We’ve talked about the various attempts by the Navy to early retire the Aegis cruisers among other misguided actions. Thank goodness Congress slapped them down. However, chillingly, have you ever thought about the consequences if Congress and other factors hadn’t intervened over the years? Just for fun, let’s pull together all the Navy’s attempts and see what kind of Navy we’d have if the Navy had gotten its way the last couple of decades.
Here’s what the Navy has attempted to do:
- Retire all the Ticonderoga Aegis cruisers
- Build 55 LCS
- Early retire 2 carriers at their mid-life refueling and overhaul points (Washington in 2014 and Truman in 2019)(1)
- Build a class of LCS-based frigates
|
|
Current |
Attempted |
|
Carriers (Nimitz, Ford) |
11 |
9 |
|
Cruisers (Ticonderoga) |
22 |
0 |
|
Destroyers (Zumwalt, Burke) |
72 |
72 |
|
Frigate (LCS) |
0 |
20?a |
|
LCS |
23 |
55 |
a Assumes a 20-ship build as with the future Constellation frigate class
What jumps out from the table is the shift that would have occurred from the current number of high end and highly capable ships to low end, less capable ones. That is what the Navy wanted to do. Thankfully, Congress and other factors stopped them.
Frightening.
______________________________
(1)Breaking Defense website, “Pentagon To Retire USS Truman Early, Shrinking Carrier Fleet To 10”, Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., 27-Feb-2019,
I thought the original attempt at building the Zumwalt is 32 or 24 ships? Would that increase (or maybe decrease) the total number of destroyers? This is more of nitpicking than anything so you can ignore it.
ReplyDeleteI do recall the canceled CG(x) program that was intended to replace the Ticonderogas in the 2010s. That was the first of many failing dominos in Navy's vision. Would love to see where they were going with it.
The Zumwalt decision to cut the build was a Navy decision, not Congress. That's why I didn't include it. In the space of a matter of months, the Navy went from declaring the Zumwalt absolutely vital to the future of the Navy to wanting to drop it completely. To this day, the reasoning still isn't clear beyond vague statements.
DeleteAs I previously wrote, prematurely retiring old but still functional ships (the Nimitz and Arleigh Burke classes) to pay for new ones (the Gerald R. Ford and Zumwalt classes), is like burning down your own house for insurance money with which to buy a new house. What if the insurance policy doesn't pay out (i.e., if Congress won't approve funds for your new shipbuilding contract)? What if your new house turns out to be a poorly constructed deathtrap (i.e., the new ships don't work)?
ReplyDeleteFirst I agree 100% with ComNavOps that we can all thank God that the Navy did not get its way. None of those moves make any sense at all.
ReplyDeleteI’m going to respond with what I am calling, “If I Had My Way,” and try to lay it out in 4000 characters. ComNavOps has expressed the opinion that I work from cost to mission/strategy/CONOPS, and I am going to try to explain that I do just the opposite—start from mission/strategy/CONOPS and figure out how to afford it.
I would prepare for is the old “two and a half wars” concept—a peer war with China in Asia and with Russia in Europe plus dealing with a rogue nation or terrorist threat somewhere, probably Mideast.
I want 12 2-carrier battle groups (CVBG) which would combine to form 6 4-carrier task forces (CTF)—2 in WestPac to deal with China, 2 in Europe (1 Med, 1 North Sea) and one in the Indian Ocean to deal with the rogue/terror threat, plus one at home for reserve/surge—24 carriers total. We can’t afford for them all to be Fords, even if they ever work, so 12 Nimitzes and 12 conventional CVs, with LHAs/LHDs serving as interim “Lightning Carriers” until the CVs make it to the fleet. Carriers would operate outside enemy A2/AD umbrellas and provide air cover for units working inside that area, until the A2/AD network was sufficiently disabled to permit them to move closer and launch strikes against the mainland.
I want 8 surface action/hunter-killer (SAG/HUK) groups—consisting of a battleship, based on the 1980s battlecarrier concept, and an ASW helo carrier—to perform sea-control/sea-denial/anti-shipping in the open ocean, and secondarily to provide NGFS and helo ops to support amphibious assaults.
The 12 CVBGs and 8 SAG/HUKs would each have a notionally attached Escort Squadron (CortRon)—1 cruiser, 2 AAW destroyers, 3 GP escorts (heavy ASuW), and 4 ASW frigates. This would give the CTF 20 escorts and a combined CTF/SAG/HUK 30 escorts.
In addition to converting the LHAs/LHDs to interim Lightning Carriers, I would convert the San Antonios to the HII ABM/BMD ships to fill a need there. In their place I would put a more conventional amphibious squadron/amphibious ready group (PhibRon/ARG)—smaller LHA/LHD, LPH, LPD/LSD, LST, LPA/LKA and NGFS/land attack frigate. Each PhibRon/ARG would lift 3200 Marines in an upgraded MEU including infantry battalion, tank company, gun, missile, and AAW artillery batteries, amphibious armor company, commando detachment, and air wing focused on ship-to-shore movement and CAS with a “Marine A-10,” with the air superiority mission and accompanying F/A-18s transferred to the Navy.
As for submarines, the Navy’s 12 Columbia SSBNs seem pretty locked in. I would want 20 SSGNS based on the Ohios as my primary strike assets, 30 Virginia VPMs as my secondary strike platforms and also for ASW, and another 30 smaller ASW and anti-ship specialists, probably based on the French Barracuda.
For support of amphibious, coastal, and littoral operations in areas like the first island chain, Persian/Arabian Gulf, eastern Med, and Baltic, I would want something like CAPT Wayne Hughes’s NNFM Littoral Fleet—30 ASW corvettes, 30 missile patrol boats, 30 SSKs, 30 mine countermeasures (MCM) ships.
For auxiliary support, I would want 20 dedicated T-AOEs, each assigned notionally to a CVBG or SAG/HUK. I would want another 20 T-AORs/T-AKEs to meet needs, and 15 expeditionary support ships that could perform limited underway replenishment/replenishment at sea (UNREP/RAS) operations. A half-dozen each of AD/AR/AS, ATF/ASR/ARS , and AGOR, and converting the 3 Zumwalts to flagships for 6th and 7th Fleets with the third a test platform
See, I laid out my whole approach without mentioning cost once. I really do approach it from a mission/strategy/CONOPS perspective. I have costed it out separately, but cost did not drive it. One thing, if we can truly build a Nimitz for $5B and a Kitty Hawk for $2B, then cost is a piece of cake.
Heres a fun version of "If I had my Way"... We just passed the $1.9T stimulus bill. Yup, you know whats coming LOL!!
DeleteOn another blog, someone noted that would buy somthing like 570 Virginias!! Id probably spread it out a lil bit, and fund the next few CVNs (prefer a Nimitz restart) and look into giving the first two Nimitzes a mini-SLEP/RCOH. ID order three dozen Flt III Burkes with rapid(all delivered within 5-7 yrs)production schedules to hedge against the Flt I upcoming retirements until the next CG(X) and DDG designs come together. 50 quickly updated Avengers would be on the list. Two more airwings would be stood up. Id gift (subsidy) major shipbuilders a few billion to expand so they can keep up with the new demands. Public shipyards would get their modernizations, and some new drydocks would appear, floating AND stationary. The inventory of all conventional munitions would be at minimum, doubled.
Im sure theres more on my list, but its ok, thered still be money left...!!!
"CAS with a 'Marine A-10,'"
DeleteThe A-10 is worst than useless- it occupies and uncomfortable middle ground between "cheap, but good enough for low threat environments" that the AT-6 fills, and the "expensive, but able to survive in high threat environments" that the F-35 fills. It is dead meat against a peer competitor- don't repeat nonsense about how useful it is in the face of Su-27s that can lob long-range missiles, against which the A-10 pilot can do nothing but hope his flying wreck holds together long enough to return to base, after which the A-10 is grounded until repairs are completed.
Money spent maintaining the middle ground A-10, will be better used on either the cheaper AT-6 for bombing guerillas without proper air defenses, or the F-35 for bombing peer competitors that have proper air defenses.
This is an example of the wrong way to evaluate any asset: in isolation. We fight jointly and in total, not in isolation. This analysis offered the example of a one-on-one A-10 versus an Su-27 and that is not the way real combat happens. We have an Air Force whose job is to ensure that the Su-27s are too busy trying to save themselves to both an A-10 down on the ground and not threatening the Su-27. We have anti-air SAM systems to keep Su-27s away. And so on. We also, hopefully, have intelligent aircraft management that wouldn't send A-10s into a high threat, air-to-air environment.
DeleteToo many people have the bad habit of constructing unrealistic one-versus-one scenarios and then drawing the wrong conclusion.
There may be arguments to be made against the A-10 but this wasn't one of them.
That said, there is nothing wrong with the idea of a lower end aircraft for the low/no threat environment of anti-terrorism work. I've called for Tucanos or some such for exactly that role.
Also, no one has demonstrated that the F-35 can fill a CAS role either in terms of effectiveness or survivability. An F-35 is not immune to close range radar or IR threats and if it opts to stand off at extreme distances then it's not likely to be effective. The F-35 and A-10 were supposed to conduct a head-to-head 'fly-off' for CAS but I never heard the results which suggests that they did not favor the F-35. Perhaps someone has a link to a report?
The A-10 cannot be used over water, as it has no radar with which to find targets for enemies on water, i.e., warships; the F-35 can. The A-10 is useless against modern enemy fighters; the F-35 is not. If the A-10 is as useful as you seem to think, why wasn't it an export success, i.e., why didn't it serve in air forces that didn't share the USAF's "wrongthink"?
DeleteThe reason most militaries shun "cheap, single-role" combat aircraft (and warships), is because conditions often prevent them from having the right thing at the right place at the right time- battle damage and the need for repairs, being just one example. Better spend a bit more to get aircraft (and warships) able to serve in greater capacities.
"The A-10 cannot be used over water, as it has no radar with which to find targets for enemies on water"
DeleteAgain, we fight joint. There are dozens of assets that can find targets for the A-10 and then it can use Pave Penny (no longer in service???) or LITENING targeting pods for target designation so, yes, it has myriad ways of finding and targeting ships.
I don't know that we've ever offered the A-10 for export? The A-6, for example, was so effective that it was prohibited from export sales. Perhaps the same applies to the A-10? I have no idea as I don't follow AF matters that closely.
"The reason most militaries shun "cheap, single-role" combat aircraft (and warships), is because conditions often prevent them from having the right thing at the right place at the right time"
No. The reason other countries gravitate to multi-role aircraft (and ships) is because they can't afford to acquire single role assets. We can. And should. Single function assets are ALWAYS more effective than a corresponding multi-function asset because multi-function assets are ALWAYS compromise designs.
"The reason most militaries shun "cheap, single-role" combat aircraft (and warships), is because conditions often prevent them from having the right thing at the right place at the right time"
DeleteI think this is likely opposite of the current condition. Vietnam who has both good relations with the East and the West (American until recently) has been desperately trying to replace its outdated MIG-21 but there's simply no viable option. The only two viable candidate for an optimized single function aircraft candidate (regardless of their role) is the JF-17 (a stripped down single-role variant) and the MIG-29. The first one is built with the help of the Chinese and a closely guarded Pakistan secret so it's off the table. The second was deemed to old to be effective (no stealth capabilities!) but it's an export success for other nations. That leaves us with no choice, how would you expect to buy something that doesn't exist?
On the contrary, the options to buy multi-role aircraft are virtually limitless from East to West with a variety of pacakges. I think it boils down to other nations reluctant to fund multiple aircrafts and only focused on one design in general. And if you focus on one and you have multiple needs, you buy a multi-mission aircraft. Funds may also play a role as CNO suggested but I think it's not a big factor.
*Side note: Vietnam's fleet of SU-30 boils down to its need of a naval strike aircraft with long range capabilities. At the time, it did not have good relations with the States so it couldn't buy US fighters. But generally there is not a better option than the SU-30 (SU-34 is a recent design and the SU-24 is a hopelessly outdated one). Further proving how limited the single-role options really is.
"Funds may also play a role as CNO suggested but I think it's not a big factor."
Delete????? A couple sentences earlier, you say,
"I think it boils down to other nations reluctant to fund multiple aircrafts"
which is funding so, yes, funding is the issue. It's the only issue!
France, for example, has only one modern, current combat aircraft, the Rafale, not because they have no other needs but because they can't afford other aircraft. The Mirage is a leftover from the '70s-'90's.
The US, which has the funding, operates a dozen or so combat aircraft. It's all about funding.
I meant more so for foreign buyers rather than home nations. India would love to spend most of their money on a capable single-role aircraft as they are numerically inferior to China's airforce. Likewise this also applies to Pakistan,Taiwan,Vietnam,....The point is, fund is a second concern to these nations. They are more concerned with existential threat and getting the best bang for your buck.
DeleteI am fully aware that fund is the epitome of modern procurement for home nations. That's why I references your comment as it talks about the foreign buyers issue.
The reason other countries gravitate to multi-role aircraft (and ships) is because they can't afford to acquire single role assets. We can."
DeleteAfter so many failed procurement programs, a skeptical Congress may deny the US military funding for more, i.e., we may no longer be able to afford multiple single-role aircraft.
"Single function assets are ALWAYS more effective than a corresponding multi-function asset because multi-function assets are ALWAYS compromise designs."
The compromise is not as severe as you think. Read about what the Israelis did to give the F-15 multirole capability, at https://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/the-amazing-saga-of-how-israel-turned-its-f-15s-into-mu-1701606283
"After so many failed procurement programs, a skeptical Congress may deny the US military funding for more, i.e., we may no longer be able to afford multiple single-role aircraft."
DeleteAnd what would be the main reason why is it failing? is it overly ambitious and complex nature of multi-role vehicles? Is it a lack of a concrete CONOPS could be causing that? It's not like we have a history of successful single-role design and now our try at this multi-role thing is failing left and right. I'm not mocking you but I was just tryna show how Congress would perceive the situation.
" The compromise is not as severe as you think. Read about what the Israelis did to give the F-15 multirole capability,"
Its nation need is different but in the case of the Isarelis, they needn't worry about peer war. The US on the other hand is facing an existential peer-level threat. A compromise (and a terrible one at that) is not what we need to win such war.
"we may no longer be able to afford multiple single-role aircraft."
DeleteWe absolutely and undeniably can afford multiple single-role aircraft. Whether we'll spend our money wisely is another issue and one that we repeatedly fail at.
"The compromise is not as severe as you think."
DeleteDo not confuse multi-function with secondary function. The F-15 was designed as a pure air-to-air fighter. Your reference states exactly that in the very first sentence of the article. What Israel did was add a secondary strike function. There's nothing wrong with that. Many aircraft have been found capable of taking on a secondary function, BECAUSE IT DOES NOT IMPACT THE PRIMARY FUNCTION.
A designed multi-role aircraft is ALWAYS a compromise and, therefore, ALWAYS less effective than the corresponding single function aircraft. For example, the F/A-18 strike/fighter was a compromise design to accommodate both strike and fighter roles. It performs neither well. It's not as good a fighter as its contemporary pure fighters (F-15, for example) and it's not as good a strike as even older pure strike aircraft like the A-6 Intruder or what the A-12 Avenger would have been or what the F-15E is.
"A designed multi-role aircraft is ALWAYS a compromise and, therefore, ALWAYS less effective than the corresponding single function aircraft."
DeleteA designed multi-role aircraft necessarily brings about one other problem--a reduction in the number of manufacturers, ultimately leading to greater cost. In my day we had the A-4 made by Douglas (later McDD) and the A-7 made by LTV, and the F-4 made by McDonnell (later McD-D) and the F-8 made by LTV. That set up inherent competition between LTV and McD-D. If the F-4 got too pricey or McD-D started slipping up on quality control, we could sift more to F-8s. They weren't exact substitutes, but across the range of mission profiles there were plenty that could be done by either. Today, if F-35 costs get out of line or it fails to perform, our only recourse is to buy more F-35s and hope the problems resolve themselves.
I have one other question. What is the point of the F-35C? I get the A for the Air Force and the B for the Marines (although both would be better if they were two separate airplanes without the compromises forced by incompatible requirements) but why the C? What does it give us that the F/A-18 does not besides some mythical electronic linking that's going to work maybe 5 minutes after the bad guys start jamming? Not range or bomb load or STOVL, to be sure. I have one thought. Maybe it can be our new EW airplane. It already as some pretty advanced electronics. What if we took the area where the lift fan is on the B and made that an NFO seat (since a good EW airplane probably needs to be a 2-seater because the pilot has enough to do) and took the bomb bay and filled it with extra fuel tanks (so it has some legs) and more advanced electronics?
In my opinion, the F-35A is pointless, as the F-35C should be perfectly capable of fulfilling its role; note the F/A-18 serves in many air forces whose sister services (navies) don't currently operate aircraft carriers, e.g., Australia, Canada, Kuwait, Spain. The USAF's reluctance to use aircraft capable of launching from and landing on USN carriers, is costing us too much.
DeleteOK, so it could be the F-35A instead of the F-35C that is superfluous. But I still think the C could be converted into a carrier-based EW aircraft and be more useful there.
Delete"Again, we fight joint. There are dozens of assets that can find targets for the A-10 and then it can use Pave Penny (no longer in service???) or LITENING targeting pods for target designation so, yes, it has myriad ways of finding and targeting ships."
DeleteA point of perspective: Pave Penny isn't a laser designator; it's a laser spot tracker that displays in the HUD where a spotting laser is being aimed so that the pilot can orient himself towards where the JTAC is calling in the target. LITENING is where we get self-lasing and FLIR capability, but this is suboptimal for an A-10 as it means the pilot must either rely on external sensor assets to guide him in. Laser designation is less ideal against warships as the laser must be painted for the entire time of flight, either by the launching aircraft, or a sensor aircraft, and the short range of Paveway/Laser JDAM (15 miles) puts them solidly within range of the warship's SAMs.
(This comes back to the earlier problem you've mentioned with the survivability of sensor assets, like P-8 and MQ-4C. If these assets with their radars are vulnerable against warship SAMs, then surely a sensor asset painting with laser, and an A-10 that has to get within 15 miles to attack, would be even more vulnerable.)
I feel that a bigger issue is that the Air Force has absolutely no interest in fighting jointly with the Navy. Out of all the air forces with coastline, the USAF is the only air force in the world that has ignored the maritime strike mission, abdicating it to the USN.
"It performs neither well. It's not as good a fighter as its contemporary pure fighters (F-15, for example) and it's not as good a strike as even older pure strike aircraft like the A-6 Intruder or what the A-12 Avenger would have been or what the F-15E is."
DeleteSomething that I've been wondering about - wasn't the F/A-18 more of a replacement for the A-7? In the sense that it's fulfilling the same light attack role as the A-7, but it can actually do things in air to air combat. I see it as being in the same niche as the F-16 and the MiG-29 - these are the lower end light fighters intended to complement the heavy fighters (F-15, F-14, Su-27).
"wasn't the F/A-18 more of a replacement for the A-7"
DeleteThe F-18 was designed as a lower maintenance cost aircraft. That's it. That was it's mission - to reduce costs. As a result we got a compromised aircraft that wasn't ideal for anything other than lower costs. In hindsight, we can describe it as fitting an A-7 niche or whatever else we want to ascribe to it but it was a business case aircraft rather than a combat-case aircraft. The F-18 clearly demonstrates the folly of designing for business cases rather than combat.
"'we may no longer be able to afford multiple single-role aircraft.'
Delete"We absolutely and undeniably can afford multiple single-role aircraft. Whether we'll spend our money wisely is another issue and one that we repeatedly fail at."
I don't think we can afford anything BUT single-role aircraft. What we can't afford is an F-35 that tries to be three airplanes at once and ends up not as good at any role as a single-role airplane would be, and more expensive than three single-role airplanes would be.
@CDR Chip: It kinda depends on which variant of F-35 we're talking about. LRIP 14 contract price of the F-35A is 77.9 million USD, making it a very attractive proposition for a land-based CTOL fighter. A quick breakdown of flyaway costs for CTOL fighters:
Delete- F-35A: 77.9M
- F16E: 100M
- F2A: 129M
- F-15EX: 87.7M*
- F-15SG: 140M
- F-15SA: 120M
- F-22A: 173M
- Rafale A: 83M
From the USAF perspective, they appear to be fairly happy with the F-35, as it fits their goal of "an F-16, but better, carrying internally all the external equipment you need to turn an F-16 into a strike fighter."
Which I think perhaps is a bigger problem/mistake with the F-35 program, because it seems to me that they designed the Air Force CTOL variant first; airbase to carrier adaptations haven't really worked out so well because of the very different requirements and operating environments. I think it says something that the most successful joint Navy-Air Force tactical aircraft - F-4, A-7, A-4**, F/A-18 - were naval aircraft adapted to land use (and in the case of the F/A-18 in international sales, pretty much sold as-is).
* To be fair, the F-15EX's low flyaway cost is because Boeing has an open and active production line, and the F-15EX is basically leveraging billions of dollars and over 2 decades of work developing Advanced Eagle variants for foreign customers. Note the higher prices of the Singaporean and Saudi F-15s, compared to the F-15EX.
** While USAF never adopted the A-4, plenty of foreign air forces acquired the A-4, using it as a light fighter and attack aircraft.
The A-10 lost out in export sales to the F-16 and other multi-role aircraft. If armies had a say in what their air forces purchase, it might have fared better.
DeleteThe N/AW (Night and Adverse Weather) demonstrator model back in the early 1980's used the WX-50 radar for N/AW attack missions, which was capable of directing Harpoon missiles against surface ships. That was a factor in some narrowly-missed export opportunities to undisclosed "Middle East and Southeast Asia" customers. But any potential customer would have had to purchase multiple aircraft models if the A-10 was chosen, and they all went single-model-multirole. Facts from Bill Sweetman's book on the A-10.
Jjabatie,
ReplyDeleteToo true. That is painful. It is made worse when one contemplates that a non-trivial amount of covid-19 funds(which is money we do not have) are being wasted on public union bailouts, blue state mismanagement, competing with the private sector to get workers to return to work from the couch, university subsidies for nonsense majors, childcare payments for public sector workers who freely elect not to return to the workplace, etc, etc, etc. It would be one thing if these funds were spent well, quite another when they are spent in such a way as to create a moral inversion...and counter-productive incentive structure. Mistakes we will be paying for over generations.
One item missed - DDG-1000, a twin failure:
ReplyDeleteStrategic - DDG-1000 was designed to against regional powers without strong navy, not part of carrier strike groups.
Technology - DDG-1000 planned to have dual band AESA radars, rail guns, cheap long range projectiles, ... All failure. What kind of R&D team do we have? Not just so, the first ship Zumwalt has heaps of problems.
Rather than procure 32, now it cut to 3.
It has 15,000 ton displacement but has less VLS than much smaller Ali Burke.
As I described in an earlier comment, I intentionally did not include the Zumwalt because that was a Navy decision to terminate the program, not a Congressional one. Termination was what the Navy actually wanted.
DeleteCouple things in regards to the A10.
ReplyDeleteFirst, no aircraft currently in service with the US military can meet the A10s specifications, besides the A10 of course. Payload, loiter time, low altitude maneuverability, flight hour cost, etc. Whilst you can shoehorn any aircraft to do CAS, such as the airforce claims to do with the B-2, doesn't mean it should.
Secondly, the A10 is a ground attack aircraft, not a warship killer. It was designed to engage soviet tank columns a few times before being shotdown by ground fire, a role to which it's the best option still. I assume the metrics required to attack a flotilla of modern warships call for significantly more speed and standoff weapon systems. Different roles...
Last but not least, to address said radar issues, couldn't a F-18 external IRST pod be attached to an A10, if needed? I understand there is a software/hardware obstacle that would need to be overcome for that to work, but wouldn't that be an option if the need arised? It would probably take the airforce a couple of decades to authorize the A10 to carry it in a similar way it took them decades to approve the carrying of droppable fuel tanks thou...
The A-10 is a specialist in one thing and one thing only--close air support (CAS). It is almost without question the best CAS airplane in the world. If we set about to develop a specialist carrier-based air superiority fighter/interceptor, a specialist carrier-based long-range stealthy attack aircraft, a specialist "Marine A-10" CAS aircraft adapted to small-deck carriers and the expeditionary environment, and a specialist carrier-based fixed wing ASW/patrol aircraft, we could probably come up with the best in the world at each of them. And they'd be 4 different airplanes, probably by 4 different manufacturers, that would almost certainly be cheaper on the whole than the bloated contraption that the F-35 has become.
DeleteA-10 was a super star for land attack but not any more. To use its famous gun, it has to fly low and close to target. It has no radar thus cannot even sense missiles head to it. Frankly, it is very easy to be shot down by missiles, even not advanced ones. Don't be fooled by its performance on terrorists without anti aircraft missiles.
DeleteWhat was the A10 designed to do? Destroy Soviet tank columns pushing the Fulda Gap inspite of ZU-23-4 and MANPADS...
DeleteOnly 7 have been lost to enemy fire, despite many A10s returning to base to later be deemed uneconomically feasible to repair.
"Easily shot down by missiles."
I'll direct you to read up on the April 2003 incident.
https://www.wearethemighty.com/veterans/this-pilot-landed-her-shot-up-a-10-by-pulling-cables/
"If we set about to develop a specialist carrier-based air superiority fighter/interceptor, a specialist carrier-based long-range stealthy attack aircraft, a specialist "Marine A-10" CAS aircraft . . . and a specialist carrier-based fixed wing ASW/patrol aircraft . . . they'd be 4 different airplanes."
DeleteThe requirements for each are so disparate that you would need a separate aircraft for each role. That's not to say an aircraft couldn't be used in other roles. The Skyraider, Intruder, Viking are prime examples of an aircraft being used in other roles it wasn't initially designed for.
Regarding the incident described in https://www.wearethemighty.com/veterans/this-pilot-landed-her-shot-up-a-10-by-pulling-cables/
DeleteThe plane was hit; even if it safely landed, it was still grounded until repairs were made. A plane with better performance and self-defense systems (including stealth to delay enemy detection, jammers to prevent enemy targeting systems from locking on, etc.) might not get hit in the first place.
"The plane was hit; even if it safely landed, it was still grounded until repairs were made. A plane with better performance and self-defense systems (including stealth to delay enemy detection, jammers to prevent enemy targeting systems from locking on, etc.) might not get hit in the first place."
DeleteClose Air Support is, by its nature, not really subtle. Stealth is probably beneficial in the approach, as of now until technology reduces it effectiveness furthur, but stealth is of limited value when you can't present the optimal profile, ie the heat signature on a plane in the final leg of a pass. Additionally, if they can physically see you, they will fire upon you. Stealth aircraft tend to be rather fragile and unstable when not damaged, I'm curious if an F35 could remain airborne if any of the control surfaces eat a 23mm.
As to the jamming systems, are jamming pods not attached to other aircraft in our inventory? Beyond military bureaucracy, I see now reason those systems can't be attached to the A10 and over the same level of performance.
@Purple Calico: On one hand 7 A-10s were shot down in Desert Storm, on the other hand only 3 F-16s were shot down. Sure an A-10 can take more damage than an F-16 or an F-35, but on the other hand an F-35 is less likely to get hit vs the A-10; in the immediate short term, operationally there's no difference from a damaged aircraft and a destroyed aircraft, because neither is on the flight line ready to fly sorties.
DeleteAnd while it's great that the A-10 was designed against of the threat of the ZSU-23, Russian and Chinese SHORAD systems have gone to 30mm guns for over 30 years now...
Like don't get me wrong, I like the A-10 and it's a great plane, but we need to have a realistic perspective on what it can and cannot do today, and how things have moved on. SHORAD systems have advanced in capability and sophistication since the 80s: the A-10's low and slow attack profile was shown to be a point of vulnerability in Desert Storm, 30 years ago. With an F-35, when you're attacking that tank column, at least you're flying outside of Tunguska and Pantsir engagement range, and with Stormbreaker you can drop 24 250lbs guided bombs from 70 km out, that's 2 companies of tanks dead in one pass from a single aircraft.
"A-10 and it's a great plane, but we need to have a realistic perspective on what it can and cannot do today"
DeleteYou're right. We do need a realistic perspective. For example, what you're describing - attacking tanks - is only one aspect of CAS and, possibly, the least important. CAS involves establishing and maintaining a picture of the ground situation, describing that to the ground element, coordinating air and ground actions, etc. That's difficult to impossible to do flying high, fast, and far away. The F-35 may survive but it won't be effective in the role.
I'm totally open to an A10 replacement, a true one. The F35 is not that.
Delete70km out is not CAS, nor do I think enemy will not be without jamming capability of their own. North Korea, the poorer of our potential adversaries, have demonstrated the capability to disrupt/deny GPS on a large front. Stealth and Jamming is a two way street. Having that stand off capability is nice, until you can't utilize it anymore.
The A10 is dated, designed in a time when we expected to lose aircraft. What I dont get, is where we got this notion that we take losses.
*is where we got this notion that we wont take losses in war.
Delete"What I dont get, is where we got this notion that we won't take losses."
DeleteFrom the reality of war.
What I don't get is where we got this notion that we can fight a war without losses.
*shrug* It was Purple Calico who was talking about attacking tank columns with their attendant SHORAD assets - though that's more Battlefield Air Interdiction, not CAS. I'm just responding to him on his own terms.
DeleteHigh, fast and far away are relative terms: In my opinion, the key point is to stay out of the SHORAD window while setting up attack, and prosecuting CAS runs while 1) staying out of the SHORAD engagement envelope and 2) if/when you have to enter engagement envelope to attack, you've got the kinematics to minimise the window that SHORAD assets have to engage you. It's the same rationale with supersonic antiship missiles.
I believe that for the low and slow paradigm of the A-10, that niche is better served by attack helicopters, because they're better able to exploit terrain masking for defense, versus an A-10 with the pilot workload. (With the tradeoffs of lower endurance and weapons load; on the other hand, you can make forward rearming and refueling points for helicopters a lot easier than improvised airstrips.)
It should also be noted that our tools for coordinating CAS are getting better: for instance, the IZLID marking laser can be seen from high altitude and reaches out to 43 kilometers away. The Air Force has deployed 50,000 ROVER units and is continually iterating on the system, which allows the JTAC on the ground to the pilot's view from the targeting pod, and slave the pod to point exactly where the JTAC wants the pilot looking, as well as digitally marking friendlies and targets.
And if the airspace is permissive enough for A-10s to orbit and be talked onto target at 300 knots, an F-35 can orbit and be talked on at that speed. It's got a throttle, afterall.
That said, I think that American expectation of being able to fight with CAS orbiting on-call is a foolish belief. Against a peer opponent, CAS is going to be a luxury. The enemy is going to be doing all they can to disrupt CAS, with midrange and longrange SAMs, fighters of their own, heavier deployment of SHORAD... the US has gotten too used to expecting CAS to be available. Like I said weeks ago: when the air is contested, when the Air Force cannot provide CAS and ISR, the Army is either going to have to deal with fighting uncovered, or else is going to have to take care of that problem itself, which means loitering munitions.
"70km out is not CAS"
Delete@PurpleCalico: To be fair, your scenario as described - attacking a tank column - isn't really CAS either, it's more akin to BAI, I believe.
But does the Close in Close Air Support really mean _proximity_ to the fighting? I was told it was for Close _Coordination_. *shrug*
Anyhow, if we're talking the hypermythical peer land war taking place in the next decade or so, I don't really expect the Air Force to be able to provide CAS on the regular, so I feel this is a moot point.
If you catch a tank column in transit and not engaged, any platform to include B52s doing high altitude carpet bombing will be sufficient.
DeleteWhen I say CAS, I mean if our troops are engage in combat, at ranges within the critical error margin of our own ordance.
Let's suppose we have 1 F35 with external pylons and degraded stealth or two F35s with just internals (to somewhat equal the payload of an A10.)
Let's suppose this is the perfect scenario with no cyberwarfare aspect and excellent and clear communication & vision so the F35 can utilize that standoff capability.
Within that scripted "what-if" scenario, disregarding operating costs, the F35(s) can perform "CAS" at no risk from short range air defense.
Thou to be fair, in a war with China, I dont really see the need for CAS, cause there won't be a clash between land armies.
Delete"Thou to be fair, in a war with China, I dont really see the need for CAS, cause there won't be a clash between land armies."
DeleteWell, there is the very real possibility of peripheral wars. Africa jumps out as one very real possibility. Such peripheral wars would involve land combat and require air support.
Personally, depending on descions being made now, I foresee the deciding theater of operations being the Pacific ocean, and I can see that being resolved within a short period of time. While combat may occur elsewhere, I don't see those as contributing much to the outcome of that war.
Delete"I'm totally open to an A10 replacement, a true one. The F35 is not that.
Delete"
I also think so. F-35 has a key problem - to maintain its stealthy, it can only carry weapons in its two small weapon bays.
A-10 is an attacker can only operate while owner has air supremacy. A-10 has very weak air-to-air combat capabilities - no radar (thus cannot launch BVR missiles), no warning on missile approaching, ... etc. Its past successes and recent feats on fighting terrorists without SAM won't work on groups with SAM.
Air Force does know the problem thus ordered F-15EX. Why not F-16V, as it said not likely? largely because F-15 carries far more payloads than F-16. Navy also wants to keep some F/A-18 for the same reason.
After operations and war games, people have realized that stealthy fighters' mission is to break enemy's air defense, that's it. Even the largest stealthy fighter J-20 cannot carry desired payloads without destroy its stealthy.
So, F-15EX and F/A-18 will do land attacks on powerful enemies. To terrorists, drones and Apache helicopters are enough.
Ironically, this goes to the Chinese concept - J-20 and J-16 combination.
"no warning on missile approaching"
DeleteThe A-10 has the ALR-69 Radar Warning Receiver, among other protective measures.
Note F-16 has historically conducted far more true CAS than the A-10 (or any other US aircraft). It is still the main platform for CAS.
DeleteCAS these days is performed using laser guided weapons dropped from medium-high altitude, not low and close to ground (save non-lethal flights designed to scare enemies).
Also it's the 21st century. UCAVs and now loitering munitions are changing the way CAS and interdiction can be handled.
Look at recent fighting in Nagorno Karabakh - very limited usage of Azeri Su-25 whilst Mi-25/35s were grounded for most part. Simply the SHORAD environment was too intense for slow systems using outdated tactics (ie not standoff)
Yet thanks to UCAVs and loitering munitions, the Azeris waged a very effective air war that destroyed a very effective defensive line based on good terrain and an enemy whose troops were historically better trained and better led.
"Note F-16 has historically conducted far more true CAS than the A-10 (or any other US aircraft). It is still the main platform for CAS."
DeleteAccording to the U.S. Senate Armed Service Committee hearing on the Air Force April 29, 2014, the airforce representive, Gen Welsh, stated the F16 has performed 40,000 CAS missions compared to the 24,0000 performed by the A10 since 2006. Given the disparity between those two aircrafts production and current inventory numbers, isn't really a critique on performance, but on airframe availability.
In regards to which sources you choose to believe, the war in Nagorno-Karabakh doesn't really prove anything beyond Armenia wasn't prepared for war. I'm currently rereading the reports of that war now, but it seems inadequate readiness, training, and planning on the Armenian side for that blow out.
It should be noted, the performance of drones in the face of Electronic Warfare assets, such as the Ukrainian deal with in their civil war, severely curtails UCAV capabilities and success rates.
I have not been able to find any mention of of similar systems being used during the Nagorno-Karabakh war, but the news of those systems being shipped Armenia and are now in place as part of the cease-fire in Armenia under the control of Russian Peacekeepers, suggests they weren't there before.
Rather than condemn the Navy as crazy, it might be better to figure out what objectives they're aiming at. They probably aren't executing those perfectly, but this seems more like different aims than giggling insanity. As far as I can see, there are two aims:
ReplyDelete1. Spend money on ships, rather than crew or maintenance. The reason for this is politics: it gives US politicians things to be happy about. Until bringing money to home districts stops being so important in US politics, this will remain a factor.
2. The Navy seems focussed on Iran as an enemy. The point of the LCS and the whole "Littoral warfare" business was to fight a war against the Iranian navy in the Persian Gulf. That was never stated as policy, but it's fairly clear from the decisions, as a view that grew out of the Bush 43 administration's policy. That seemed to be aimed at creating a new and smaller Cold War, because that was what the people in the Bush 43 administration had been brought up on. Iraq was going to play the part of West Germany, and Iran East Germany and the USSR in one. Of course, this policy never got anywhere, because Iraq declined its role. But the Navy still seems to be working on those fleet ideas.
One reason for that is that they don't want to plan for a war with China, because it's already obvious that such a war would be economically disastrous for the USA. Too much manufacturing has been outsourced to China and neighbouring countries, in the search for short-term profit.
"but this seems more like different aims than giggling insanity."
DeleteThe Navy's 'aims' are not something they come up with on their own. Their 'aims' are DICTATED by law and national responsibility. It is their 'aim' to prepare for, and win, high level, peer war along with myriad other lesser responsibilities. These are non-negotiable and unchangeable. If the Navy has developed other 'aims' then they've done so in violation of their oaths, the law, and their responsibilities. Understanding what those other aims are does not excuse them and should serve only to provide the foundation for building criminal cases against Navy leadership.
"provide the foundation for building criminal cases against Navy leadership."
DeleteNow theres a thought. You just made a very bold statement, somthing thats been skirted around but I've never actually heard it.
The fact is that the mismanagement is so bad as to true, "criminal" is not just a a catch phrase pronoun. No private business would suffer such idiocy and financial waste. No private citizen could make decisions relative to the Navys and not suffer ridicule, bankruptcy, divorce, etc...
And yet the backlash about the last decades isnt even a dull roar!!!
Ive asked here and on other forums repeatedly, "what can we do??"... Maybe we all have a "Citizens vs Navy Leadership" Class Action???🤔😁
"Rather than condemn the Navy as crazy, it might be better to figure out what objectives they're aiming at. They probably aren't executing those perfectly, but this seems more like different aims than giggling insanity."
DeleteI’m not (and I don’t think ComNavOps is) condemning them as crazy. At this point I am condemning them as dishonest.
"1. Spend money on ships, rather than crew or maintenance."
Spend money on crew and maintenance and weapons. We are way, way behind the curve on anti-ship missiles, and have been so consciously and intentionally for at least 50 years that I am aware of. We need to see ships as platforms, and weapons and sensors as the business end.
"2. The Navy seems focused on Iran as an enemy."
Our whole approach to the region has been incredibly stupid. There are 4 major players—Iran, Turkey, the Sunnis led by the Saudis, and Israel. We have consistently misread the tea leaves. I get emails from expat friends working over there asking what is the USA thinking. I don’t have a clue.
One reason why Iraq didn’t play along is that Iraq is majority Shia and Iran is Shia. What we should have done—if there was any point in toppling Saddam in the first place—was to correct some of the errors of San Remo by splitting Iraq into three countries—Kurdistan in the north, Shia Mesopotamia in the east, and Sunni Iraq in the west. Kurdistan gets Mosul and Kirkuk, Mesopotamia gets Baghdad and Basra, Sunni Iraq gets Tikrit, Samarrah, and al-Ramadi. Turkey didn’t want Kurdistan, but at the time, they badly wanted into EU (maybe not so much now). So give Schlumberger the Halliburton contract for Kurdistan, tell France that is their payback for getting screwed at San Remo, and that it’s their job to convince Turkey that Kurdistan is the price of EU membership. Unfortunately, that ship may have sailed. Shia Mesopotamia would be fine. They have oil and water. Sunni Iraq would have quickly allied with the Sunnis in eastern Syria, with considerable Saudi assistance. If we had left the Baath power structure in place in Sunni Iraq, they would have had a lot more sense than the ISIS crazies, and that would probably have gone better than the mess that Syria is today.
I have included in my proposed fleet essentially Wayne Hughes’s littoral fleet to deal with littoral areas including the Gulf, the first island chain, the eastern Med, and the Baltic. This is in addition to my proposed blue water fleet which would be based around winning peer wars wit Russia and China.
"One reason for that is that they don't want to plan for a war with China, because it's already obvious that such a war would be economically disastrous for the USA. Too much manufacturing has been outsourced to China and neighboring countries, in the search for short-term profit."
Such a war would be economically disastrous for both China and the USA. This is one reason why I have focused on a policy of containment toward China rather than peer warfare. Over time, we can—and, quite frankly, we must—implement policies that will move manufacturing back to the USA. But that’s not going to happen next week. I still think that Cold War II is winnable by doing what we did in Cold War I. Truman bribed up an alliance to contain the Soviet advance into western Europe, Nixon started triangulating China against Russia, and Reagan put enough pressure on their economy to bring the Soviet Union down. But that takes a very different foreign policy—and a very different Navy—from where we are headed today.