There’s an old saying that generals always prepare to fight
the last war. Nowhere is this truer than
the Ukraine-Russia war. The US (and, to
be fair, the entire world) is preparing to fight the Ukraine conflict for the
next war.
We noted the success Ukraine has had using unmanned surface
drones against the Russian navy and so we are dutifully pushing ahead with
unmanned vessels just as quickly as we can while ignoring the unique factors
that make the Ukraine conflict a true one-of-a-kind example.
We noted the inability of manned aircraft to exert decisive
effect and so we’ve begun revising our air doctrine and tactics to reflect this
while ignoring the unique factors that make the Ukraine conflict a true
one-of-a-kind example.
We noted the impact of small UAVs in attacking individual
soldiers and vehicles so we’ve enthusiastically embraced all manner of small
drones while ignoring the unique factors that make the Ukraine conflict a true
one-of-a-kind example.
We noted the marked lack of success by tanks and their high
rates of attrition and so we’ve eliminated the entire Marine Corps tank
component and begun moving away from tanks and toward light vehicles while
ignoring the unique factors that make the Ukraine conflict a true one-of-a-kind
example.
There can be no dispute.
When we enter into a duplicate of the Ukraine conflict we will be more
than ready. On the other hand, when we
take on China we’ll be lost, floundering, and wondering why we aren’t better
prepared. It’s because we’re preparing
to fight the Ukraine war, not China.
I agree that we are learning the wrong lessons from the Ukraine/Russia war.
ReplyDeleteBut I have a little bit different take on our preparing to fight the last war.
Since WW2 we have lived in an era of limited war. As long as the Cold War remained cold we didn't have large scale conflicts. Even fairly large fights like Korea and Vietnam were just hot (but deadly) flare-ups that did not exceed the scope of limited war.
The GWOT has been more of the same. Battles against terrorists and non-state actors have changed the way the military fights. The military has simply been adapting to what it has been doing for an extended period of time.
It doesn't require an armored division to fight terror cells.
Much of this type of involvement can be done with precision strikes that may or may not be from a manned asset.
And that is where things start to get a little bit different.
When a manned aircraft gets shot down and the pilots are killed or captured, it is big news. The American public immediately starts to evaluate whether or not the mission that was being performed is worth the costs.
But if a Predator drone gets shot down, nobody really give a crap. It's just money, just a slice of the enormous military budget.
If you are in the intelligence community, or the state department bureaucracy, or the military....you might want to be involved with foreign entanglements that the American public does not see as a vital national interest.
The avoidance of American casualties goes a long way in allowing the agencies quite a bit of latitude in involving themselves in operations that much of the public might see as meddling.
Thus the need for unmanned equipment.
But we seem to be moving into a different paradigm.
When we move into an era of existential, or nearly existential, conflicts, the American public's tolerance for both risk and casualties changes substantially.
Casualties are still mourned, but they are accepted as the price that must be paid to defend the country and to maintain our civilization.
In that environment you don't need or want expensive unmanned equipment with limited capabilities.
You do need and want manned ships, planes and vehicles that are highly effective, that will viciously take the fight to the enemy, and will win total victory.
We are not preparing for that war.
We are preparing for the last war.
Lutefisk
"Thus the need for unmanned equipment."
DeleteThe point that you may be missing (or maybe not - to be fair, you don't explicitly say) is not whether unmanned assets, in a mostly permissive environment are helpful ... they are! The point is that we've begun REPLACING manned, highly capable assets with unmanned, limited capability assets in a quest to prepare for the Ukraine war that we apparently think is the new future of warfare. China will disabuse of that notion fairly quickly when war comes.
"We are preparing for the last war."
You seem to be agreeing with me?
I am wholeheartedly agreeing with you. And I also agree completely with your statement above.
DeleteLutefisk
What have learned from the Ukraine war is the Group Soviet Forces Germany, an army that would have reached Paris in under two weeks is no more. Sic transit Gloria.
ReplyDeleteQuestion for the class, Please define "Total Victory" in the China War.
Will a modern "Ever Victorious Army" march on Peking ?
or what ?
For my part, I've answered this question in, "China War - Setting the Stage" . Check it out and then, perhaps, share with us your answer.
Delete"Will a modern "Ever Victorious Army" march on Peking ?"
ReplyDeleteI don't think a war with China would be with ground forces. The only places I could see it happening is a Vietnam style fight in the Philippines or a conventional war in Korea. Maybe ground forces assistance in Indochina.
A military fight with China would be a navy fight to strangle their economy.
The Chinese economy is dependent on importing resources and exporting manufactured goods. But they don't have a blue water navy to secure those trade routes.
And we have a blue water navy that can shut down those trade routes.
The Chinese economy really needs the US for both its trade routes security and as a market for their export products.
I don't see any reason to have a ground military force anywhere near China.
Lutefisk
“ Have you lived in a cave”
DeleteComment deleted. Your points were fine. If you’d care to repost without the personal insult, you’re welcome to.
ComNavOps
Minor quibble, although it doesn't affect your overall point.
ReplyDeleteThe Marines decided to get rid of their tanks before the Ukraine war started. So while it may be a mistake, it isn't because of Ukraine.
This is true and I knew that as I prepared the post. The Marines, however, have trumpeted with glee the "proof" from Ukraine that their shedding tanks was wise and predictive. Thus, they're using Ukraine to justify their decision to shed tanks and not consider bringing them back. So, yes, you're correct but I used the example anyway for the reasons described.
DeleteThe Army also seems to be moving away from heavy tanks (M1) towards lighter "tanks" (M10). Again, not a direct result of Ukraine but fits the trend.
The Army isn't replacing the M1 Abrams with the M10 Booker. The M10 is going to Stryker units to replace the Stryker MGS as an assault gun organic to the Infantry Brigade, to provide direct fire support. Current practice is to slice tanks away from Armor divisions nd attach them as fire support guns to IBCT on an ad hoc basis.
DeleteWhile it does look like the Army is buying more M10 than M1, it should also be noted that there are some 10 thousand mothballed Abrams hulls in the desert, left over from the post Cold War drawdown. That's where the Army has been getting their tanks for the last 30 years - pull them outta the desert and reurbish them in the factory.
Haven't I seen reports to that the Russians have been doing the same, pulling tanks and other vehicles out of storage for use in Ukraine, and perhaps burning through their entire inventory?
DeleteYes. The difference is that the Russian tanks are in significantly worse material condition and have worse crews because they burned their instructor cadres as immediate reinforcement instead of training new crews.
DeleteAnyhow the other difference is that that 10 thousand tank reserve in the desert is to buy time for Lima to ramp up the production line for new tanks. It only makes a couple dozen new Abrams a year to keep the instituional knowledge alive because we frontloaded our production 40 yars ago. The Russians cant make new tanks anymore.
"While it does look like the Army is buying more M10 than M1"
DeleteThe question is how is the composition of armored units changing? I don't know since I don't follow land combat but it seems as if the Army is moving away from heavy tanks toward the M10. Not a one-for-one replacement but a change in composition. Maybe yes, maybe no?
Business Insider reports that Russia has a single tank factory that is producing around 20 tanks per month.
Delete"The question is how is the composition of armored units changing? I don't know since I don't follow land combat but it seems as if the Army is moving away from heavy tanks toward the M10. Not a one-for-
Delete1one replacement but a change in composition."
The composition of armor divisions is NOT changing. The M1 is still in use in Armor divisions.
No M10s are going to the armor divisions. It is purely going to outfit the INFANTRY brigades that either have no fire support vehicles, or were using the Stryker Mobile Gun System. It has a 105mm rifled gun, which was already surpassed by the 120mm smoothbore gun as an antitank weapon 30 years ago. This gun is getting HE-frag rounds for fire support use. At best, it can engage enemy IFVs, and suppress enemy long enough to disengage (because no tank likes taking rounds). If it's lucky, it can kill a tank from the rear.
The Abrams is on a weight loss program, yes, but that's intended to.come from an overall revamp.of systems and their placement. The biggest causae of weight growth has come from adding new shit to.one side that requires you to add a counterweight so the turret can turn. Same problem the wide SEWIP Burkes have.
Like others, generals rely on what they know than unknow. Wars are life and death thus people do whatever. You can "predict" but just like financial advisors who predict the future. Furthermore, change courses mean lots of money in stake. In today's environment, every weapon has many upon many live in its food chain - from your Congressman to union workers.
ReplyDeleteUnfortunately, China's military industry food chains are much shorter than US. They can re-direct resources much easier. Yes, they also have corruptions, but bribes only go to top generals than a long food chain.
Furthermore, how future wars to be fight also depend on your potential enemies as how they think. You cannot just brainstorm among your top advisors but forecast how others will evolve. What new weapons will they develop and how will they think that future wars will be.
This will help the US Navy fight future wars. But this seems odd:
ReplyDeleteA Navy first: USS Chosin tests resupplying rapid-fire launch system at sea
"At-sea rearming has been intermittently tested by the U.S. over the years but became a top priority for Del Toro in 2022, as the threat of conflict with China loomed. The rearming mechanism uses a crane that can lift and rotate 25-foot missile canisters vertically, then lowers the explosives into the launchers, which are small openings in the ship deck."
Is this poorly worded, or do they insert the cannister with missile then insert and attach the warhead?
The advantage of a cannister is that it comes "factory wrapped". If they open it and screw around with attaching a warhead while underway that brings up a host of safety and reliability issues.
https://www.stripes.com/branches/navy/2024-10-11/navy-resupplying-rapid-fire-launch-system-at-sea-15478342.html
There is no need to do this underway. Just a system where ships can be reloaded in a calm bay while at anchor.
G2mil
I think that's just poorly written. Similarly, the 'small openings in the ship deck' presumably refers to the VLS cell - an extremely odd way to describe it. The article's author seems to have no familiarity with Navy systems.
DeleteAs always, there is no practical benefit to reloading at sea.
A better description of the test, with some accompanying photos, is here:
Deletehttps://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/10/u-s-navy-holds-first-tram-at-sea-vls-loading-test/