The Avenger was the proposed A-6 Intruder replacement from
the McDonnell Douglas/General Dynamics team.
It was to be an upgraded, stealthy, A-6 that could fly faster and
further than the Intruder though, apparently, not by a huge margin. Its main improvement was to have been
stealth. You can see in the picture
below that it was a flying triangle with smooth, blended surfaces, two engines,
and internal weapon bays. From Wiki, the
dimensions/specs were 38 ft long, 70 ft wingspan (36 ft folded), 39,000 lbs
empty weight, 5160 lbs internal weapon capacity (A-6 had 18,000 lbs weapons
capacity, all external), 800 nm range (this must be combat radius; by
comparison, the A-6 is credited with a combat range, presumably meaning radius,
of 878 nm).
However, the initial specs were much more ambitious.
… the initial
requirements for the A-12 called for an aircraft with a 1,700 nautical mile
combat radius and an internal payload of 6,000 lbs with a radar cross section
comparable to the Northrop B-2 Spirit strategic bomber. (4)
Technical problems conspired to reduce the A-12 capabilities
to 1000 nm unrefueled combat radius and, eventually, to perhaps as low as 785
nm. (4)
 |
| A-12 Avenger |
The A-12 had two main weapon bays, each designed to carry
one HARM and one strike weapon with the bay sized to fit any weapon in the Navy
inventory. In addition, there were two outer
self defense bays which would each hold one AMRAAM. Thus, the A-12 would have been a
self-escorting aircraft with capability against both land (SAM) and air threats
with two HARMS and two AMRAAMs. The main
strike weapons could have included guided or unguided bombs, Standoff Land Attack Missiles (SLAM – land
attack version of Harpoon), etc. that could strike defended targets from close
in or stand off distances.
Actual development and production efforts began in
1988. By 1990, the program was in
trouble due to excessive weight, radar problems, advanced avionics delays, and
runaway costs. The program was cancelled
in Jan 1991. Years of litigation between
the manufacturer and the Navy ensued.
 |
| A-12 Avenger |
Cancellation of the A-12 permanently removed long range
strike from the list of carrier capabilities and naval aviation has never
recovered. Termination of the A-12,
while certainly a proper and wholly justified decision, negatively and, thus
far, permanently impacted carrier strike capability, rendering carrier strike a
short to medium range capability instead of long range, stealthy, penetrating capability.
The two biggest problems were excessive weight, reportedly
30% overspec, and problems with the Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar (ISAR).
Excessive weight was, apparently, due in large part to the
failure of new composite materials to achieve anticipated structural
performance and weight savings. (3) Some
composite structural elements had to be replaced by heavier metal versions
which lead to increased weight.
Now for the fun part.
Let’s speculate a bit. What if,
instead of insisting on leap ahead non-existent technology, we had settled for
state of the (then) art materials and electronics? In other words, the 80% solution instead of
the 110% one or good instead of perfect.
Here’s what we could have done to achieve a very good aircraft using
existing technology.
Radar. Instead of the ISAR, what if we had installed
the APG-70 radar that was installed on the F-15E Strike Eagle that was built
around the same time? It was a highly
effective radar. Here’s a brief
description of the APG-70.
Gate
array technology enables the APG-70 to incorporate modes not available in
earlier radars while providing greatly enhanced operational capabilities in
other modes.
The
APG-70 radar system allows aircrews to detect ground targets from long ranges.
One feature of this system is that after a sweep of a target area, the crew
freezes the air-to-ground map then goes back into air-to-air mode to clear for
air threats. During the air-to-surface weapon delivery, the pilot is capable of
detecting, targeting and engaging air-to-air targets while the WSO designates
the ground target.
…
during Operation Desert Storm … Pilots claimed the APG-70 attack radar in the
F-15E and the APG-68 in the F-16 offered "phenomenal" range and
resolution. In interviews, they proclaimed "if it had metal in it, we
could find it," and "with the APG-70, you could tell from 30 miles
away whether a MiG-sized target had weapons or fuel tanks on it." (1)
Composites. Instead of non-existent composite materials
to achieve stealth and weight savings, what if we had gone with existing
conventional materials and relied on shaping and internal weapons carry to
achieve stealth? Flying wing designs
have been demonstrated to be inherently quite stealthy, dating back to the
late-WWII German Horten HO 229. There is
no reason to believe that adequate stealth and acceptable weight could not have
been achieved.
Wing Fold. The wing fold mechanism was, apparently, a
major source of excess weight in that it had a complex, convoluted design. What if, instead of that design, we had gone
with a simple, straight forward design like any other folding wing Navy
plane? I don’t know the specifics of the
fold issue but folding wings are something that the Navy mastered long ago and
should not have been a problem had we simply stuck to the basics.
Avionics. Instead of non-existent advanced avionics
displays, what if we had used the same avionics as in the F-15E Strike Eagle?
Engines. Reports suggest that the A-12 was
significantly underpowered. (5)
The aircraft
was designed to have two General Electric F412-GE-D5F2 turbofans, each
producing about 13,000 lbf (58 kN) thrust … (2)
As an alternative, the F-15E Strike Eagle used 2× Pratt & Whitney F100-PW-220
afterburning turbofans
each producing 14,590 lbf (64.9 kN) thrust (Wiki). Substituting the F-15E engines into the A-12
would have provided a bit over 12% more thrust for the A-12. Even using older engines, such as the F-111
Aardvark’s 2× Pratt & Whitney TF30-P-100 turbofans
with 17,900 lbf (79.6 kN) each would have provided 38% more
thrust. What effect, good or bad,
alternate engines with differing fuel efficiencies would have had on the A-12’s
range is unknown but the point is that the power issue could have been easily
solved with existing engines.
There you have it.
Had we gone ahead with the A-12 using then current, state of the art
equipment we could have had a long range, penetrating, stealth attack plane
that, with suitable upgrades, would still surpass any other strike aircraft in
the world, including (you F-35 fanboys might want to turn your heads for a
moment) the F-35. Consider the following
characteristics for our notional A-12, built as we’ve described.
Stealth. We can only speculate about the A-12’s
stealth level, however, the flying wing form of the A-12 would far exceed the
F-35 stealth level and would do so from all aspects as opposed to the F-35
which is optimized for frontal stealth and is reportedly far less stealthy from
other aspects. Perhaps only the B-2
would equal the A-12 stealth levels.
Updates, including modern stealth coatings would further enhance the
stealth levels.
Range. This one is pure speculation but it’s
interesting to note that even the most downgraded range estimate is
significantly greater than the F-35 or F-18.
More likely, with appropriate engines and considering the lift imparted
by the flying wing, the combat radius would be in the 1000+ nm realm. Upgrades with more modern engines would
further enhance the range. Even the
F-15E Strike Eagle, listed at 700+ nm range is only at the very low end of the
A-12 range estimates. Recall that the A-12
was designed to have greater range than the A-6 which is credited with 800-900
nm combat radius. This suggests, again,
that a 1000+ nm range for the A-12 is not unreasonable.
Radar/Sensors. Using then state of the art radar and sensors
would have provided the A-12 with very capable sensing, equal to the F-15, for
example, and upgrades, as has been done for the Hornet and F-15E would have
kept the A-12 as good as any aircraft.
The sensor suite would have been state of the art but not some kind of
magical, unattainable capability – just darn good.
Weapons. The self-escorting design of the A-12 is
intriguing although, as regular readers know, I’m not a fan of multi-purpose
platforms. The drawback to the
self-escorting capability is that every weapon dedicated to self-escort (air to
air missiles and anti-radiation missiles) detracts from an already limited
weapons payload of 5,000-6,000 lbs.
Although the program never advanced far enough, presumably the A-12
would have been given external pylons for larger weapon loads in more
permissive environments, as was done for the F-35.
The internal weapons payload limitations are an inherent
problem for all smaller stealth aircraft like the A-12 and F-35. The 5,000 lb or so limits are dwarfed by the
15,000-20,000+ lb payloads of conventional aircraft.
Summary. We see, then, that it would have been
possible to build a very stealthy, very long range strike aircraft that, even
today, would be the best in the world for its size. The weapons payload would have been adequate,
though nothing special, given the requirement for internal carry. Radar and sensors would have been state of
the art, for the time, and upgrades would have maintained that status. In short, we could have had a very good
aircraft that would still be the standard for strike aircraft today.
More importantly, the A-12 would have kept long range,
penetrating, carrier strike aviation in the game instead of being woefully
short ranged and ineffective as is the case today.
The key to achieving this very good, but not magical,
aircraft would have been to resist the temptation to design around non-existent
technology and, instead, use existing, then state of the art equipment. The only saving grace from the A-12 debacle
is that at least we didn’t engage in concurrent production and
development. We were able to cancel the
program before we committed to vast numbers of unachievable aircraft as we’ve
done with the F-35.
The lesson from the A-12 is crystal clear: build with existing technology and leave
non-existent technology in the R&D world until it’s ready. Had we done so, we could have had a very good
attack aircraft, quite likely the best in the world – it just wouldn’t have
been magical but it would have existed and been better than anything else and
certainly better than the nothing that we got.
And a EA-12D electronic attack & HARM shooter and KA-12D tanker, meaning less worn out F/A-18s.
ReplyDeleteThe Navy seems to approach the FFG(X) in the same way you're suggesting for the A-12. Tell industry what the Navy wants, and then ask industry if it's practical.Then listen. Even if McDonnell Douglas/General Dynamics weren't honest, Northrup/Grumman would've provided sufficient warning to avoid such a fiasco. Who knows? Maybe they did? A long time ago I talked to a guy who worked for General Dynamics. I brought up the A-12. He rolled his eyes.
ReplyDelete"He rolled his eyes."
DeleteThe engineers had to know that what they were doing didn't make sense. The question is who was pushing the stupidity? Was it the manufacturer, the Navy, or both?
The manufacturer had to have known that the project would be cancelled if they didn't get it under control and yet they didn't do that. Or, maybe they miscalculated about whether the Navy would actually cancel the program?
It was completely in the manufacturer's best interest to produce a viable aircraft rather than risk cancellation so I tend to think it was the Navy that was leading the push to stupidity. That said, I'm sure the manufacturer didn't exactly discourage the Navy, as long as the funding kept rolling in. So, again, maybe a miscalculation on the part of the manufacturer?
Yes, the FFG(X) does seem to be following the existing technology approach and, if they stick to it, ought to produce a viable ship. Cost, of course, is almost a separate issue and usefulness absolutely is a separate issue.
Read the Case Study - The Navy runs Aground in Jim Burton's book The Pentagon Wars. The amount of deceit on the part of the Senior Navy Management (NOT leaders) is just sickening. That is why the engineer was rolling his eyes. Just one tidbit - they actually stages F-15 parts and stands in a hanger to show SecDef Cheney that the A-12 was under construction.
DeleteAll this makes me think about Kelly Johnson's comment about the Navy. It might be apocryphal, I've not read the book.
Delete"According to the book "Skunk Works" the 15th rule is: "Starve before doing business with the damned Navy. They don't know what the hell they want and will drive you up a wall before they break either your heart or a more exposed part of your anatomy."
"The internal weapons payload limitations are an inherent problem for all smaller stealth aircraft like the A-12 and F-35. The 5,000 lb or so limits are dwarfed by the 15,000-20,000+ lb payloads of conventional aircraft."
ReplyDeleteWhile the A-12 might not have been able to carry any external stores, the F-35C can carry 18,000 lbs of combined internal and external stores. Slightly better than what the A-7E could carry.
The A-12 never made it past the mock up stage. There is no reason to believe it wouldn't have been fitted with external pylons.
DeleteThat said, if the environment is permissive enough that external weapons are appropriate, then you don't need a stealth aircraft. The value of a stealth aircraft is the weapons payload it can carry and still maintain its stealth signature.
One could build a larger stealth aircraft to carry 15,000 to 20,000 lbs internally, but it likely wouldn't be carrier capable due to the larger and heavier airframe that would be required.
DeleteWhile it's true that fighter-size stealth aircraft are limited to what they can carry internally, its unfair to compare that limitation to conventional aircraft. One advantage stealth aircraft have over conventional aircraft is their ability to operate in both permissive and non-permissive environments. Despite its many faults, the F-35 is the first carrier capable aircraft that can operate in a non-permissible environment.
"its unfair to compare that limitation to conventional aircraft."
DeleteIt's completely fair! However, what we're overlooking is the mission. For a given mission, of course we'll compare various aircraft to see which can best accomplish the mission. If all we want is a bomb truck in a permissive environment, a stealth aircraft is not the best choice. If we want a penetrating aircraft for a high threat environment then a conventional aircraft is not the best choice. And so on. It all depends on what mission we're asking the aircraft to perform.
Stealth aircraft, because of the internal carry requirement, represent a compromise between firepower and survivability with the emphasis on survivability. Conventional aircraft are a compromise, as well, with the emphasis on firepower. Which one you want depends on what mission you're trying to perform.
The huge problem with talking about operating in both permissive and non-permissive environment is wear and tear. Every hour you use on milk runs is an hour you don't have for training for or use in high end environments.
Delete"problem with talking about operating in both permissive and non-permissive environment is wear and tear."
DeleteQuite right. This is where the Super Tucano or something similar comes in. The Air Force, however, is extremely reluctant (refusing?) to pursue this eminently reasonable option.
One possibility is to use navalized Tucanos on carriers. Dual hat the F-18/F-35 pilots and add maintainers for the prop jobs. There is plenty of room for the extra planes and maintainers. When you can use the props and when you need capability use the higher end A/C.
Delete"One possibility is to use navalized Tucanos on carriers."
DeleteYes and no. Yes, we ought to be using navalized Tucanos or something similar, operating from carriers. However, no, we shouldn't be operating them from Nimitz/Ford carriers. I've posted on this. Just as we need a very low end aircraft for peacetime, so too, we need a very low end carrier for those aircraft instead of wearing out a supercarrier. We need a WWII Essex type carrier (maybe an escort type, depending on what air wing size we think we need) that's small and basic.
If you're looking for a high-low mix for carrier aircraft, bring back the A-7. In addition to being a bomb truck, it can double as a tanker.
Delete"If you're looking for a high-low mix for carrier aircraft, bring back the A-7."
DeleteNo, we're looking for a peace-war mix. The peace aircraft would be a very, very, very, very, very, cheap aircraft that is, on a relative basis, free to purchase and operate. Hence, a Tucano or something similar.
Then bring back a modernized OV-10, which was quite successful for its day.
Delete"Then bring back a modernized OV-10"
DeleteYes. Yes yes yes yes yes.
From: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_American_Rockwell_OV-10_Bronco
"The aircraft's design supported effective operations from forward bases. The OV-10 can perform short takeoffs and landings, including on aircraft carriers and large-deck amphibious assault ships[5] without using catapults or arresting wires"
Now, I'm not sure what it's payload might be, but in one fell swoop it turns our large deck 'phibs into platforms that can handle low intensity conflict and keep hours off of more expensive aircraft.
And, as an aside, it might give naval crews on those 'phibs at least some low intensity combat experience.
It seems completely insane that they didnt go with the A-6F and A-7F as low-risk, lower-cost stop gaps while maybe just kicking the A-12 program a decade down the road.
ReplyDeleteThe failure of the Navy to go with the A6F is just mind boggling.
Deletehttp://aviationintel.com/it-could-have-been-the-a-6f-intruder-ii/
With the F-404 an F intruder was predicted to have better range. It also would have simplified logistics.
Now, it wasn't stealth. But even now I bet the carriers would be happier with a 1000nm range F class intruder onto which they could put standoff weapons.
Perfect? No. Maybe a 70% solution. But I'd argue better than the all hornet airwing.
AND kept the 26,000 pound refueling capability of the KA6D. To me, that capability lost was as great as weapons-carrying because without lots of fuel aloft, you have no extra fuel over target to evade if anything goes wrong on the way in or out. You HAVE to have gas after launch and you frequently need gas to get back and the greatest impediment since the A6 demise has been gas aloft. It affects everything.
DeleteA program of actual R&D, not intending to provide a front-line aircraft, to develop and demonstrate long range, LO, flying wing 2-seat jets with CATOBAR capability, sized to Nimitz elevators, could have likely produced something that could inform the development of a real A-12.
ReplyDeleteR&D is a different creature than a design and development effort, as the travails of concurrency demonstrate to us.
Now we have the F-35 and MQ-25 to pin upon our hopes of “long-range” naval aviation.
I frankly admire the Air Superiority Carrier concept, but I wonder what direction our discussions of the future of naval aviation would take if we had the more achievable A-12 of this post.
The Navy needed three different aircraft:
ReplyDelete1) A stealthy long-range attack airplane;
2) A nimble fighter/interceptor; and
3) An aircraft that can operate off short and poorly prepared surfaces, for the Marines.
By trying to make the F-35 be all three, you end up with something that is not as good as any of three specially-designed aircraft would have been. The motivation behind the F-35 was supposedly to cut design costs by building one airplane. But by the time all the adjustments and change orders are costed out, I'm not sure there will be any savings there. The A-12 could have been the attack version of that airplane for at least a while.
"The Navy needed three different aircraft:"
DeleteRemember that at the time of the A-12, meaning 1988-90, the Navy had a young, capable long range interceptor, the F-14, which had entered service in 1974 and brand new aircraft were still being manufactured through 1991. Thus, the Navy had no need for a new fighter and, if they did, they didn't need a small (I assume that goes with 'nimble') fighter - they needed what every carrier has always needed, a long range interceptor for the outer layer defense ring. They had what they needed in the F-14.
I agree that the stealthy, long range penetrating attack aircraft was a valid need, at the time (it no longer is given the advent of the Tomahawk).
As far as a Marine aircraft, I'm very dubious that a dedicated Marine small airfield aircraft is of any value. The fantasy of hidden jungle bases is just that, a fantasy. Marine air support should be provided by Navy carrier air. I know the Marines are institutionally paralyzed by fear that the Navy will abandon them in another Guadalcanal but that doesn't justify the creation of an entire private air force just for the Marines. What it justifies is establishing some viable amphibious assault doctrine which includes providing air support from carriers. Further, if the Marines do want their own air support, it should be a purpose designed, heavily armed and armored close air support aircraft - gee, it almost sounds like I'm describing a Marine A-10!
Had the Navy pursued proposed upgrades to the F-14 Tomcat, less the Marine requirement, we would have had an aircraft with many of the capabilities of the A-12 and F-35 that much earlier. Your Super Tomcat Today post is worth a read.
DeleteYou read about all the failed programs that Navy has done and you wonder just how the heck they ever got programs like the Tomcat, intruder, Nautilus or Nimitz to work.
DeleteHow did the organization that recruited and trained people like 'Tomcat' Connolly, willing to put their career on the line for a better aircraft, fail so utterly to pass on that culture?
"The motivation behind the F-35 was supposedly to cut design costs by building one airplane."
DeleteIt would be very interesting to see a study that looked at if that has ever worked in the modern era.
If I remember correctly, did not the major problem start with the technical information supplied to the manufacturers about such key information wrong. There was differences between information supplied and the actual material strength in tension and compression and the strength of bonding when glued. And that the USAF had all this information from the B-2 Spirit development program, but refused to share it with the USN.
ReplyDelete"The lesson from the A-12 is crystal clear: build with existing technology and leave non-existent technology in the R&D world until it’s ready. Had we done so, we could have had a very good attack aircraft, quite likely the best in the world – it just wouldn’t have been magical but it would have existed and been better than anything else and certainly better than the nothing that we got."
ReplyDeleteAnd, of course, we learned that lesson so well that we didn't repeat that mistake with the LCS or the Ford or the Zumwalt or the F-35.
Here's the question I want answered--What happens when the balloon goes up? Time and again, we've seen that what works in combat is reliability, not gee-whiz magic. So where are the proved, reliable systems that are going to win the next war? Oh, that's right, we haven't been in the war-winning business for a while.
"Here's the question I want answered--What happens when the balloon goes up? Time and again, we've seen that what works in combat is reliability, not gee-whiz magic. So where are the proved, reliable systems that are going to win the next war? Oh, that's right, we haven't been in the war-winning business for a while."
ReplyDeleteI hate to be Donnie Downer, but the way things are now, I think a lot of people are going to die in a peer war while we pay for the mistakes of our past, and people who can fight are elevated.
The bigger question to me this time is if we have the time or the will to pay that price in order to win.
Very interesting post and commentary, and useful if it informs future procurements. As an acquisition person, A-12 offered many lessons. The Beach Report done by Navy Secretariat General Counsel Chester Paul Beach offers a fascinating look at how the program departed the rails - basic ignoring/suppressing of all the indicators and data that were apparent, behavior bordering on professional malpractice and a lack of ethics. The old adage that bad news does not get better with time applies, and no one had the courage or conviction to disclose the problems to leadership, because it would "upset" them. Read this for a peek at what happened in the program: https://www.imanet.org/-/media/e7339e46d464424abdb11ad3ed623a3b.ashx
ReplyDeleteYour premise about using state of the art rather than developmental technology is right on. At the very least, with so much developmental content, they picked an inappropriate contract vehicle (FPI) that put huge risk on industry for something which was a real technical reach. And then were "shocked" by how industry behaved. Cancellation was the right move, but hammered the Navy, as you point out. This is a perfect example of why I'm suspicious of/cautious about "transformational" new tech. Need tech to help pace threats, but need it to work above all.
By "transformational" do mean the Fabulous LCS the Zummwalts or the Great F35 the military Never ever seems to learn from it's own stupid mistakes
DeleteMy guess is poor lateral control to land on aircraft carriers, a problem with flying wings. Rudders mean something.
ReplyDeleteThe X-47B is, essentially, the same aircraft and the Navy had embraced it for carrier work.
Delete"Composites. Instead of non-existent composite materials to achieve stealth and weight savings, what if we had gone with existing conventional materials and relied on shaping and internal weapons carry to achieve stealth?"
ReplyDeleteIf the aircraft was already 30% overweight, I don't see how using more conventional materials would improve that situation. And, with a flying-wing design, I'm not sure how much help shaping would be either.
Being 30% overweight is a tough gap for any program to close.
It was 30% overweight because they designed it that way, meaning they designed it to use magic, weightless composites. Had they designed it from the start to use conventional materials there would have been no weight problem. We built every aircraft before the A-12 and every one immediately after with conventional materials and none of them had any undue weight issues.
DeleteIf you design an aircraft to be a given weight with magic composites then, sure, you'll be overweight if you try to substitute heavier materials at the last moment. However, if you design with conventional materials from the start then you'll design an acceptable weight in from the start just as we did with every other aircraft.
The magic composites are one more example of something that should have been left in the lab until it was ready.
"with a flying-wing design, I'm not sure how much help shaping would be either. "
Huh???? The flying wing was inherently stealthy just because of its shape! I'm saying we should have stuck with just the shaping for stealth instead of trying to wish-fit fantasy composites for even more magic stealth. The flying wing shape alone would have offered unheard of levels of stealth, for its time. We could have also played around with shaping of bay and wheel well openings (the sawtooth outlines that we see today) to squeeze out a bit more stealth, if we even knew about it then.
"It was 30% overweight because they designed it that way, meaning they designed it to use magic, weightless composites. Had they designed it from the start to use conventional materials there would have been no weight problem. We built every aircraft before the A-12 and every one immediately after with conventional materials and none of them had any undue weight issues."
DeleteNobody would start out by designing an aircraft to be 30% overweight then work backwards to your goal. Perhaps McDonnel Douglas and General Dynamics underestimated the weight savings using composites, but they wouldn't have ignored it.
Unlike land-based aircraft, carrier aircraft need a much stronger airframe and landing gear (which usually means more weight) to handle the stress of take-off and landing. And, a flying wing usually has more internal volume than a traditional aircraft. These could have contributed to the weight issues.
"Nobody would start out by designing an aircraft to be 30% overweight then work backwards to your goal."
Delete????? Of course not. Had the designers not attempted to incorporate non-existent composites into the design, they would have designed the aircraft like any other aircraft and designed to a weight commensurate with the materials, missions, requirements, etc. - just as we did for the F-14, F-15, F-16, E-2, and every other aircraft. Weight would never have been a concern because the structural weights would have been known and accounted for. They would have structurally designed the aircraft like any other aircraft.
Regarding heavier structures for carrier aircraft, we've been designing such aircraft for decades from lightweight A-4 Skyhawks to heavy A-3 Skywarriors. There's no mystery here. The A-12 would have been just another aircraft.
I really have no idea what you're trying to argue about.
Composites weren't nonexistent back then. They weren't in wide use as they are today, and certainly not used for structural members, but composites for aerospace use go back to 1960's. Both the F-14 and F-15 used boron composite material in their horizontal stabilizers. The Space Shuttle used Reinforced Carbon-carbon (RCC) on the leading edge of its wings. Composites were used in many pressure vessels.
DeleteThe A-12 might have been the first time composites were used for major structural elements. I suspect weight was a critical requirement and that's why composites were used. And, given the engines were reported to be underpowered, weight might have been more of an issue than it normally would have been.
If building such an aircraft using conventional materials were easy as you say it would be, why didn't they go in that direction from the start? Why take the risk of using composites?
"If building such an aircraft using conventional materials were easy as you say it would be"
DeleteEvery aircraft we built at that time used conventional materials. Of course it was easy. It was the standard! What are you arguing about?
"If building such an aircraft using conventional materials were easy as you say it would be, why didn't they go in that direction from the start?"
Because they made a bad decision. Why did we choose to build electromagnetic elevators when we already had perfectly good conventional ones? Why did we choose to try to build the Zumwalt around a non-existent gun/rocket? Why did we decide to build 55 LCS before we even had a design? I can go on and on with these but the point is that we make a lot of stupid decisions in the quest to get the next magical, breakthrough technology.
Seriously, I have no idea what or why you're attempting to argue. Do you believe that an A-12 couldn't have been built, like every other aircraft, using conventional materials? Do you think the mere act of giving it the name "A-12" meant that it started with weight problems before the first napkin drawing was complete?
We built aircraft using conventional materials before and after the A-12 and none had insurmountable weight problems and yet you seem to think the A-12, alone, was doomed to have weight problems?
This is becoming pointless. Either explain your concern or we'll terminate this.
How can you say they made a made a bad decision to use composites? Neither of us know what the requirements were nor the design challenges they faced. I doubt this was a decision made lightly, but after a careful review of the requirements and what they could do to meet them.
DeleteI realize your assertion is based on the success of building other aircraft, but a flying wing is a different animal than a conventional fuselage and wing design. Empty, according to Wiki, the A-12 was more than 12,000 lbs heavier than the A-6 (39,000 lbs versus 26,660 lbs). So, I can see why the designers chose to save weight by using composites where they could.
In hindsight, perhaps the Navy should have built a few experimental aircraft first to work reduce the risks and improve the design.
"How can you say they made a made a bad decision to use composites?"
DeleteBecause they had never been used for that type of structural application before so, for practical purposes, THEY DIDN'T EXIST! You don't base a plane on non-existent structural materials. THAT'S how I can say they made a bad decision. It's not even debatable. It was an idiotic thing to do. Non-existent items need to stay in R&D until they're ready. Depending on non-existent items for your build would be as stupid as, say, building a ship that depends on non-existent modules for its function (oh, wait, we did that and it failed utterly).
You seem to think there's something inherently unachievable about building a flying wing. Of course, we built the B-2, the Germans built the Horten, we built the X-47, and so on.
"Empty, according to Wiki, the A-12 was more than 12,000 lbs heavier than the A-6 (39,000 lbs versus 26,660 lbs)."
And it was 5000 lbs LIGHTER than the F-14 which, somehow, managed to fly with all that weight!
I really have no idea what you're possibly objecting to and I've spent enough time on this.
If only you were there to set them straight.
DeleteYou say that sarcastically, I know, but consider if someone like me had been there at the start of the LCS, Zumwalt, F-35, Burke Flt III, Ford, minimal manning, Spruance class sinking, etc. as well as the A-12. Someone to say, stop, what you're about to do is stupid. How much better off would we be now? So, your statement, minus the sarcasm, is actually spot on.
DeleteIt's one thing to criticize a program as it unfolds and evolves, like the LCS and Zumwalt programs, which are, unfortunately, all too easy to criticize.
DeleteBut, to go back 30+ years and proclaim what should have been done, as if only you had the solution to their problems, is simply ridiculous. You weren't there, you don't know what the requirements were and what was driving them. Your solution is just speculation, which is fine as we're all entitled to our opinions.
By the way, none of us are perfect nor correct all the time.
"By the way, none of us are perfect nor correct all the time."
DeleteNo need to apologize for being wrong. I'm here to help you learn.
"as if only you had the solution to their problems"
Oh good grief! Anyone with an ounce of common sense could have told them not to design around non-existent technologies. However, just as the Navy ignored me and untold numbers of others about not designing the LCS, Ford, Zumwalt, etc. around non-existent technologies, the Navy also ignored whatever voices and common sense and tried to build the A-12 around non-existent technologies. To no one's surprise but the Navy's, it failed just as the LCS, Ford, Zumwalt, etc. have all failed. I and everyone with an ounce of common sense could, would, and probably did tell the Navy not to do what they did.
Ironically, you're incorrect about no one being correct all the time - ComNavOps is always right!
There's nothing further to be gained from this so let's move on.
Was very unaware of the A-12 program. If it had been developed properly, along with letting the F-14 continue to evolve and mature, it sounds like the airwings would have been much more capable today...
ReplyDeleteUnderstand, the Intruder was built to fly UNDER radars. Stealth was never going to be an issue with those. Also, I'd like to know the altitudes the stats use to calculate range. With defensive weapons being what they are, anti-shipping cruise missile swarms, advanced hypersonic weapons and whatnot, plus the fact that there is simply no hiding surface ships on the oceans anymore, perhaps NAVAIR's day is past us now. We don't have planes with range, no way to refuel them mid-air. We can't defend them. And so I begin to wonder if they're mainly a profit center? Sure, they're great for bloodying the nose of a defenseless Third World, but even then, carriers expensive, missiles cheap. Me thinks it would be wiser to build submarines.
ReplyDelete"Also, I'd like to know the altitudes the stats use to calculate range."
DeleteNobody knows.
"the fact that there is simply no hiding surface ships on the oceans anymore,"
Not only is this not a fact in evidence, there is substantial evidence that the statement is false. Evidence ranges from our Cold War experiences with the Soviets trying and often failing to find carrier groups to today's most advanced Burke class destroyers being unable to detect giant commercial vessels and, instead, colliding with them.
It's interesting that only the part of A6Nimitzguy's comment about surface ship detection is obviously false. Air refueling is still useful for long range bombers and extending other land-based aircrafts range to reach contested areas, but can't be done reliably in a contested airspace (unless and until a KB-2 or KB-21 actually gets made) to accomplish penetrating strikes with shorter range CV-based aviation, we lack air wings large enough (and the multi-CV battlegroup doctrine) to launch major strikes with (or without..) sufficient AAW/EW escorts, nor do we have another method of defending conventional strike aircraft in contested airspace. Stealth strike aircraft make up for these deficits, but at significantly higher cost for an equivalent payload compared to conventional aircraft or missiles. Stealth ISR has been discussed here before; CNOps, do you see ISR (and fleet defense) as the primary role for NAVAIR in the future?
Delete"CNOps, do you see ISR (and fleet defense) as the primary role for NAVAIR in the future?"
DeleteNo. I've posted on this in the past. Historically, carriers have provided the main strike capability and the carriers escorts existed to protect the strike asset, the carrier. Now, however, I see the Tomahawk (or its follow on successor) as the principal long range, penetrating strike capability. That capability resides on Burkes. Thus, I see Burkes as the primary naval strike asset which means the carrier now exists to escort the Burke shooters - a reversal of roles, in a sense!
The carrier's job is to escort and protect the Burke shooters, provide local air superiority for Air Force bomber strikes, and conduct long range air superiority operations.
Stealth ISR would be a nice capability but we currently have no such platform.
I wasn't clear, I recall that post and meant "fleet defense" to include all the roles for CV-based aircraft you describe, though that doesn't clearly include the role of supporting air force strikes and other operations by establishing local air superiority, which are also critical roles.
DeleteBased on this comment and the post you're referring to, you seem to (at least mostly) agree that the strike asset with the best combination of cost, range, payload, penetration, and other figures of merit are cruise missiles. There are many mobile targets on land and at sea that are worth striking from standoff range at the outset of a peer war, when the enemy's IADS and air force are still intact. Ballistic missile TELs, cruise missile TELs, SAM TELs, radar vehicles, EW vehicles, every PLAN warship that isn't docked, etc.
The importance of real-time targeting data for such mobile targets has come up before in the B-21 Hawkeye discussion. LRASM and other advanced cruise missiles are intended to have a significant built-in ISR and target acquisition/discrimination capability that could eliminate the need for an ISR aircraft operating in contested airspace, but these high-tech systems are likely to be about as prone to technical issues as the A-12 program was. If we want to actually strike mobile targets with our long-range cruise missiles - and we treat emerging technologies conservatively, as CNOps wisely does - then survivable ISR is more than a nice capability, it's a necessity. Whether or not the Navy will (or should) provide it for itself is another story. It may be superior for the Air Force to procure a "B-21 Hawkeye" style aircraft and operate it in support of joint operations, in which case the answer to my question is "no, the Air Force is better suited to do that".
"Stealth ISR would be a nice capability but we currently have no such platform."
We certainly don't have a carrier-based stealth ISR aircraft due to the scale-back of the UCLASS program to a pure jet fuel truck. More broadly, I'm not sure, it's classified.
A6Nimitzguy, perhaps you should look up an article on the internet called 'How To Hide a Task Force' which was written by a Mr. Andy Pico (I think). You will need to find a task force in order to sink it. And enemy attempts at detection can be dealt with both passively and (in wartime) actively. It seems to me that people talk of ISR assets as being invincible or invulnerable to anything, and that is just total BS!
DeleteThis post is old, but as an aviation enthusiast I thought I'd comment.
ReplyDeleteIt seems to be that one could build a very effective and CHEAP stealth bomber by doing the following:
Small Airframe
Large payloads are less important with PGMs, and obviously for a naval aircraft small is beautiful.
A small airframe reduces both production and maintenance costs.
It also reduces all signatures and thus increases survivability.
Major drawbacks other than previously mentioned payload are range and crew size (or comforts). Range can be somewhat mitigated by making your flying wing as "wet" as possible for a drastically high fuel fraction. Crew comfort for long missions is desirable, so ideally the airframe would be large enough to fit a crew capsule of the sort seen on the Russian Su-34 (crew of two can lay down and have access to a lavatory).
How small can you go?
https://www.hondajet.com/
Maybe you can produce a small flying wing bomber roughly the same size as the HondaJet. Yes, it has a completely different planform, but it's a twin-engine microjet which can fly seven people and their luggage 1200nm with 4,100 pounds of thrust. Perhaps a flying wing with the same engines could fly 1200nm with two crew members and ten small diameter bombs.
No Exotic Materials
Stealth shaping accounts for the first hundred fold in signature reduction in VLO aircraft. So exotic, expensive to maintain materials and coatings are chasing diminishing returns.
Instead, build the plane out of wood, fiberglass, carbon fiber, or some combination thereof. Paint it with charcoal & ferrite impregnated latex point. Done.
COTS Everything
Should easily be able to source commercial subsystems for every part of the aircraft in this size and performance class. Maybe you'd have to develop a new astrocompass, not the end of the world. And I suppose the bomb bays themselves would have to be developed.
NO RADAR
Radar is a heavy, expensive source of emissions which is not required for a stealth bomber aircraft. Excellent navigation systems mean that radar is not required to find targets or bomb them.
Terrain-following missions are not needed for such a small VLO aircraft and would be undesirable owing to the large penalty in fuel consumption.
Performance, or Lack Thereof
There is no need for such a bomber to have high performance. The only desirable performance characteristics are long range and high altitude. Both are well served by a flying wing planform, which ought to have a much higher lift-to-drag ratio than the B-2 in order to allow for higher altitude and more fuel capacity.
Cost?
Honestly, I don't see any reason this would need to cost more than $10m per copy. I believe a new HondaJet is $4.5 million.
"twin-engine microjet which can fly seven people and their luggage 1200nm "
DeleteI assume that's a one-way flight. For a combat aircraft, you have to go out and back which means your combat radius is half the range. So, the 1200nm range you contemplate is actually only a 600nm combat radius and that assumes straight line flight at optimum cruising altitude/speed. Combat flying (waypoints, evading radar, max power during engagement, etc.) would further reduce that radius.
For Pacific theater combat we need an aircraft with, ideally, a 1000+ nm combat radius.
The rest of your thoughts are good common sense ideas. Whether they're achievable is the question.
Good point and probably true. I had the HondaJet in mind simply because it's the smallest passenger jet manufactured today.
DeleteThe F-117 (which was offered to the Navy, which declined) had a price of $63 million in today's Dollars and could carry two 2,000 pound bombs 930nm at 594kn.
The F-117 had two GE F404 low-bypass turbofans (same engine as the classic Hornet), terrible aerodynamics, and was intended to operate in the transonic range.
The F-117 actually employed a number of my design ideas. Its subsystems largely came from existing aircraft (mainly the F-16), and amazingly its fuselage was largely made out of aluminum. Whatever you can say about the plane's ugly looks, it was clearly a major combat success (despite that legendary, highly-talented Serbian SAM operator).
For my suggested plane range and cost improvements should be achievable in this payload carrying class with a lower top speed, an aerodynamic high-lift flying wing planform, and using civilian high bypass turbofan engines.
Are my ideas achievable? The problem is political. What are the odds of the Navy, or any branch of the armed forces, promoting a manned combat aircraft with no radar that only costs $10m? Perhaps the Coast Guard should develop a mission to stealthily bomb drug traffickers in order to get this one approved...
My apologies for being late to the party, just found this blog and it has been some heavy reading! I wanted to comment on the A-12 specifically because my cousin got an appointment to the Naval Academy in '88 and graduated in '92. He worked hard to be one of the top 100 in his class and was able to get jets, and part of it stemmed from his desire to fly the Avenger. I remember him coming home for Thanksgiving Plebe Year with notebooks and drawings about the design, and he told me how excited all of the aviator hopefuls at school were , they all wanted either Tomcats or the Avenger.
ReplyDeleteWell, he did get jets, then a masters in aerospace engineering, became a Prowler guy for over a decade before going to Test Pilot School. After work as a test pilot and engineer on the Growler, he finished up his career as a Commander working on the new jammer pods. None of this makes me an expert, of course, but talking to him and hearing his stories fuels my enthusiasm, so I wanted to share.
I love "What If" scenarios involving my favorite planes, so I found this a great read. Have to mention about the engines, the F412 was a non-afterburning development of the Legacy Hornets' F404. The F404 was designed to be rugged, reliable, easy to maintain and efficient. GE also worked to make sure it was responsive to throttle inputs. It was not tuned for outright performance. I've no clue how much of that stuff would translate to a variant powering a stealth strike platform, but part of the reason for choosing the F412 was parts and maintenance commonality with the F/A-18s that were already replacing the A-7s onboard American carriers at the time.
You mention the PW F100 and TF30s, although I think you have the thrust figure for an afterburning TF30 quoted, as wiki shows a max thrust of 14,560 without the 'cans lit. I don't think you would want either of these PW engines in an A-12, because they are '60s tech, and unless some "magic" happens and you hit your original weight targets, I don't think you want GEF412s, either.
You want parts and maintenance commonality with the F-14B and -D variant Tomcats' F110 engines, so you want F118s, 19k lbs of thrust without reheat, as found in the B-2. Per wiki, it was first run in the '80s.
Also, to paraphrase Stephen Coonts' Jake Grafton character regarding a fictional ATA competitor in the spy novel The Minotaur: "Can you put a gun in it? There's a hundred thousand tanks against us and you can't shoot them all with million dollar missiles..."
I would try to find room for a Bushmaster or 3-barreled 20mm or something. Just because. Remove the AMRAAM bays, fill them with fuel, enlarge the main weapons bays if possible (enough space to maybe add a single AMRAAM and/or some SDBs), and of course, add lots of pylons for when firepower is desired over stealth, as mentioned.
It would be awesome if the A-12 had worked out. What if an A-12 variant had replaced the F-111, F-117 and F-15E in the USAF inventory, and increased F-22 production edged out subsequent F-15 and Viper variants? What if the A-12 precluded any need for the SuperBug in the Navy and we went with one of the badass F-14 developments (hopefully the most bonkers, Flanker-devouring one we can imagine)? What if America's frontline tactical jets were all F-22, A-12, F-14, F-16 and maybe a Legacy Hornet variant with stealthy intakes, and there is no need for the F-35?
Again, sorry for the late comment. Thanks for the fun reads!
Welcome aboard!
DeleteRegarding engines, Wiki lists the F-15E Strike Eagle with P&W F100 engines as having 14,000 lb dry thrust each and 24,000 lb afterburner each. (F-15E/P&W F100)
The larger point about engines is not which specific engine should have been chosen but that there many options using existing engines that could have provided more thrust than what was, apparently, spec'ed for the A-12. This is the 'existing' vs. 'non-existing' philosophy of aircraft and ship design, which is the main point of the post.
The one specification failing of the A-12 was the relatively small weapons payload and wasting some of it on A2A weapons was a questionable choice. However, as you suggest, there would have been plenty of room and opportunity to somewhat redesign the aircraft.
The only thing I would disagree with you on is the gun. I don't think you really want your top of the line, very expensive, stealth aircraft going down in the weeds and gun-dueling with tanks. That's a job for A-10s or artillery.
Nice background info about the engines. Thanks! I particularly like the note about throttle responsiveness which was one of the Tomcat's weaknesses.