As the navy contemplates the next carrier aircraft, it is well to recall the state we’re in and how we got here. The ‘state’ I’m referring to is a carrier air wing with only one type of combat aircraft, the F-18 Hornet. The F-18 was designed as a combination strike and fighter aircraft and, as a combination, is badly flawed since it is optimized for neither the strike nor fighter role (see, “The Strikefighter Myth”). It is not well suited for pure air combat as it lacks maneuverability, speed, acceleration, endurance/range, sensors, and other aspects that a modern air superiority fighter must have. Similarly, the F-18 is not well suited for pure strike as it lacks a degree of all-weather/night effectiveness in terms of dedicated air-to-ground sensors, terrain following, targeting, speed, range, maneuverability, and other aspects that a modern strike aircraft must have.
We used to have dedicated strike aircraft such as the A-6 Intruder and dedicated fighters such as the F-14 Tomcat. How did we neck down to a single, compromised, inadequate aircraft? There’s a variety of reasons but they boil down to trying to build an air wing based on a business case instead of a combat effectiveness case. The F-18 was a cost saving, business aircraft instead of a supremely effective combat aircraft.
What does this mean for our next aircraft?
The most important lesson from the F-18 is not to try to build a do-everything, combination strike-fighter. We need to return to dedicated fighters and dedicated strike aircraft (if we even want strike aircraft ?!).
Many of you are already pounding out replies about the much hyped benefits of combination strike-fighters. Before you finish your misguided comments, let’s take a closer look at the combination, strike-fighter concept by looking at the most famous example the Navy has of the ‘success’ of the strike-fighter. Yeah, you know the one – it’s the only one. It’s the Jan 17, 1991, Desert Storm mission by a pair of VFA-81 Sunliners, Lieutenant Commander Mark Fox and Lieutenant Nick Mongillo with CVW-17 flying off the USS Saratoga. During the mission which was intended as a strike mission, the F-18 Hornets encountered enemy aircraft, shot down two of them with air-to-air missiles, and then continued on to bomb their original targets.
Wow! This is the perfect example of why the strike-fighter combination is so awesome, right? The aircraft are self-escorting and can fight their way through to the target, taking on all enemy aircraft, destroy the ground targets, and then fight their way back home. What’s not to like about this?
Well, the reality is that this example was a one-in-a-million scenario that just happened to work out perfectly for a variety of reasons and is unlikely to ever be repeated and certainly not during a peer war.
An aircraft loaded with weapons for a strike mission cannot successfully engage in air-to-air combat. The weapons load renders the aircraft non-stealthy, slow, and unmaneuverable. The air combat word for that combination of characteristics is ‘dead’. The only reason the F-18s were able to succeed in this scenario was the total ineptness of the Iraqi pilots.
LtCdr Fox acknowledges this. In his own words,
Talking about the strike-fighter concept that the F/A-18 represents, Fox has a definite opinion. “This is the first time to my knowledge that an airplane scored a kill while carrying four 2,000-lb bombs, then continued on to hit its target. If the MiGs had got behind us, we would have had no choice but to honor their threat. You can’t do that with 8,000 lb of bombs. We would have had to jettison ordnance to face them, and would have served their purpose in stopping our strike. They failed, we succeeded.” (1)
Fox recognizes what so many outsiders don’t: the strike-fighter is not a capable fighter in any scenario more challenging than a drone shoot down which is, essentially, what the Iraqi incident was. The added drag and weight of bombs and missiles significantly impacts the aircraft’s already sub-optimal fighter characteristics.
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| VFA-81 Sunliner |
As a point of interest, here’s the weapons load the aircraft carried for that Desert Storm mission :
- 4x 2,000-lb Mk84 Low Drag, General Purpose Bomb
- 2x AIM-9L Sidewinder
- 2x AIM-7 Sparrow
Examining the weapons load we note that attempting to conduct aerial combat against a competent enemy peer fighter while lugging 4x 2,000 lb bombs would be suicidal. Here’s the other overlooked aspect: if the strike-fighter jettisons the ground attack weapons, it is left with a very minimal air-to-air weapons load – 2 Sidewinders and 2 Sparrows, in this case. That kind of a minimal air-to-air load is starting the fight at a decided disadvantage.
A strike-fighter, by definition, carries a less than optimum load of ground attack weapons since it has to give up hard points to the air-to-air missiles and it carries a less than optimum load of air combat weapons since it has to give up hard points to the ground attack weapons. Thus, both missions are compromised and sub-optimal right from the start.
The next issue for a strike-fighter is training time and, hence, competence. There is simply not enough flight training time for pilots to be supremely competent at both missions. In fact, today’s pilots are barely staying flight certified when not deployed and the use of waivers to maintain flight certification is becoming commonplace. How can a pilot be supremely skilled at both missions when he can’t even get enough monthly flight hours to remain flight certified without waivers?
The only possible conclusion from this is that a strike-fighter can only succeed when the opponent is so incompetent as to be barely flight-capable, as was the case in the Desert Storm incident. In any other scenario, the strike-fighter is a kill or, at best, a mission kill, waiting to happen. It is certainly not a viable concept against a competent, peer enemy.
What does all of this tell us about the next Navy fighter? The answer is crystal clear: do not attempt to produce another strike-fighter. Make the next fighter a pure fighter. The A-6/F-14 combination is the example to follow, not the F-18/F-35. The A-6 and F-14 were huge successes, for their time, whereas the F-18 and F-35 are mediocre and marginally successful, at best.
The next fighter must be a pure fighter.
_________________________________________
Didn't the F-14 evolve into a strike fighter, once it was wired for LANTRIN and PGMs? As I recall, F-14s took over the strike role once the A-6s were retired.
ReplyDeleteThe F-14 took on a secondary function as a strike platform (the so called Bombcat). The actual A-6 replacement, the A-12 Avenger, was cancelled.
DeletePerhaps, but doesn't that show that the strike fighter concept isn't inherently flawed? Likewise with the F-15E - there's a reason that all Advanced Eagle development has been Strike Eagle variants - even the USAF's air defense F-15EX is an advanced Strike Eagle.
DeleteIt's a matter of _how_ the concept is executed.
Say you had a somewhat full deck, 4 squadrons of Tomcats. You could use all of them on an Alpha Strike (which happened in Vietnam with F-4s and F-8s.) You could throw all of them up as fighters. Or couldn't you do things like having 1 Tomcat squadron assigned to strike, 2 squadrons assigned to fighter escort of the strike package, and 1 squadron held back for BARCAP?
If you were going to design a dedicated strike asset to go up against the best defenses the enemy had, would you design an F-14 Tomcat (even for its time)? No, you wouldn't. You'd design something like the A-12 Avenger. The F-14 was a strike asset as a secondary function and was not an optimized strike asset. That's fine to go bomb third world targets that can't fight back but it's a very poor way to attack peer defended targets.
DeleteI'll say it again. Every strike-fighter is a compromised design that can't execute either mission to the maximum. In combat, executing less than max is a good way to fail and die.
There's also the training issue and there's no way around that.
Both the Strike Eagle and the 'Bombcats' came with 2 crewmen to help with the dual mission load.
DeleteI wonder if it would make sense to have 2 seat dedicated 'A'-18s and single seat dedicated 'F'-18s.
At least that way crews can focus on one particular mission-set, and aircraft can be somewhat optimized.
@Kirby, the services have basically been saying that the F-18 and its derivative are obsolete for peer-warfare (lack of stealth as the main concern.).Any procurements now serve as a stop-gap measure and a jobs decision rather than actual combat survivability.
DeleteI am basically for the split described. Nothing wrong with a switch hitter, I just see the manned fighter coordinating unmanned assets for a generation and that keeps the manned fighter somewhat in the pure fighter arena. Even then, the actual fighters will start to look like cruise missiles and can just launch from any plane with a 2500-5000lb weapon station.
ReplyDeleteMany traits an interceptor (fighter) needs, are also useful to an interdictor (ground attack aircraft), and vice versa; an airframe strengthened for high G maneuvers used in dogfighting, will also be resistant to the battering an aircraft is subjected to when flying at low altitudes (note the F-15E is rated for 9 G, compared to the F-15A and C's 7 G); high speed and acceleration not only allows both interceptors and interdictors to quickly reach their targets, saving those the enemy are targeting; and it should be obvious how large internal fuel tanks can be used for both missions.
ReplyDeleteThe challenge is recognizing the necessary compromises for designing an aircraft to perform at both high and low altitudes, and forcing the customer to accept those compromises. For budgetary and technological reasons, I think the Air Force and Navy should start with a carrier-borne interceptor, and then add mounting points for targeting pods and ground attack weapons- as the F-15C to F-15E, Su-27 to Su-34 conversions demonstrate, it's easier to adapt an interceptor to perform interdictions, than the other way around (no sane person used the F-111 for air defense missions).
A single-role interdictor is a luxury to most air forces, compared to an interceptor with a useful secondary role.
"A single-role interdictor is a luxury to most air forces,"
DeleteAnd that does not apply to the US. We have the budget and resources to build dedicated strike and fighter aircraft, assuming we use our money wisely and stop building LCSes, Zumwalts, Fords, and F-35s, among other foolish and costly decisions.
Consider the traits that would make for an ideal strike aircraft and those that would make for an ideal fighter aircraft. While there may be a few characteristics in common, most are not.
A strike aircraft would want maximum weapons carrying capacity for large weapons, internal air-to-ground sensors, moderate speed, great unrefueled range, moderate maneuverability, terrain following sensors, multiple air-to-ground targeting modes, redundant systems, a degree of armor, frontal stealth, IR suppression, no gun, etc.
In contrast, a dedicated fighter would want maximum internal weapons carry for small weapons, all aspect stealth, maximum speed, maximum range, maximum maneuverability, internal gun, minimal weight, no armor, IRST, optimized LPI air-to-air radar, maximum climb rate, high thrust to weight, maximum pilot visibility, etc.
There is relatively little overlap of characteristics and the design of the two aircraft would have relatively little in common.
The mounting points for bombs can be used for long-range air intercept missiles- see the AIM-54 Phoenix. Guns are useful for strafing ground targets AS WELL AS dogfighting. The overlap is enough to let us use fighters as bombers (though obviously not the other way around), IF the engineers are smart enough. And if the resulting plane is an export success, the USAF and USN can lower production and maintenance costs for themselves.
Delete"We have the budget and resources to build dedicated strike and fighter aircraft, assuming we use our money wisely and stop building LCSes, Zumwalts, Fords, and F-35s, among other foolish and costly decisions."
True. Sadly, I doubt the Navy has learned its lesson, as demonstrated with its obsession with using unmanned ships as a substitute for manned ones, BEFORE properly testing the proposed systems to make sure they work.
"The mounting points for bombs can be used for long-range air intercept missiles- see the AIM-54 Phoenix."
DeleteNo. Today, an aircraft attempting to engage in A2A combat or penetrating strike MUST be stealthy and that means internal bomb bays. It is not the number of attachment points but the volume of the bay that is important. Strike weapons are larger require more volume. Each aircraft must be designed to carry the max weapons for its role. They are not interchangeable.
While a fighter can be given a few bombs and can drop them, that does not make it an effective bomber. I listed some of the characteristics of a modern strike aircraft and a fighter does not meet most of them. Using a fighter as an adapted strike aircraft will yield a suboptimal strike aircraft. Suboptimal aircraft produce suboptimal results and a lot of shot down aircraft.
"A single-role interdictor is a luxury to most air forces,"
DeleteActually, if you only have to make it do one role, it can be cheaper, and better at that role. Another cheaper, better attack airplane can be built by focusing.
A new fighter is less important that a very long range,fuel efficient, and low cost subsonic turbofan multi-role aircraft the size of a Gulfstream.
ReplyDeletehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gulfstream_IV#Specifications
It looks big but is the same size of an F-14, and of course that tail would need change.
This would have more than twice the range of current carrier aircraft since it burns half the fuel with a turbofan. It is needed for an airborne tanker (that our Navy does not have) and COD (at one-third the cost of a V-22 with three times more range) ASW patrol (our navy does not have) or long range patrol/surveillance (our navy does not have) and a long range attack/bomber (like the subsonic A-6) that can release stand off munitions (Tomahawks or glide bombs or even dumb bombs for low intensity ops). We burned out F-18s doing very long range bombings in Afghanistan.
They may need EC-2s for escort to avoid enemy aircraft perhaps trailed by F-18s (with tanker support) if they encounter trouble. Development costs would be low as well as profits, so I doubt this can happen.
"Gulfstream"
DeleteAbsolutely we need a non-combat, multi-role aircraft. Conceptually, the Gulfstream is a S-3 Viking although substantially larger in every dimension which is a potential problem for a carrier aircraft.
I note that the Navy bought 5 C-20G in 1995 to provide logistics support. I don't know how they performed or what became of them.
One of the challenges for any aircraft in the COD role is the requirement to deliver an F-35 replacement engine which, in its packaged form, is enormous. It fits within the MV-22 COD with about a millimeter to spare! The C-20G had a side opening cargo door and would likely have been unable to deliver engines. Typically, this kind of cargo delivery is accomplished through tail-opening cargo doors.
Sounds like someone needs to review the engine packaging - is the engine itself really that much bigger?
Delete"Sounds like someone needs to review the engine packaging"
DeleteYes, you're right. You do need to review packaging.
"The weapons load renders the aircraft non-stealthy"
ReplyDeleteOnly stealthy fighters in service NOW are:
F-22, F-35, J-20(China), and SU-57(Russia). Most stealthy (smallest radar reflection) are F-22, J-20, followed by F-35, then SU-57 as I read. More than 80% of stealthy comes from external shape designed to deflect/diffract radar wave than reflect back. Coating contribute far less than shape.
In two Iraq wars, US destroyed most Iraqi radars in first phase thus Iraq became blind to fight.
What Navy faces today is not regional powers without technology competency as US but China which rivals US in technologies. Therefore, manufacturers' data in specs are only for references. For instance, a radar's most important item is how good it performance under enemy's jamming/interference than detecting range, target tracking capabilities, ... etc. listed in specs.
Navy cannot conduct land attack without first eliminate threats from sea and under sea. Even though today, Russia doesn't have strong naval power over sea, its nuclear submarines are still very competent. Without enough money, Russian navy now puts submarines as their top priority, both strategic and attack.
I look at the super carriers as a tool for achieving local air superiority away from our land-based air assets.
ReplyDeleteTo perform that mission I believe that you need to have a true air superiority fighter. In this day and age that means something like an F-22.
My expert review of the most reliable sources available (wikipedia) leads me to believe that the F-22 has the range, avionics, and dog-fighting ability to splendidly replace the F-14's role.
Unfortunately there is not currently a naval version.
And they would probably cost in the neighborhood of $200 million apiece.
But I think that's the cost of doing business these days. The cost to put first 12, and then 24, of these in each carrier air wing is going to be enormous, but unavoidable if you want aircraft carriers to be viable assets going forward.
As a strike aircraft, I would look to have an aircraft that would fill the modern role of the A-6. Something like the A-12.
I don't think you need to have a super high performance aircraft for this role. Something with long legs, ability to carry a reasonable payload, and stealth to surprise and survive.
It wouldn't be able to bomb downtown Beijing, but it wouldn't need to...those kind of super-high-threat environments are what cruise missiles are for.
I would foresee the navalized F-22's displacing the F-18's in the fighter role as the F-22's became available...with the F-18's taking on a supporting role.
When budgets allowed I would do the same with the A-12ish strike aircraft...supplementing and then replacing the F-18's as they became available.
Lutefisk
My only question about the A-12 is that looking at the same best available source that you did, it appears to have very short legs (800 nm range). An attack aircraft needs to have something like a 1000-mile combat radius.
DeleteAgree with the concept of a navalized F-22, also unfortunately with the likely cost.
"it appears to have very short legs (800 nm range)"
DeleteI believe that is reference is a mis-statment as every other reference suggest a 800-1000+ mile radius. I think whoever wrote that did not understand the difference between range and combat radius. I covered this in: A-12
I wonder what they could do with current technology?
DeleteCould they make the A-12 concept work for a reasonable cost?
Lutefisk
Back in my day, we had these aircraft in numbers:
ReplyDeleteA-3 (going out) by Douglas
A-4 by Douglas
A-5 (going out) by North American
A-6 by Grumman
A-7 by LTV/Vought
F-4 by McDonnell
F-8 by LTV/Vought
F-14 (coming in) by Grumman
S-2 (going out) by Grumman
S-3 (coming in) by Lockheed
E-2 by Grumman
P-3 by Lockheed
We had 6 manufacturers—Grumman (4 aircraft), Douglas (2), LTV/Vought (2), Lockheed (2), North American (1), and McDonnell (1)—for 12 aircraft (including 2 coming in, 3 going out). After subsequent mergers and consolidations, we still had 5 manufacturers. We used to call Grumman the Navy’s “pet manufacturer” since it built so many different aircraft for the Navy but none for the Air Force.
Today we have:
F/A-18 by Boeing
F-35 by Lockheed Martin
E-2 by Northrup Grumman
P-3 (going out) by Lockheed
P-8 (coming in) by Boeing
So now we have 5 aircraft (one coming in, one going out) made by 3 manufacturers—Boeing (1 aircraft plus 1 coming in), Lockheed Martin (2, but 1 on the way out), and Grumman (1).
There are several problems with multi-purpose aircraft. As already noted, they’re not going to be as good at anything as a single-purpose airplane will be. But another problem is that with fewer different aircraft, you will necessarily have fewer manufacturers.
In my day (excluding aircraft on the way out) we had F-4, F-8, and later F-14 for fighters and A-4, A-6, and A-7 for attack. You had 3 different manufacturers for fighters (McDD, LTV, later Grumman) and the same 3 for attack. Each airplane had particular attributes, but there was enough substitutability that if McDD got too pricey or dropped the ball on quality control, you could reduce the buys from them and buy more from LTV or Grumman. Today we can’t do that. If F-35s don’t measure up, what do we buy instead? We’ve created a monopoly situation and that means we are going to get hosed on price. As a bean counter myself, I get the argument that the supply chain gets more expensive and complex if you have more different kinds of airplanes. But we handled it okay with 12 airplanes. And 3D printing should cut down on your inventory requirements.
I think we need the following basic aircraft types:
- Air superiority fighter/interceptor for fleet air defense—long loiter time, stealth, long range sensors and weapons, excellent acceleration, maneuverability, and visibility in case it gets caught in a dogfight.
- Attack bomber—fewer in number since this is a secondary carrier mission, with long legs, stealth, and heavy weapons load.
- Carrier-based ASW/patrol aircraft—basically modernized S-3
- Tanker—could be S-3 or something similar.
- AEW aircraft—could be E-2 for now, but need to find replacement.
- EW aircraft—since F-35C already has advanced electronics, put NFO where lift fan goes on the B, and fill the bomb bay with fuel tank for longer legs and additional electronics.
- Carrier onboard delivery (COD)—preferably S-3, might be V-22.
- Shore-based ASW/patrol aircraft—P-8 is the Navy choice, but I’m not fond of giving up low level ASW, so I would prefer a mix of P-8s and license-built Kawasaki P-1s.
- A “Marine A-10” for Marines—rugged, easily maintained, handles well low and slow, has a big cannon and a big bomb load, and ideally STOVL so it can fly off “Lightning Carriers” and operate off short and unprepared strips, in order to go ashore with Marines and stay close to the front to pop up as needed.
Each of those aircraft is unique, none is an F/A-18, and other than the EW aircraft none could be an F-35.
I would see a carrier air wing something like:
3x12 fighter
1x12 attack
1x12 S-3/replacement (6 ASW/patrol, 5 tanker, 1 COD)
6 AEW
6 EW
8 helos (or 7 helo, 1 V-22, since the navy seems to love them)
Total 80, maybe add 5 unmanned tankers
A Nimitz or a Kitty Hawk could easily carry that entire air wing. A 4-carrier CTF would have 320-340 aircraft—144 fighter, 48 attack, 24 ASW/patrol, 20-40 tanker, 24 AEW, 24 EW, 32 helos, 4 COD, adjusted for specific missions.
Forget it, I doubt we will see another manned fighter for USN, they drank the kool aid and no way they will do the right thing!!! My guess, this is really what USN wants and they don't care if it doesn't work:
ReplyDeletehttps://www.defenseone.com/technology/2021/03/drones-could-one-day-make-40-carrier-air-wing-navy-says/172799/
I think this is the reason USN still buys the SH and keeps upgrading it compared to F35C, the fact its a 2 seater is a big plus if most of your fleet goes unmanned, its just too much to ask to fly and fight while "controlling" your unmanned wingman, having that second seat will force USN to keep SH and develop future variants, F35C won't stay around very long with USN....
USN needs a true interceptor/fighter and attack/strike with very long range, decent speed, good payload and moderate to good LO, the problem is these are heavy platforms by necessity, no way USN spends the money. They will prefer to go all in on Unmanned vehicles.
"and they don't care if it doesn't work"
DeleteThat is by far the saddest part of this whole situation.
I think that unless the US develops a defence against EMP weapons (which can be generated without the use of nuclear explosions now) it won't matter what gets developed. Especially if the US goes into the SCS where the chinese can use land-based generators which can be much larger.
ReplyDeleteEMP hardening has been around for some time and we used to do it routinely. We just need to begin doing it again.
DeleteHave you thought this through? You know that EMP is not discriminatory, right? A Chinese land based EMP burst would do far more damage to Chinese assets than to US.
Not a huge believer in EMP, just too much of a heavy hammer, too indiscriminate. I think far more likely are targeted hacking into radar, avionics,logistics supply chain etc....thats a lot more precise.
DeleteWe all question the ability to put a DF-21 on target... But if its ever possible to create a missile-carried EMP device, that could be problematic!! Even a rough guess at a CVBGs location, and some theatre saturation could wreak havoc. It would certainly be a case for having a lot of tugboats in the next shipbuilding budget!!
DeleteOut of curiosity I did a quick net surf, and found a Washington Times article that talked about Chinese EMP research and efforts, and it theorized that in fact, they were looking into coupling EMP generators and the DF-21 for use against American carrier groups...
Delete@Jjabatie. What's the advantage though of an EMP attack over a "traditional" saturation attack? If you get close enough with an EMP, its a mission kill but the AC still remains, no physical damage or casualties. Why would China do that, if you going to attack first, yiu might as well go all the way and use convention warheads and hope a few missiles get thru, that happens you probably also have a mission kill BUT the chances are better that you sunk the carrier, EMP cant sink a carrier....only maybe if you combine the 2 methods, that might work but I dont see the advantage of just using EMP alone....
DeleteA mission kill is good enough..plus itd be great CCP propaganda to see a CVBG towed home, along with the "benevolent PLAN that didnt kill thousands" of exploited capatalist sailors" angle. Handy ways to try and slant opinion against the agressive imperialists LOL...
DeleteThing about an airborne EMP is it doesnt have to be precise. Depending on device and altitude, it could cover a huge area, so "in the ballpark" is good enough...
Delete"so "in the ballpark" is good enough..."
DeleteNuclear based EMP is what you're describing. A nuke is detonated 20 miles up and the EMP effect area is very large. At that point, if an enemy is lobbing nuclear weapons, why bother with just the EMP? Drop the nuke on top of the target and get the blast effects, too.
The non-nuclear based EMP effects are very limited in area, on a relative basis although I've never found an exact description of what 'limited area' means.
I havent found much on the strength of a non-nuclear EMP. But if you had a general idea of a BG location, an area saturation could accomplish a lot. Setting of somthing at a two mile altitude, and considering just line of sight to the horizon, that covers 60k sq miles!! Obviously the effects would be minimal at the longer ranges, but some simple overlapped targeting gives you some good chances of success. If I was on the enemy team Id be all in on this. Being able to hurt a CVBG WITHOUT going nuclear seems a safer way to keep things conventional. While i dont believe they'll ever be used, what do you think our response would be to a nuclear attack on a BG??
DeleteThe CHAMP system can affect a building it's overflying at low level without affecting other buildings, so that's basically point blank range. CHAMP got upgraded to produce multiple bursts so a stronger single-burst device of that size is possible but quadruple the power only gives double the range so even DF-21 would have to basically put the EMP payload right on top of the target.
DeleteThe advantage of the EMP weapon for either side is largely political - we like to talk up how much we care about collateral damage, and the Chinese would like to be able to disable a CV without giving the US population Pearl Harbor Syndrome (the one where we start seeing red and flip the economy into war mode until the world remembers why we're the sole superpower). There may be merit in developing non-nuclear EMPs as penetration aids for ballistic missiles, but unless they were directed at a radar with laser-like focus they'd be too weak to function in the midcourse phase, and terminal intercepts of IRBM/ICBM are already unlikely due to their speed.
EMP and microwave emitters still have ways to go before they're reliable enough to be in frontline service.
DeleteThat being said, microwave emitters would be more useful then a EMP pulse because you can "aim" them somewhat and alter its performance characteristics,
power supply permitting.
Hardening and that they generate a rather large signature, in addition to some other limitations, are why development has stagnated on these types of projects.
"There is simply not enough flight training time for pilots to be supremely competent at both missions."
ReplyDeletePerhaps not an ideal solution, but couldn't the single-seat Super Hornets focus their training on the air-to-air mission and the twin-seat Super Hornets focus their training on the strike mission? Or, vice versa, as the case may be.
Wow! Different training, with different focus, for pilots of different aircraft. What a concept!
DeleteNot sure I'm wild about the specific dividing line you draw. I'd rather have actual different mission-built aircraft, but it is a heck of a concept.
@CDR. Been trying to find the break down in numbers ordered/delivered of E and F variants for SH. Supposedly they are virtually identical except for a little less range for the F but it would be interesting to see if USN has them mixed up in units or are more "segregated" by type...also saw on Wiki that USN says they saved 1$ billion by getting rid of all the other types of jets like S3s,A6s,F14s etc to just SHs....seemed to me penny wise, pound foolish.
DeleteI hate to say it but saving $1 billion isn't much compared to how much they spend.
Delete"I'd rather have actual different mission-built aircraft, but it is a heck of a concept."
DeleteI'm trying to make the best of what we have as opposed to what we'll never get.
How many pure fighters does the Navy need? Even with 10 carrier air wings (20 squadrons) plus training/transition aircraft that can't be more than 300 aircraft. In today's budget situation, it would be hard to justify that kind of investment in so few aircraft. And, being unique to the Navy, its not like it could be developed with the Marines or Air Force. The Marines don't need them since it's not their mission and the Air Force already have what works for them.
"10 carrier air wings"
DeleteJust a point of interest … there are currently only 9 active air wings.
"it would be hard to justify that kind of investment in so few aircraft."
It's not hard at all. It's an existential requirement, not a 'nice to have' wish list. The survival of the country depends on it so you pay the bill, whatever it is. You don't put a price on existence, you put the price and budget constraints on social programs and other idiotic stuff.
"... there are currently only 9 active air wings."
DeleteI know. That's why I said "Even with 10 air wings . . ." to bump the numbers up some.
I agree the Navy needs an air superiority fighter but I just don't see that as an affordable separate program given the low number of aircraft needed.
"That's why I said "Even with 10 air wings . . ." to bump the numbers up some."
DeleteOkay. Wiki lists the current inventory of F-18s as 532, by the way. Extra aircraft are always needed to replace those in depot. Training aircraft are also needed. So, to simply replace the current inventory, with no bump up, you would need 532 and that does not count F-35s.
Except, that number is for the entire Super Hornet fleet which includes both the E and F models. With end of the Block II production aircraft last April, the Navy had taken delivery of 322 one-seater F/A-18Es and 286 two-seated F/A-18Fs.
DeleteThe Navy needs 216 aircraft to field 2 12-plane squadrons per air wing (nine air wings). With 300 aircraft, that leaves 84 aircraft to fill two fleet replacement squadrons at 30 aircraft each and 2 test and evaluation squadrons at 12 aircraft each. Maybe you need a few more, but 300 is well within the ballpark.
You need quite a few more so that aircraft can rotate through depot maintenance.
DeleteIt would also be nice to have a sufficient supply of extra aircraft so that some degree of initial attrition could be made up in the event of war.
The Navy procured 322 F/A-18Es and fields 21 operational F/A-18E squadrons. The Navy needs only 18 squadrons of fighters to complete 9 air wings. But, for the sake of argument, let's call it 330 total.
DeleteI don't think that quantity justifies a dedicated development program.
Noting also the 1991 incident the F/A-18s were guided by an E-2 and shot down obsolete MiG-21s which had no AWACS, no decent radar, no BVR capability, no decent WVR (either R-3 or R-60) and whose French built ADS (KARI) was thoroughly compromised before the war even began!
ReplyDeleteAccording to the reports the MiGs didn't even manoeuvre initially. They were literally blind and got bushwhacked (all fair in love and war!).
Replace the MiG-21 with a Su-30/-35/J-10 and give the bad guy their own AWACS and the bombed up F/A-18s won't be so lucky.
Even the E-2 is at risk here especially as Chicom J-20 stealth jet seems to be designed as an AWACS/tanker killer (the Chicoms figured out western aircraft are short legged and that AEW&C is the main component of successful air superiority tactics).
I have some old book written not long after GW1 extolling that mission in the OP, to which is given the immediate reply- "Yeah, but that assumes a pretty incompetent enemy"
DeleteWe've been punching the special ed kids in the side of the head as they step off of the short bus for so long that we forget that there's a "peer-plus" adversary pumping firepower into the theatre, and they intend to use it.
F/A-18 is a multirole fighter jets. You can have some loaded with BVR anti aircraft missiles for air superiority, some loaded with ground attack weapons, some loaded with anti-ship missiles (old Harpoon, need a new one) , and some loaded with electronic warfare equipment - EG-18G
ReplyDelete"The most important lesson from the F-18 is not to try to build a do-everything, combination strike-fighter. We need to return to dedicated fighters and dedicated strike aircraft (if we even want strike aircraft ?!)."
ReplyDeleteExactly. I still think there is a (very much secondary) carrier strike mission, but it requires a very different aircraft from the air superiority fighter/interceptor airplane. The more missions you require an aircraft to do, the more expensive it becomes and the less effective it becomes at doing each of them.
For one thing, adding an additional mission almost automatically means getting bigger, and in general the smaller the stealthier. I still stick with my concept of different aircraft with different capabilities:
- Fighter/interceptor
- Attack/strike
- EW
- AEW
- Carrier-based patrol/ASW
- Land-based patrol/ASW
- Tanker
- "Marine A-10"
Except that the carrier-based patrol/ASW can double as a tanker, no two of them can really be the same airplane. And the F/A-18 can't really be any of them much longer, nor can the F-35. I wonder about the F-35C as a possible EW platform. It already has some fairly sophisticated electronics. Put an NFO where the lift fan goes on the B (since the pilot has enough todo flying the airplane), and load the bomb bay with additional fuel (so it has some legs) and electronics.
I still think the same aircraft can perform fighter and naval strike roles- with modern air defenses, a strike fighter needs stealth, speed, and agility to evade missiles from the Aegis cruiser analogues now in Chinese and Russian service, not to mention its own radar so it can find and target those Aegis analogues. The EW variant can use the same airframe- that will allow the jammers to keep up with the strike planes they protect, making them more useful, as the USAF learned with the EF-111.
DeleteThe AEW, COD, and tanker can share cockpits, wings, and tails- they all need a wide fuselage to accommodate radar operators (AEW), cargo (COD), and fuel tanks (tanker).
The Marines will be better served with a hybrid helicopter like the AH-56 Cheyenne, able to takeoff and land from amphibious assault ships, WITHOUT using the technologically risky and ruinously expensive VTOL technology the AV-8B (of which the USMC lost 1/3 to accidents), F-35B, and V-22 Osprey use. If the Marines insist they must operate ground attack planes from USN carriers, force them to either rely on USN aviators, or fuck off.
"The Marines will be better served with a hybrid helicopter like the AH-56 Cheyenne"
DeleteThat is an interesting idea.
I think the primary advantage, as you mentioned, is the Cheyenne's ability to take off and land vertically more efficiently than a VTOL aircraft. That ability to hover would also give some tactical flexibility.
But the Cheyenne would also bring some substantial drawbacks as well.
It's speed is about 1/2 of an A10, and it's payload is a fraction of that aircraft.
It would also be much more susceptible to damage, and there would be no realistic way to harden the rotors and the accompanying push-pull tubes and such.
As a former army scout helicopter pilot, the primary survivability advantage for combat helicopters is to stay unobserved by flying low and slow.
To engage the enemy, you take advantage of terrain and hover holes to pop-up, shoot, and then move on to another firing position.
At Fort Campbell they had an AH-56 at the museum, and it is a huge helicopter. Its speed advantage over other helicopters would be negated by its size, which would hinder its ability to stay hidden.
If I were making the decisions on what to do with CAS, I would limit Marine aviation to nothing but close air support and helicopters.
I would give them "low cost" fixed-wing aircraft for the missions. That would be a navalized A-10 and A-1 Skyraiders. They would be relatively low cost, carry enormous payloads, and be able to take damage.
I would take the newer, bigger LHA's and put an angled and lengthened flight deck on them. They would be CAS carriers and could go 50 miles out to sea and not have their mission hampered.
I would take the older LHA's and convert them to helicopter assault carriers. Due to the limited range/speed of rotary wing aircraft, they would need to be closer in towards shore, but still could have some standoff space.
These ships would not carry troops. They would have all the aviation fuel, munitions, maintenance, parts, and all of the logistics crap that goes with aircraft on board, but separated from the ground troops.
The infantry would then be on an assault transport, maybe with a well-deck for landing craft and a large landing pad on top. (this is sounding a lot like an LHA/LHD isn't it)
The helicopters would take off from the helo carrier, pick up the infantry from the transport, and then continue to shore.
Anyway, that's what I would do.
Lutefisk
"If I were making the decisions on what to do with CAS, I would limit Marine aviation to nothing but close air support and helicopters."
DeleteGood ideas. The USMC's ambition to SIMULTANEOUSLY be a second US Army AND a second USAF, imposed and still imposes ruinous costs upon the nation.
"I would give them 'low cost' fixed-wing aircraft for the missions. That would be a navalized A-10 and A-1 Skyraiders. They would be relatively low cost, carry enormous payloads, and be able to take damage."
The A-10s would certainly be better used and maintained in US Army than the USAF.
"I would take the newer, bigger LHA's and put an angled and lengthened flight deck on them. They would be CAS carriers and could go 50 miles out to sea and not have their mission hampered.
"I would take the older LHA's and convert them to helicopter assault carriers. Due to the limited range/speed of rotary wing aircraft, they would need to be closer in towards shore, but still could have some standoff space.
"These ships would not carry troops. They would have all the aviation fuel, munitions, maintenance, parts, and all of the logistics crap that goes with aircraft on board, but separated from the ground troops."
I'm not sure such ships will be cost-effective; the USN will certainly argue any money spent on them, will be be better used for traditional carriers and guided missile destroyers (the latter providing "close air support" by saturating a target with cruise missiles). But if it can launch an A-1 Skyraider or A-10, it can launch UCAVs as expendable surveillance and strike platforms- certainly a better use of resources than USS America (LHA-6).
"The infantry would then be on an assault transport, maybe with a well-deck for landing craft and a large landing pad on top. (this is sounding a lot like an LHA/LHD isn't it)."
DeleteThat actually sounds a lot like the French Mistral, although it carries a bunch of embarked helos. It's basically an LPH with a well deck.
"The helicopters would take off from the helo carrier, pick up the infantry from the transport, and then continue to shore."
DeleteSetting aside the vulnerability of helo assaults, this is not practical for an assault. Having helos land, one at a time, to load up troops would be a very time consuming exercise and you'd have helos hovering for an hour or so waiting for them all to get their loads of troops and gear. I assume you'd want all the troops to be transported and landed at the same time rather than fed into the assault one helo at a time, spaced out every ten or twenty minutes apart which would make for a very weak assault! Helos need to load, launch, and land simultaneously to have any chance of being effective. Again, this sets aside the demonstrated non-survivability of helos over a modern battlefield.
In my mind I was picturing flights of a few helicopters landing simultaneously. I didn't really think through it, so I should probably do that now.
DeleteMy experience is with the 101st Airborne, where I served on active duty. I think it would be fair to say that they are as good at this kind of thing as anyone.
But even though I was a pilot, I was in the Cavalry. We did the scouting and I don't think I ever watched the infantry brigades do these kinds of exercises.
But I did earn my Air Assault Badge where we did a couple of these assaults, so I do have a little bit of exposure to it (much of what we learned was about sling loads).
Ok, having said all that...I would think that those lift helicopters shouldn't be on the ship for very long.
A minute is an eternity to load infantry onto a helicopter if you're serious about what you're doing and practice it.
I don't know what helicopter the Marines use for infantry assault. The army uses the UH-60 which can carry a light infantry squad each.
The Marines seem to use the CH53, which is huge and would take up a lot of deck space. But they also look like they carry a full platoon+.
If that's correct, four of the CH53's would be able to carry a company of Marine infantry.
Even if you could only fit 2 at a time on the deck, it should still be possible to load a company from each transport ship in a few minutes.
I'm not all that knowledgeable about air assault lift logistics, but this seems possible to me.
Lutefisk
"I would think that those lift helicopters shouldn't be on the ship for very long."
DeleteTwo points:
1. Time on the deck is only one part of the total load/launch time. Landing a helo on a ship isn't quite like landing on land. The ship is a small target and it's sailing horizontally away from you and pitching vertically. The entire approach, landing, and takeoff is slower than on land. Take a look at some videos on YouTube and you'll get a feel for the process. I'm not saying it requires an hour to approach and land but it's not normally a ten second thing either!
2. While you'd like the actual troop loading to be quick, it takes a bit of time with today's heavily (excessively!) loaded troops. It's not like the Vietnam days of lightly loaded troops just hopping on a small Huey and sitting with their legs dangling outside while the helo lifts while the last guy is still climbing aboard. Getting today's heavily loaded troops aboard, settled, and secured takes some time.
"serious about what you're doing and practice it."
And that's the key, as you rightly note. I'm not aware that we're doing any serious practice. Every exercise video I see looks like a slow motion affair as we slowly load helos and, eventually, lift. To be fair, on an LHA there is no need for speed at the start of an assault so that's not really a problem. I'm more concerned with the assault landing portion and that's where I really don't think we're exercising realistically but I can't be sure.
Lastly, consider your own comments about survivability and now apply that thinking to troop laden helos that are, by comparison, big, slow, and not maneuverable. They'll be coming in high and slow. The attrition rate would be enormous against a peer defended landing. Consider the helo losses we suffered in assaults during Vietnam and they were not a peer defender. Another data point is the losses the Soviets took in Afghanistan. Or consider the Army's experience when the lost nearly an entire unit of helos in one action. Large, slow helos are just not survivable which makes the entire concept of helo assault highly questionable. Of course, you could land the troops well away from the enemy but what does that accomplish?
Helo assaults might be viable against terrorists but seem impractical against a peer defender.
Lots to talk about from your post...
DeleteFirst thought is the one you made about landing on the ship.
Pinnacle landings are always a little bit tricky.
But a pinnacle landing where the landing point is moving, probably also up and down with the wave action (even a couple of feet is a lot), and possibly turbulence in the wind caused by the superstructure? That's a tough gig.
Second thought, the Marines would need to get more like the 101st and learn to get their asses on and off those aircraft quickly, like sprinting quickly.
Third thought dovetails with what you are saying about the value of the air assault during an amphibious landing.
Why are they even doing it?
I didn't address the value of it, just took it for granted that it was important...but is it?
The Marines are using too big an aircraft. It would be the same as the army using Chinooks for air assault.
They never would do that. Too big a target, too much wind on the LZ's from the big rotors, too much combat power lost when one gets shot down.
I can see a place for limited air assaults to seize key objectives behind the beaches. Using a historical example, the airborne drops behind Normandy but on a much, much more limited scale.
But whenever you drop troops behind the FEBA you have created a 'rescue mission' scenario that can quickly become a 'hostage crisis'. Think Operation Market-Garden.
I don't think you want to do very much of it.
Another point, I don't think that amphibious assaults can be done against a peer defender, but I also don't think they ever have been.
Even in WW2 we never, at least to my knowledge, made an amphibious assault without local air superiority.
I would maintain the Marines' amphibious ability. Of course, that means I would maintain the Marine Corps as well. They are too good at creating a tough fighting force to throw it away.
The amphibious operations I would anticipate would be things like landing in hostile territory.
Not a landing near Shanghai, but maybe in the Philippines, or Malaysia to help Singapore, or re-seizing Okinawa, or maybe the Middle East for some reason, or anything else I can't envision right now. But it is an arrow I want in my national defense quiver.
In a non-peer scenario, I also wonder how valuable air assault is for the Marines? If you really need to fight an air mobile war like that, where you're landing in hot LZ's, just deploy the 101st. That is their specialty.
This speaks a little to force structure.
In my military, the army and marines would complement each other.
The army would be heavy and mechanized. Three or four armor divisions, three or four mechanized infantry divisions, three armored cavalry regiments, and three divisions worth of light infantry (airborne, air assault, and rangers mix). They'd rid themselves of nearly all of that wheeled crap that they've become infatuated with while patrolling in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Their job is to fight the nation's land battles, and for that they need superior armored forces. The US isn't likely to be compromised by losing a light infantry fight is some jungle somewhere, but it could be from losing a big battle fight with a well-armed foe.
That means winning with armored forces.
I'd maintain three divisions of marines. They'd be split between light infantry and medium heavy forces. That would mean that I'd give them the Stryker family of vehicles cast-off by the army.
That mix to me would seem to fit the mission of the marine corps of seizing a foothold in a territory and then handing the fight over to the army.
In a less than peer fight (even in a peer war) the light marines and light army forces could be supported by the wheeled light armor Strykers of the marines.
Kind of all over the place with this, but I really enjoy this kind of discussion. Thanks for the great blog.
Lutefisk
"value of the air assault during an amphibious landing.
DeleteWhy are they even doing it?"
Why indeed? Bear in mind that helo forces are, by definition, VERY LIGHT infantry and that is not an assault force that is likely to succeed on its own as it lacks firepower and logistic sustainment (as well as being non-survivable). So, the only reasonable scenario for helo assault is a very lightly defended (low end third world or terrorist) target. At this point, you have to ask yourself whether you can justify the mind boggling cost of maintaining an amphibious fleet that is only useful against a very, very low end threat? Of course, I'm neglecting the well deck/waterborne component but it's not all that much better since LCACs are, by doctrine, relegated to follow on support, not initial assault.
"The Marines are using too big an aircraft."
The Marine air assault aircraft of choice is the MV-22, not a helo. The MV-22 is about as far away from being assault suitable as you can imagine. Check out the landing spacing requirements, for example. The old days of Vietnam Hueys landing rotor tip to rotor tip in massed assaults is a far distant dream. Each MV-22 needs almost an entire football field of its own to land. What kind of scattered assault is that going to produce. Look at the landing profile of a MV-22. Talk about hanging out high and dry!
"airborne drops behind Normandy"
Those succeeded, to the limited extent they did, only due to the massive relief force (the main assault force) that was able to hook up with them with a day. We do not have that type of relief force capacity today which renders the 'behind the lines' drop suspect, to say the least, and suicidal, to say the worst.
"Even in WW2 we never, at least to my knowledge, made an amphibious assault without local air superiority."
That is one of the conditions for a successful assault. If you can't achieve that, you have no business assaulting.
"They are too good at creating a tough fighting force to throw it away."
That should be past tense. They were a tough fighting force. They are not now. They have allowed myriad social issues to drag them down to everyone else's level, as we've documented on this blog.
" just deploy the 101st."
And that's the crux of the issue. If you aren't doing frontal amphibious assaults, then you aren't doing anything unique so why do we need the Marines? The Army can assault anywhere in the world on less notice than the Marines and do it better and with more support, if we're only doing airborne assaults.
"That means winning with armored forces."
Unfortunately, we're substituting networks and data for firepower. The Marines have totally dropped their tanks and much of their artillery. They are now a very light infantry force and would hugely overmatched against any armored force or even a mechanized infantry force.
MV-22 for air assault. Ugh.
DeleteI'm without words.
"you have to ask yourself whether you can justify the mind boggling cost of maintaining an amphibious fleet that is only useful against a very, very low end threat?"
That's the key to this, I suppose.
It's the opportunity cost that is the killer.
If each America class LHA costs about $4 billion, you have to wonder if it's worth it.
You could build Des Moines class cruisers. You could put twenty or more F-22's on super carrier decks for that.
If I'm the Dept of Defense, maybe I maintain the Marine Corps to fulfill half of the light infantry needs (other half army), but greatly reduce the amphibious naval commitment?
Not eliminate the capability completely, so it can be expanded in the future if necessary. But with much reduced numbers (and cost).
Interesting food for thought.
Lutefisk
CNO, I was looking for information about how much it costs to have that amphibious ability we were discussing (I found that to be a huge undertaking, btw).
DeleteI stumbled onto this 2011 thesis by a student at the Naval Postgraduate School.
It documents Operation and Support costs for various classes on navy ships.
It seems like it touches on a lot of the things that get discussed here.
You may already be familiar with this. But if you're not, here's the link:
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a556074.pdf
Lutefisk
"I stumbled onto this 2011 thesis by a student at the Naval Postgraduate School."
DeleteYeah, I've got that one but thanks for keeping an eye out for good data sources. Unfortunately, this is not a great source. There are a lot of problems with the report beginning with the fact that the author doesn't do a good job of describing the factors that go into the various cost categories and their relative impacts. For example, what is the manpower cost for a single sailor? Should be an easy question to answer, right? But it's not. Salary should be included, obviously, but what else? Do you include the cost of training when the sailor is not on the ship? What about travel/relocation costs? Retirement benefits? And so on. I've seen ridiculous variation in manpower man-year costs ranging from around $150,000 on up to several hundred thousand dollars, depending on what point the particular source was trying to make. The short of it is that manning and overall operating costs can be any number you want them to be. Should the cost of operating a drydock be distributed across the ships in the fleet as part of their operating costs since its a necessary support item? And so on.
There were some interesting tidbits in the thesis but nothing really useful. Maybe you have a different take on it?
"I was looking for information about how much it costs to have that amphibious ability"
DeleteThe cost is whatever you want it to be. For example, in order to have an amphibious ability we need a Marine Corps so, the entire budget of the Marine Corps is part of the 'cost to have that', if you choose to include it. Or, you have to have Joint Chiefs planning to use an amphibious force so do you include the entire cost of the Joint Chiefs administration? Or, do you just include whatever equipment is actually embarked on the amphibious ships? But what about the tanker fleet that supports the amphibious force. And so on. You can make the cost whatever you want it to be.
If you're arguing against it, pile on the associated costs and then claim it's too expensive. If you're arguing for it, just include the bare minimum, immediate costs and maybe even depreciate them and then claim it's a very cheap bargain.
You see why cost discussions are almost pointless?
"There were some interesting tidbits in the thesis but nothing really useful. Maybe you have a different take on it?"
DeleteNot really, it was the first time I'd seen anything like that, so I was just taking it in.
One shortcoming I noticed as I glanced through it was that it didn't explain the causes of the maintenance cost spikes, or really anything else.
Maybe the paper was intended to be of limited scope, or had a page or word count limitation...but it definitely invoked a bunch of questions in my mind.
"You see why cost discussions are almost pointless?"
I sure do.
To be fair, the F-18 was build to complement the F-14 not replace it. That it was forced to take over the latter's role is an administrative issue rather than a design one.
ReplyDeletePlus flight hours issue an issue that can be remedied, in 2016 the annual flight hours of the USAF pilots was 150 hours, or 3 hours a week, so is might be possible to change that to 4-5 hours a week. 200 hours is already the bare minimum required.
The legacy F/A-18s were designed to replace the A-7 on the carrier decks. They also had the virtue of being a light fighter, supplementing the F-14 in the air-to-air mission and effectively increasing the number of fighters available. And while the F-14 had poor availability rates (it was known as a hangar queen), the first few decades of the legacy Hornet's life had comparatively higher availability rates.
DeleteIn that regard, the "Naval Strike Fighter" concept was extremely successful.
If availability rates are the end all be all of air to air combat then we might as well settle for WW2 props which are by far more readily available and easy to maintain.
DeleteThat being said, I agree that the F/A-18 original goal was not to eventually replace the F-14, but in war there is no prize for second place.
I would say lets maintain a variation of the F-18 concept in the future, but bring back the F-14 as well.
The Air Force has had the same notions about multi-role aircraft and do their own misinterpretation.
ReplyDeleteThey like to point to the success of the F-4 and, F-15 as multi-role aircraft.
But the F-4 was not a great fighter. I love it as my Dad spent 35 years of his life making parts for it, but it wasn’t really even meant to be a fighter. It was an interceptor. A fighter and interceptor were not the same thing back in those days. The Interceptor wasn’t meant to dog fight just climb and fly fast and hopefully shoot an enemy bomber in the face with a missile at long range. It’s shortcoming is part of what led to Top Gun as we trained our way past its shortcomings. It did okay with strike because as an interceptor it was overpowered, huge, and had a backseater, all of which are good for carrying and using a decent payload. This was as more luck and Douglas’s propensity for overbuilding than genuinely designing a multi-role
The F-15 was designed with “not a pound for air-to-ground” as its development motto. But its need for insanely rapid climb (for the time period) and high energy for ACM and a long range simply gave it some good bones to start with. When the Israelis bombed Hussein’s nuclear reactor, the F-15s were earlier A models and provided CAP, they didn’t bomb because it wasn’t yet a strike aircraft. But that big airframe, engines and the option of a second seat gave it potential. The F15E was almost a redesign in terms of changes to make it a strike fighter.. In fact the F-15 strike variants aren’t really the equivalent of an attack planes so much as the equivalent of a medium bomber.
A big frame with lots of excess thrust and good range made the F-4 and F-15 useful for conversion to a strike fighter. The F-18 A-D, didn’t have this. F-18E does but lacks the range.The Navy could have an A-18 where they do a ground up rebuild of the F-18E/F with a strike only mission like was done with the F-15, but it is not really one at the moment. The F-35 is just a stealth strike aircraft like the F-117. The F-35 has the same limitations as the F-117 in terms of payload but without the range of an F-117. The 35 has an enormous engine but judging by the performance must have lead as a major structural metal.
An F-35 has just matched a record set by the F-11F back in 1956 -- it has shot itself with its own gun!!
ReplyDeletehttps://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/39920/a-marine-f-35b-fighter-jet-accidentally-shot-itself-with-its-own-gun-pod
Unlike the F-11F Tiger, however, it did not shoot itself down -- only a self-inflicted "mission kill" and a hideous amount of damage.