The Navy – and most naval observers/commentators – are obsessed with modernization. If something isn’t the absolute latest and greatest technology then these people believe it’s automatically obsolete and must be replaced (the Navy’s view) or modernized (everyone else’s view). In fact, ships are intentionally designed to be modernized part way through their service lives. More to the point, ships are sold to Congress as ‘good value’ because they can be periodically upgraded and modernized and serve a full service life over three or four decades because modernization will keep the ship up to date and supremely effective.
Of course, the constantly repeated reality is that modernization almost never occurs and the vast majority of ships are retired early.
Let’s take a closer look at the very concept of modernization.
We all assume we know what modernization is, right? Sure, it’s the process of replacing older technology with newer, more effective ones. What could be more simple and what could be more desirable? I mean, it’s a no-brainer to modernize, right? Who would not want a better radar? Who would not want a faster computer? And, of course those better, faster items mean a more effective ship, right? Come on, this is obvious to the point of silliness … … … or is it?
When considering modernization, the point – the main point and the only relevant point – is whether the item under consideration can effectively do its job? If it can, it doesn’t need to be modernized. The fact that somewhere in the world there might be a piece of equipment that can do the job slightly better is irrelevant. Effective is good enough. Remember that saying, ‘perfect is the enemy of good (enough)’? That’s essentially what we’re talking about here. Modernization is the enemy of effective!
For example, the fact that the Ticonderoga’s radar can only identify a target and provide a fire control solution as opposed to the latest radar that can produce a 3D, holographic, full color image of the target is irrelevant. The task is to find and destroy. Everything else is just icing on the cake and, almost invariably, more expensive and unnecessary icing at that! If the Ticonderoga’s radar can see the target and provide a fire control solution, that’s all that’s needed. Anything more than that is just expensive waste that adds no value.
Modernization is only needed when the item under consideration is no longer effective.
Consider the WWII standard M1 carbine. It’s been replaced by the current M4 (I don’t follow land combat matters so maybe the M4 has already been replaced? Doesn’t matter) but is the M4 actually more effective than the M1? I strongly suspect not. Since 99% of all rifle rounds sent downrange are just sprayed in the general direction of the target, some slight gain in claimed accuracy at a thousand yards, or whatever, is irrelevant. The M1 can spray rounds just as well as the M4. Now, perhaps the M4 has other characteristics that make it more desirable like lower weight (nope, it’s heavier), or cheaper (nope!), or better reliability (doubt it), or easier maintenance (pretty sure not), or whatever, but those are peripheral characteristics and do not make the M4 more effective. Hey, as I said, I’m not a land combat guy and I’m not going to entertain a rile comparison discussion. I’m illustrating a point.
To repeat, combat effectiveness is the only reason for modernization. Note that there’s a huge difference between something that must be modernized because it can no longer do the job effectively and something that someone would like to modernize because there’s a slightly newer and slightly more effective version somewhere in the world.
The US military has an obsession with technology to the overall detriment of our military power and effectiveness. Consider the example of the Ford/Nimitz. The Nimitz design is perfectly capable and effective, as is. The Ford, despite all the upgrades/modernizations, offers zero additional combat effectiveness over the Nimitz and it does so at twice the price tag. The Ford was modernization for the sake of modernization not for the sake of enhanced combat effectiveness.
Returning to the Ticonderoga example, it offers yet another lesson in the Navy’s version of modernization. Why is the Ticonderoga modernization effort racking up higher than expected costs? According to Adm. Galinis (Vice Adm. Bill Galinis, commander of Naval Sea Systems Command),
“Number one is the amount of change that we have pushed into the availability, driven principally by, in some cases, the condition of the [hull, mechanical and electrical] plant, the hull in particular. So a lot more structural work than initially anticipated as we got into tanks in some cases that had not been opened for quite some time. Some additional work on the underwater hull portion, including the running gear – and again, in some cases, these ships had not been docked for an extended period of time … (1) [emphasis added]
Do you see the glaring fallacy in his statement? He basically just indicted Navy leadership over the last couple of decades! The problem isn’t modernization, it’s routine maintenance. He notes that tanks ‘had not been opened for quite some time’ and ‘ships had not been docked for an extended period of time’. Hey, admiral, that’s called routine maintenance and it should have been performed … well … routinely! If the tanks were being maintained routinely as the ship’s service plan specifies, there would be no problems with the tanks and you could move on to actual modernization items, if any. If you, Adm. Galinis, and the rest of Navy leadership had done your jobs, there wouldn’t be any problems. Every former CNO should be brought back to active service and court-martialed for dereliction of duty.
As demonstrated by the Ticonderoga example, most Navy modernization isn’t actually modernization, it’s an attempt to catch up on long deferred, routine maintenance. What actual required modernization is being done to the Ticonderogas? I’ve heard of almost none.
On a related note regarding the Ticonderogas, specifically, the Navy’s so-called modernization program for the Ticonderogas (1) was never intended to modernize the ships. It was just a ploy to get around Congress’ refusal to allow the Navy to retire the ships. Now, CNO Gilday is claiming the Ticonderogas MUST be retired because they’re too expensive to modernize. Well, they never needed to be modernized, in the first place! Sure, you could swap out a newer computer, if you want but the basic ‘find and destroy’ function worked as effectively as ever.
We see, then, that modernization is the huckster salesman’s fraudulent claim that allows the Navy to sell oversized, overpriced ships to Congress. Modernization almost never happens and most of what is purported to be modernization is actually just routine maintenance, most of which has been deferred far beyond acceptable limits. Modernization is a myth and, since it almost never happens and ships are almost always retired early, doesn’t this pretty much demand that the intelligent navy design ships for a limited 20 year service life or less?
________________________________
(1)USNI News website, “Navy ‘Struggling’ to Modernize Aging Cruiser Fleet As Tight Budgets Push Pentagon to Shed Legacy Platforms”, Megan Eckstein, 5-Apr-2021,
"The Ford, despite all the upgrades/modernizations, offers zero additional combat effectiveness over the Nimitz "
ReplyDeleteUnlike steam ejection which supply fixed ejection force, the electromagnetic ejection pioneered by USS Ford can adjust ejection force (adjust electricity supplied). The steam ejection utilizes steam expansion thus force is not adjustable, at least current US system cannot adjust.
Adjustable ejection force allows USS Ford to launch drones which are usually lighter than other jets on board.
The US Navy does not operate any drones requiring catapult launches and almost certainly never will. Thus, the Ford offers zero improvement in combat effectiveness over the Nimitz.
Delete"Your example is not a good one."
ReplyDeleteI said I wasn't going to entertain rifle debates.
For future consideration of a like-minded analogy, I would suggest you use the modern JLTV vs the Hummvee. Both vehicles are large jeeps, but the modern late 2010s JLTV is by far too much jeep versus the 1980s Hummvee - it better fits the illustration you meant to paint.
DeleteI understand what you were trying to say with this analogy, but your choice of illustration could have been better. Unfortunately, I don't think you can un-ring this bell.
"I understand what you were trying to say with this analogy, but your choice of illustration could have been better."
DeleteI'm not going to entertain a rifle debate but since that's not what you're doing and since you offered a reasoned comment, I'll give you a response.
The analogy was okay but, clearly, the explanation was not good enough. A rifle, AS COMMONLY USED IN COMBAT, is intended to spray rounds downrange in a suppressive fire pattern. Very little actual aiming at a specific target occurs. With that use in mind, the post-M1 rifles offered little or no improvement in combat effectiveness. That was the analogy and that was what did not, apparently come across well enough although going back and re-reading, it seems clear enough to me.
That a replacement/modernized rifle is more accurate at a thousand yards or whatever other claim is made, is irrelevant BECAUSE THAT'S NOT HOW THE RIFLE IS USED IN COMBAT. For those few snipers who do fire carefully aimed shots then, sure, a better rifle than the M1 is warranted but that was true even during WWII.
"A rifle, AS COMMONLY USED IN COMBAT, is intended to spray rounds downrange in a suppressive fire pattern. Very little actual aiming at a specific target occurs. With that use in mind, the post-M1 rifles offered little or no improvement in combat effectiveness."
DeleteWithin the parameters you've laid above, your premise fits for the sake of your illustration. However, as an overall take on rifle doctrine; it's incomplete and missing certain nuance that you're perhaps unaware of, since, as you said, land combat is not your area of expertise. That's what's causing all these comments you're getting, telling you how you've gotten it wrong (not helped by how the M4 is a more lethal weapon versus M1 carbine).
I wouldn't mind discussing further the doctrinal usage of rifles in a rifle squad and evaluating both weapons and their pros and cons in that context, but that would be getting into a debate about rifles and their roles and usage, which, as you've said, is not something you want to do.
On the other hand, perhaps having that discussion comment might serve as a tarpit to preempt all the comments you're getting? Commenters read that one thought provoking statement, get riled up all ready to post, and then they see they've been beaten to the punch. :P
"(I don’t follow land combat matters so maybe the M4 has already been replaced?)"
DeleteThe M4 will likely never be replaced; the Army has been trying to replace it for the last 20 years but all efforts have failed because none of the offerings available from industry are a large enough improvement over the M4 to justify the costs involved in a complete inventory changeover.
As an aside, the SOPMOD Block 2 upgrade program for the M4 carbine is, in my opinion, an example of a modernisation program done right. The key features were shifting to a freefloated DD RIS rail, a more accurate barrel and more durable barrel, PEQ-15 laser, and move to the Elcan Specter optic. This results in a rifle that has now significantly improved its accuraccy, going from 4 MOA to 2 MOA, while being in a robust, tough package (durability and strength was a priority for SOCOM, which accepted tradeoffs in increased weight and less ). That said, there's a reason these upgrades haven't really propagated army-wise: the average soldier doesn't shoot well enough to exploit the inceased capability and combat effectiveness, which is why this program stays within SOCOM.
Edit: (durability and strength was a priority for SOCOM, which accepted tradeoffs in increased weight and a rifle that was not the most accurate it could have been.)
Delete(1/2)
DeleteAlright, I'll avoid a comparison of weapons and just discuss the concept of suppression in abstract then.
"Very little aiming at a specific target occurs"
To veer to this tangent for a moment, I think you've confused certain MG-specific tactics with suppression. In searching fire, you're shooting at an area, with the intent being to discover a hidden enemy enemy by provoking him into returning fire at you, or forcing him to unmask himself from concealment to reposition and take cover. In suppression, the machinegunner is still aiming at a target; though as he is likely to be firing a more powerful round than the squad's rifles*, his definition of target is a little wider. As a GPMG gunner friend opined: "Cover from the rifle is concealment from the GPMG. The rifleman has to shoot at the enemy soldier when he pops out of cover; I just shoot him and his cover."
*This applies for the forces which doctrinally use a general purpose machinegun, such as the FN MAG/M240 or PKM, as the squad machinegun; this is less applicable for forces that use a light machinegun such as the M249, firing the same round as the squad's rifles.
Coming back to the topic of suppression, let us assume first that we are fighting serious opposition: the true believer, be he jihadi insurgent, Russian soldier, or the PLA soldier. The true believer is not suppressed by noise, but by being directly threatened with fire.
To suppress this determined and motivated enemy, you must threaten him. That means accurate aimed fire with an intent to kill. You don't suppress a determined man by dumping 30 rounds 3 feet away from him; you suppress him with one round that hits right in front of him. And then another, and another, and another, forcing him to keep his head down - because he knows that if he sticks his head out, he dies. That's how a rifle squad fixes an enemy squad in place for supporting fires (mortars, artillery, CAS, gunship, tank, IFV, etc) to kill the enemy - or to allow a leapfrogging rifle squad to flank and close with the enemy.
The usage of the assault rifle is in the name: assault. It is employed by the rifle squad in the assault to allow them to close with the enemy by fire and maneuver, and kill the enemy. Suppressive fire is one of the ways a rifle may be used, augmenting the squad's machineguns that form the base of fire, but even then, for that suppressive fire to be effective, the rifle needs to be accurate enough, it must fire a round lethal enough, it must represent a threat that forces the enemy to respect it and take cover, it must have sufficient range that the squad can return fire at the enemy.** As The Eagle Went Over the Mountain noted, the enemy is not suppressed by noise or unaimed fire, a point reinforced in this reflection by former Special Forces soldiers ( https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VxDtKHe21-g ). Or as a Sergeant I knew once told me: "To effectively suppress, you need to aim to kill."
You don't need to choose between volume of fire and accuraccy of fire when you can have both. And consider even the squad automatic weapon: be it an LMG or GPMG, it's used to form the base of fire, delivering a higher volume of fire than the squad rifle. And yet machinegunners are taught to fire in short bursts of 5-10 rounds, with pauses in between firing for cooling and fire control (i.e., being told what to shoot at).
(2/2)
Delete**This is one of the factors driving the Army's Next Generation Squad Weapon program and the proposed adoption of the heavier, more powerful 6.8mm round: overmatch against enemy body armor at 600 meters, beyond the effective range of the M4 carbine. Many American patrols in Afghanistan were attacked by Taliban insurgents using long-range weapons (RPG, recoilless rifle, SVD sniper rifles, PKM GPMGs), which allowed them to attack with impunity, safe from attack (requiring engagement with supporting fires or the weapons squad's GPMG). If you were to do further reading on the program, I believe you would conclude that the rifle component (NGSW-R), is a better example of modernisation that does not improve on combat effectiveness (and potentially counterintuitively _reduces_ combat effectiveness vs the M4 carbine).
On the other hand, NGSW-AR, the machinegun component, is a very promising effort to get GPMG firepower into a platform half the weight of the legacy M240 and lighter ammunition, allowing machinegunners to carry the same firepower in a lighter load, or more ammunition for the same weight. If I were to try and relate things in naval terms, NGSW-AR would be akin to a 5" gun that performs as well as 6" in a lighter footprint, while NGSW-R is trying to fit that same 5" into the profile and footprint of 3". (This is a pretty bad analogy, but explaining the problems with the NGSW program will take a very long time - problems that have come from trying to force a machinegun program to also birth a carbine.)
"ballistics of the ammunition"
ReplyDeleteI said I wasn't going to entertain rifle debates.
"The Ford, despite all the upgrades/modernizations, offers zero additional combat effectiveness over the Nimitz "
ReplyDeleteWell, in fairness to the Ford, which probably due to gross mismanagement does not deserve it, there are at least two things that actually ARE needed improvements:
(1) Electrical generating capacity - the Nimitz cannot supply enough electrical power to supply equipment expected to be added during a new ship's service life
(2) Stability. Obviously, ships need to be stable at sea. Even in combat. So they are designed with limits on displacement and center of gravity (especially weight high in the ship) so that they meet stability requirements. And the design typically includes margins so that additional equipment can be added during the ship's service life. But remember that the Nimitz design is now 50 years old. Those margins are largely used up so that a new Nimitz may not be able to accommodate needed new equipment in the future. A 2005 Rand Corp report stated “with modernizations undertaken over the years, the ships’ weight has increased and their center of gravity has risen (i.e., worsened) to the point where further increases in topside weight are unacceptable.”
Could these gains have been achieved with a more incremental upgrade to the Nimitz design? Perhaps. I'm not a naval architect so I have no idea. But they were needed.
Do not confuse a new ship design and construction program with modernization. Modernization is a process applied to an existing ship.
DeleteThe Ford ?needed? more power generation ONLY because it was given equipment that consumed more power. That equipment conferred NO IMPROVEMENT in combat effectiveness over the Nimitz. The power issue was a self-fulfilling prophecy, in a sense.
I am unaware of any critical stability issue with the Nimitz class. Weight margins get consumed in the normal course of a ship's life but true modernization generally does not significantly increase weight. In fact, in many cases, modernization reduces weight. Newer electronics, for example, are invariably smaller and lighter than their older versions.
If a ship has outgrown its weight margins and center of gravity, that's a design issue and might well trigger a new design/class but it is not a modernization issue.
Of course I will concede that I haven't actually read the RAND study. The quote from it came from another article.
DeleteRegarding the power capacity of the Ford, obviously the electric catapult takes a lot of electricity, but I think there was also a concern that, in the future, other power intensive things like directed energy weapons might need to be added.
Delete"Dude, don't lecture me"
DeleteComment deleted. Respect is mandatory for comments.
"other power intensive things like directed energy weapons might need to be added."
DeleteTHAT WAS EXACTLY THE POINT OF THE POST, that 'future' modernizations almost never happen! If, and when, a new piece of miraculous, breakthrough technology becomes available, the Navy invariably claims that existing ships are too old and would cost too much to modernize and they early retire the existing ships and go to Congress for more money to build new ships. History assures us of this with near 100% certainty.
Re stability: Consider this link:
Deletehttps://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/91342/49898754-MIT.pdf?sequence=2
It is a thesis at MIT on displacement vs strength issues for the Nimitz class. On page 6, it includes a table showing the displacement at delivery and displacement in 2001 (when the thesis was written) for the first 8 Nimitz class carriers. Each one had grown in displacement by several thousand tons. For example, USS Nimitz weighed 93,282 long tons at delivery and (estimated) 101,080 tons in 2001. Or an increase of over 7000 tons. I'm not sure what they added over those years, but it wasn't trivial.
I don't think it's unreasonable to assume that growth might continue in the future.
Would be interesting to know what caused so much weight gain on the last Nimitz class carriers? Fuel? Weapons? Or just better Habitability? My guess it's the latter....
Delete"I don't think it's unreasonable to assume that growth might continue in the future."
DeleteWeight gain is a given over a ship's life! That has nothing to do with modernization.
That aside, the thesis makes a fascinating statement:
"... present methods of determining the limiting displacement for strength are very conservative and that, indeed, a significant amount of weight may be added to the hull and still not exceed the bending moment capacity of this hull."
"...in the future, other power intensive things like directed energy weapons might need to be added."
DeleteWhile designing in excess capacity is reasonable, Ive heard this cited often for the Fords. Question is, are those weapons really anywhere close to functional reality?? We have whole ships, weapons, and sensor systems built expressly to defend the carriers. So why would we expend significant effort and expense for these non-existent weapons on them?? If we truly believed the carriers needed lots of self defense capability, Id think that the Nimitzes would have CIWS/RAM covering every free piece of horizontal space, like the 20 and 40mm guns on Essexes during WWII.
And to be honest, with our defensive systems largely unproven, that doesnt seem like a bad idea. Having 4-10 CIWS/RAM per ship depending on class/size seems like a reasonable, relatively cheap, and easilly accomplished upgrade...
That aside, the thesis makes a fascinating statement:
Delete"... present methods of determining the limiting displacement for strength are very conservative and that, indeed, a significant amount of weight may be added to the hull and still not exceed the bending moment capacity of this hull."
Be a little careful here. The thesis also says that this analysis looks ONLY at the hull girder strength, even though there are many other factors involved in displacement limits:
"It should be noted that numerous other limitations such as
speed requirements, Side Protection System Immersion, nuclear propulsion, and trim
requirements may limit the future growth displacement. The focus of this investigation is squarely on hull girder bending moment limits. No other limitations are addressed in this
study"
Addressing Anonymous above: The FORD can't even launch the Navy's newest fighter, the F-35c, with out upgrades...And it isn't even in service yet.
ReplyDeleteI seems to me that the Navy is betting on too many "IF"s.
The FORD would be better than the NIMITZ class IF everything worked properly.
The LCS would be useful IF the mission modules were developed....and worked.
The ZUMWALTs would be effective in there designed role IF they had their gun system and it worked.
It also seems to me that the TICOs were denied routine mechanical maintenance in order for them to be decommissioned before their time.
But it has ever been thus. The Major Caliber Lightweight Gun, designed to let destroyers have an 8 inch gun that threw a 260 pound (118kg) projectile approximately 17 miles versus a 70 pound projectile 15 miles, was canceled because the Navy decided it wouldn't be any more effective than a 5 inch gun firing hypothetical (and never realized) rocket assisted projectiles. How they determined that given the projectiles were hypothetical, I do not know.
DeleteThis was an epic oops by the Navy, and I still think reviving the project, and getting that major caliber back to sea is a worthwhile idea!!!
DeleteGoogle built its empire using 'low grade' hard drives in its server farms instead of the industry accepted 'Enterprise' hard drives.
ReplyDeleteGood enough is good enough: the trick is identifying priorities and matching solutions.
From a maintenance point of view, do I really want 20 different versions of Aegis s/w and hardware ?
ReplyDeleteDo the trainers have knowledge to teach the differences in performance between different generations of equipment ?
Or is that one of the reasons that contractors have to maintain Aegis ?
"20 different versions of Aegis s/w and hardware ?"
DeleteThat's not a modernization issue, that's a version management and standardization issue.
If a new version of software comes out that significantly improves effectiveness then that might be a legitimate modernization candidate but simply spewing dozens of different versions across the fleet on a haphazard basis is not modernization, it's poor management.
"From a maintenance point of view, do I really want 20 different versions of Aegis s/w and hardware ?"
DeleteMaybe depending on how fast you can roll the updates to everyone and what the hardware can support.
Sorry 20 different versions should not worry a navy if they are spending on time and crew and training.
I am sitting in front a Windows 10 professional workstation typing this. The 3 node PS2 cluster behind me runs Yellow Dog Linux. A little farther in front of me I have old tower that running Suse and and a sun workstation to do overflow work for the spouse running statistical programs. Add in the rest of the the family who has annoying but manageable different Widows home versions ... that is five and seeing as they tend put off upgrades endlessly more like over technicality more. Also I have A virtual machines running of of all things windows 95 and MAC OS just because I have the occasional job online supporting them And that is not even addressing hardware. Also lame IT/programmer ! I still practice FORTRAN
What corporate IT person who still has a job does not have 20 different versions of software and hardware to be maintained? Either they are well trained and have the time and resources to stay that way or your system is betraying the meat ware.
I think I am ranting a bit. But I would expect no capital thing like a ship designed for some 3 decades or more of life to be static. What I would expect is that the navy can in spend the money to find and train individuals who can deal with legacy technology and whatever the latest and greatest is that is being being plugged in.
You go to war with the navy you have, not the navy you want. If we can't figure out how to make the ships we have work, decommissioning them for ships we aren't building will leave us with no actual navy to conduct operations. And if we keep reducing the number of armaments per vessel, we won't be able to conduct any offensive operations at all. Using your rifle analogy, we didn't remove the M1 rifle before we had M16's to issue in anticipation of the rifle being developed. If we don't prioritize warfighting and firepower, along with maintenance, we are lost.
ReplyDeleteA common sense reminder. Well said!
DeleteGood comment, sir.
DeleteOld reserve XO/NAV
"That which is old is not broken"
ReplyDeleteIn medicine, we still use ECG's (electrocardiogram), even though they've been in clinical practice since about 1909, and we now have hand-held echocardiograms. ECG's are fast, cheap, portable and well-enough understood to still be very useful, in conjunction with other tools. We have electronic stethoscopes with computer analysis, but old-school acoustic stethoscopes that work the same way they did 200 years ago, are still widely-used because they are good enough to do the job.
And there's nothing stopping us from using both new and old. When something is cheap and quick enough, you can add it to the mix of tools easily.
From my limited understanding, a WW2-era paved airfield might still function for modern planes, with longer runways (and perhaps less tolerance for irregular surfaces). If our floating airfields (ie carriers) still work, there is no absolute need to replace them.
Modernisation needs to be judged against the enemies' capabilities. In medicine our enemies (disease and indifference I have always said) perhaps change less than in warfare. However, the US Navy's enemies seem years away from fielding highly stealthy aircraft, and planes still maneuver within a fixed set of parameters. If a radar can track a target, it still works, just like an ECG.
One thing that has changed is ECM, as CNO has stated. While there should be secrecy about ECM, I am concerned that the lack of information is more due to lack of interest than deliberate secrecy.
There is a historical analogy. Pre-WW2 the UK faced what they believed to be a threat to national existence, strategic air attack. They made a number of preparations, including radar. While Germany had better radar technology at the time, Germany did not develop an understanding of how the UK used it, and under-estimated the UK's capabilities. They did remarkably little to pursue relatively cheap counter-measures, which could have substantially altered the loss ratio in the Battle of Britain, even if it did not change the final outcome.
Germany had very modern aircraft for the time, but they were defeated by inferior aircraft used as part of a system for home defence. As much as it pains me to admit, the Hurricane was a simpler design than the Me109, and did most of the air fighting during the Battle of Britain. Crucially, the Hurricane being a simpler design was a deliberate choice. It was replaced later when it was logical to do so.
Looking back it remains remarkable just how careful the UK pre-war air defence preparation was, compared to other aspects of the democracies' preparations for WW2. The UK made their modernisation choices very carefully, calculating out their own and their enemy's expected production and actions to the best of their ability. They deliberately put a lot of effort into a more basic design, the Hurricane. Not only could it be in service quicker and be produced more cheaply, they knew that it was also cheaper to repair and maintain. This was also factored in.
I worry that the US Navy's modernisation choices are not so carefully made.
Modernization and good enough, let's use iPhone as an example.
ReplyDeleteAn old veteran who uses it for phone calls, there is little need for him to buy a new iPhone every year.
A youngster who uses it to play latest 3D games, he needs to buy latest iPhone as old ones may give him many gliches.
Back to navy, if your potential threats lag far behind you, current weapons are good enough.
If they have new toys making your proud outdated, you have to follow.
How did Soviet Union bankrupt itself?
"How did Soviet Union bankrupt itself?"
DeleteIt didn't. That's largely a myth that has arisen. Gorbachev's political decisions led to independence movements that rapidly escalated and led to revolt. Underlying that was, indeed, a fundamentally flawed economic system and severe trade problems. How's that for summarizing some of the most momentous events in human history in one or two sentences?
Soviet Union's huge military spending beyond her domestic economy can support contribute heavily.
DeleteThis may be a distract from my original view - an old iPhone is good enough for an old person who only uses it to make phone calls; it is not acceptable for a youngster addicts in latest 3D games. He needs to buy new iPhones frequently to play new games without glitch.
This applies to Navy on modernization.
Read up on the collapse of the Soviet Union. For example, see this article, "Soviet Union Collapse"
DeleteMilitary spending was a minor factor, if even that.
I recently finished 50 Years in the Royal Navy, where the author explains how hard it was to be in a 1880s navy where gunnery was so ill regarded that headquarters would deliberately block any innovations in aiming and rangefinding gear, and ships would actually sell their practice powder and dump their shells, and use the money for new bedding and paint, which is what ship captains and XOs were judged on.
ReplyDeleteIt felt like the current US navy, except COs are judged solely on underway time. No painting needed, no systems working, just time away from the pier.
Do that, no sex with crew, and don't throw your coffee mugs at jr Os too many times, and O7 can be yours.
"Problem with the M1 carbine"
ReplyDeleteI said I wasn't going to entertain rifle debates.
"Modernization is only needed when the item under consideration is no longer effective"
ReplyDeleteA case in question is with the all new SEWIP Block 3/V7 to fitted to the single Burke in the proposed FY2022 Navy budget, its costed at $73 million four times the cost of the SEWIP Block 2/V6 for the two Burkes funded in FY2021.
Expect new SEWIP Block 3/V7 first production model to be expensive and in future costs will decrease to a degree but still looks to be substantially more expensive than Block 2/V6, my impression is that with its all new tech AESA GaN antennas etc, it will bring a substantial increase in ESM and EA capabilities for ship protection over the older generations of SEWIP with its spoofing/jamming giving much improved soft-kill of anti-ship missiles - if it lives up to its claims:)
How do you make that judgement as to whether or not to make that expensive choice to retrofit/modernize older ships, you could even say it becomes a necessary expense if you are keeping ships in service for 35 to 50 years. It will depend on what Navy criteria/educated guess make as to the current/future threat and whether or not the older kit will be still effective against current anti-ship missiles let alone future missiles eg the Mach 2.8 BrahMos and the ~ Mach 4+ Kh-22/32, would you retrofit/modernize the CVN's or Ticos or only the Burkes and if you do might be a possibility as rumored in the Falklands that a frigate spoofed the targeted Exocets locked on that they then diverted and locked onto the nearest ship and hit the freighter it was escorting.
"SEWIP Block 3"
DeleteYou may be misunderstanding the SEWIP program. SEWIP Block 3 is not just a little better than Blk 2 which, in turn, was a little better than Blk 1. The SEWIP program divided the capabilities into 3 separate versions (4 actually; there's a Blk 4 planned). I don't have the exact descriptions in front of me but it was something along the lines of Blk 1 provided software and hardware upgrades, Blk 2 provided enhanced detection and classification previously unavailable, and Blk 3 provided an active jamming capability that was previously not available. Thus, each Block added NEW capabilities, not just slight improvements on the old. So, these were not upgrades, they were new capabilities at each step.
So, it's not a case of trying to decide whether the next block provided enough of an improvement over the old - it was a case of adding new capabilities. It was planned to add all three (four) blocks right from the start although not every ship was planned to get every new block.
One of the misconceptions many people have about the original SLQ-32 is that it was a jammer/ECM of some sort. It was not. It was purely a detection/warning device and had no actual defensive capability. The SEWIP program was the attempt to upgrade the detection capabilities, add new detection/warning, and provide the first ECM/jamming capability.
Here's the post on the SEWIP program that lists the Blocks and their capabilities: "SEWIP"
I'm sure your correct though don't think SEWIP Blocks 2 (Lockheed) and 3 (Northrop Grumman) share a single nut or bolt, antennas totally different, may be using some element of Block 2 software, don't know the answer?
DeleteQuestion is should the Navy be funding modernization of its fleet with the SEWIP Block 3 with its active jamming capability and if so is the 50 ships planned for its installation identified in the FY18 budget plan too few in number?
Trick with all the SEWIP versions is there is very little public detail aside from price and general function. No weights, power requirement, dimensions. Northrop Grumman makes it sound like Block III could be used as a search radar, perhaps as the main radar for a smaller combatant. Even that isn't very clear.
Delete" Northrop Grumman makes it sound like Block III could be used as a search radar"
DeleteI've seen those claims and they appear to be the type of thing that is technically true but realistically and practically ridiculous. The system's transmitters are software defined so, theoretically, the emitted waveforms can be manipulated to provide communications, jamming, radar sensing, or whatever. However, the transmitters are very small compared to a dedicated radar and would likely provide only very short range, limited capability sensing and would, presumably, eliminate the EW functions to do so. So … technically true but not realistic.
As you note, Block 3 power requirements are unknown but are, presumably, much less than the power requirements for a full size radar which, again, means much less range and capability if used in a radar configuration.
As we've seen repeatedly, manufacturer's claims have to be cut in half, as a starting point, and then whittled down from there as development and testing proceed!
If the Chinese did manage to infiltrate our Navy ship building decision making community.....what would they do different to our current practice?
ReplyDeleteNothing.
DeleteIt seems to me that part of the problem is that the Navy has spent the last 20+ years and tens of billions on two classes of warships that are marginally capable of combat against a peer enemy. And, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan haven't helped either. Both wars have sapped money that could have been better spent.
ReplyDeleteThe problem is that the navy is trying to use concurrency. Had they built the modules before they they built the ships, they would have known that the ASW module was to heavy and the MCM was not ready for prime time. Building LCS-1 and LCS-2 and running them for 5 years would have told them that you had to have a bigger crew and why. The adjustment would have allowed the navy to build a good LCS type ship had the need still been there.
ReplyDeleteThe navy needs to start on the Constellation class replacement now! They should build one (or two competing) ship(s), and run it(them) hard for 2-4 years to work out the bugs. Then, when the Constellation run is finished, they have a successful design ready to build. This was done with aircraft during the cold war.
@ComNavOps:
ReplyDeleteI found it a little amusing you mentioned the M4 carbine, because this is one of the few times when the US government is paying LESS than a COTS buy. The average retail price of an M4 on the civilian market is 1000 USD - that is, a rifle built to the requisite military specification and tolerances by a reputable manufacturer* (Colt, FN, BCM, DD, LMT). In the recent contract awarded to FN last year, the Government is paying some 730 USD per weapon (although it's also buying over 167,500 carbines, so economies of scale count for something).
It does seem to me though that higher cost in dollars and weight is always the price you have to pay for increased capability. I think of WW1 to WW2 with the growth in size and armament of warships, and how the Fletcher-class DDs, the American workhorses, would have been considered turn of the century light cruisers...