inside of a Collins which was proving too elusive US ASW hunters. However, the Australians were "cheating" by hugging the coast of an island and only crossing a channel when they thought the Americans weren't looking. Also, the Perisher TV series is still available. An SSK proves easy meat because of something clanking. Maintenance is crucial and some of it can't be done at sea. More worryingly, one of the nuclear submarines featured appears to be run far more competently than the other. The are from the same class. Crews are crucial.
ReplyDeleteASW in the Atlantic may be more taxing than ASW in the Pacific. Getting to Norway means going through ambush points. I don't think there will be a near peer war any time soon, but if there was, the opposition would prepare the playing field in advance. Submarines would close on carriers long before real hostile intent was obvious.
"Submarines would close on carriers long before real hostile intent was obvious."
DeleteNo, not really, and the reverse applies, also. Most US carriers are not deployed but are, instead, in their home ports. A sub could lie outside a port, waiting for hostilities to commence but without knowing an exact date of commencement, that could be a very long wait! Also, as hostilities approached, the defenders would be ramping up their ASW efforts and time favors the ASW rather than the sub. ANY sub will eventually be found and if it's hanging around, say, a port, it is even more likely to be found given time.
Now, a deployed carrier could be stalked by a sub prior to hostilities but, again, the same applies to the defenders who can spend extended time searching, secure in the knowledge that they can't be fired on until open hostilities start.
As hostilities approach, every effort will be made to protect carriers and time favors the ASW.
I take your point with regard to SSKs but does the time issue also work against nuclear submarines? Russian subs are known to hang about in or near the Clyde. Allegedly, Britain had to ask for help dealing with one of these submarines as our own ASW was unavailable at the time.
DeleteAn article in the Sun, and I'm not going to make the obvious jibe as I don't know how good they are on defence, claims Kilos are tracking RN ships, including our aircraft carriers. It would seem a bit inept if they weren't as we have just had an exercise.
Didn't a Chinese submarine pop up near an American carrier? Protecting the carriers as hostilities approach might not be easy.
I would love to know what really happened to the RN submarine which was allegedly driven off by Russian ASW, including two Kilos. If this happened, it would suggest that preparations for dealing with boats as quiet as an Astute can work. As your post is about the Gotland, I have to wonder whether an SSK would have been harder for the Russians to deal with.
"Protecting the carriers as hostilities approach might not be easy."
DeleteNo one said the US Navy was proficient at ASW! I've repeatedly criticized them. We need to drastically ramp up our proficiency or else the advantage of time will be wasted. Leasing the Gotland was a nice, small step in that ramp up but then we abandoned the effort for unknown reasons. I would think we would want to purchase a couple of SSKs for continuous training purposes - and yet we have no interest in doing so. That's baffling.
"Didn't a Chinese submarine pop up near an American carrier?"
It did. However, that was peacetime during a period 'don't give a crap about ASW'. No one was making any concerted effort to detect subs. That's tragic and misguided and that attitude is the first thing we need to change.
I wish I could remember the details of the TV programme which featured an Australian submarine. It suggests that the USN is still working on ASW against SSKs with Australian help. However, I have seen a comment which said the Collins class is deemed to be as loud as a rock band.
Delete"It suggests that the USN is still working on ASW against SSKs with Australian help."
DeleteThe US conducts occasional exercises of opportunity with any ally that happens to have a sub available for an exercise. However, these typically involve a single US ship or aircraft which hardly constitutes fleet wide training. So, on average, each US surface ship might get one extra, short ASW training opportunity every five years or so - not exactly a wholesale commitment to ASW proficiency!
As far as the Collins' acoustic signature, it does have a reputation as a noisy sub. At one time, consideration was given to making some hull shape modifications to address some of the noise issues. I don't know what, if anything, came of that.
The Collins class were noisy at speed. However all issues have been fixed. They are now super quiet at all speeds.
DeleteThe combat system also didn't quite work and was replaced by an American combat system (presumably the SSN combat system).
"They are now super quiet at all speeds."
DeleteAs I understand it, the noise issues were due to structural (shape) issues with the hull form. It is very difficult/impossible to significantly alter the basic hull form. Yes, you can add baffles and whatnot to try to redirect flow, break up turbulence, and suppress cavitation but there's a definite limit. The bow of the Collins was supposedly just plain wrong, acoustically. Short of cutting off the bow (did they?) and grafting on a new one, there's not that much you can do.
I get that you're proud of your Navy and that's fine but I'm highly skeptical that a structurally noisy sub can be made 'quite at all speeds'. That's just not reasonable or possible barring a complete rebuild of the ships basic hull form. If you have some documentation that describes what was done, if anything, and the results, let me know. I'm as sure as I can be without actual proof that improvements could have been made but it would not have been possible to bring them up to modern acoustic standards. 'Quiet' is a relative term and I'm sure Australian officials would describe them as quiet but I'm certain they're not up to modern standards given their structural flaws.
According to Wikipedia they used fibreglass and carbon fibre fairing to alter the hull shape. It took over 10 years to make them good. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collins-class_submarine#Noise_signature]
DeleteNote they got their CVN kill while in original configuration.
They are currently being upgraded with all new machinery like engines.
"It took over 10 years to make them good."
DeleteI've seen nothing that says they're 'good'. The changes likely improved things but it's simply not possible to slap fiberglass and lipstick on a pig and make it a gazelle. The magnitude of the problems the class had guarantees that the most they could hope for is to be 'better', not 'good'. If you have documentation about acoustic levels - and, of course, no one does), I'd be happy to look at it.
" they got their CVN kill while in original configuration."
You read the post, right? If you do enough iterations, a Sopwith Camel will eventually 'kill' an F-22.
From Wikipedia
DeleteNote we found Japanese subs are not as good as the Collins class. That's why we went French for the Attack class.
"During several multinational exercises and wargames, the Collins class has demonstrated its effectiveness in the hunter-killer role by successfully attacking both surface warships and other submarines.[174] In late May 2000, Waller became the first Australian submarine to operate as a fully integrated component of a USN carrier battle group during wargames.[175] Waller's role was to search for and engage opposing submarines hunting the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, a role in which she performed better than expected.[175] A few days later, as part of the multinational exercise RIMPAC 2000, Waller was assigned to act as an 'enemy' submarine, and was reported to have successfully engaged two USN nuclear submarines before almost coming into attacking range of Abraham Lincoln.[176][177] Waller performed similarly during the Operation Tandem Thrust wargames in 2001, when she 'sank' two USN amphibious assault ships in waters just over 70 metres (230 ft) deep, although the submarine was 'destroyed' herself later in the exercise.[176][177] Waller's second feat was repeated by Sheean during RIMPAC 02, when the boat was able to penetrate the air and surface anti-submarine screens of an eight-ship amphibious task force, then successfully carry out simulated attacks on both the amphibious assault ship USS Tarawa and the dock landing ship USS Rushmore.[177][178]
Later that year, during two weeks of combat trials in August, Sheean demonstrated that the class was comparable in the underwater warfare role to the Los Angeles-class nuclear-powered attack submarine USS Olympia.[177][179] The two submarines traded roles during the exercise and were equally successful in the attacking role, despite Olympia being larger, more powerful, and armed with more advanced torpedoes.[179] In 2003, a Collins-class boat carried out successful attacks on two USN nuclear submarines and an aircraft carrier during a multinational exercise.[180] The repeated successes of the class in wargames and multinational exercises earned the Collins class praise from foreign military officers for being "a very capable and quiet submarine",[174] and recognition of the boats as a clear example of the threat posed to navies by modern diesel submarines.[181]"
And note the above seems to have been written 17 years ago.
DeleteYou read the post, right? It's training. Everyone gets a turn at winning and everyone gets a turn at losing.
Delete"a Collins-class boat carried out successful attacks on … "
And I guarantee you they carried out unsuccessful attacks, too.
The bow was reshaped but by far & away the bigge s t problem was from the sail to the rear of the sub. This was solved by sheer dumb luck and it's a fascinating story. The fact of the matter is there were significant teething problems but the Collins came in under budget and considerably over spec. The "Son of Collins" is now being pitched to the Dutch.
DeleteDue to corruption and sheer incompetence Australia has precious little to be proud of in military acquisitions partly because the govt cannot seem to go for COTS, but the Collins, which everyone bags is, ironically, an exception.
"The bow was reshaped but by far & away the bigge s t problem was from the sail to the rear of the sub."
DeleteI know only the bare bones of the Collins' story but I am amazed by the shape problems as they relate to noise. The fundamentals of submarine shape had been worked out decades prior to the Collins. Who decided to ignore all the lessons?
"Collins came in under budget and considerably over spec."
DeleteI'm not intimately familiar with the Collins story but this does not even remotely match the Wikipedia description which claims the Collins came in just a bit above the original contract price but around 20% over when the cost of corrections and fixes are accounted for.
As far as 'over spec', the class had significant problems and failings as delivered. Corrections were eventually made (I don't know to what degree) but to claim they came in over spec appears to be incorrect. The eventual, corrected vessels may be moderately capable but they certainly didn't 'come in' that way! In fact, they appear to have been almost non-functional, as designed and delivered.
Just from the Wiki;
Delete"Most systems and features worked with few or no problems, while the boats' maximum speed, manoeuvrability, and low-speed submerged endurance were found to exceed specifications.[70] The ship control system, which during development had been marked as a major potential problem, functioned beyond positive expectation: for example, the autopilot (which aboard Collins was nicknamed 'Sven') was found to be better at maintaining depth during snorting than most helmsmen.[71]"
I'm told by a former diesel mechanic on both Oberon and Collins class, that the low speed endurance wasn't just better, it was considerably better than expectations.
There were welding problems, but only on the first boat.
The noise signature is quite a story, but;
"During the year 2000, an unusual meeting took place with a next door neighbor (Francis 'Frank' Smith) of the then HMAS Stirling Naval Base commander. He was an Aircraft Maintenance Engineer (originally trained at Government Aircraft Factories Fisherman's bend) who had been aware of the fluid dynamics issues of the Collins class for some time, purely by interest and observation on television. After a lengthy discussion, he was invited to discuss and demonstrate where possible, his observations at the Stirling Naval Base with Navy and DSTO staff who were there at that time as part of an investigative group. He showed on a white board, the aerofoil issue with the Dorsal – Sail conning tower structure showing that the aspect ratio (span (height) to chord (width)) was too short and that severe turbulence / cavitation would be generated by such a design."
"He made several recommendations during the lecture that would be cost-effective and possible. 1) To lengthen and taper the dorsal fin and create a more streamlined integration of the dorsal to flat upper Hull deck section. and 2) To 'fill in' the hollow section of hull aft of the bow curvature. Both these could be achieved with Carbon Fibre or Fibreglass covers as no load bearing strength would be required. Subsequent studies by the Defence Science and Technology Organisation showed that the submarine's hull shape, particularly the redesigned sonar dome, the fin, and the rear of the submarine, focused the displaced water into two turbulent streams; when the seven propeller blades hit these streams, the propeller's vibration was increased, causing cavitation.[91] These problems were fixed by modifying the casing of the submarine with fiberglass fairings.[92]"
"The propellers themselves were also found to be poorly manufactured, having been shaped by hand, with at least one cast at the wrong pitch.[97] This was rectified by using a five-axis milling machine for future shaping work and replacing the miscast propeller.[98] The material used for the propellers was also found to be weaker than expected, developing fatigue cracks after only a few years of use.[97] Instead of going to Kockums, which had started to go into decline after the end of the Cold War, the submarine project office sent the propeller to the United States Navy for redesigning.[99] Despite the Americans fixing the problems with the propeller design, resulting in significant performance improvements,"
DeleteIIRC the book I'm about to link to points out that this was at least part of why the subs were better performers than expected.
"The propulsion system was also found to be a secondary source of noise: poor design of the exhaust mufflers, weight-saving measures in the generator mountings, and an incorrect voltage supply to the battery compartment exhaust fans were noise-creating factors found and eliminated during studies by the Defence Science and Technology Organisation.[102]"
"When the fast track program is factored in, the Collins class cost just under 20% more than the inflation-adjusted contract value; a smaller increase than other contemporary defence projects.[133]"
I'm sure I've read that the other way around somewhere? Maybe my memory is faulty.
Finally, a book on the topic, which I doubt you have time or motivation to read, and that's okay, who cares about 6 subs in a foreign navy? I wouldn't.
DeleteSpells out how the problems occurred and how most of it was actually related to politics and contracts rather than hardware. Typical...
https://www.amazon.com.au/Collins-Class-Submarine-Story-Steel/dp/0521868947
As long as there are choke points there are opportunities. An SSK like Japan's or the future Australian can have as elaborate a sensor, communications, and networking suite as an SSN. The sub can get more help finding a target now than ever before. Plus, what's really stopping a UUV from long distancing it into port and going boom?
ReplyDeleteYes, navigational choke points are the SSK's hunting ground. Obviously, a carrier would avoid those areas at all costs.
DeleteKamikaze UUVs are a threat, to a degree, but penetrating the often winding approaches to a port while remaining unseen is a challenge for a manned vessel let alone an unmanned, 'dumb' one. Sadly, US port defense, both military and civilian, is horribly lacking.
A SSK is a "cheap" way to wreck the enemy's maritime trade if their ASW isn't good, not a carrier killer.
ReplyDeleteSure, it can happen sometimes (I-19's lethal salvo), but that's not exactly likely.
The I-19 attack demonstrates the danger for a carrier operating in a semi-fixed position. Wasp was 'tied' to Guadalcanal instead of operating freely and that greatly increased the odds of encountering a sub. Of course, sometimes you have to do things that are dangerous, in a war, and sometimes it doesn't work.
DeleteThe Wasp wasn't operating tied to Guadalcanal at the time, it was providing distant cover for a convoy, and, according to the USN investigation it could have also be a problem of tactical management. You also forgot to mention that Saratoga was torpedoed twice in 1942, and the successful US attack on Tahio and Shokaku. Both were sunk by submarines at the battle of the Philippine Sea.
DeleteGerman U-boots, sank HMS Curageous, HMS Eagle, and HMS Ark Royal.
We are not talking CVEs...
Said that it is part of the game. There are no unsinkable ships. And dumb COs do not help.
"The Wasp wasn't operating tied to Guadalcanal at the time"
DeleteIt most certainly was! Wasp was operating around Guadalcanal from 6-Aug until she was sunk on 15-Sep. On 15-Sep she was escorting a convoy to Guadalcanal and was 150 nm from San Cristobal. 'Tied' doesn't mean anchored a hundred feet off the coast. 'Tied' means operating consistently and for a prolonged period in a defined and constrained area. That's exactly what Wasp was doing. Japanese subs knew there were US carriers operating in close proximity (close in carrier terms) to Guadalcanal and, sure enough, one eventually found Wasp. A carrier not tied to the spot would have been 600 miles away the previous day's location.
As I said, sometimes you have no choice but to stand in a dangerous position but when you do, you often pay the price. This simply illustrates how carriers should and should not operate and the safety that lies in the open ocean while staying on the move.
reply gone... have to retype... basically 24kts cruising speed (and I am generous), for 24 hours, steaming in a straight line, no flight ops, not change of course, no refueling the tincans is 574 miles. Then look at aircraft ranges. I think you are stretching's the definition of tied, at least for WW2 terms.
DeleteThere is also the issue that if you argument of not being 'tied'. In any major operations you carrier will be tied to a specific, albeit large, stretch of sea. IF not, you simply fuel the argument of the naysayers that carriers will be so preoccupied with their own safety to be useless. Not what your are arguing of course, but a annoying way to see the problem.
On a different tack, this talk about carrier vulnerability or lack thereof brings to mind two suggestions that I would like to see.
ReplyDelete1) A long-range (1200-1500 NM sortie) attack aircraft, instead of the current 500-750 NM sortie range for the F/A-18 and F-35. If we double the distance from which carriers can launch attack strikes, then we quadruple the size of the ocean area from which they may launch. See Jerry Hendrix analysis at: https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNASReport-CarrierAirWing-151016.pdf. At that range carrier air can attack China from outside the range of the current Chinese A2/AD system.
2. Bring back the S-3 or some modernized version. OK, I get that in the modern sub era, it may take considerable upgrades to its sensors and processors. But had we kept it in the fleet, those updates would almost surely have been incrementally. It's a capability that we abandoned because we thought that with the end of the Cold War, we wouldn't have to worry about subs any more. We do, and every tool that we can employ moves the odds in our favor.
Move carriers out and give them more room in which to operate, so they are harder to find, and give them another tool to prosecute submarines, and I think you shift the odds significantly.
The carrier can attack at that range now, it just requires some combination of AAR and/or standoff munitions. The USAF would have to get involved. Little Navy tankers can't handle large scale strikes at that range.
DeleteOf course 1200-1500 nmi radius aircraft could also fly from land bases like Guam and Palau with one AAR each way and strike China.
On the S3, I'm ambivalent. The likelihood of investigating distant contacts detected by surface ships is significantly lower than it used to be, but such an aircraft could locally aid task forces performing distributed ASW.
DeleteHowever every spot taken by an S-3 replacement is a spot not carrying a fighter. Not sure that's a good trade when we're facing potential fighter numerical inferiority vs the Chinese.
The best future use of carriers might be to provide fighter overwatch for other naval and land forces.
"it just requires some combination of AAR and/or standoff munitions."
DeleteI don't get the fascination/obsession with 1000+ mile aircraft strikes. We already have unmanned versions that can do that. They're called Tomahawks (we need a modern Tomahawk!) and they cost a hundred times less than a manned aircraft.
"However every spot taken by an S-3 replacement is a spot not carrying a fighter."
DeleteIf our air wings were 95-100 aircraft, as the carrier is designed to handle, that would be an issue. The current air wing is 65 aircraft, or so. We have plenty of room!
"If our air wings were 95-100 aircraft, as the carrier is designed to handle, that would be an issue. The current air wing is 65 aircraft, or so. We have plenty of room!"
DeleteBack when we had tiny A-4s filling out air wings, maybe. Compare the size of an A-4 with a Super Hornet or an F-35.
Doesn't change the fact that every spot taken by an S-3 is a spot not carrying a fighter, whether it's 65 or 100. We need numbers to balance out their home field advantage. Local land bases are going to get smacked by S/IRBMs and cruise missiles. We may only have carrier air to protect the rest of our forces in the Pacific.
"The best future use of carriers might be to provide fighter overwatch for other naval and land forces."
DeleteI've stated that the role of the carrier (air wing) should be to provide local, mobile air superiority for other forces such as Air Force bombers penetrating on deep strike missions or to 'escort' cruise missiles by clearing lanes. The days of massive carrier strikes are over due to the sophistication of both the defenses and the cruise missiles which can perform the same role as the strike aircraft for a fraction of the cost. The carrier, now, should be the escort for the Burkes (Tomahawk shooters) instead of the other way around.
"Back when we had tiny A-4s filling out air wings, maybe."
DeleteBack then, we also had giant A-3 Skywarriors, RA-5C Vigilantes, EA-3B Skywarrior/Whales, E-2A Hawkeyes, RA-3B Skywarrior Recons as well as F-4 Phantoms (which were actually a bit longer than a SuperHornet though a bit narrower, also). Aircraft space on a carrier is not an issue, today - not even a little bit.
Now, if you're proposing increasing the air wing size to 95-100 aircraft, where it used to be (with larger aircraft!), then space might become an issue. However, not only is the Navy NOT even considering that, they're planning to DECREASE the squadron size for the F-35 (down to 10 aircraft from 12). So, there will be even more space available on a carrier!
"The carrier, now, should be the escort for the Burkes (Tomahawk shooters) instead of the other way around."
DeleteIf we accept this premise, doesn't it suggest that a specialized Missile Shooting Ship would be better than multi-purpose Burkes?
" doesn't it suggest that a specialized Missile Shooting Ship would be better than multi-purpose Burkes?"
DeleteThat would work and would be similar to the arsenal ship idea although the number of cells/missiles would have to be balanced against risk (too many eggs in one basket).
Of course, the best approach is the SSGN which we're retiring without a comparable replacement despite the overwhelming benefits.
SSGNs are great and I love them, but they're expensive and can't be used in a carrier group.
DeleteIt's not an either/or situation.
Still, getting rid of them is monumentally stupid.
The timeline for replacement of the Ohio class will not allow for the conversion of any of Columbia class subs into SSGNs without creating a shortfall in the US Navy's ability to fulfill the nuclear deterrence role.
DeleteThe realistic options are to convert the Ohio subs with the longest hull life into SSGNs or buy/build some Dreadnought class subs and use them as SSGNs. The Dreadnought class is only slated for 4 subs and 2 are in production. The US Navy could add an additional order for 10 Dreadnought SSGNs with 4 produced in the UK and the rest at a new BAE submarine shipyard in the USA. A hot production line and a large order could keep the cost reasonable.
A new nuclear capable shipyard for submarines would allow for increased production of attack submarines when the Dreadnought order was finished.
The Dreadnought and the Columbia class both lack the Ohio's number of tubes(22)(24 if you include the tubes not used for weapons) so you need more boats or the Dreadnought(12) or Colombia(16) would need an extra section or three of tubes.
"Back then, we also had giant A-3 Skywarriors, RA-5C Vigilantes, EA-3B Skywarrior/Whales, E-2A Hawkeyes, RA-3B Skywarrior Recons as well as F-4 Phantoms (which were actually a bit longer than a SuperHornet though a bit narrower, also). Aircraft space on a carrier is not an issue, today - not even a little bit."
DeleteTo my knowledge, we never carried large numbers of A-3s or A-5s when we had 90 aircraft air wings. At most 4-5.
Regardless, I'm not arguing whether carriers have extra space. I'm saying swapping a fighter for an S3 may not be a smart trade, given the number if aircraft we could be facing in the Pacific.
"I'm saying swapping a fighter for an S3 may not be a smart trade"
DeleteIt doesn't even matter until we hit the carrier space limit. At that point, and only then, will need to make a judgement about fighters versus ASW.
"At most 4-5"
Not even close. As an example, according to the CVN65.us website, the CVW-9 air wing on Enterprise during Oct 65-Jun 66 included a det (dets are usually 2-4 aircraft) of A-3B, a full squadron (unknown number, likely 6-8?) of RA-5C, a det of E-1B Tracers, two full squadrons (14 each?) of F-4B, a det of EA-3B, and a det of RA-3B. That totals around 14-24 large size aircraft plus the 28(?) F-4B which are longer than SuperHornets. We forget just how many aircraft our carriers used to carry and how big those aircraft were.
Enterprise's nominal air wing in '65 was,
Delete24 F-4B
56 A-4C
3 A-3B
3 RA-3B
4 E-1B
3 EA-3B
3 UH-2
Lots of aircraft, for sure, but most are tiny A-4s. Not a lot of large aircraft.
Source (pg 241) : https://www.amazon.com/Aircraft-Carriers-Aviation-Influence-1946-2006/dp/1574886657
Even using your numbers, that's 13 very large aircraft and 24 aircraft longer than a SuperHornet. That's quite a few more than 'at most 4-5'.
DeleteTrue. I'll concede that point.
DeleteI have no interest in winning any point. I hammered on this because the underlying concept is important. We need to remember just how big our air wings used to be in terms of both numbers and size of aircraft. This is important because we (the big 'we', meaning admirals, civilian leadership, aircraft designers, and everyone) are currently looking at redesigning the air wing for a Pacific war with China - a war that will require - my opinion, now - very large aircraft for the very long range air superiority role and yet we're locked in to our current paradigm of relatively small aircraft which, in turn, locks us into small weapons loads, short ranges, and short endurance (loiter/combat time). There's no getting around it that only larger aircraft can provide the needed range and weapon loads. We need to recall the size of aircraft and air wings that we used to operate. We need to get back to air wings with 95-100 aircraft and with many of them much larger than today's aircraft.
DeleteWe also need to get back to very large air wings because when war comes we'll suffer attrition and only numbers can compensate for attrition. Again, so many of 'us' have grown up never knowing that air wings were once 90+ aircraft and that our carriers are designed for up to 100 aircraft.
If you were to imagine a very long range air superiority fighter, you'd probably imagine 12-20 missiles (with so many stealth aircraft, most missiles will miss!) as the weapons load, a very powerful (meaning large) radar, a powerful (meaning large) IRST, very long range (meaning large and many fuel tanks), very powerful (meaning large) engines, maybe a two-seater (meaning large), and so on. You can see the common characteristic, I think. You may or may not agree with every aspect of this design but if you want mobile air superiority then something along this line is the only way to achieve it. Feel free to offer your vision of the next fighter the Navy needs. They've started their design process and I have no confidence that they'll get the right design, numbers, or cost.
Along this line, what do you see as the composition and numbers of a future air wing?
The F-35C might grow to hit this combat radius. The AETP engine could add up to 25% range alone. External or conformal tanks might be able to do the rest. External tanks would have to be jettisoned along with the pylons in flight to regain stealth.
DeleteA more expensive option is a modest fuselage stretch and wing enlargement to go with the upgraded engine. This could also allow space for a second crewman.
Would be nice to have two engines, but that's a much bigger change (basically a new aircraft).
Such an enlarged F-35 might not have the best thrust to weight but might be good enough, and would have better area ruling.
A combination of these "F-35Ds" plus smaller, loyal wingman UCAVs would be my preference.
Nothing wrong with the idea of an extended range F-35 although it still has the basic problem of a small internal weapon load which, if it's on a thousand mile mission, presumably means it's inside enemy territory and needs stealth.
DeleteWhat do you think about the 'arsenal' aircraft concept - a bomber loaded with A2A missiles? The AF has shown some interest although I can't recall hearing the Navy talk about it.
"External tanks would have to be jettisoned along with the pylons in flight to regain stealth."
DeleteI wonder why external tanks cannot be made stealthy. True, that may make them more expensive, which will only matter in peacetime.
In regards to our obsession with 1000+ mile aircraft strikes: I believe that that is related to the amount of ordinance we can deliver over time. The tonnage of available ordinance deliverable by aircraft carrying bombs is significantly greater than by precision guided munitions such as Tomahawks. Destroyers/cruisers/subs carrying such precision land attack guided munitions can provide pulses of strike for the first couple of days of a war, but will rapidly run out of munitions and be required to return to port to be reloaded. The aircraft carrier air wing in contrast can deliver in a sustained fashion the necessary tonnage of bombs for 2 weeks afterwards. I read/saw this on some sort of think tank debate (either with CSIS or CSBA) about the carrier air wing in a war with China
Delete"The aircraft carrier air wing in contrast can deliver in a sustained fashion the necessary tonnage of bombs for 2 weeks afterwards."
DeleteI haven't run any numbers but … no. If you're doing 1000+ mile strikes, you're doing one per day, at most, and likely not even that after day 2 due to aircraft maintenance requirements. Modern stealth aircraft are finicky, maintenance-craving beasts.
The modern air wing has only around 44 combat aircraft, max, and in any realistic scenario, far less than that are available for strike. F-35 squadrons will have fewer aircraft with squadrons consisting of 10 aircraft each for only 40 aircraft. Assuming you want to keep a couple dozen at the carrier for CAP and defensive purposes, that only leaves around 16 aircraft available for a strike. Assuming you need tankers and EW, you'll have to dedicate a half dozen or so to high value CAP (HVUCAP). That only leaves around 10 aircraft for the strike. Thrown in some barrier CAP (BARCAP) and you have less. If you don't have tankers and have to use combat aircraft, as we currently do, you'll have around one aircraft available for the strike. So, how much tonnage can that one aircraft deliver every couple of days?
Also, if we're conducting 1000+ mile strikes, the aircraft are going to be carrying mostly fuel tanks instead of munitions, further lowering the tonnage delivered.
So, no, a carrier air wing can't deliver sustained high tonnage in combat. They maybe can on paper but very few wars are fought on paper.
"What do you think about the 'arsenal' aircraft concept - a bomber loaded with A2A missiles? The AF has shown some interest although I can't recall hearing the Navy talk about it."
DeletePersonally I think it's interesting, but dogfights could be an issue, among others.
"Nothing wrong with the idea of an extended range F-35 although it still has the basic problem of a small internal weapon load which, if it's on a thousand mile mission, presumably means it's inside enemy territory and needs stealth."
DeleteSidekick increases the load from 4 to 6. Mini missiles like Peregrine could double that. Or some mix.
Not sure any fighter really needs more than that. Loyal wingman can carry additional missiles.
Or, F-35Ds could carry external missiles in "beast mode", sit back and let loyal wingman detect targets. Obviously would compromise stealth to some degree.
"What do you think about the 'arsenal' aircraft concept - a bomber loaded with A2A missiles? The AF has shown some interest although I can't recall hearing the Navy talk about it."
The problem with this is getting detections and targeting at great enough range to be able to use all those missiles. So it could be used to increase the number of shots available to other aircraft, but not sure it makes sense on its own.
"Not sure any fighter really needs more than that."
DeleteEvery report and anecdote that I've heard/seen suggests that when stealth aircraft are fighting each other they will run through missiles rapidly and ineffectively. The same stealth that we think protects our aircraft will protect the enemy's stealth aircraft. Both sides will wind up shooting a lot of missiles that fail to hit. It may require several missiles to achieve one hit. The aircraft that has enough missiles to keep firing will win.
Plus, fighting a peer will see scenarios of dozens/hundreds of aircraft. Going out with just enough missiles to get one kill won't accomplish anything. Aircraft need to have enough missiles to stay in the fight and achieve multiple kills.
A modern stealth fighter needs 12-18 missiles to be combat effective.
Loyal wingman is an interesting developmental project that is well worth pursuing but is nowhere near a practical technology yet. The number of obstacles and challenges are immense.
"F-35Ds could carry external missiles in "beast mode", sit back and let loyal wingman detect targets."
DeleteThis is the kind of thinking that the military is engaged in. It assumes perfect conditions and that the enemy will cooperate in their own destruction. Consider … If we have the capability of loyal wingman, won't the enemy have it, too? The Chinese have quickly duplicated everything we've done, so far. If we can detect their stealth aircraft, won't they detect ours - especially in 'beast' mode when our stealth is compromised? Won't they launch long range A2A missiles at our F-35D that's just loitering waiting for leisurely targets? Would we allow a Chinese stealth aircraft to sit back and leisurely target us? Of course not! Why would we think they'll allow us to do that to them? And so on.
That's not to say that the concept has no potential value but that the tactical implementation will be much, much harder than the PowerPoint presentation on the subject would suggest.
"Every report and anecdote that I've heard/seen suggests that when stealth aircraft are fighting each other they will run through missiles rapidly and ineffectively. The same stealth that we think protects our aircraft will protect the enemy's stealth aircraft. Both sides will wind up shooting a lot of missiles that fail to hit. It may require several missiles to achieve one hit. The aircraft that has enough missiles to keep firing will win."
DeleteCan you point me to these reports?
My read is they won't see each other until they're close, so there won't be many long range missile shots unless they have a sensor forward, detecting for them (e.g. loyal wingman).
And if it devolves into close-range combat it will be over fast, given the lethality of missiles, so no need for a lot of missiles there either. Another reason for expendable loyal wingman. Let the robots do the dying at close range.
Also, fighter fuel state is a factor. Fighters often go bingo before they run out of missiles.
"A modern stealth fighter needs 12-18 missiles to be combat effective."
Now you're just making up numbers.
"And if it devolves into close-range combat it will be over fast, given the lethality of missiles,"
DeleteNo, neither side will be able to get more than fleeting weapon locks, including IR (heat seekers) since modern aircraft are IR 'stealthed' to the degree possible. There will be lots of missiles tossed around based on sub-optimal locks.
"Now you're just making up numbers."
Of course I am. I thought that was clear. The number is based on my assessment of modern stealth v. stealth aerial combat and combat versus large numbers.
"Can you point me to these reports?"
Go do what I've done which is to read everything I can get my hands on and then I analyze what I've read. There is no such thing as a straightforward report of, say, an F-22 v. F-22. You have to read about Red Flag exercises, foreign engagement exercises, Top Gun exercises, foreign F-35 evaluations, occasional pilot reports, etc. and then read between the lines. With a little effort, it's all there. Add to that the anecdotal emails and texts I get from readers and the conclusion is pretty obvious.
"No, neither side will be able to get more than fleeting weapon locks, including IR (heat seekers) since modern aircraft are IR 'stealthed' to the degree possible. There will be lots of missiles tossed around based on sub-optimal locks."
DeleteNo. At close range, the value of stealth disappears. Maneuvering aircraft can't maintain favorable aspects. Everyone is on burner. WVR is the great equalizer.
"Everyone is on burner."
DeleteYou need to read up on visual range A2A accounts. For obvious reasons, afterburner is NOT used in dogfighting except in careful, small bursts when not being imminently threatened by an IR missile.
Radar stealth is NOT negated. It still applies and prevents a solid radar lock, forcing the combat to short range IR missiles or guns.
IR signature reduction combined with the extreme maneuverability of today's aircraft make it very difficult to get an IR lock.
You might try some of the Israeli A2A combat accounts for some good insight. As I also suggested, there are many exercise A2A accounts on the Internet although you have to search for them. It's worth the effort, though, as they provide good indications of modern aerial combat. Though not authoritative, you might also try viewing the YouTube DCS videos of which there are lots. DCS is the most realistic simulator in the commercial market. Several ex-military pilots have flown those in aerial combat and not always successfully!
Of course it’s negated. As soon as you start hard maneuvering all that careful channeling of radar energy into lobes becomes worthless. Showing your full planform to the enemy in a turn will light up his radar.
DeleteIR signature reduction reduces the range of detection but the aircraft is still hotter than the air around it. It’s not a magical cloaking device. Missiles are plenty sensitive.
That’s why there’s a concerted push to stay outside WVR unless you can set up a favorable shot and get out fast.
I was going to bring up UUV's, but as usual CamNavOps beat me to it! I think of these as a sort of moving super-sonobouy. Do you think that they will one day fill the roll of the SSK?
ReplyDeletePerhaps this is the reason the Navy doesn't seem interested in SSK's?
"I think of these as a sort of moving super-sonobouy. "
DeleteIf you mean as a purely sensing platform, the problem/challenge is to transmit the data on a timely basis to another platform that can use the data. Every time the UUV transmits, it risks revealing it's position, just as a sub does which is why subs don't transmit frequently, at least not during combat.
If you mean as a unmanned sub with a full range of sonar arrays, torpedoes, etc. then the problem is that we have no automated sonar system that is as good as a human operator so the unmanned sub will be at a distinct disadvantage in combat. Yes, humans certainly make use of automated sonar analysis to ASSIST them but the human interpretation and, more importantly, the human anticipation of the target's movements cannot be duplicated by any software package currently in existence.
If you are inclined to suggest that, hey, who cares if we lose an unmanned sub, recognize that a sub with a full complement of sensors, torpedoes, comms, engines, etc., just like a manned sub, will cost the same as a manned sub. Any savings from not having a crew will be offset by the cost of the total automation required to operate the sub. So, if a fully capable manned sub costs nearly $3B (a Virginia) then an unmanned version will also cost nearly $3B.
UUVs are not the panacea that the Navy believes. They can have a niche role but they are not one-for-one replacements for manned subs.
I envision this as a purely sensing drone, at least to begin with. Ways to communicate could be, if the drone UUV finds a target, popping a comm buoy set to transfer data after so much time, allowing the UUV to make distance.
DeleteHowever, what I find to be the most promising tech both for UUV's and submarines is Quantum Key Distribution. Do you have any opinion on this?
https://www.naval-technology.com/features/featuredeep-secret-secure-submarine-communication-on-a-quantum-level/
Quantum communications require a mechanism passing on information about the state of the entangled particles being used. Currently, this requires a fibre optic cable. In future, submarines may use lasers for communicating with an airborne node. Cables and lasers bring practicality issues. I have read that the Swedes can fire two, small, wire-guided torpedoes from the same 533mm torpedo tube, which suggests a lot can be achieved with fibre optic cables. However, they remain a limiting factor.
DeleteWhat about an SSK-like vessel with a small nuclear reactor now being designed?
ReplyDeleteOr perhaps SSK carrier that is ocean going?
We'll have to consider that if/when a small package reactor becomes a practical reality. I'm quite dubious that a small reactor can operate safely, unattended given that we require a fair amount of highly trained personnel to operate current reactors.
DeleteAlso, I envision UUVs as having high attrition rates and I'm not comfortable with a bunch of small reactors littering the ocean floor.
"an SSK-like vessel with a small nuclear reactor"
DeleteThe French have Rubis but are replacing her with the Sufren, which is twice as big.
I'm sorry, I didn't mean those reactors on UUV's. I meant on an SSK sized submarine -- of course, "if/when a small package reactor becomes a practical reality."
ReplyDeleteMy bad!
DeleteWhile speaking of, essentially, a small nuclear attack submarine, and the previous conversation on hull shapes, I learned that the "Sea Shadow" program came from work on sonar-stealthy submarines. Using the flat shapes to redirect sonar. Apparently, this reduced speed and was thus abandoned. I wonder if this problem could be solved?
ReplyDeletehttps://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/news/features/history/sea-shadow.html
You failed to include the fact that USS Saratoga (CV-3) was struck TWICE by IJN submarine launched torpedoes early in the Pacific War.
ReplyDeleteSo? I also stated:
Delete"half a dozen or so sub-carrier encounters occurred."
Pretty much exactly correct.
Do you have some point to make?
There can never be enough Gotland submarine images in this blog...
ReplyDeleteAlthough you do note that submarines must be considered a threat, I think you miss out on some of the nuances.
First, not everyone believes that the Gotland is an almighty weapon. I think the general idea is that Gotland wwas hired by the USN to do some ASW exercises and that it performed better that expected under the circumstances. (In Internet language: "This Is The Sub That Single-Handedly Destroyed The US Navy" Click here.) The Gotland was manned by a competent crew (the CO was Jens Nykvist, later chief of the Swedish Navy) and was a modern and well maintained SSK.
Then there is the issue of carrier deployment. While a blue water deployment such as you describe in your Escorts post is desireable, exercises to that effect are a bit difficult to find.
There are also other scenarios - such as deploying carriers in the Persian gulf - where enemy SSKs might be a threat to carriers and other valuable assets. And while the competence of the Iranian crews may be debatable, their desire to live should not be over-estimated.
Finally, you mention the hunt for a potential Russian submarine in 2014. Up until around 2000, the Swedish Navy was rather proficient in littoral submarine hunting. Mainly due to the friendly Russian neighbour providing frequent opportunity to train and try out new equipment. But around 2000 the Swedish government in their infinite wisdom and against all available history lessons decided that Russia would forever be a peaceful neighbour and dismantled more or less all of the ASW capability. Including sonars, helicopters submarine obstacles and ASW grenade launchers. In 2014 peaceful Russia decided to test the Swedish ASW capacity again. It was found wanting. It is difficult to hunt if you sold your rifle. While a lot of that ASW capacity has since been recovered, the Baltic sea is an extremely difficult place to find a submarine and particularly so the archipelago outside of Stockholm. The Gotland subs were there in 2014 but they can't do it alone.
/IED
Another example to look at:
ReplyDeletehttp://www.opex360.com/2015/03/04/marin-nucleaire-dattaque-francais-fictivement-coule-le-porte-avions-uss-theodore-roosevelt/
Seems like a similar exercise but shorter and with a French SSN in stead of a Swedish SSK.
DeleteImpossible to know without knowing how the exercises were scripted but either the two submarines have shown significant quality or the carrier groups are lacking in ASW. There is a distinct possibility that both are true.
/IED
There is also a third possibility. US forces have routinely dialed back their capabilities and allowed foreign units to 'win' in joint exercises to avoid hurt feelings, to promote international cooperation, and to assist in weapon system sales. I've heard dozens of such stories from participants who were instructed to allow the foreign units to 'win'.
DeleteBear in mind that US forces are routinely forbidden to use some pieces of equipment even in exercises with allies, so as to avoid revealing capabilities.
I look at any exercise with foreign units with extreme skepticism about the results.
It is possible. Likely even. But I would say more so with the french than with the swedes who have stubbornly refused to be members of NATO.
DeleteMore that one answer can be correct and until proven incorrect I still believe the Navy needs to step up regarding ASW.
/IED
"I still believe the Navy needs to step up regarding ASW. "
DeleteOh, absolutely! Please don't misunderstand anything I've said as implying that the US Navy has mastered ASW. Far from it! I'm only saying that the claims that some SSK is routinely sinking carriers are likely false in any realistic sense. The exercises are staged, scripted, constrained, possibly politically manipulated and 'faked', unrealistic, and almost meaningless. This applies to the carrier and the sub. The exercises are probably slightly better than doing nothing but not much.
The Navy needs to revitalize its ASW and relearn the basics. Right now, I doubt the Navy could find a sub in a bathtub.
Aren't we overlooking something here?
ReplyDeleteFrom the description of this (and other exercises) a picture is painted of the SSK being the attacker and the carrier being the defender. But that only applies to the tactical setting.
Operationally speaking, the SSK is a defensive asset whose task it is to deny the attacker (the carrier group) use of a certain area to launch missions from. It's not going to be searching the oceans randomly for targets of opportunity.
If the main defence of a carrier group is to flee the scene to avoid contact, than the SSK has achieved its main purpose, effectively inflicting a mission kill, even if it never gets into firing position.
The carrier could of course stay in the general area but the risk of an encounter would now be increased as the enemy would be alerted to its presence and other SSKs would likely patrol nearby areas. You'd end up with the Wasp scenario where the carrier is tied to a location and the enemy is aware it's somewhere in the vicinity.
This begs an interesting question, would it be more profitable for the sub to take a high risk for the opportunity to fire at a carrier, or would it make more sense to make sure it stays alive to scare away the carrier groups and get those mission kills? If (all of) the sub(s) in the area get sunk, they cede the terrain to the enemy. That can't be good.
Wouldn't the persistent threat of an attack on a high value asset such as a carrier in a given area be more valuable than a single low odds role of the dice to try and knock one out?
Ultimately, carriers have to close with the enemy to be of use. Give the realities of today, naval battles on the high seas are unlikely. This means that the US ships will need to close with enemy land bases, and move into relatively restricted areas (whether it involves the seas around North Korea, Taiwan, the South China Sea islands, the Gulf region, etc). Those would be the same areas that the SSKs are likely to patrol, so the odds of an encounter go up drastically.
In ww2, the royal navy deployed only a handful of carriers for much of the conflict while the Germans and Italians at any given moment had a limited number of submarines out (and those were usually going after convoys), and yet there were quite a few encounters leading to several sunk carriers.
The British were of course forced into constricted spaces (in the North Sea and the Mediterranean). Isn't this a more apt historical example to use for comparison?
R.
"If the main defence of a carrier group is to flee the scene to avoid contact, than the SSK has achieved its main purpose, effectively inflicting a mission kill,"
DeleteNo. As I described in the post, a carrier and an SSK generally operate in two different areas. If they were to cross paths, it would be a momentary encounter occurring while the carrier was transiting to wherever it wanted to go. Momentarily turning and fleeing is just a 'sidestep' for the carrier on its way, not a mission kill.
If the SSK and carrier come into sustained contact then the carrier operator (admiralty) has screwed up badly by putting the carrier in a vulnerable position.
Also, turning a fleeing doesn't mean helos, aircraft, surface ships, and subs can't be detached to eliminate the SSK, in which case the 'fleeing' is, again, just a sidestep.
An SSK, once somewhat localized, is in a difficult tactical position. It hasn't the speed or submerged endurance to conduct a long, drawn out battle. In a sense, the reverse is true. Once the SSK has been somewhat localized, it is the one who has been mission killed because it can be pinned down and neutered, if not destroyed.
"it would be a momentary encounter occurring while the carrier was transiting to wherever it wanted to go."
ReplyDeleteWhere it needs to go (not just wants) would be the general area where the SSK is operating. That is the whole point. It denies the use of that area to the carrier unless it is willing to risk an encounter with the sub.
As you yourself stated with the example of the Wasp, being tied down to an area and therefore vulnerable to intercept does not equal being moored to a single spot. You are moving within a limited area because your assigned mission forces you to. That area is the place you need to be to conduct your mission. If the enemy commander does his job, that will the areas where he will deploy his SSKs. They too can figure out a) likely deployment areas for carriers and b) the areas where they themselves don't want the carriers to be and launch missions. The latter is the most likely area where the SSKs will be. The encounters between sub and carrier group will mostly take place within the general deployment area of the carrier, i.e. the place it wants and needs to go to.
"An SSK, once somewhat localized, is in a difficult tactical position."
Not 'once', but 'if'.
The SSK should not be operating out in the back of beyond but within range of other assets that could come to its aide. If the sub does get somewhat localised, the US commander will not know if he has been spotted in turn and his location passed on to those other assets.
He now faces the choice of facing not only the risk the sub poses, but also those of any potentially available supporting forces that may be on their way. Again, the encounter will most likely take place within the general deployment area of the carrier group, not in some random location far away from it. So if word of the carrier group is passed along, the enemy can reasonably deduce where they should be looking for it now (if it stays in the general area to conduct its mission).
If the US commander does detach some of his forces to 'pin the sub' those forces will not be available to him for other purposes, for example as air defence, or to screen him from other subs that may be coming his way.
The question for the US commander doesn't go away, can he stay in his general deployment area and risk his high value asset? Or should he go elsewhere, which means leaving his intended deployment area and likely taking the forces needed to 'pin the sub' with him?
R.
"If the enemy commander does his job, that will the areas where he will deploy his SSKs."
DeleteIf an enemy commander can predict where a carrier will be then the carrier commander has failed badly at his job. A carrier, with several hundred mile strike range (should be 1000+ but that's another topic) can be anywhere in a 1.5M mile area. Naturally, geography and other factors may reduce that area somewhat but the point is that an SSK with an instantaneous effective combat range of 10 miles or so has no hope of locating a carrier barring pure dumb luck and no enemy commander has any hope of placing his subs near a carrier barring, again, pure dumb luck. Some things are debatable but this isn't one of them. This is pure mathematics of probability.
If, for some unholy reason, someone decides a carrier absolutely must operate for an extended period in a constrained area then the wise commander would flood that area with friendly subs and other ASW assets. If you can't do that then you'd be a fool to be there.
This is not even discussion-worthy. It's just basic operations doctrine.
Practically, no submarine can follow a US aircraft carrier as it moves close to 30knots even under normal conditions. A few nuclear submarines can reach that speed but with very high noisy level which can be detected easily.
ReplyDeleteTherefore, the only way is to stay quietly waiting an aircraft carrier to pass by. I am not sure current Russian or Chinese nuclear sub can be quietly enough. However, many Chinese and Japanese non-nuke submarines do employ AIP tech. Under AIP, a submarine can stay under water for a long time ( a couple weeks). Next, this AIP capable submarine needs to have the aircraft carrier's acoustic footprint or it might strike a wrong ship. Third, once it strikes, as it cannot simultaneously strike all ships in the aircraft carrier group, it cannot escape.
There is a better way to achieve above mentioned goal - use unmanned under water drone or smart mine. It would stay under water on route an aircraft carrier likely to pass. Use the aircraft carrier's acoustic signal to switch it on, then, use AI written in it to attack.
This might be why China displayed SUB-005 under water drone during last October's military parade caught many attention. China didn't say what its functions would be but only displayed it.
"on route an aircraft carrier likely to pass"
DeleteI've made this point and I'll make it again. If a carrier is on a predictable route, it's been horribly commanded. The fundamental carrier operating doctrine is to stay well out at sea, in the open ocean, constantly moving along unpredictable routes. There are an infinite number of ways to cross the ocean from point A to point B. Barring dumb luck, no one can predict it if the carrier is being operated correctly.
In war, there is no like route for a carrier to pass!
These are WW2 SS patrol lines. They are doable, but require a lot of boats, and as CNO points out you need to be lucky, or, I add, served by good intelligence.
DeleteWhile there is not 'like route' per se, once you have large operations that require carrier support, you can put patrol lines in likely places. Bases are limited, as it is time.
Plus, the Carrier itself has no problem going full speed, but the escorts, now all conventional, will burn plenty of fuel keeping station. That was one of the reasons why, when using the logistic rules in the Fleet Series, I really love Virginia/California. They can sprint at the same speed of the carrier without ticking fuel boxes.
If you read maps, you can find in certain area, there are only few passages which you must pass.
DeleteFurthermore, your enemies don't just have one AIP submarines. What if they have many? What if they have underwater drones with capable AI?
Hopefully, China can release more information of their SUB-005.
I'm not sure if there is a naval equivalent, but one of Robert Rogers' (of Rogers' Rangers fame) rules is, "Don’t ever march home the same way. Take a different route so you won’t be ambushed."
DeletePredictability can get you killed on land, on sea, and in the air. A Nighthawk was shot down over Yugoslavia in 1999, in part, because the Air Force flew particular routes into and out of the country.
"Third, once it strikes, as it cannot simultaneously strike all ships in the aircraft carrier group, it cannot escape."
DeleteThis.
Any sub that gets off a torpedo attack against a carrier pretty well gives up its position and becomes a dead duck. It would be an incredibly brave thing to do.
"if/when a small package reactor becomes a practical reality."
ReplyDeleteSmall Modular Nuclear Reactors have been an option for decades. I think ALL the Navy ships could be run on these. The only credible that I can see is "Because Nuclear." I would have mentioned this before but didn't have the link to back it up. Reactors can be tailored to match any purpose, if the red-tape can be surpassed.
https://engineering.unm.edu/news/2019/04/unms-nuclear-reactor-celebrates-50th-anniversary-with-historical-symposium.html
I think there is a role for AIP SSKs at and around choke points, and there are a bunch of important ones right now--Malacca, Sunda, Hormuz, Bosporus, Dardanelles, Skagerrak, and Kattegat.
ReplyDeleteThey are also useful in any littoral campaign. I see potential littoral engagements in and around the first island chain, the Persian/Arabian Gulf, the eastern Mediterranean, and the Baltic.
So I think we could use a few for those situations and free the SSNs for blue water stuff
What are the proposed numbers of escort in a CVBG that the Navy is thinking? I have seen numbers ranging fron 6-7 to 30+ (however no recent tests even show this is practiced). I couldn't find the numbers of the escort of the Syrian strike in 2017,could anyone lighten me?
ReplyDeleteOn other notes, have anyone read this Fleet problem article (https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2018/march/fleet-problems-offer-opportunities) by Admiral Scott H. Wick? His ideas or almost similar to CNo ones and his pivot towards realistic training is a good development. What is your verdict on the Admiral? Has he done anything positive over the years?
I also recommend any naval observers to read the amazing "How the Fleet forgot to fight" series by CIMSEC that were inspired by the preceding article.
"What are the proposed numbers of escort in a CVBG that the Navy is thinking?"
DeleteI doubt the Navy is doing much thinking lately, but six escorts for a carrier group is a total joke against a peer.
Of course, if all you're doing is bombing Third World heathen then you don't need escorts, or even carriers: just bring a few crop dusters for total air superiority.
"What are the proposed numbers of escort in a CVBG that the Navy is thinking?"
DeleteThe Navy isn't thinking about this at all. I, on the other hand, have posted on carrier group escort numbers:
"Escorts"
Shinano, Shokaku, Taiho and Unryu. That's 4 of 13 Japanese fleet carriers sunk by subs.
ReplyDeleteDiesel electric subs that where smaller (german u-boats) than modern subs had no problem patrolling the Atlantic and US subs scoured the Pacific.
While it may not be modern doctrine surely they can be used and while patrol planes, escorts and helo's may be better at finding them WW2 numbers just aren't going to happen.
If the US pushes on China to back Taiwan then all Chinese subs aren't going to struggle to find US ships to sink.
"Shinano, Shokaku, Taiho and Unryu. That's 4 of 13 Japanese fleet carriers sunk by subs."
ReplyDeleteYou pretty much proved the post! Here are the sinkings:
Shinano Dec 1944 off Japan's coast by a sub that was on lifeguard duty
Shokaku Jun 1944 Battle of the Philippine Sea
Taiho Jun 1944 Battle of the Philippine Sea
Unryu Dec 1944 200 nm SE of Shanghai in East China Sea
One was sunk in Japanese home waters when it stumbled over a US sub on lifeguard duty. Two were sunk at a major battle that attracted every US unit for a hundreds of miles around. One was sunk in restricted waters of the East China Sea.
None were sunk in the first three and a half years of the war. They were all sunk at the end of the war when the US forces had closed in on Japan and severely limited Japan's naval movements and the US had built up and flooded the ever-shrinking area with subs. None were found in the open ocean during normal carrier operations. The grand total, four encounters, in four years of war with gazillions of miles of sailing by subs and carriers criss-crossing the Pacific proves just how unlikely sub-carrier encounters were/are.
Just for info for the CSG carrys the Submarine Operations Coordinating Authority, SOCA, staff to coordinate with the accompanying SSN, a key element in countering ASW threats, SOCA mission is to coordinate the close airborne, surface and subsurface assets.
ReplyDeleteThe Saratoga was torpedoed in January 42 and again in October. That kept her out of the fight when she was needed most, and the Brits had to lend the USN the Victorious untol the Essex's came on line in numbers in 1943.
ReplyDeleteThe Liscome Bay was sunk with tragic loss of life in November '43. A lesson to heed as the (old) Level II LHAs and LHDs are pressed into service as modern day CVL's.
Immediate lessons were learned though in 43, and it was fortunate that the backfitted extra protection around the magazine made a difference in helping prevent a similar catastrophic internal mass detonation aboard the Block Island when she was torpedoed and sunk in May of 44.
While not delivered by sub, the aircraft launched torpedo that nailed the Intrepid February 44 is instructive of the damage 1 torpedo could deliver on an Essex.
Sidenote to that case, is there a First Lieutenant at sea today with the seafairing acumen to rig a studding sail and keep a ship mission capable as was done aboard the Intrepid?