Wednesday, September 14, 2016

I Told You So

Well, it’s about time for ComNavOps to indulge in a massive, “I told you so”, directed at the Navy and, to be honest, many commenters who have been apologists for the Navy.  USNI News website has published an article that confirms virtually everything I’ve been saying since this blog started.  Let’s check it out, shall we?

“The Navy took risk in many of its destroyer fleet’s mission sets during a period of uncontested operations at sea, and U.S. Fleet Forces Command has now been tasked with regaining sea control and all-domain access.

Fleet Forces Commander Adm. Phil Davidson said Tuesday at the American Society of Naval Engineers’ annual Fleet Maintenance and Modernization Symposium that strategy documents around the 2006 timeframe called for ships disaggregating and operating independently in an uncontested maritime environment. As a result, “we fundamentally decided to take risk on one of our main missions (sea control), and that risk was taken in order to source new missions.” (1)

The Navy knowingly and purposely abandoned its core mission and opted to put the nation at risk.  Why?  Why?  Why would anyone do this?  Why?  I bet if we follow the money trail we’ll find out why.

“The Navy reduced destroyer crew sizes and instead devoted personnel to expand the explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and Seabees communities, take on new riverine and harbor patrol missions, and create a cyber force.” (1)

There it is.  In a time of unchallenged maritime control, the Navy feared losing budget share and opted to compromise their core mission to keep budget money flowing.  How?  By expanding into non-core mission areas that could have, and should have, been handled by other services.

EOD?  Explosives disposal on land?  If that doesn’t sound like a Navy mission to you it’s because it isn’t.  The Navy has no business putting sailors ashore in a role that doesn’t directly support the fleet.  This was a budget grab, pure and simple. 

The same thing applies to the Seabees.  Their job is not to build deep inland, permanent structures.  Their job is to offer construction support to expeditionary forces engaged in combat.  Another budget grab.

Riverine and harbor patrol.  I’d be inclined to go along with that one if the Navy had actually made an effort to field a competent force which, as we’ve seen recently, they didn’t.

Cyber force?  That’s a function that should be handled at the DoD level or higher.  Again, a budget grab.

What was the impact of all this rearranging of the Navy?

“In doing so, “we took risk in (anti-submarine warfare), we emptied the sonar shacks and we made boarding teams out of those guys,” he said of submarines. 

“We took risk in (electromagnetic warfare), we took risk in (electronic warfare support measures). We took risk in sea control, gave up Harpoon (anti-ship missile) among some other things. That was all to produce that force that we needed over the last 15 years.” 

The Navy is now admitting that,

-in order to secure more budget, the Navy knowingly and purposely allowed ASW and EW to atrophy. 

-in order to secure more budget, the Navy knowingly and purposely abandoned our only anti-surface weapon.

-in order to secure more budget, the Navy knowingly and purposely abandoned its core mission.

The Navy claims that all this was done to produce the force that we (presumably, he means the nation) needed.  No it wasn’t.  It was done to ensure the Navy’s continuing slice of the budget pie.  In the Navy’s world, the worst possible thing that could happen is not putting the nation at risk by abandoning a core mission.  No, the worst possible thing that could happen is to lose budget share!

So, now what?

“Davidson [Fleet Forces Commander] said he was tasked by the chief of naval operations to “enhance power at and from the sea” and undo some of the risk taken a decade ago.” (1)

“From the sea”?  Are you serious?  From the sea is the core mission.  How can the CNO task someone with that assignment without immediately resigning in shame for having allowed the situation to occur?  Remember Navy documents like “From the Sea” and “Forward … From the Sea” and “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” and others?  The Navy now confirms that those were absolute lies foisted on us by a Navy that cared more about budget than their mission. 

Okay, well as long as we can simply undo the damage, I guess there was no harm done, right?  Wrong!  There was massive damage done.  Possible irreparable damage.

Here’s the damage: the Navy has lost its institutional knowledge of how to even be a Navy.  Witness this stunning statement.

“The admiral [Fleet Forces Commander Davidson] is still in talks with type commanders and numbered fleet commanders about how to design a fleet that can maintain sea control in any environment against any adversary …” (1)

The Fleet Forces Commander is in talks about how to design a fleet?  Are you freaking kidding me?  This is the top guy.  The Fleet Forces Commander.  And he’s asking how to design a fleet that can maintain sea control.  We’ve lost our institutional knowledge of what a navy is and how to design a force structure to be an effective Navy!

Because we’ve so thoroughly forgotten what a navy is and how to design one, we’re now latching on to concepts that are badly flawed and utterly misguided:  networking, data sharing, unmanned, limited explosiveness, lightness, mobility, distributed lethality, Third Offset Strategy, presence, humanitarian assistance, etc.  Why?  Because there is no one left in the Navy who has ever fought a war and, apparently, none who have studied war.

Many people criticize any alarm raised about Chinese or Russian threats by, in part, noting what they believe to be a huge quality edge that we supposedly have.  We are, supposedly, an experienced Navy with hundreds of years of operational experience and run by leaders with the accumulated wisdom of the naval ages.  Unfortunately, as this article makes all too clear, we have lost our institutional experience and knowledge.  We possess little or no substantive quality advantage in experience or leadership (we may or may not possess some slight mechanical advantage).

The Fleet Forces Commander doesn’t know how to design a fleet?  How did he get his job?  Relax, I know exactly how he got his job.

Every criticism I’ve made of the Navy has been confirmed in this article.  I’m now going to indulge myself.  Hey, Navy, hey, commenters,

I told you so.


(1)USNI News website, “Navy Embracing Distributed Operations in Quest to Regain Sea Control”, Megan Eckstein, 13-Sep-2016,


  1. Sadly, very true, and well done.

    It goes farther back than 2006. I'd argue that the SuperHornet decision, the LCS, heck, even the Virginia's (remember when this new sub, bigger than the 688 class, was going to be a 'littoral' sub?).

    What really burns me was this:

    "The Navy claims that all this was done to produce the force that we (presumably, he means the nation) needed. "

    That's an excuse, not contrition. It's my 8 year old saying that he had to eat all the cookies because otherwise his sister would get them.

    So now we have a HUGELY expensive Navy that's not good at what a Navy needs to do in many key areas.

    Is there a way back? I'd argue yes. Read around the blogs and there are a ton of older guys who manned ships in the cold war and have the institutional knowledge we need. USNI blog just ran an article about a guy who was in fleet ASW exercises at the end of the cold war. There's bound to be F-14 guys who know about the outer air battle, and Perry/Spruance guys who know ASW at the ship level.

    We could tap those guys the same way we tapped old BB sailors when we reactivated the Iowa class.

    But, given the Navy's statement, I think its hubris will stand in the way of it tapping these guys as resources. That would admit that they were wrong in eating all the cookies.

  2. Well maybe if one of the Candidates gets in and runs out a lot of Admirals it will be a good thing. Sometimes you have to clear the landscape to be bale to grow a new good crop.

    One point the longest serving SecNav is equally responsible for this fiasco, don't let his legacy off the hook.

  3. I don't see either of the candidates doing that.

    When one candidate in the last war suggested fleet size was a problem in the debate the other candidate suggested that the modernity of our fleet meant it didn't matter. That had my blood boiling. But his source was 'my admirals tell me'.

    If the next President comes in and the admiralty tells him/her what they want to hear I don't really see anything changing.

    If The Ford Boondoggle hasn't moved the needle, I don't think anything will other than a President caught with their pants down because the Navy can't execute a mission, or a high value target blown up.

  4. As the one force that deploys regardless of whether the nation is at war or peace, there was more than enough justification based upon OPTEMPO, PMS and training.

    The fact that the USN was unchallenged at sea I think was the biggest scare because to uninformed pols it appeared as though the Navy mission was completed. Big Navy felt they needed to justify their existence beyond just power projection at sea.

    It would have better better to take the budget hit than face the current challenge of terrible investments and a depleted knowledge base.

    1. Or better yet, develop plans for less expensive WORKING designs for ships that could be built when the budget comes back in balance.

    2. Exactly right. When you have a period of peace, that's the time to plan and train for war, not go budget hunting.

  5. There is huge justification for fixing this, Jay. But I just don't see it happening.

    Now, more than at any time since probably the age of sail if we get into a peer conflict we'll be fighting with what we brought to the dance. The Navy has always been more dependant on big ticket hardware than the other branches (with the exception of the land based nuclear silos).

    Most future war scenarios I can think of won't last as long as a WWII, so we won't have time to ramp up production. And our industrial capacity isn't as flexible as it was to be able to crank out shipyards.

    So if we get into a peer war with a foe with modern submarines and aircraft and we are sailing ships that are barely passing INSURV (who knows?) because they've been ridden hard and put away wet, and that don't ship many weapons, and are out of practice using ASW, we'll have some, in my mind, unnecessary casualties.

    1. I was referring to a budget justification for the Navy's slice of the pie. But I agree with you and CNO that the distractions of the past 15 years have left Naval readiness in a perilous state.

      Moreover, I think near peers have realized that trying to fight the Navy on the open ocean is a foolish goal and instead actually implemented a joint concept with A2/AD that would accomplish all of their short term needs while the Navy's attention was elsewhere.

  6. "EOD? Explosives disposal on land? If that doesn’t sound like a Navy mission to you it’s because it isn’t. The Navy has no business putting sailors ashore in a role that doesn’t directly support the fleet. This was a budget grab, pure and simple."

    Expansion of EOD would have had a limited effect on DDG crew sizes and the like (so is hardly to blame for any weakening of the blue water navy), but there is a legitimate reason to have been expanding that community. In addition to the "all hands on deck" work that was done in the mid-2000's to counter the IED threat, the EOD community has a significant role in mine countermeasures and exploitation.

    1. "All hands on deck"? That's not even remotely close to true. The Army had plenty of people that could have dealt with mine disposal. The Navy was not needed.

      Further, the Navy's maritime MCM efforts have atrophied to an alarming degree and if the Navy had extra men (and the article makes it clear that they didn't, in their minds) then they should have been working on maritime MCM, not land. This was a budget grab, pure and simple.

      The Army has an entire companies of Explosive Ordnance Disposal Specialists (MOS 89D/E). They have 2400 EOD soldiers. They had more than enough to meet the land warfare needs of the time.

      The Navy has ramped up to 8 EOD platoons and 1670 men. Of those, only 8 EOD platoons were involved with maritime EOD and that's the point of the post. The Navy is neglecting its own responsibilities just to chase more budget. Worse, the Navy, in the midst of severe mission and force structure challenges, plans to increase the EOD force to 18 platoons.

      On top of all that, the Air Force sent its own EOD personnel to the MidEast.

      Face it, the Navy wasn't needed and had much higher priority maritime EOD/MCM needs that it ignored in order to chase budget.

      You can get some background information here

    2. Oops, meant to say "only 4 EOD platoons were involved with maritime EOD"

  7. We need some adult leadership to tell the Marines to quit trying to become an all aspect air force and return to naval missions. We need riverine and harbor patrol and our Marines should do that. Same with EOD, give it all to the Marines. I give them all the MP duties too! The Navy provides Marines with medical, dental, and Chaplin services, so what do the Marines do as part of the naval service? At one time, ship guns were manned by US Marines! I'd also have Marines take over the HCS squadrons and provide H-53 mine warfare support. The Marines can shed some new BS missions to man this.

    For example, the Marines want to be unique, so why did it get dragged into providing manpower for the Special Operations Command, doing identical things as the Army? Same with our SEALs, who grew in numbers yet lack mine clearing and scuba commando skills since they run around Afghanistan like foot soldiers.

    1. A very good comment.

      Follow the money. The Marines are engaged in an all out budget grab. They're trying to pick up any mission that they think has future budget security.

      I'm most intrigued by your suggestion that the Marines take over some mine warfare. Very interesting. I'll have to give that some more thought.

  8. I try to have a positive view of things and am glad to see that the Navy Flags of this generation have realized the Navy has lost its way and are returning the Navy to its proper missions. Many Navy Officers, mostly us retired and exempt from political punishments, have been arguing for the last two decades or more, and especially for the past 15 years the Navy needed to return to its core mission of sea control / sea denial and providing amphibious capabilities.

    In order, as you note to be considered important and to keep money flowing into the Navy, Admirals like Mullins and others seemed to think converting the Navy to Riverine Groups, increasingly large numbers of SEALS and EOD, etc was the way to go -- all the while allowing our ASW and other capabilities and skills to deteriorate.

    Instead, they spent money developing that ridiculous LCS -- the "Littoral" ship. They wanted the Navy to fight close to shore and needed a vessel to take on the ever feared Iranian Speed Boats -- their sea going equivalent of Toyota trucks with machine guns. That idiot Mullins and others whose names escape me forgot that all we needed to do was throw some 5-inch High Explosive Shells into the water and swamp them -- or call for air support and let the Airdales have some target practice. And trust me, from personal experience off III Corps Vietnam disposing of some swimming VC -- 5 inch Shells will explode underwater. The Navy Flags bought into the Strategically Costly and Failed Policy of Intervention and COIN Occupation.

    This idea that the Navy needs a permanent Riverine Force is ridiculous. It’s an occasional need temporarily staffed with the necessary Officers, Chiefs, and Sailors to operate and maintain those Boats -- who had the "luck" to come up for Sea Assignment at the wrong time. It happens. And, this idea of using SEALS to accompany them, as in Vietnam, is nuts. That's why we have Marines. The number of SEALS the Navy has should be no more than needed to raid from the sea and perform UDT type missions in support of a landing.

    The only logical move occurring over the past 15 years is using Carrier Aircraft to bomb in Iraq. It gives pilots target practice while deployed.

    Re: The Above. Marine Detachments on Capital Ships normally manned a single 5 inch Gun Mount as their GQ Station. Manning Gun Mounts is a GQ Station, not a permanent assignment. Having Marines man a gun mount during GQ is a use of them in line with their core mission and allows them to be commanded by their Sergeants instead of having them train and man Damage Control Stations where they would necessarily be led by Navy Chiefs or PO1s. And, the Navy needs some limited EOD capability -- especially aboard Aircraft Carriers. They are / were once a very small number -- having so many they are employed in Afghanistan with Army EOD's is ridiculous.

    Also, Mine Sweeping on the Sea is not the same as on land. It is ship based – not in the Marine playbook. They have no idea how to maintain and operate ships. They need to return to being soldiers from the sea and worry about working with the Navy to determine how in the future they are going to carry out their amphibious assault capability in the ever complex A2AD environment into which we are entering -- else they will lose their purpose other than guarding bases.

    Anyway, I see this as a positive, and everyone knows the Navy needs direction along a "road not taken" for a long time -- to sort of borrow from on my favorite poets.

    1. "This idea that the Navy needs a permanent Riverine Force is ridiculous."

      I'm interested in your thoughts on this. I agree with the rest of your comment but this one gives me pause. I see a need for a permanent riverine force. We should be engaged in the near-shore and rivers of Africa, for example, to reduce the inroads that various terrorist groups are making there. Iran, is another area that riverine forces could be effectively utilized to counter Iran's small boats - though not under our current ROE! And so on.

      Now, I don't necessarily believe that the Navy has to be the one to operate riverine forces. The Marines or Army could do it just as well and, given the likelihood of associated close combat, probably better.

      So, tell me more about why you don't see permanent riverine forces as useful.

    2. "glad to see that the Navy Flags of this generation have realized the Navy has lost its way and are returning the Navy to its proper missions."

      That's only half the battle. If, and that's a big if, the Navy leadership truly sees the problem and is returning to their core mission, that's half the solution. The other half is doing the mission properly and that's where we still have major problems. Saying that you are returning to your core mission of sea control and then building LCS's do accomplish it is badly flawed - right mission, wrong method/equipment. Similarly, if we're returning to our core mission, we're going about it all wrong with networking, data sharing, minimal manning (how are you going to man battle stations and conduct damage control?), lightness and mobility, collateral damage avoidance at all costs, early retirement of Aegis cruisers, etc. The core mission demands high explosives, rugged ship construction (armor, separation, redundancy), sensors, mine warfare, MCM, large air wings, etc.

      So, we haven't yet seen the error of our ways. At best, we've seen half of the error.

  9. What does it say about our civilian leadership and defense strategy for condoning the Navy's strategic malpractice. It stands without saying that the Navy's leadership is at fault for protecting its budget by diverting resources from sea control to non-core missions. However, the Navy is also subject to civilian leadership. This civilian leadership failed to hold the Navy accountable and even provided financial incentives for the Navy to emphasize COIN related missions. Ensuring America's control of the global maritime commons is the Navy's raison d'etre. Moreover, sea control is arguably the highest priority for America's conventional military - especially in a peacetime setting in which a major land war is unlikely.

    Given the Navy's decay and mismanagement and the vital importance of the global maritime commons, it is high time that sea control became the Navy's top priority. Civilian leadership in Congress and the executive branch must create accountability when the military fails to achieve its strategic goals.

    I would like to see your thoughts on how to the Navy should use its resources and budget to enhance its ability to win sea control against a modern enemy. I would suggest this ship building as a starting point. A lot of this is canceling underperforming projects - one question is then how do you commit these freed up resources.

    1) Cancel LCS construction and shift the funding into fixing the maintenance backlog while an ASW frigate is designed. Also, use these savings to construct new Avenger class minesweepers which will be slightly modified to accommodate advancements in combat-ready technology.

    2.) Reduce operational tempo.

    3.) Cancel construction of additional Ford class carriers. The Ford's massive cost increase and dependence on unreliable technology is not worth the purported sortie generation increase - especially when CAG sizes are shrinking. New CVN's must be more affordable the Ford class.

    4.) Develop modern ASM's to improve the surface fleet's ASuW effectiveness.

    5.) Test existing weapons systems under realistic combat conditions to identify the next torpedo issue. This test program should be optimized to discover severe failures in potential combat.

    6.) Add a dedicated tanker and more long range aircraft to the CAG's. Short range aircraft are ineffective at launching deep strikes into an A2AD zone.

    7.) Cancel construction of new amphibious assault ships until the Marines can produce a viable CONOPS for a contested amphibious assault against a peer adversary. Then build new assault assets needed to implement the strategy.

    8) Shift more resources into construction of Virginia class submarines. Also, do a limited run of low-cost diesel electric / AIP submarines to be forward deployed in East Asia.

    9) Replace the Burke Flight III program with a new destroyer capable of providing necessary ABM capabilities.

    10) Reevaluate the INF treaty. The US might want to possess land based ASBM and ASM's prohibited under the treaty. The US should consider using the threat of developing these weapons to force China and other A2AD nations to adopt restrictions on their land based missiles.

    11) Reform acquisition. Look for cost savings from shifting military personnel to civilian status or vice versa. End contractor preferences on the basis of gender, race, etc.

    12) Embrace training and wargaming that simulates combat with a modern navy.

    13) Pressure American allies into enhancing their naval presence in areas like the Mediterranean, Baltic, and Gulf of Aden. The idea is to use allied ships to free up and reduce the operational temp of American naval vessels.

  10. Sea control is the reason why the US has a Navy. Arguably, control of the maritime commons is the most important mission for the conventional military. Moreover, since the seas are America's first line of defense, the Navy should be the last branch to lose resources in peacetime when a major war appears to be unlikely. The Navy disregarded the potential threat from modernizing adversaries like Russia and China. Instead, the Navy along with the civilian leadership reallocated resources to COIN related missions so the Navy could justify its budget and be involved in Iraq and Afghanistan.

    The role of civilian oversight is to hold the military accountable when the military fails to achieve the government's goals. The Navy's foremost goal needs to be defeating any potential opponent's navy and A2AD zone. How the Navy can utilize its resources to achieve this result should be a matter of thorough debate. There is a lot that needs to change. I would offer the following action items as a starting point.

    1)Cancel new LCS construction. While a new ASW frigate is designed, reallocate these funds to fill in the maintenance backlog. Also, construct a new dedicated mine clearing vessel. Perhaps this vessel would be a variant of the Avenger class modified to adopt combat-ready advancements in technology.

    2)Use diplomacy to persuade America’s allies to enhance their naval presence. The goal is to mitigate the effects of a reduced American naval presence in low priority areas so we can reduce our operational tempo.

    3)Reduce the operational tempo to sustainable levels. This will have to happen in the short-term by reducing our naval presence.

    4)Cancel construction of additional Ford class carriers. The massive increase in cost and reliance on undependable technologies likely do not justify the increased sortie rates. New CVN’s need to be more affordable or we will have to reduce the size of the CVN fleet.

    5)Build a dedicated tanker to improve the strike range of the CAG’s and to free up Hornets.

    6)Develop a modern ASM.

    7)Test weapons in combat conditions in order to identify any major defects similar to the WWII torpedoes not working.

    8)Replace the Burke Flight III with a ship built to meet ABM operational needs.

    9)Reduce or freeze construction of new amphibious assault ships until the Marine Corps develops a CONOPS for contested amphibious assaults against a peer adversary. We need to build a force structure is better suited for this mission.

    10)Increase construction of Virginia class submarines. Construction needs to increase in order to prevent the force size from falling below stated operational needs. These new Virginias should have the VPM cruise missile tubes to help alleviate the loss of the Ohio SSGN’s.

    11)Build a limited number of SSKN’s for forward deployment in East Asia. This class of boats should be based on the mature technologies already developed.

    12)Use diplomacy to curtail the development and use of land based ASM and ABSM. The US should reconsider its position in the INF treaty and developing its own weapons in these classes. The threat of the development of American land based missiles banned under INF should be used to reduce the proliferation of these weapons in China and other countries developing A2AD zones.

    13)Place more emphasis on training and wargames for combat against a modern naval adversary.

    14)Examine acquisition reform to potentially save money and increase the effectiveness of the ship building budget.


  11. CNOps, basically I entirely agree with you, but about some things I'm puzzled. When you quote “The Navy reduced destroyer crew sizes and instead devoted personnel to expand the explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and Seabees communities, take on new riverine and harbor patrol missions, and create a cyber force” was there an alternative to reducing destroyer crew sizes? If not, you can't include expanding EOD crews, etc, as the cause of reducing destroyer crews; rather, as a means of maintaining budget even though destroyer crew sizes had to be (for whatever reason) reduced.
    When you say "in order to secure more budget, the Navy knowingly and purposely allowed ASW and EW to atrophy" are you saying that ASW and EW funding could have realistically be maintained (something I would unhesitatingly support, but I'm not in Congress) even if devices for devoting more budget elsewhere had not been supported?
    And so on, and so forth. What I'm asking is: was the decrease in funding of vital USN capabilities (we're agreed there) caused by the increase of funding of, to be kind, non-vital capabilities: or would the decrease in vital funding have happened anyway?

    1. I'm not completely sure I understand your question but I'll take a shot at answering and you tell me if I'm missing what you're asking.

      There were two things that caused an apparent decrease in funding for, as you put it, vital capabilities.

      1. Increased funding of vital but unwise projects. Examples are the LCS, Ford, F-35, LPD-17, etc. These projects were aimed at vital functions but badly missed the mark and resulted in runaway costs with no commensurate runaway capabilities. In short, huge amounts of money were spent unwisely.

      2. Increased funding of non-vital projects such as land based EOD, SEALs, Seabees, cyber, etc. These took both personnel and money away from the core missions. In order to fund these additional "berths" on land, berths at sea (destroyers among them) had to be reduced.

      You need to understand that the Navy's budget has been remarkably steady since 2008. To wit, the total budget in 2008 was $131B and in 2015 it was $135B - a slight increase, actually! So, no, there was no decrease in vital funding. What there was, was a shift in Navy spending priorities, as documented in the post.

      Did this answer your question?

    2. Thanks. That makes it a great deal clearer, if not more understandable.

      I had supposed that when you wrote "the Navy feared losing budget share and opted to compromise their core mission to keep budget money flowing. How? By expanding into non-core mission areas that could have, and should have, been handled by other services" you might have meant that the budget going (under Congressional control) to the core mission of destroyer crews, etc, was going to be cut, and that the USN responded - needing to get total funding maximal, to account for salaries of admirals and so forth - by getting Congress to expand funding for non-core activities.

      That seems to me to be a very odd way to run a navy, and I am relieved to hear it was not so..

      If I have it right, what you meant was that the USN deliberately cut their share of the funding committed to destroyer crews, etc, in order to direct more funding to non-core activities.

      That does seem an even odder way to run a navy. Have I got it right?

    3. "If I have it right, what you meant was that the USN deliberately cut their share of the funding committed to destroyer crews, etc, in order to direct more funding to non-core activities.

      That does seem an even odder way to run a navy. Have I got it right?"

      Sadly, and almost unbelievably, you have it right. That's exactly what happened. The Navy's goal was not core mission readiness but, rather, budget maintenance. In other words, the Navy pursued those activities that they thought could maintain or increase their slice of the budget pie.

      The Navy was looking at the decades long war on terrorism, saw a largely land and air war, and feared that their slice of the budget pie would be reduced so they pursued land based activities. This is incompetence, mismanagement, and negligence on a scale as to almost comprise treason.

      At the very, very least, Navy leaders willfully violated the nation's trust in them. Every single serving admiral should be court-martialed and dishonorably discharged. Then, every retired admiral for the last ten years should be recalled to active duty, court-martialed, and dishonorably discharged.

  12. CNO. You get a LOL and a slap on the back


Comments will be moderated for posts older than 30 days in order to reduce spam.